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Abstract 
Given a) the recent increases in the volume of aid for scaling up health interventions, 
b) the introduction of new aid modalities, and c) the growing interest to move towards 
a more results-oriented approach to deliver aid, this research seeks to better 
understand the relationship between Government and donors by assessing: 
- The nature of the incentive structures embedded in the new aid mechanisms and 
how they are structured by the monitoring and compensation schemes (penalties 
and rewards); 
- The motives (objective functions) of the organisations and individuals and how 
those shed light on the behaviours of the parties in the aid environment in 
Uganda; 
- The appropriateness of thinking embedded in economics, particularly the agency 
theory framework when applied to understand the aid contract. 
This investigation made use of qualitative methods (interviews, participant observation 
and documentary analysis) and a case-study approach. 
Key findings were: 
- Monitoring capacity and ability to assess performance was weak; 
- There was a lack of high level commitment towards improvement of monitoring 
from Government and donors; 
- Performance assessment was based on a subjective system and presented 
inefficiencies, which allowed for the distortion of the compensation scheme as 
penalties and rewards failed to be applied by donors vis-ä-vis the Government; 
- There were inter- and intra-organisational conflicting goals. Comparing stated 
and revealed motives, I found that there was less commitment towards health 
systems development by Government and aid effectiveness by donors than 
asserted by the parties. 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by providing an in-depth understanding of the 
relationship between Government and donors in a country-specific setting. It shows 
that agency theory is a useful framework to analyse the motives of the parties as well 
as the incentive structures embedded in the aid contract (albeit with some limitations). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The role of Government is central for the functioning of health systems. In the context 
of low-income countries, other stakeholders, in particular development partners2 
(DPs), also play a crucial role in assisting governments with the financing and delivery 
of health services. Both actors, recipient governments (RGs) and donors, face 
immense challenges in their goals of improving the performance of existing health 
systems, in terms of efficiency, quality of care and equity. 
This chapter sets the scene to both the aid debate in the health sector and the country 
studied, Uganda. Its particular concern is to present the overall changes in recent 
years in the area of development aid, which has been subject to greater focus, but 
also in the health sector and in Uganda. 
Changes taking place in the aid environment reflect donors increasing concern with 
the effectiveness of aid (Adam and Gunning, 2002; Lavergne, 2002; Hecht and Shah, 
2006; de Renzio, 2006). This is of even greater relevance given increased aid 
volumes (scaling up of aid) in recent years. For instance, the volume of International 
Development Assistance (IDA) to the health sector more than doubled in the past five 
years (World Bank, 2007). Pledges of more funds have been made internationally, 
such as during the meeting of the G8 countries in Gleneagles in -2005 (Collier, 2007; 
Riddell, 2007). 
These changes have also been reflected in the way aid has been delivered at country 
level. New aid modalities have been introduced which co-exist with older ones. How 
these changes are impacting on the performance of specific sectors such as health is 
of concern, particularly in countries that have high levels of aid dependency. Uganda 
is an interesting case study as it is been at the vanguard of many of the new 
instruments and approaches introduced recently [e. g. the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) and the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp)]. 
The above issues signal the need for further investigation into how, the aid relationship 
between RGs and DPs in the health sector is operating at countrylevel., 
2 Or donors - these terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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This chapter is structured as follows: the next section describes the general context of 
aid effectiveness and then gives an introduction to aid reforms in Uganda. Section 1.3 
provides the study's scope, aims, objectives and the structure of this thesis. 
1.2 Background and rationale for this thesis 
1.2.1 General context of aid effectiveness 
Recent developments within the international aid architecture 
More commonly in the past, projects were used to channel aid resources to a specific 
sector and/or programme of interest. In pursuing the goal of greater aid effectiveness, 
donors have introduced novel arrangements and approaches from around the late 
1990s and early 2000s. These include the new aid modalities of General Budget 
Support (GBS) where funds are channelled to Government budgets (general or 
earmarked for specific purposes such as poverty alleviation interventions) and Sector 
Wide Approach where funds are pooled to support a sector (Hecht and Shah, 2006; 
de Renzio, 2006) (see below). 
Yet, donors continued to use projects as a mode of aid delivery and calls ensued for 
greater harmonisation among donors of their activities as well alignment of their 
practices with those of RGs. For instance, in the Paris Declaration of the High Level 
Forum a number of commitments were agreed on aid effectiveness which aimed at 
shifting the behaviour of the agencies and highlighted the importance of ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability (High Level Forum, 2005). 
Part of the changes in the international aid environment was a paradigm shift from a 
focus on longer term economic development towards a greater focus on poverty 
reduction (Riddell, 2007). Poverty reduction was adopted as the centre piece of the 
aid policies of various bilateral and multilateral agencies (e. g. DFID, 1997; World 
Bank, 2001). This shift signalled a move away from a more equity-oriented and 
comprehensive approach of human and economic development towards a narrower 
approach focusing on the alleviation of poverty within a range of other problems that 
could be tackled, such as environmental protection. The fact that poverty is the most 
.1 
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basic development problem may underlie the consensus among the international 
agencies to concentrate efforts on poverty alleviation (Thomas, 2000). 
In line with the new approach of poverty reduction, novel instruments of aid were 
introduced, which included, for instance, the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks 
(MTEFs) and the PRSPs (Maxwell, 2003). The purpose of MTEFs is to shape the 
budgeting process according to a country's medium term priorities as opposed to 
historical trends. PRSPs were set up in the context of the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) agreement and are based on the principles of country ownership, 
participatory process, conditionality for donors, and dynamic evolution over time (as 
opposed to a static plan) (ibid. ). 
The growing concern for aid effectiveness seems to have also been permeated by 
changes regarding the functioning of government and the introduction of ideas from 
the New Public Management (NPM) debate. The NPM debate advocates a clearer 
causal link between inputs and outputs and encourages the use of performance- 
related agreements, among other changes (Kaul, 1997). The instruments and 
measures of monitoring in the public sector have shifted their focus from inputs 
(mainly financial and human resources) and processes to outcomes (for instance the 
variation in literacy rates) (Paul, 1992). This shift is mirrored in changes in IDA by 
means of a commitment to Results-Oriented Management3 (ROM) and the focus on 
international targets, to a large extent based on outcomes, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) as well as alternative delivery mechanisms more closely 
related to budget support than to the project approach (Maxwell, 2003). The MDGs 
are indeed a clear example of this shift. They are the result of an international 
consensus to reduce poverty and were chosen and agreed by all member countries of 
the United Nations in 2000. 
In addition to the above, development partners and RGs turned their attention to other 
approaches, architectural forms and channels of aid in the health sector. For instance, 
new global health initiatives (GHIs) were launched. These can be differentiated 
between those focusing on advocacy, such as Roll Back Malaria and Stop TB, and 
those operating as funding bodies, such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines Initiative 
(GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria4 5 (GFATM), 
3 Other terms used in this context include "paying for progress" (Barder and Birdsall, 2006) or "results- 
based aid" (Gunning, 2005). 
4 Strong pressures at the international arena contributed to the establishment of the Fund. Significant 
points of pressure included, for instance, the summit meetings of the Organization of African Unity and 
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which involve a more visible participation of private sector organisations (Brugha and 
Walt, 2001; Brugha et al., 2002). However, there is concern that the GFATM is 
addressing donors' priorities as opposed to those of RGs (for instance the fund 
activities match poorly the activities planned under the PRSPs) and that it focuses on 
short term responses to more complex problems of developing equitable and efficient 
health systems (Carlsson, 2001). 
How all these different aid modalities and approaches are interacting at the country 
level is not very clear. Further, it is questionable the extent to which they are aligned 
to the recipient countries' priorities. At the implementation stage in , recipient countries, 
all these international initiatives will either merge with existing national structures and 
priorities, or partially so, and positive and/or negative effects may arise. Newer aid 
modalities such as GBS and SWAp emphasize country ownership as one of their 
guiding principles (de Renzio, 2006). At the same time, priority areas like HIV/AIDS 
[e. g. through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)] or 
interventions such as the introduction of new vaccines promoted by GAVI are 
receiving earmarked contributions to be implemented via traditional project 
approaches or some intermediary forms. 
Key modes of international development assistance in the health sector 
In the health sector, projects have been the traditional approach to deliver aid 
resources into certain priority areas or diseases at the level of recipient countries. 
Project aid using government systems "provide[s] more specific earmarking of 
expenditures to a discrete set of activities for which coherent objectives and outputs 
and the inputs required to achieve them can be defined" (Foster and Leavy, 2001). 
Projects often take the form of vertical or categorical programmes. Such programmes 
deliver health services through free-standing structures (as opposed to an integrated 
delivery approach) and are designed to address specific health conditions or disease 
with clear objectives within a limited time frame and often making use of a specific 
technology (Oliveira-Cruz et al., 2003). 
the G8 countries, the European Commission's policy framework for addressing the burden of the three 
diseases, and the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001 
ýGFATM, 2003). 
The fund is a partnership between the public and private sectors and its main objective is to raise and 
disburse funds to developing countries facing a high burden of these infectious diseases. 
6 For instance, via a special project within a ministry or district to carry out the specific activities or via 
contracts with the private sector. 
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Projects present both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, they can: 
provide swift responses to urgent health problems, as they often operate in an 
insulated environment and `buy out' local constraints'; and be used as pilot 
experiences to test out innovative approaches before scaling up to the wider 
environment. In contrast, projects have been criticised for: 
- Being defined by individual donors, without major efforts to coordinate with other 
DPs operating in the country, leading to fragmentation and duplication of efforts 
(Cassels and Janovsky, 1998; Lawson and Booth, 2004); 
- Putting government resources, especially human, under pressure to respond to 
the different requirements of different DPs (Cassels and Janovsky, 1998); 
- Having high transaction costs, which hinder the effectiveness of government 
systems (Lawson and Booth, 2004) and of aid more generally; 
- Lacking ownership by national governments in deciding about priority areas 
(Cassels and Janovsky, 1998; Lawson and Booth, 2004); 
- Lacking homogeneity of activities across the country as projects rarely cover the 
entire geographical area of a country or population group in their delivery strategy 
or in their scope, thus leading to inequalities in the distribution of benefits. 
The new aid modalities, SWAp and GBS, evolved because of frustrations of the 
international community with the drawbacks of the project approach. They are 
characterised by a more comprehensive approach to aid delivery and to funding of 
activities in a given country. They are defined as follows: 
- The SWAp is an approach where "all significant public funding for the sector 
supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under Government 
leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing 
towards relying on Government procedures to disburse and account for all funds" 
(Foster et al., 2000); and 
- GBS is "a form of programme aid in which Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) that is not linked to specific project activities is channelled directly to 
partner governments using their own allocation, procurement and accounting 
systems" (Lister et al., 2006). 
Schmidt (1995) explains that donors have incentives to bypass or circumvent the central structures and 
operate directly via a project implementation unit or by contracting a non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) in order to avoid uncertainties regarding disbursement bottlenecks, onerous bureaucratic controls 
or layers of bureaucracy (complex, arbitrary and unpredictable whereas an ideal bureaucracy is the 
opposite of this). 
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The main difference between a SWAp and GBS is that the former is specific to a 
sector, such as health or education, whereas in the latter aid resources are not 
earmarked to any sectoral activity; they can be used to fund any type of government 
expenditure. The key principle underpinning these two new aid modalities is that they 
should allow RGs to coordinate development assistance in terms of policy design, 
strategic management, financial pooling, resource allocation, and common 
arrangements for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). 
These new aid modalities are said to contribute to: enhanced donor coordination and 
harmonisation as well alignment with the RG's systems (Lister et al., 2006); improved 
efficiency of public spending (ibid. ); reduced transaction costs (Lister et al., 2006; de 
Renzio, 2006); greater domestic accountability (ibid. ); and increased ownership of 
policies and interventions by RGs (de Renzio, 2006). However, evaluations of the new 
aid modalities have only recently started to emerge (Koeberle et al., 2006). Further 
evidence is still needed regarding the expected improvements from GBS or SWAp. 
1.2.2 Country background with a focus on aid reforms in the health sector 
This thesis focuses on the experience of Uganda and this sub-section provides a 
general background of the country in relation to development aid and in particular aid 
in the health sector. 
Uganda was a UK protectorate until 1962 when it obtained independence. Since then 
and up until the late '80s the country experienced a period of internal conflict and 
considerable violations of human rights perpetrated by dictators (Obote and Idi Amin) 
and their use of the state machinery. Most of the country underwent a more peaceful 
time after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) overtook power in 1986. 
However, the Northern part of the country is still plagued by conflict due to resistance 
by the Lord's Resistance Army (a rebel group) to the NRM Government. 
Yoweri Museveni, Uganda's president since the NRM took power, was considered a 
reform-minded leader and became "a symbol of what was - during a short hopeful 
period - seen as the African Renaissance" (Adam and Gunning, 2002). Under his 
presidency Uganda is argued to have enjoyed a good relationship with the donor 
community and through joint efforts to have led the way in relation to a range of 
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innovative approaches - such as being the first country to implement a PRSP (Lister 
et al., 2006). 
Uganda's per capita GDP8 in 2004 was US$1,478 (UNDP, 2006). In view of the 
overall scarcity of domestic resources, the country has had to rely on the contributions 
of DPs to run a very significant proportion of its budget. Approximately 50% of total 
government expenditure in Uganda corresponds to IDA (Adam and Gunning, 2002). 
As an aid-dependent country, Uganda has gone through the experience of projects in 
various forms; for instance, when implemented by DPs themselves, or by contracted- 
out organisations (for and not for profit ones), or by specific government units at 
national or local levels. Ssengooba (2001) notes that key reasons for adopting the 
project mode in Uganda are historical ones as well as weak national policies and 
structures. 
Overview of aid effectiveness reforms in Uganda and linkages to the health sector 
The Government's preferred mode of aid is GBS rather than project support (as well 
as grants instead of loans) (MoFPED, 2003d). Preference is based on the greater 
level of flexibility that GBS allows Government to deliver services. This should entail 
efficiency and ownership gains (ibid. ). 
Budget support, which was introduced in Uganda in 1998 (Lister et al., 2006), occurs 
in two different forms, i. e. as general contributions to the budget of the Government or 
as earmarked contributions to the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). The PAF was created 
as a mechanism to channel the additional resources the Government received from 
the HIPC Initiative as well as to mobilise extra donor funding in line with the priority 
areas of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) - equivalent to a PRSP. The 
PEAP provides the overall framework of development for Uganda, thus guiding the 
formulation of public policies and resource allocation. 
PAF resources are reserved to key government priorities with clear poverty reduction 
objectives. Main PAF expenditure categories include primary education, primary 
health care services, access to water and sanitation, agricultural services for poor 
farmers, and rural feeder roads. Resources allocated to PAF are protected from 
budget cuts both at national and district levels, given the need to safeguard 
e In purchasing power parity. 
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interventions directly related to poverty reduction. PAF funds are provided to districts 
in the form of conditional grants. 
Uganda receives budget support from various DPs. The number of partners moving 
towards budget support has also increased substantially over time. At the beginning of 
the first HSSP (spanning a five-year period from 2000/01 to 2004/05), there were five 
DPs using this mode of assistance: UK, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, and the World 
Bank (MoH, 2003d). In Financial Year (FY) 2002/2003, Uganda received budget 
support from the following DPs: the previous five apart from Belgium, and the 
European Union (EU), Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, France and 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (donor support spread sheet, 
2004). The contributions were either to the general budget or to the PAF but exclude 
loans and funds from the HIPC. The World Bank has provided GBS to the 
Government of Uganda (GoU) through the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 
since 2001 (World Bank, 2006). 
As part of the growing focus on results (outputs and outcomes) and the overall goals 
in public management of improving efficiency, accountability and consistency of 
targets across sectors towards the PEAP objectives, the Government has introduced 
the Long and Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (LTEF and MIEF), Outcome- 
Oriented Budgeting and ROM (Ssendaula, 2003). Other reforms elements of the 
budget process include: the Budget Framework Papers, which sectors prepare on a 
yearly basis for submission to the MoFPED ; the Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), 
which take place once a year; SWAp and related structures and process. The latter is 
described below. 
Uganda launched its SWAp for the health sector in 2000. The introduction of the 
SWAp was related to Government objectives of improving national leadership, 
efficiency and equity (MoH 2000b). Under the SWAp, the Government has been 
endeavouring to get DPs to discuss and agree on joint priorities for the 
implementation of the National Health Policy (NHP) and the Health Sector Strategic 
Plan9 (HSSP). It is a flexible system in that it accepts other forms of funding (e. g. 
project mode) and not only contributions channelled through the sector or general 
budget. The position of the Ugandan Government is one of a holistic perspective 
9 The first comprised the period of 2000/01-2004/05 and the second follows this period for another 5 
years. 
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which interprets SWAp as a platform for implementing the HSSP by bringing together 
all resources available in the country (Oliveira Cruz et al., 2006). 
In order to operationalise the SWAp partnership in Uganda, a number of structures 
and processes have been put into place, including those that facilitate the link 
between GBS and the SWAp. A summary description of these is provided in Tables 
1.1 and 1.2. 
Table 1.1: General Budget Support Processes linked to the SWAp 
Description 
Public This conference is organised by the MoFPED with the participation of DPs, 
Expenditure Parliament, sector ministries, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and others. 
Reviews (PER) The purpose of the meeting is to: consult and discuss adjustments to the allocation 
of public expenditure for the forthcoming FY and medium term; and to review budget 
performance during the previous year as part of the budget process. It takes place 
on a yearly basis (around May). 
Budget 
Support Poverty This process reviews performance on the basis of agreed prior actions or 
Processes Reduction undertakings as well as Government expenditures. This review focuses on the 
Support Credit performance of the Government in regard to credits provided by the World Bank for 
(PRSC) the PRSP (PEAP in Uganda). The mission is led by the World Bank but with the 
Reviews participation of various other donors who use the outcomes of this review process so 
as to avoid duplication of efforts. It takes place on a yearly basis (around March). 
The purpose of the SWG is to formulate and Implement policies related to health 
financing Issues, including mechanisms for financing the sector and allocation of 
resources. In particular, the SWG discusses and reviews the Budget Framework 
Sector Working Paper1 
° as well as proposals of new health sector projects before submission to the 
Group (SWG) Development Committee of the MoFPED (Oliveira Cruz et al., 2006). This process 
should allow for alignment of new investments in the sector with the health sector 
strategic plan. Meetings should be monthly but in practice they do not happen as 
regularly. 
Table 1.2: SWAp-related structures and processes in Uganda 
Description Frequency 
" Joint visits to selected districts (chosen on a 
rotational basis, according to performance (low 
and high)) based on standard terms of reference 
with a view to assess progress on areas such as 
human resources, financial flows, information and 
A joint review of management systems, and agreed technical 
sector performance priority areas; 
by Government of - Review of the Annual Health Sector Performance 
Joint Review Uganda (GoU) and Report (AHSPR) (including district league table); Annual (October) 
Meeting Partners (i. e. Use of the agreed PEAP indicators (health)" as Used to be twice (JRM) districts, the basis for progress assessment; a year. 
Parliament, NGOs, Discussion of proposals for the Budget 
private sector and Framework Paper/Medium Term Expenditure 
donors). Framework priorities for the following financial 
year, 
" Discussion and agreement on undertakings 
(priorities), one or two priority programmes, and a 
tracking study for following year. 
Continued... 
10 Budget Framework Papers are prepared by each sector ministry in consultation with stakeholders (to 
be discussed in SWG meetings). This is part of the budget process in line with the PEAP objectives and 
the MDGs and forms the basis for the Macroeconomic Plan and Indicative Budget Framework Paper, 
prepared by the MoFPED, discussed and approved by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament around April 
of each year (Kassami, 2004). 
11 These are: utilisation of out-patient services in public and private-not-for-profit units, immunisation rates 
for DPT3, deliveries in health units, HIV prevalence rates, and proportion of posts filled by qualified staff. 
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Description Frequency 
Substitutes the previous arrangement of two JRMs per year. This meeting 
Technical among stakeholders aims to review and discuss a specific technical issue Annual (around 
Review agreed during the prior JRM. The 2004 technical review meeting will discuss the April) 
first draft of the HSSP (2005-2010). 
National Involves a broad participation of district and central level, and civil society 
Health stakeholders. The purpose of the assembly is to act as a forum for building Annual Assembly nationwide consensus and advocacy for the health development agenda in the 
(NHA) country. 
Health Policy Monthly 
Advisory Established as a forum to discuss and advise the MoH and DPs on the 
Started as 
weekly and goal Committee implementation of the NHP and the HSSP. is to have it (HPAC) 
quarterly. 
There are currently 9 WGs who report to HPAC: 
" Human resources for health, (HRH) During JRMs Initially created to Drug procurement and management; and throughout prepare for the first Health infrastructure; the year as per 
Working HSSP and are now 
considered to play a 
Supervision and monitoring; programme of work (e. g. on a Groups 
(WGs) key role in translating 
Basic health care package; 
P bli i more regular HSSP outputs into u c-pr vate partnership in health; basis during 
policies, plans and Research and development; preparations for 
activities. Finance and procurement; the second 
" Health systems. HSSP). 
The functions of these committees are to: 
" Define core interventions, review overall 
progress in implementation and agree 
priorities for programmes; 
" Coordinate projects and other forms of 
Bring together all support to a specific programme; 
Interagency implementing agencies Review workplans and budgets of the 
Coordinating and donors who programme; 
Committees support a particular 
Examples of existing ICCs include: Quarterly 
(ICC) programme, and other Reproductive health; MoH departments, Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI); 
NGOs and districts. " Malaria; 
" HIV/AIDS; 
" TB; 
" Sanitation Is in the process of organising an 
/CC. 
SWAP 
Review 
Government and DPs Review the general status of the SWAp partnership and Annual 
Meetings 
discuss specific problems. 
" Provide a forum for discussion on issues in 
the sector, 
" Enable partners to coordinate and assemble 
Health Established to joint responses; 
Development coordinate 
Serve as opportunity for members to 
Partners development partners communicate amongst themselves and with Monthly 
Group working in the health the MoH more effectively; 
(HDPG) sector in Uganda. " Function as a space to discuss issues related to HPAC; 
" Allow DPs to contribute more effectively to the 
JRMs in the health sector. 
A special bank account held by the MoH for implementation of SWAp and HSSP specific activities 
(e. g. the costs of the JRMs, tracking studies and technical assistance). Monitoring of the account is 
performed by HPAC. Expenditures from this account require the signatures of one representative of 
Partnership Government and one of the DPs. 
Fund Contribution of funds to the account is made by DPs, which included Ireland Aid, the Swedish 
Account International Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), DFID, the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) over the period of December 1999 to July 2003. 
Continued... 
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Table 1.2 continued 
Description 
Undertakings are actions or processes agreed during a JRM between the GoU and DPs in a specific 
area to be given priority during the year. Progress towards the achievement of undertakings is 
Undertakings reviewed during the following JRM. For a number of donors, successful outcome of the JRM and 
achievement of the undertakings determines the release of funds to the budget. 
These studies are agreed during JRMs and progress related to the studies' recommendations are 
followed up by the HPAC. While these studies maybe seen to have a quasi audit function, they are 
Tracking envisaged as a broader type of audit, answering questions such as 'why is it not working? ' and ` Studies where are the constraints? ' Thus these studies allow an in-depth assessment of problems, formulate 
recommendations for action, and serve as opportunities to build consensus for these actions to be 
carried out, instead of functioning as narrow or internal types of audit. 
Source: Oliveira-Cruz et al. (2006) 
Volume of international development assistance for the health sector in Uganda12 
Contributions channelled by DPs as budget support to'the GoU increased from 
US$227.17 million to US$275.1 million13 between FYs 2000/01 and 2003/04 
(MoFPED, 2001; MoFPED, 2002a; MoFPED, 2003a; MoFPED, 2004a). Project 
support to the health sector was estimated to total US$69.1 million in 2003/04 (HDPG, 
2004a). This estimate referred to budgeted project contributions from 6 multilateral 
agencies and 10 bilateral ones. However, not all project contributions from the 
different DPs were reported (e. g. only one of the World Bank projects was computed 
and it also excluded information from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Another source reported the total budget of project aid to the 
sector to be US$61.5 million in 2003/04 (MoH, 2004c). This was based on a survey 
including 8 donors. 
A decreasing trend of project support to the health sector occurred while a 
simultaneous increase of public funding14 took place. The proportion of funding for the 
health sector financed through projects decreased from 45% in 1999/00 to 34% in 
2002/03 in relation to the overall resource envelope for the health sector (Ssengooba 
et al., 2006). This shift is argued to be mainly associated with various DPs channelling 
their contributions from project support to budget support (ibid. ). While it is not 
possible to disentangle the overall amount of aid provided by donors as general, 
12 Information for this section was collected during field work (2003/04). Hence, this represents the 
situation at that time. Moreover, there were great difficulties in reconciling the figures from the different 
sources. This was related to organisations not being forthcoming in sharing expenditure/budget 
information (see chapter 7 on motives). 
13 These figures included grants only (exclude loans). 14 Government of Uganda budget, which included domestic funds and budget support contributions 
provided by donors to the country's budget. 
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budget support that was allocated to the health sector specifically15, it is clear that the 
total amount of public funding for the health sector increased over the reported period. 
From 1999/00 to 2002/03 there was a rise of 18% in real terms (ibid. ). 
Yet, considerable inequalities and resource gaps persisted. Poverty, which had 
decreased substantially in the 1990s, increased from 34% in 2000 to 38% in 2003 
(MoFPED, 2004f). The results of the second Ugandan Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (UPPA) suggested16 health to be the main cause of poverty (MoFPED1 
2002b). Moreover, the population growth remained one of the highest in sub-Saharan 
Africa at 3.4% per year (MoFPED, 2003b). While the LTEF (10 years time horizon) 
had indicated that the health sector was due to receive a larger share of the 
Government budget (MoFPED, 2004c), these projections had not materialised. The 
share of the health sector budget vis-ä-vis the total Government budget was 6.5% in 
the period of 1997/98 to 2000/01 and in 2002/03 it increased to only 9% (World Bank, 
2004a). Funding levels in the health sector of approximately US$7-11 per capita 
(including donor funding) were clearly not sufficient to cover a minimum basic 
package cost of $28 per capita (Ssengooba et al., 2006). 
In contrast to the trend mentioned above, from approximately 2003 onwards, the 
volume of project aid increased substantially. This was due to the approval of a 
number of grants from global health initiatives, mainly in the area of HIV/AIDS. The 
GFATM as well as the US PEPFAR formed the two largest GHIs in Uganda. The total 
approved budget by the GFATM to Uganda over 4 rounds totalled US$211.9 million" 
18 (UGFATMP, 2004). This amount exceeded the entire budget for the health sector 
by the GoU (including budget support)19 (Feuer, 2004). 
Uganda was expected to be the recipient of about US$500 million over 5 years from 
PEPFAR, thus doubling US aid to AIDS in the country (Richey and Haakonsson, 
2004). Among all beneficiaries (14 countries), Uganda was due to receive the largest 
amount, even though it had one of the lowest prevalence rates in Africa (Richey and 
Haakonsson, 2004; Rinaldo, 2004). Approximately 55% of these resources were 
budgeted for scaling up Anti-Retrovirals in the country. No funds were to be provided 
75 Once the resources are channelled to the Government accounts they become an integral part of the 
overall resource envelope of the Government and are allocated according to the Government budgetary 
systems. u stems. 
cited by respondents. 
17 This was before the cancellation of some grants in 2007. 
18 US$134 million for years one and two and US$77 million for year three. 
19 Not in any one year though. 
29 
directly to the Government (but to NGOs and private sector organisations)20. 
PEPFAR's budget for Uganda in 2004 was US$94 million (USAID, 2004). 
Approximately US$48.8 million reflected new resources contributed by the US 
Government to Uganda (or additional to their previous contributions). By February 
2004, PEPFAR had disbursed US$37 million to Uganda (Richey and Haakonsson, 
2004). This amount corresponded to about one-third of the budget of the MoH 
(excluding project support) for 2004/05 (MoFPED, 2004e). 
1.3 Scope, aim, objectives and structure of the thesis 
1.3.1 Scope 
Within the aid effectiveness debate, it appears that the two most fundamental 
changes that deserve more in-depth analysis are: 
1) The introduction of new aid modalities (GBS and SWAp), the emergence of GHIs, 
and the effects they have had on the relationship between RGs and DPs at country 
level. Particularly in view of the: 
- Objectives of improving government ownership and aid harmonisation set out by 
the new aid modalities; 
- Changes as to how funds from the new GHIs are delivered and how they may or 
not conflict with GBS and SWAP; 
- Large volumes of aid disbursed by these different aid modalities and the strong 
political clout of GHIs such as PEPFAR. 
2) The interest within the international aid community to move towards more results- 
oriented approaches of delivering aid (including having clearer targets and paying for 
results), once again of particular relevance given the context of increased volumes of 
aid. 
These ideas of aid effectiveness and paying for results can be linked to the NPM 
approach which draws particular inspiration from economics. Within economics, New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), chiefly agency theory, can be used to understand 
relationships (between a principal and an agent). NIE/agency theory may help to 
20 PEPFAR funds were outside the Government budget predictions. 
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frame the relationship between RGs and DPs as a contractual arrangement. The 
value of such a framework lies in its ability to understand the incentive structure 
embedded in the aid delivery process (Martens et al., 2002). This thesis is interested 
in how appropriate are the ideas of NPM, ultimately based on the agency theory 
framework, in regard to the changes of the relationship between DPs and RGs. 
Two approaches could be taken: one would be to discover the nature of the agency 
relationships; another is to use the agency framework as a mode of analysis. Probing 
the nature of agency relationships is a means to understanding how new aid 
modalities change underlying processes and may change outcomes. In this thesis, I 
am using the framework to seek explanations for outcomes observed and the 
mechanisms that have been put in place. I therefore assume that agency theory offers 
through its conceptual framework plausible explanations in this context, rather than 
test the hypothesis of there being or not a principal agency relationship. 
Uganda was chosen as a suitable case study. It is a low income country, with high 
levels of dependency on donor aid. In addition it has experimented with the various 
approaches and aid delivery modes proposed by the aid community (e. g. PRSPs, 
MIEF, GBS, SWAp). 
1.3.2 Aims 
The overall aim of this investigation was to better understand the relationship between 
RGs and DPs. More specifically, it assessed: 
- How the relationship changed with the new modes of development assistance for 
health in Uganda: SWAp and GBS; 
- The nature of the incentive structures embedded in the new aid mechanisms and 
how they were structured by the monitoring and compensation schemes (the 
system of penalties and rewards); 
The motives (objective functions) of the organisations and individuals and how 
these shed light onto the behaviours of the parties in the aid environment in 
Uganda; 
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- The appropriateness of thinking embedded in economics, particularly the agency 
theory framework when applied to understand the aid contract. 
1.3.3 Objectives 
The specific objectives of this thesis were to: 
- Describe the existing monitoring mechanisms and how they differ in terms of focus 
(inputs, process, outputs, outcomes); 
- Examine the effectiveness of the mechanisms, as understood by the actors, for 
monitoring performance; 
- Seek to understand the implications of monitoring mechanisms for behaviour 
under the aid contract; 
- Explore the nature of the compensation scheme (penalty-reward system) adopted 
under the new aid modalities; 
- Assess how credible the penalties and rewards are from the agents' point of view 
and how the credibility affects their actions (incentives to under-perform); 
- Assess how the parties understand the nature of the contracts (projects, SWAp, 
GBS) in terms of objectives or expectations. 
1.3.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two reviews the literature on agency theory and presents its key concepts. 
The next chapter provides a framework for the study by seeking to explore the 
suitability of applying agency theory's main concepts to the area of International 
Development Assistance for Health (IDAH). While investigating the suitability of the 
concepts, the chapter also reviews the literature in IDAH. The fourth chapter outlines 
the study's design and methods. It applies qualitative methods and adopts a case 
study approach combined with an analytic narrative. 
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The results chapters were conceptualised by combining suitable theoretical 
dimensions from the analytical framework and analysing the data set obtained vis-ä- 
vis the structure offered by the framework. The first results chapter (five) reviews the 
monitoring environment in Uganda. In a contract, one of the most common modes of 
obtaining information on the behaviour of the contracted party is by monitoring it. The 
following chapter (six) reviews the performance appraisal system as agreed between 
the parties and examines how the compensation scheme (penalties and rewards) 
operates. The final results chapter (seven) considers the motivations of the parties in 
entering into the relationship, from both an individual and an organisational 
perspective. 
The last two chapters (eight and nine) provide a discussion of the thesis' main findings 
and its conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This review assesses the plausibility of NIE, more specifically agency theory, as a 
conceptual framework to throw some light on and provide a better understanding of 
how DPs and RGs interact. 
Key papers, books and reports were reviewed and are discussed here with the above 
aim as a backdrop. The searching strategy involved: consulting of economics (NIE) 
text books and papers; following up of relevant material in reference lists of books and 
papers reviewed; consulting with experts in the area; and consulting of some internet 
sources (e. g. the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), 
Department of Economics, University of Maryland - www. iris. umd. edu/forum/pal)ers. asp 
and the World Bank - www. worldbank. orp). 
Following the review of the main concepts of agency theory, a concluding paragraph 
presents the identified knowledge gaps in the area. 
2.2 Understanding New Institutional Economics - Agency theory 
Given the background described in the previous chapter and the kinds of issues 
outlined in relation to the aid environment, a theoretical framework that seemed to fit 
the kinds of questions underlying the study area was NIE. Within this branch of 
economics, agency theory appears to be particularly valuable for shedding light on the 
inter-relationships between key groups of actors. As noted in the introduction chapter, 
agency theory could help to understand issues in international development aid by 
framing aid as a contractual arrangement. 
The use of agency theory as a conceptual framework to analyse relationships in the 
health sector has become well established since Arrow's contribution in 1963. The 
application of agency theory in the sector has grown since then. Recent contributions 
include, for instance, a study of hospital-based doctors in China (Liu, 1999), the 
design of physician payment incentives in the USA by Robinson (2001); the role of 
performance measurement in health care in the UK (Mannion and Goddard, 2002; 
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Goddard et al., 2000) and the application of the principal-agent model to key elements 
of the health care systems (Smith of al., 1997). 
Agency theory has been used to further analyse the area of development aid, in more 
general terms - at times explicitly (Zinnes and Bolaky, 2002; Martens et al., 2002; 
Svensson, 1997) and sometimes only implicitly as in the case of the World 
Development Report in 200421 22 (World Bank, 2004c). It has also been applied to 
more specific aspects of the relationship between RGs and DPs, as for example in 
relation to: aid as an interaction between incoherent agents (Mackinnon, 2003); the 
use of performance indicators in the design of aid contracts, though only implicitly 
using an agency theory framework (Adam and Gunning, 2002); and to conditionality 
contracts (Killick, 1997), which as argued by Martens et al. (2002) are inherently about 
principal-agent relationships. 
Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence relating to the micro-institutional 
relationships in international aid organisations (Martens et al., 2002) and the 
discernment of the multiple stages of the aid delivery process and the many involved 
actors (principals and agents) with various (and often conflicting) objectives and 
constraints (Zinnes and Bolaky, 2002). Within the broader area of international 
development aid, as pointed out by Martens et al. (2002), it is surprising that so few 
studies in this area have examined the incentive environment of the aid 
implementation process (through the explicit use of agency theory). Most instead have 
focused on the performance of recipient countries. The authors noted that the results 
of evaluations in this area have repeatedly shown: "that aid programme performance 
was not only determined by the particular circumstances of individual project 
managers and recipient countries but also - and perhaps predominantly - by the 
incentives embedded in the institutional environment of the aid agency and its aid 
delivery process". 
2.2.1 Basic model or single model 
Initial contributions which later led to the complete development of agency theory can 
be traced back to Kenneth J. Arrow. His work on the general equilibrium model of . 
21 It referred to agency theory by framing relationships in terms of accountability which involved five key 
elements: delegation, finance, performance, information about performance, and enforceability. 22 However, the theme paper for the report (Devarajan and Reinikka, 2002) explicitly acknowledges the 
use of elements from agency theory to develop the analytical framework for the report. 
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competitive economies with uncertainty (cited in Stiglitz, 1974) and the study of the 
health care industry and its special economic problems, such as moral hazard (Arrow, 
1963), have provided key elements for the development of agency theory, which were 
taken forward by Ross (1973), Stiglitz (1974) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Since 
then the study of agency theory has grown considerably, enriched by inputs of authors 
such as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Dixit (1997). And in more recent years, 
agency theory has received the denomination of incentives theory (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). 
The following account of the basic model of an agency relationship draws heavily on 
Arrow (1985), who provides an overview of the conceptual framework as well as the 
works by Ross (1973) and Stiglitz (1974; 1989). 
The basic model of an agency relationship comprises two individuals, i. e. a principal 
and an agent. In this relationship, there is always an explicit or implicit contract 
between the parties, and as in any contract, principals use incentives to guide or to 
motivate the agent's actions towards agreed desired outcomes. The principal will 
contract and pay an agent who will implement an agreed task or implement a series of 
activities leading to the production of outputs. The compensation scheme agreed 
between the parties shall establish the fee schedule (penalties and rewards system, 
whereby the agent may be rewarded for good performance and penalised for bad), 
and conditions. Given relationships between objective functions, information, action, 
randomness and performance, a key agency problem is how best to structure the 
compensation scheme from the principal's point of view. 
Agency relationships arise in various circumstances of economic and political lives, 
where a principal delegates certain tasks to an agent. Examples of principal-agent 
relationships include the case of an employer-employee contractual arrangement, a 
sharecropping scheme between a landlord-worker, the relationship of the 
shareholders of a company with their chief executive officer, and the representation 
system in democracies between constituencies and their elected politicians. 
Central elements of agency theory are the conflicting objective functions between 
principal and agent and information problems. As put by Laffont and Martimort (2002): 
"delegation of a task to an agent who has different objectives than the principal who 
delegates this task is problematic when information about the agent is imperfect". 
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Thus, delegation is at the core of an agency relationship. An agent is delegated a task 
where a principal cannot him or herself carry out the task (Martens et al., 2002). 
With regard to conflicting objective functions, in an agency relationship both parties, 
principal and agent, have independent utility functions and act so as to advance their 
expected utility. In this respect, there are two important constraints: the participation 
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. In the participation constraint, 
"the principal must choose a fee schedule that offers the agent a utility at least equal 
to what he or she could achieve in other activities" (Arrow, 1985). In view of the 
opportunity costs for the agent, the principal has to provide powerful enough 
incentives for the agent to accept to enter into the relationship or contract. In relation 
to the incentive compatibility constraint, incentives are needed not only for the agent 
to choose the employment but also to advance the principal's interests within that 
employment. Hence, there should be a certain level of compatibility between the 
advancement of the principal's utility and the agent's maximisation of his/her utility. 
Information problems, characteristic of agency relationships, refer to asymmetry, 
uncertainty and risk. With respect to information asymmetries, Williamson (1985) 
defines them as the situation where one party has access to information that the other 
does not. The agent may have information that the principal does not and it is not in 
the agent's interest to share this information with the principal. If the agent has private 
information and/or information about the state of nature which is relevant to the 
contract's expected output, he or she has no immediate reason to reveal this 
information (MacDonald, 1984). 
Uncertainty is defined by Williamson (1985) as the situation where individuals are not 
able to predict all the possible outcomes of an action or circumstance and their related 
probabilities. In addition, he associates uncertainty with bounded rationality (limited 
cognitive ability and scope to foresee and plan for eventualities), information 
asymmetry and to randomness. Uncertainty is an important element of agency theory 
as it compounds the problem of measuring outcomes, which can be the basis for a 
compensation scheme. 
Risk bearing is inherent in a principal-agent relationship. While the principal tends to 
be risk-neutral, the agent tends to be risk-averse (Strong and Waterson, 1987). Such 
a stand in regard to risk on the part of the agent is related to the result of its efforts 
being part stochastically determined (MacDonald, 1984). Thus, penalties and rewards 
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serve the function of allocating risk, and when the agent is risk-averse, effective 
incentives are needed in order for the agent to bear unwanted risk (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991). This will depend on various circumstances (such as the nature of the 
contractual arrangement between the parties, expected outputs, etc. ), but in general it 
is very complex (sometimes impossible) to identify effective incentives to motivate 
agents to bear unwanted risks. 
The two main categories of information problems analysed in the economics literature 
are: moral hazard, also called hidden action, and adverse selection, or hidden 
information. 
Moral hazard is defined by Strong and Waterson (1987) as the situation "when the 
principal and agent share the same information up to the point at which the agent 
selects an action, but thereafter the principal is only able to observe the outcome or 
payoff, not the action itself'. A classical illustration of moral hazard comes from the 
insurance market, where the agent may take more risks or a hidden action because 
the principal may not be able to observe it. Mussa (2002) gives an example of a best 
and worst case scenario of fire insurance. At best, the insured might put less effort 
and expense to control risks to his/her property because he/she knows that losses will 
be covered by insurance. At worst, the insured might overstate the value of his/her 
property and subsequently arrange for its destruction to collect the insurance. 
An individual's action is influenced by the inputs he or she devotes to the task, 
whereby inputs are understood to encompass time (number of hours) and effort. 
Although the definition of effort provided by Stiglitz (1974) is somewhat loose, it 
includes various dimensions that affect output, such as the pace, thoroughness, 
efficiency and inventiveness of an individual. Both time and effort are difficult to 
ascertain but more so the latter. According to Arrow (1985), the effort of an agent is 
the most typical hidden action. While the effort represents a disutility to the agent, it 
contributes to a positive outcome and is thus in the interest of the principal: Contracts 
could specify the agent's provision of both time and effort or output and effort. Yet, this 
may not be worthwhile because there are cases where the principal cannot observe or 
verify the effort, even though it may be able to observe performance. The relationship 
between effort and performance is permeated by the element of uncertainty (a 
random variable). 
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As for adverse selection, this refers to the situation where the agent has private 
information and uses it for taking an action or making decisions while the principal can 
observe the action and outcome but has no access to the information used by the 
agent (Arrow, 1985). To illustrate this point I give an example from the insurance 
market. When a person decides to buy life insurance, he or she, usually has a higher 
level of information about her or his risk of a young death than the insurance company 
does. Hence, the person can decide to take an insurance policy on the basis of the 
risk information and in this case the insurance company is left with an adverse 
selection of insured members. 
The agency literature has also been concerned with the distinction between 
observability and verifiability. A variable can be observed by the principal and the 
agent but it may not be verified by a third party, for instance a court of law (Stiglitz, 
1989) or an auditor. This has important implications in relation to the extent to which a 
contract can be enforced or not. While Stiglitz (1989) and other authors such as 
Guesnerie (1990) see the problem of unverifiable actions as part of hidden action, 
Laffont and Martimort (2002), in a more contemporary approach to the issue, consider 
this as a third category of informational problems. 
The design of effective incentive schemes (compensation contract) is an intricate 
exercise. Corporations and public organisations alike face considerable difficulties 
when attempting to ascertain their agent's performance. Thus a key issue in relation 
to the design of incentive schemes refers to the question of what to base the 
incentives on, particularly in view of the kinds of problems mentioned above. Possible 
circumstances that make the design of incentive schemes even more complex, and 
have been the focus of analysis of principal-agent problems, involve cases when the 
actions performed by individuals, in this case the agents, are not directly observable 
or easily inferable by the principal, or at least not at low cost (cases which arise rather 
often); and, when the output produced by an agent is influenced but not totally 
determined by the agent's action (Arrow, 1985). In the latter case, the output is 
stochastically determined, i. e., it is a random variable whose distribution relies on the 
action taken by the agent. Thus, in circumstances where actions are not observable, 
they do not form the best choice of a basis for the incentive scheme. Consequently, 
alternative measures of the agent's performance need to be identified. Output is then 
the best alternative basis for the incentive scheme, when the principal cannot observe 
the action but can observe the output. Yet, this alternative is not free of problems, as 
uncertainty will make it difficult to distinguish the influence of randomness from the 
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effort of the agent. Furthermore, output-based incentive schemes transfer risks onto 
agents. This carries inefficiencies if agents are risk averse. 
An additional problem that complicates the task of designing effective incentive 
schemes consists of what Hart (1990) defined as 'contract incompleteness'. He 
argues that it is practically impossible to write complete contracts which could specify 
all possible eventualities of each party's obligation during the contractual relationship. 
Contract incompleteness is taken further by Williamson (1985) who points out some 
important behavioural assumptions in contractual relationships that help deepen our 
understanding of policy performance. These include, 'information asymmetry, 
'bounded rationality, and potential or scope for opportunism (pursuit of self-interest 
with 'guile'). 
Thus, the challenge of devising effective incentive schemes is vast. In addition, there 
is need to constrain perverse incentives and alter inadequate ones. A recent 
illustration of this challenge is provided by the Arthur Anderson and Enron scandals. 
Both shareholders and managers have strong incentives to present a positive picture 
of their companies and the purpose of auditing, in such cases, is to set limits on 
eventual abuses (Stiglitz, 2002). On the other hand, as evidenced by the incident with 
these American companies, auditors also need to be restrained from opportunistic 
practices. In fact, the crucial point in this case was that contracts produced to 
reconcile the interests of principals and agents were incomplete, i. e. contained 
perverse incentives that caused the collapse of the companies. 
2.2.2 Dynamic models (multiple tasks and multiple principals) 
An organisation or an agent is often responsible for the performance of more than one 
single task. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) developed a model where the principal 
has various different tasks for the agent; or several agents to perform the tasks; or a. 
multi-dimensional single task to be performed by an agent. The model is based on the 
assumption that there are multiple tasks to be carried out or a single task is 
multidimensional and that the allocation of time and attention between them is 
essential. The authors show that if the principal provides incentives to one of the tasks 
or one dimension of the tasks, the agent's response is to divert attention away from 
the other tasks. In line with this, Dixit (1997) explains that in the context of large and 
complex organisations responsible for the performance of various tasks, "the , 
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existence of some inaccurately observed dimension of outcome pulls down the power 
of incentives of all tasks". 
The results of Holmstrom and Milgrom's model (1991) show that a range of 
instruments can be used by a principal to guide an agent's performance in one activity 
(and thus attempt to deal with the problem of multi-tasking), going beyond the option 
of how to pay for performance, considering difficulties in observability and 
measurement of tasks and outputs. The most important of these I detail below. 
- The optimal incentive contract can be used to pay fixed wages regardless of 
measured performance where agents perform several tasks that compete. for their 
time and effort. As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) put it, "the desirability of providing 
incentives for any one activity decreases with the difficulty of measuring performance 
in any other activities that make competing demands on the agent's time and 
attention". Further, contracts based on fixed wages may still produce results as 
workers may take pleasure in working up to certain level. However, the authors also 
recognise that work beyond that level shall require positive incentives. 
- The optimal setting of policies can be used to limit personal business activities on 
company time. For instance, the principal may introduce restrictions as substitutes for 
incentives on tasks performed by the agent that represent too much of an effort or 
cost for the principal to monitor (and consequently to reward). In fact, where quality is 
difficult or impossible to measure, quantity incentives are regarded as inappropriate. 
In relation to the public sector, the authors note that "the rigid rules and limits that 
characterize bureaucracy.... constitute an optimal response to difficulties in measuring 
and rewarding performance". An assumption built into the model is that it is easier for 
the principal to exclude an activity completely as opposed to monitor it or to limit its 
scope. For instance, it is easier, in terms of enforcement/monitoring, for an employer 
to prohibit the use of personal email accounts (such as a hotmail) in work computers 
(by making it inaccessible in the company's network) as opposed to limit its use during 
office hours to a certain number of hours per day. 
- Job design can be used as an instrument to control incentives. For instance, the 
principal may choose the agent's portfolio of tasks: "some employees specialising in 
activities that are hard to monitor and others in activities that are easily monitored. 
Separating tasks according to their measurability characteristics ... allows the 
principal to give strong incentives for tasks that are easy to measure without fearing 
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that the agent will substitute efforts away from other, harder-to-measure tasks" 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). However, even the authors recognise that the model 
oversimplifies the manoeuvring space of the principal to group tasks. For instance, it 
may not be possible to separate tasks, leading to high quantities from those leading to 
high quality. Moreover, grouping of tasks may not be feasible in situations of multiple 
principals (the issue of multiple principals is discussed in the next subsection). 
Another option for principals, using job design strategies, is to vary limits and 
incentives for competing activities which differ in nature, i. e. individual or team 
production. Under the assumption that the individual contribution of an agent to team 
work would be difficult to measure, rewards for good performance on the individual 
projects would be risky (as the agent would shift time and effort to individual tasks at 
the expense of the tasks related to team work). 
Where comparison among more than one agent is possible, an option is to use 
tournaments, to compensate performance on the basis of individual rankings. This 
option is also discussed by various other authors (MacDonald, 1984; Arrow, 1985; 
Stiglitz, 1989; Guesnerie, 1990). However, the value of individual rankings can be 
undermined in situations where choice of agents or providers is scarce or non- 
existent. 
'Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) conclude that the design of an incentive scheme 
should take into account the analysis of the complete range of tasks performed by the 
agent as well as a range of instruments23 to control the agent's performance, going 
beyond the decision of how to pay for performance. 
As an illustration to this subject, one can think about the current reforms in the 
education sector (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Devarajan and Reinikka, 2002). 
Teachers are expected to perform a wide range of tasks such as provide literacy and 
numeracy teaching, support emotional and physical development, provide vocational 
advice and prepare children for working life, inspire citizenship, alleviate 
disadvantages of home life, assure an enabling environment for children to learn and 
grow. While for the teacher it is not a matter of excluding one task in favour of 
another, these different tasks do compete for their time and effort. In addition, the 
large majority of these tasks are difficult to measure due to their subjective nature. 
23 For instance, to alter limits and incentives for competing activities or cluster related tasks into a single 
job. 
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Thus placing incentives on, for instance, higher scores on literary or numeracy may 
lead to diversion of teaching staff to these tasks to the detriment of less easy to 
measure tasks such as support to emotional development and inspiring citizenship. 
Further to the dynamic model, a key contribution refers to the application of agency 
theory to the public sector. The debate in this sector has been enriched by the works 
of Tirole (1994) and Dixit (1996,1997). They have analysed the multi-principal nature 
of governments where public organisations are accountable to a number of different 
constituencies which pursue different objective functions; in Dixit's words, they are 
"commön agencies" with "many principals". 
The different organisations forming part of a government have several different 
mandates such as revenue collection, resource allocation, service provision, and 
regulation. Estache and Martimort (1999) noted that "as a whole, these principals, 
may have for a collective objective the maximization of the same social welfare 
function as that of a single benevolent regulator. However, each, single principal has 
only a limited mandate to fulfil". Different agencies have the objective or mandate to 
increase the social welfare function of the people in a different sphere, while the 
government, which is constituted of the different agencies, has the overall 
responsibility to increase the general welfare function of the people. 
To exemplify this, while a ministry of health is concerned with one aspect of the 
welfare of the population, to improve their health; a ministry of education is devoted to 
increase the educational level of the population, another aspect of the welfare of the 
people. Hence, both agencies are working towards the collective or common objective 
of a government (as a congregating body of several public agencies / organisations) 
of improving the social welfare function of the people. However, these agencies are 
also concerned with their specific objectives and have to compete for influence and 
resources in order to achieve their objectives. 
Likewise, within the agencies, the same problem occurs, of the conflicts between 
contributing to the overall objective of the agency versus contributing to the specific 
mandate of the different units or departments. This trickledown effect can be 
interpreted as a series of layers in government structures, whereby various principal- 
agent relationships operate. 
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Additionally, as a result of the interaction of the various competing principals, 
incentives in public organisations will tend to lose power (Dixit, 1997), or to use 
Williamson's (1985) terminology, the incentives are low-powered. This happens 
because each principal attempts to take advantage of the incentives provided by the 
other principals as substitutes to maximise their utilities (Dixit, 1996,1997). For Tirole 
(1994), contributing factors to low powered incentives in public organisations include 
the lack of comparison (competition) among agents and the heterogeneity of tastes of 
principals [the people and their various and changing (over time) objective functions]. 
2.2.3 Dealing with agency problems 
The establishment of monitoring mechanisms is a natural response of principals in 
order to gain access to information on the agent's performance (MacDonald, 1984). 
Generally, in a contractual relationship, the compensation scheme is linked to some 
kind of monitoring strategy. However, the use of a monitoring strategy to assess the 
performance of an agent involves complex problems, which I discuss further in this 
document. 
Performance is defined as the action or process of carrying out a set of duties (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995) which should lead to a (series of) result(s). A 
somewhat different view of performance is provided by Liu (1999) who explains 
performance as related to how well or badly (the process) an action is implemented in 
relation to a target, "it is a measure against the performance target", which should be 
set by the organisation in line with its objective and/or vision. Kurowski (2002) refers 
to performance as a result of inputs, processes, and outputs and the association of 
these factors to planned outcomes. This leads to four categories of indicators, i. e., 
input, process, output and outcome (Zumeta, 2000; Kurowski 2002). Frequently, 
performance is measured by monitoring strategies that track an action (inputs used 
and process followed) or observe / verify an output or outcome of the action by using 
indicators. These indicators are defined as follows: input indicators measure all the 
resources (human, physical, financial, information and etc) used to produce a good, 
service or project; process indicators refer to the methods and or procedures used 
upon inputs to achieve the production of goods or services or project results; output 
indicators measure the quantity, and to the extent possible also the quality, of goods 
or services or the results of a project; outcome indicators measure the medium term 
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results of applying the outputs. Impact indicators are also sometimes used and 
measure similar elements to outcome indicators but with a longer term perspective. 
However, it is important to highlight that performance indicators do not represent a 
direct measure of performance (Mannion and Goddard, 2002). They act as proxy 
measures and this has important implications, as discussed further in relation to 
problems of observability and verifiability. 
As discussed earlier, the notion of effort, though not a category of performance 
indicator itself, permeates inputs and processes (Wilson, 1989 cited in Dixit, 1996); 
and hence influences outputs and outcomes. The difficulties in observing and/or 
measuring effort (because of uncertainty and multidimensionality) compound the 
monitoring exercise of the principal and the compensation scheme. In the case of 
hidden action, the principal can see the output but wishes to gain information on the 
action and possibly on the effort exerted by the agent. Arrow (1985) noted that "if this 
observation, y, conveys any information about the unobserved action, a, beyond that 
revealed by the outcome, x ... then one can always improve [the compensation 
contract] by making the fee depend upon y as well as x". 
Depending on the contract, more specifically the nature of the good or service or the 
delegated task and the interests of the principal, the focus of the monitoring strategy 
may lie on inputs, processes, outputs or outcome. But often monitoring strategies will 
be based on a combination of these categories. For instance, an audit although more 
directly associated with an input-based monitoring strategy (focus on verifying the 
inputs used in accomplishing a task or programme), often seeks to verify information 
beyond inputs and verify how the inputs were used (process) and the yields 
produced24 (outputs). A further example of a monitoring strategy is the establishment 
of a reporting system. In this case, the agent will be requested to provide the principal 
with information on inputs, the process used to perform a task and the outputs 
produced. The reporting system is usually structured over a given period of time, 
depending on the length of the contract. Thus, progress reports will be required during 
the period of implementation of a task or production of a good. At the end of a 
24 Within the domain of public auditing and budgeting, Mikesell (1991 cited in Gershberg, 1998) 
understands audit as a more encompassing strategy and identifies four categories of audits: "(i) financial, 
which keep track of financial records and focus on legal compliance of expenditures (theft prevention); (ii) 
operational, which check the efficiency of management practices and the concomitant use of public 
resources; (iii) programme, which determine if programmes (and the mix of programmes) under a 
government agency achieve their goal in a cost-effective manner; and (iv) performance, which investigate 
the outcomes from specific programmes in detail to verify that the promised results are being achieved" 
(Gershberg, 1998). 
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contract, a final report should be produced by the agent. With respect to monitoring 
strategies focused on outcomes, more complex approaches that investigate medium 
to long term impact are required. For example, a study can be carried out to measure 
the level of change in literacy rate in a given population over different time intervals. A 
variety of study designs can be applied and will depend on the nature of the activities, 
characteristics of the population and resources available. In general, base line studies 
will be needed to provide initial data for benchmarking. Alternatively a case control 
group may be constructed after implementation of a policy or programme in order to 
compare impact. 
Monitoring is a costly undertaking but a strategy needed by principals to elicit 
information from agents. While no monitoring provides the principal with zero 
information, on the other hand, monitoring may give the principal access to some 
information but it is unlikely to provide the full range of information, knowledge and 
insights that the agent is endowed with. If principals want to have full information 
which requires the monitoring of every single aspect of the agent's activities, then 
monitoring becomes so costly that delegation of tasks becomes meaningless and the 
principal might as well carry out the tasks him or herself (Martens et al., 2002). One 
can think of this problem in terms of diminishing marginal returns, where at zero cost 
no information is elicited, at cost X1, the degree of information available is Y1 and so 
on progressively. However, the cost of monitoring will reach a point where the 
marginal cost of information exceeds its marginal value to the principal. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Cost of monitoring 
Information 
Y2 
Y' 
x1 x2 Costs 
While monitoring is costly for the principal, it is also likely to be costly for the agent. 
The monitoring strategy will involve opportunity costs for the agent, who will need to 
spend time and effort providing information to the principal or, at the minimum, getting 
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administratively engaged in the monitoring arrangements established by the principal. 
For instance there are "estimates that a US weapons program manager must spend 
30-50% of his time defending his project inside the Department of Defence and 
Congress" (Fox, 1988 cited in Tirole, 1994). However, it is questionable whose cost 
this really is, given the participation constraint. 
According to Propper (1995) and Whynes (1993), an agent's response to a 
performance monitoring mechanism is characterised by a change in the set of 
outputs, whereby the dimension of the ones being monitored will be increased and 
those not monitored will be decreased. This is in line with the multi-task model 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) where the agent diverts its efforts to those tasks that 
are being monitored by the principal or that are being given higher incentives. As 
stated by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), "when agent's actions cannot be easily 
monitored and their reports easily verified [by a third party], the agents have greater 
scope to pursue their own interests [or to engage in opportunistic behavior] rather 
than the principal's. Then to provide incentives for the agents to behave in the 
principal's interests, it is necessary to arrange for them to bear some responsibility for 
the outcomes of their actions and therefore' to bear more risk than would otherwise be 
desirable. " Otherwise, the principal's utility will not be maximised, only the agent's. 
In spite of the difficulties discussed above, in the public sector, monitoring plays a 
more important role because formal incentives, such as piece rate wages and 
bonuses, which are based on quantifiable performance measures, are difficult to 
assess due to the multiplicity of goals in government organisations, and incentives on 
measurable dimensions of public sector goals may jeopardise the non-measurable 
dimensions of social welfare (Tirole, 1994). 
Finally, it is worth considering three additional options discussed in the literature for 
dealing with agency problems. 
Repetition (also called infinite period models), i. e. situations of a contractual 
relationship over more than one period, may lead to ameliorated contractual results 
"assuming that the agent has progressive information on the occurrence of the 
outcome [actually information on the state of nature] so that he can continuously 
adapt his action (here his effort) in the time interval where the relationship takes 
place" (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1985 cited in Guesnerie, 1990). From the principal's 
perspective, repetition may allow him/her to compare the output of the agent over time 
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(MacDonald, 1984). In addition, repetition may help to alleviate hidden action 
problems. This may happen, according to Guesnerie (1990), because time may 
contribute to separate out uncertainty and allow for more precise knowledge of the 
average action taken (Guesnerie, 1990). An additional reason may be that the 
expectation of the contract being renewed or continued operates as an incentive for 
the agent. This shall maximise the principal's utility as the action will be adapted and 
potentially result in better outputs. However, it would be precipitate to conclude that a 
long term relationship would eliminate problems of hidden action (Guesnerie, 1990; 
McDonald, 1984). As discussed earlier, a point to consider here is the scope for 
verifiability (and related implications of enforceability) as it depends, in fact, if the 
action is revealed through multi-period relationships or not. 
Another way of thinking about repetition is to use the notion of relational contracts 
developed by MacNeil (1978). He analyses contracts of long term duration as 
relationships overtime, as opposed to isolated (single) exchanges, which would be in 
line with the definition of classical contracts. Allen (2002), argues that trust and 
cooperation can play a crucial role towards effective relational contracts by 
substituting the lack of capacity, or actually impossibility, of writing complete contracts 
and specifying and monitoring fully the agent's performance in view of problems of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
Yet trust and cooperation may not represent the 'magic bullet' to contractual 
difficulties. The question is to what extent is it feasible to build trust so as to counter 
opportunism in dealing with agency problems given that each party in a contractual 
relationship is inherently interested in advancing his or her utility function. This begs 
the question as to how trust can solve the arising conflicts. In fact, Allen (2002) has 
shown in her study of the National Health Service (contracting for district nursing 
services in Greater London), that trust was non-existent in large measure and there 
was fear of opportunism occurring. 
In long term relationships, parties (within the chain of principal-agent relationships in 
large organisations or where several organisations are involved) may develop 
knowledge about each other over time and learn about how to collaborate and build 
up a certain level of trust among them, which maygive rise to a situation of 
'accommodation'. The negative side of this familiarity is that shirking and bribery may 
take place, especially in large organisations (collusion of middle managers as 
principals and agents), in the presence of contract incompleteness, and where the 
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monitoring or supervisory body may have been co-opted by the agent for mutual 
benefit at the expense of the principal. The two may (falsely) present success in the 
absence of the principal having an independent monitoring capacity. The other 
negative side of long term relationships is the associated transaction or administrative 
costs to changing the agent. Thus principals may not consider renewals of contracts 
by means of bidding processes because of such costs. 
A further option considered is the use of reputation as a mechanism for contract 
enforcement. Stiglitz (1989) postulates that in this case "good behaviour may be 
enforced so long as the state is observable by both parties". At this point the 
discussion of observability and verifiability is once again pertinent. For instance, for 
the continuation or repetition of an existing relationship, observability is of greater 
relevance, while verifiability will be more important when an agent's reputation needs 
to be verified by a third party via the agent's existing or previous contractual 
relationships. 
Finally, dismissal or termination, i. e. the cessation of the contract or relationship, may 
be considered as a way to deal with serious agency problems and limitations in the 
incentive scheme (Arrow, 1985; Stiglitz, 1989), particularly when other options such 
as close monitoring, repetition, reputation and the effectiveness of penalties have 
failed to solve agency problems. A question to bear in mind is whether principals will 
know that other options have failed given problems of observability and verifiability. 
The above options may work in some settings or circumstances, or not, and they need 
to be analysed in the overall context of the various feasible options or the scarcity of 
these. For example, in environments with short supply of agents, principals may have 
to consider more sophisticated alternatives than contract termination. In any event, if 
agency problems are intrinsic to the nature of the transaction, they apply to the next 
contract as well. This suggests that the principal needs to rely more on the 
development of innovative incentive schemes and monitoring strategies or to avoid 
delegation of tasks to an agent, which is often not possible. In other words, agency 
costs are not avoidable but only minimisable. 
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
This review provided a brief justification for the choice of agency theory as a possible 
framework to analyse the relationship of DPs and RGs. It highlighted that the 
application of agency theory to the health sector is now well established. However, it 
found that agency theory has only recently started to be used to further understand 
the dynamics of the aid delivery process. It revealed that studies in the area have 
focused on the behaviour of recipient countries and not on the incentive environment 
faced by both recipient and donor organisations. 
The review presented the basic model of an agency relationship. It also examined the 
dynamic models including multiple tasks and multiple principals. In addition, it outlined 
various options for dealing with agency problems, the most common one being the 
establishment of monitoring mechanisms. Other options were: the use of repetition, 
reputation and termination. 
As of yet, agency problems (conflicting objective functions, incentive structures, 
difficulties in observing and verifying the performance of agents) have not been 
thoroughly assessed in relation to IDAH. The application of agency theory to this 
sector (health) is of particular relevance as health outcomes are determined within a 
complex scenario of uncertainties and various contributing factors. These complexities 
enhance the difficulties in monitoring and measurement, which instigate the use of 
principal agency theory to understand the explicit and implicit incentive structure of the 
aid contract. This reinforces the idea that agency theory seems a plausible framework 
worth exploring in depth as one possible approach to study this subject area. 
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Chapter 3: Understanding aid effectiveness in the health sector through the 
lens of agency theory: a conceptual framework 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I explore how the literature on IDAH, with a focus on monitoring issues, 
relates to agency theory concepts (by reviewing the former and discussing it in 
relation to the latter). By doing this, I highlight the key elements within agency theory 
that help to construct the guiding analytical framework for this study. Some concluding 
remarks are presented in the last section of the chapter. 
3.2 Nature of the aid contract 
In IDAH, the nature of the contract will vary widely, but will tend to be rather implicit, 
and one can construe the modes of IDAH outlined previously, such as SWAp, as an 
example of such contracts. As put by McPake et al. (2002), "where these contracts 
and incentives are implicit, it is interesting to consider their nature and effectiveness... 
the systems are often subtle and may be unobservable to outsiders... they are 
sometimes hidden in the trading of political favours... which may not be written down. " 
3.3 Types of principal-agent relationships and level at which they operate 
More generally, in IDA there will be various sets of principal-agent relationships 
between and within the involved organisations (Zinnes and Bolaky, 2002), through 
multiple layers of delegation (Martens et al., 2002). Figure 3.1 shows the main sets of 
principal-agent relationships between organisations in IDA. For instance, a bilateral 
aid agency acts as an agent on behalf of its government, which acts as the principal 
towards a recipient government or an NGO (either an NGO from the 'donor' country or 
from the recipient country) or even a subcontracted for-profit organisation. This is the 
case of DFID -a bilateral agency acting as an agent on behalf of the Government of 
the UK. In this case, the government of the UK will also be acting as an agent on 
behalf of UK citizens, which are the ultimate principals in this chain. Another 
illustration of a principal-agent relationship includes the one between a multilateral 
agency and the 'donor' government. In this case, the agency acts as the agent and 
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the government as the principal. At the same time, the multilateral agency acts as a 
principal towards a recipient government or NGO. A further example of a principal- 
agent relationship refers to the recipient government which acts as an agent on behalf 
of a bilateral and/or a multilateral agency and/or a 'donor' NGO. The recipient 
government also acts as an agent on behalf of its citizens. In the case of a 
decentralised government, the central or national government acts as a principal 
towards the local government. A final illustration of a set of principal-agent 
relationships involve the private sector, where companies can set up a charity or 
foundation which delivers aid to recipient countries. The foundation acts as an agent 
on behalf of the company or persons that fund it. On the other hand, it also acts as a 
principal towards recipient governments or NGO or multi- and bilateral agencies. An 
example of such a set up is the Gates Foundation, which is an increasingly important 
actor in IDAH with respect to the volume of aid it provides. 
Figure 3.1: Sets of principal-agent relationships in international development 
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McPake et al. (2002) suggest that there are cases when agency relationships function 
in both directions between the parties. As mentioned above, Figure 3.1 shows when 
DPs act as agents on behalf of their governments. In addition, one could also interpret 
DPs to be acting as agents vis-ä-vis RGs. In this case the argument would be that the 
principal, RGs, hold resources that DPs are interested in, i. e. RGs offer access to the 
country and population groups where DPs can carry out their aid activities and thus 
disburse the funds which they are supposed to on behalf of their principals 
(governments in 'donor' countries). Standard agency theory presumes penalties and 
rewards to be centred on financial incentives. Figure 3.1 shows this through the 
continuous lines. When RGs act as principals vis-ä-vis a DP, they "incentivise" DPs by 
means of regulation. This is depicted in the above figure through the dashed lines. 
The dotted line represents the absence of a principal-agent relationship. 
Zinnes and Bolaky (2002) identified three different levels of analysis for the study of 
the aid environment: the macro, meso and micro levels. The sets of principal-agent 
relationships in international development assistance shown in figure 3.1 represent 
the macro level. This-level encompasses the entire set of organisational actors (e. g. 
donor governments, donor agencies, recipient countries) the aid package (e. g. the 
interventions to be delivered, the required resources) and the institutional environment 
(e. g. the constitutions / legislations in donor and recipient countries, the memorandum 
of understanding or contract between the parties, budget frameworks). The meso 
level involves the aid organisations as actors and focuses on their interests and 
institutional rules/games. Analysis at the micro level addresses the incentives and 
games that individuals within organisations have to deal with. 
Also shown in Figure 3.1 is the lack of a direct link of relationship between what are 
supposed to be the two main actors in the chain of IDA. These actors are the 
population in 'donor' countries, the taxpayers that finance the bulk of foreign aid, and 
the population in the 'recipient' countries, those that are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
aid. In between them, there are several organisations and layers of national and 
international bureaucracy and delegation, with various actors in the functions of 
principals and agents. As the link between these two population sets is intermediated 
by various other actors, it is a weak and vague relationship in terms of accountability. 
Martens et al. (2002) call this the broken feedback loop. While beneficiaries of aid 
may be able to observe the action of the agents, they are not entrusted to influence 
the incentive structure of the aid contract. The population in the 'donor countries' have 
to rely on their agents (bilateral or multilateral or NGOs) to observe the performance 
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of delivered aid. However, as discussed previously, actions are often not observable, 
agents have no immediate reasons to reveal private information and there are 
inherent complexities in measuring performance. 
The broken feedback loop issue may be less problematic in the case of aid being 
delivered through pooled arrangements. These arrangements make use of existing 
recipient government accountability mechanisms which are often far from perfect but 
are the focus of improvements as part of the implementation of a SWAp or GBS (at 
least in theory). 
Although the population in the 'recipient' countries are the ultimate beneficiaries of aid, 
they are actually only the indirect beneficiaries. The agents in the principal-agent 
chain of the relationships of aid are, in fact, those organizations and actors that are 
located in the middle area of the boxes and arrows in Figure 3.1. They are the 
domestic suppliers of goods and services in IDA, i. e. consultancy business, 
independent professionals, suppliers of products. They are considered the agents 
(direct beneficiaries of aid) as they are the ones that receive the contractually agreed 
rewards and have direct influence on the domestic political actors (Martens et al., 
2002). 
Finally in regard to Figure 3.1, it is worth noting that new aid modes offer the 
opportunity of changes in the nature of the principal-agent relationships (content of the 
arrows), as the incentive environment can be altered, but not the direction of 
relationships (direction of arrows). 
3.4 Conflicting objective functions 
As discussed in the preceding section, penalties and rewards are used to influence 
agents towards agreed outcomes between the parties. The agreement between the 
parties may, ultimately, be congruent, and in the area of IDA, should be along the line 
of the overall goal of alleviating poverty and fostering socio-economic development, 
by means of the implementation of specific policies and improved delivery of services. 
However, as presented in chapter 2, agency relationships are characterised by 
conflicting objective functions. Hence, the objectives pursued by DPs and RGs may in 
practice, and routinely, not be completely in line with the overall goals agreed in a 
contract. 
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What one organisation and its set of actors may be pursuing, at one point in time, is 
not always the same as another organisation and its set of actors. DPs may be willing 
to provide aid motivated by commercial and foreign policy objectives25 (White, 1998; 
Kanbur et al., 1999; Martens et al., 2002; Robinson and Tarp, 2000) which leads to 
favouring of certain countries over others (Walt et al., 1999a). Alternatively, the 
international agency (e. g. GFATM) may be under the influence or be the result of a 
new world trend or fashion, as for instance pursuing a focus on infectious disease 
[which could be linked to the motivation of donors to provide aid in view of externality 
problems (Kanbur, 2003)]. 
On the other hand, a policy priority of the recipient government may be to strengthen 
local health services and improve coverage and quality of Primary Health Care (PHC). 
Then again it may be influenced by a systemic patronage system and a need to deal 
with national economic and political priorities (Walt et al., 1999a). In this sense, there 
may be a conflict of objective functions, and differing objective functions give rise to 
agency' problems. 
In addition to competing priorities and differing objective functions between 
organisations, there are also conflicting ones within organisations. In other words, one 
needs to distinguish the inter- and intra-organisational conflicts between different 
principals and among them. 
With respect to inter-organisational conflicting goals, actors (in this case, more 
specifically, aid officials) are guided by their organisations' overall institutional vision 
and mission (when these are clear, as mentioned later). For instance, the specialised 
team within an agency, such as the health group in the World Bank, pursue the goal 
of getting loans approved and funds disbursed for projects in the area of health sector 
reform for example. In contrast, the government may think that the priority for 
investment is to concentrate efforts on a specific disease. Hence, in such a context, 
25 While political, strategic and commercial motives in the allocation of aid seemed to have constrained 
more effective aid allocations, DPs are driven by other motives as well and not all donors tend to be so 
strongly driven by the same objectives. For instance, existing evidence suggests that while the large 
donors tend to provide aid to a great extent based on strategic and political goals (e. g. USA and Japan), 
smaller donor countries (e. g. Scandinavian countries) tend to align their aid allocations more closely with 
the objectives of the recipient countries or pursue more altruistic motives such as poverty reduction 
(Hjertholm and White, 2000). There are, however, exceptions as shown by Ostrom et al (2001 cited in 
Martens et al., 2002) in the case of Sweden which tends to pursue more commercial interests when 
allocating aid. 
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incentives are needed to align the objective functions and guide the agent's behaviour 
towards the advancement of the principal's utility. 
Regarding intra-organisational conflicting goals, aid officials, besides handling their 
organisation's vision, are also motivated by their own objectives and ambitions. They 
have strong incentives to pursue such goals as maintaining the flow of lending 
projects (or aid more generally) as it underpins their jobs and may advance their 
careers within the aid agency (Collier, 2002; Kanbur, 2003). Alternatively, they may 
strongly invest (or advocate) for one particular programme, even if that programme is 
not necessarily of high priority for the recipient country. On the side of recipient 
governments, public servants may think that their primary objective is to generate per 
diems to top up their low salaries26. 
As pointed out, IDA organisations are often not clear about which institutional vision 
and mission they are pursuing. This is illustrated by their conflicting objective function: 
if the promotion of long term development in recipient countries or the advancement of 
the interests of domestic suppliers, as is the case with USAID when it ties aid to 
specific American suppliers (Azfar, 2002). 
3.5 Dynamic model (multi-principals and multi-tasks) 
As discussed earlier multiple tasks and multiple principals pursuing a variety of 
objectives are pervasive in public and large organisations (Dixit 1996,1997; Tirole, 
1994; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). As aid agencies are in general large 
organisations and operate in a public administration environment (not for profit), they 
also face similar problems that arise in such contexts (Martens et al., 2002). An 
exception is the private companies often subcontracted to deliver services or 
consultancies. For example, USAID is an agency that often uses such private 
companies. 
DPs when acting as agents are accountable to various constituencies and their 
interests. For instance bilateral agencies are accountable to a range of principals in 
government (different layers within executive and legislative branches of the public 
sector) and multilateral agencies are accountable to a series of principals in different 
26 And they may actually be responding to perverse incentives provided by donors who are prepared to 
offer staff supplements, fund training activities and vehicles which encourage rent seeking and patronage 
(Foster and Leavy, 2001). 
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countries (member states of the international organisation) where again there are 
various layers of delegation within their governments (Murrell, 2002). 
DPs operating in a country also face the multi-principal dimension of the recipient 
agencies which are accountable to a variety of constituencies. For instance, at the 
central level, disease-specific programmes within the MoH are likely to be 
accountable to the policy and planning department (or unit with equivalent function) - 
which if the country operates a SWAp or GBS will be responsible for coordinating aid - 
as well as to different DPs if these are operating vertical programmes. Further, if one 
takes the perspective of a local government in terms of the multiplicity of principals, 
they may include the central government, donor NGOs, local population, multi- and 
bilateral agencies, and in end effect also the tax payers in 'donor' countries (despite 
the problem of the broken feedback loop). These various principals have, of course, 
diverse interests as well. So the agent, the local government, has to perform a variety 
of tasks to advance the interest of various different principals which can give rise to 
agency problems. 
In trying to deal with the problem of low powered incentives in bureaucracies, Dixit 
(1996; 1997) proposes some strategies. First, he suggests "to group together 
principals whose interests are better aligned, who can then collude within each 
group". This may be a strategy pursued, for example, by DFID which is trying to 
influence other DPs to join pooled arrangements. In Uganda it seemed to be working 
in a positive way, for example with Ireland Aid, although the idea is not to collude 
within a group but to lobby other like-minded DPs to join and strengthen this kind of 
aid delivery. A problem linked to principals' collusion refers to the complexities of 
agreement among principals about the division of the total gain from cooperation 
(Dixit, 1996). This problem is even more relevant in the public sector where gains are 
often non-monetary and "are measured in non-comparable, non-transferable units". 
This problem is in line with one of the dilemmas of pooled arrangements which refers 
to the non-attributability of results to specific DPs (IHSD, 2000). 
Second, he recommends that "agencies can be so designed that each performs fewer 
tasks, thus reducing the externalities among the principals affected by its actions". 
Perhaps this could be achieved by using NGOs which are specialised in specific 
service areas such as HIV/AIDS or family planning, thus reducing the number of tasks 
performed by the government. This suggestion mirrors the project approach where 
specific programmes or sets of activities are implemented either by NGOs or special 
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units within the government or even by a DP itself, also by establishing a separate 
project implementation unit. Alternatively, a selection of priority areas or diseases 
could be the focus of government services, as is the example of 'essential health 
package' schemes. Such a package of priority services may be the focus of funding in 
a SWAp, as is the case in Bangladesh where maternal care, some infectious diseases 
and child health take precedence (Ensor et al., 2002). 
Third, he proposes that "one may restrict the principal's incentive schemes so that 
each one is allowed to observe and reward only the dimension of output for 
alternatively measurable tasks as well] that concerns him". Dixit (1997) points out that 
if the agent's utility contains different sorts of efforts as surrogate, this will induce each 
principal to try to monopolise the agent's effort to advance his own utility by providing 
strong incentives. In the project approach, it is possible that DPs will compete and by 
providing the strongest incentives will win vis-ä-vis other DPs. This may lead to 
inequality problems among districts or areas covered by the different DPs who work 
directly with local authorities, some that provide weaker incentives and others that 
provide stronger ones. 
However, the question is if this is possible. In the project approach, different principals 
(in this case different DPs) attempt to attract the agent's (here the recipient 
government or NGO) effort for their individual projects. This leads to a patchwork of 
different activities (sometimes even duplication) and competition for scarce local 
resources (human and infrastructure) putting them under pressure to respond to the 
DPs' different requirements (Cassels and Janovsky, 1998). 
On the other hand, in the SWAp approach the question is more about how a single 
DP can distinguish which dimension of output of the government's action arises from 
the DP's financial contribution. In an ultimate form of SWAp (where funds of all 
partners are pooled together and budgeted, disbursed and accounted for using the 
recipient country's system), attribution of specific contributions of the different donors 
to specific outputs is practically impossible. The issue of attribution in pooled , 
arrangements (SWAp and GBS) is a source of concern for DPs, particularly those 
involved in disease-specific programmes who fear that: they will no longer be able to 
account for the impact of their particular investment; there may be a dilution of training 
and performance management systems (they supported via projects); that RGs' audit 
capacity and procurement systems are weak (IHSD, 2000). In addition, the attribution 
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of results is frustrated by the difficulties in observing the agent's efforts in advancing 
the principal's utility (assuming that the principal knows what to pursue). 
In order to deal with these difficulties while waiting for recipient countries systems to 
improve, DPs set up accountability mechanisms or additional demands on the 
recipient government's systems. These demands created by DPs are in line with 
those required by the principals of DPs. These accountability mechanisms focus on 
managerial and financial aspects of resource disbursements and to some extent on 
outputs and outcomes (as discussed in the next section). However, accountability 
mechanisms in recipient countries also need to respond to the demands of the 
country's principals, i. e. other branches of government such as the legislative, civil 
society and ultimately the population. Yet, these seem not to be the focus of 
strengthening within the SWAp or GBS agreements. Civil society groups have voiced 
their concern that they feel excluded from these new types of aid modalities and 
hence restricted in their role of holding governments to account (Lister and 
Nyamugasira 2003). 
In regard to the problem of multiple tasks, I explained earlier that when tasks are 
clearly defined, incentives tend to work well, but in the case of the public sector and 
IDA, where tasks tend to be multidimensional and outcomes are difficult to observe 
and verify, incentives become weak (Devarajan and Reinikka, 2002). 
Drawing on the results of the model developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), 1 
discuss here some of the instruments proposed to deal with the problem of multiple 
tasks in relation to IDAH. 
First, the payment of fixed wages for aid officials (in DPs agencies and RGs), as a 
weak performance incentive, is already the most common incentive scheme used. 
This scheme is preferred over a perhaps more high-powered scheme of paying them 
piece rate wages because of the multiple tasks which compete for their time and 
effort, and the associated difficulties of measuring these (particularly effort) with 
respect to the agency's goals (Azfar, 2002). 
With regard to the delivery modalities in the health sector, the use of fixed wages is 
common in both the project approach and pooled arrangements. However, the main 
difference between these is that in the case of the former a form of high-powered 
incentive exists, whereby DPs, when contracting out an implementing agency or 
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setting up a project implementation unit, are able to attract local staff by offering 
higher salaries and benefit packages as compared to salaries paid by the government 
for employees performing similar tasks. In the case of the latter, government 
employees are not offered any extra incentives. Another type of incentive linked to the 
project approach refers to the use of per diems for the supervision of activities or 
attached to the participation in workshops (for planning, training, evaluation purposes 
etc. ). These can be offered to staff of project-delivered activities as well as to 
government employees, in which case the use of per diems also affects SWAp and 
GBS. 
DPs are criticised for providing such incentives as they attract away from government 
service scarcely available skilled local staff and divert the staff's time and attention 
from their regular activities by means of offering generous per diems (Conn et al. 
1996). This aggravates the staffing situation in the public sector (Cassels and 
Janovsky, 1998) and compromises the quality and effectiveness of services (including 
financial management which is often of great concern for donors) (Devarajan and 
Reinikka, 2002). But it can be understood from the perspective of the staff who 
respond to the incentives as they endeavour to advance their utility functions, and 
from the perspective of DPs who in order to achieve progress in their projects or 
activities attempt to attract the necessary human resources available. 
In such cases, Azfar (2002) argues in favour of weak incentives based on broad sets 
of outputs as opposed to sharp incentives on specific tasks that may divert the agent's 
efforts towards the easy-to-measure tasks, implying perhaps that DPs should not be 
allowed to reward staff using high-powered incentives. However, in the context of low 
income and aid-dependent countries, it is questionable the extent to which the RG 
would be able to curb such behaviours by DPs (particularly in the case of GHIs such 
as PEPFAR which tends to come into a RG with strong political clout) and individual 
government officials. 
The introduction of policies setting limits on outside activities instead of providing 
incentives for inside and non-tangible tasks that are difficult to measure and 
subsequently to reward27 is a second method of dealing with multiple tasks that can 
-be observed in IDA. Earmarking of resources channelled via IDA occur in both the 
27 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) suggest that "constraints are substitutes for performance incentives 
and are extensively used when it is hard to assess the performance of the agent". 
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project approach and pooled arrangements, as a control mechanism to constrain the 
activities of the agent. 
In the case of projects, DPs often earmark funds for capital investments only, in the 
understanding that recurrent costs are assumed by recipient governments as their 
counterpart. However, recurrent costs requirements are most often not met by 
governments, resulting in poorly maintained facilities, lack of basic inputs such as 
drugs, and poorly motivated staff (who are on low salaries and do not have the 
adequate tools and materials to perform their tasks). A form of enforcing such 
restrictions can be illustrated by the procedure adopted when using a World Bank 
loan. In this case, a failure to spend resources on capital investments results in such 
an expenditure not being reimbursed by the World Bank. 
In the case of the SWAp, this is a form of restriction itself on the part of DPs, whereby 
their contribution is earmarked to a specific sector, health or education for instance. 
The introduction of restrictions in IDA is also related to aid fungibility. This happens 
when IDA funds are not spent as additional money to the RGs' budget but rather as a 
substitute for the government's expenditures in that area or project (Devarajan and 
Swaroop, 1998). This has contributed to DPs preferring project aid in the past as a 
means to secure that their funds go into those areas they have chosen as the priority. 
More recently, the use of targets when DPs channel funds as support to RGs budgets 
constitutes another form of conditionality, an ex post one (Adam and Gunning, 2002). 
It is worth noting however that targets are a form of incentives themselves. This 
suggests that the two opposing roles of targets (i. e. as a form of conditionality and as 
incentives) are not wholly separable, because they may alter how restriction works 
and who decides how monitoring should be carried out. 
Thirdly, in the use of job design as an instrument to control incentives, the principal 
may choose, for example, the agent's portfolio of tasks, with some employees (or 
agencies/units) specialising in activities that are difficult to monitor and others in 
activities that are easy to monitor. This relates to the second option discussed above 
under multiple principals where Dixit suggests that agencies be designed so that each 
performs a smaller number of tasks, therefore reducing the externalities among the 
principals. There might be some scope for this being achieved by using NGOs, which 
are specialised in specific service areas, as in the project approach or even the 
essential package of services to be delivered under a SWAp. Also mentioned 
previously is the case of restricting DPs funds under the project approach to capital 
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investments where the output of the action is easier to measure, for instance if a 
hospital was built or a piece of equipment purchased. To separate tasks according to 
their measurability characteristics in order to provide a foundation for the incentive 
scheme is certainly less of an option under pooled arrangements, as funds are 
channelled for all types of tasks, tangible and non-tangible ones. 
Finally, the use of tournaments or rankings for comparing the performance of different 
agents and rewarding accordingly is considered. A kind of tournament, though not 
explicit, already takes place when DPs choose those countries that are considered as 
good performers to receive aid [in line with the aid selectivity debate (Kanbur, 2003)]. 
Good governance is a criterion often adopted by DPs for selecting a country to be a 
recipient of IDA (see for example JICA, 2003). Less overtly recognised criteria include 
geopolitical interests, when for instance countries like the USA choose to provide IDA 
to recipients like Egypt instead of The Gambia, for strategic reasons (Zinnes and 
Bolaky, 2002). 
A more explicit approach to tournaments seems to be in taking place in IDAH, as 
GAVI and the GFATM adopt clear targets and country competition as part of the 
compensation scheme of the aid contract. An even more complex version of such 
schemes could be to reward or penalise recipient countries on the basis of a more 
comprehensive performance ranking, which could be based for instance on progress 
towards the MDGs or the performance assessment developed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) presented in the World Health Report (WHR) 2000 (WHO, 2000). 
This approach, however, raises a series of problems, which have similarities to the 
heated debates that took place in the aftermath of the release of the WHR 200028 (see 
for instance Williams, 2001; Almeida et al., 2001; Navarro, 2001; Blendon et a/., 2001; 
Walt and Mills, 2001). Key criticisms included the lack of discussion in relation to what 
indicators to use and how to measure them (the simplicity and transparency of data 
collection and processing, if composite measures or not, if routinely available data or 
survey). This highlights that at the minimum, the choice of indicators should be based 
on their policy relevance, and data should be easily (transparently) collected, 
processed and analysed. 
28 WHO's framework for assessing the performance of health systems centres on 3 main goals (to 
improve health, to enhance responsiveness to the expectations of the population, and to assure fairness 
of financial contributions) and 4 functions (stewardship, financing, service provision and resource 
generation) (Murray and Frenk, 2000). WHO's motivation to propose the above framework resulted from 
the lack of agreed goals and objectives of health systems as well as from the analytical focus on 
processes rather than outcomes (WHO, 2001). The framework was used by WHO as a departing point 
for the measurement and categorisation of countries in relation to their health system performance. 
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One of the potential problems of using tournaments is that countries are ranked and 
rewarded on the basis of their position in a league table, but this may allow DPs to 
simply'wash their hands' of the process, and distance themselves from the important 
elements of participating and contributing to the country's capacity development, i. e. 
why and how it is in position x and may move up or down on the table. Tournaments 
could also limit the scope for building up a more in-depth international knowledge 
base and disseminating positive and negative experiences on the process of reform 
which other countries can learn from. 
Looking at the options for using tournaments for aid delivery within recipient countries, 
besides problems of measurement of performance (discussed in further detail in the 
next section), there is the problem of lack of potential competition as the number of 
agents could be limited, as raised by Tirole (1994) in the context of the public sector. 
In addition, the use of tournaments may focus the attention on efficiency while other 
goals, inherent to the public sector, such as equity and accountability are neglected. 
3.6 Dealing with agency problems 
3.6.1 Monitoring under imperfect information 
In recent years, the approach to monitoring in IDA has been influenced by recent 
reforms in the public sector in developed and developing countries alike. Such 
reforms have focused on improving the efficiency, quality and accountability of public 
services. The NPM, an approach to these reforms, entails, among others, changes 
related to the introduction of clearer links between inputs and outputs and 
performance agreements (Kaul, 1997). Experiences of applying NPM types of reforms 
in the public sector in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the USA and others abound 
(Kaul, 1997; Ashton, 1998; Mannion and Goddard, 2002). All across African 
countries, reforms inspired by NPM (though not all reforms29) are also gaining ground 
(Therkildsen, 2001). 
ROM is based on the approach that public services or departments are remunerated 
on the basis of their performance. Emphasis on accountability has led to increasing 
pressure to adopt and promote ROM as a way to improve monitoring practices and 
29 For instance, some reforms have been inspired by other groups of ideas such as the neo-liberalism 
which pervaded economic changes in many African countries throughout the 1980s. 
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mechanisms (Lavergne, 2002). Lavergne points out that a contemporary definition of 
accountability increasingly stresses accountability for results, as opposed to 
accountability for following certain rules and procedures. Hence accountability for 
expenditures is tied to the results achieved and not only to the inputs and processes 
used. Changes in performance need to be measured by using indicators and 
benchmarking for assessing progress towards established goals or targets. 
For instance, the GFATM is using indicators of progress based on results for the 
disbursements of funds to recipient countries (GFATM, 2002). Alternatively earmarked 
contributions to the general budget may be provided based on the commitment of 
countries to improve results related to the three diseases covered by the Fund. 
Though it is not clearly specified what kinds of results the Fund expects, it is assumed 
that these are more clearly defined in the specific contractual arrangements between 
the Fund and the countries awarded grants. 
There are two issues embedded in this new approach to aid delivery. First is the shift 
of focus of monitoring indicators from inputs to outputs. Second is the conditional use 
of funding to results or targets to be achieved by the recipient organisation. These two 
issues are reviewed in further detail in the remainder of this section. 
This shift in the accountability approach from an input based model to an outcome or 
results based model, as exemplified by the GFATM above, corresponds to an overall 
trend in public administration (Paul, 1992; Zumeta, 2000) as well as in IDA (Adam and 
Gunning 2002; Lavergne, 2002; Martens et al., 2002; Maxwell 2003). Adam and 
Gunning (2002) refer to the use of performance indicators as a form of ex post 
conditionality for aid delivery. Martens et al. (2002) mention the focus towards inputs 
as opposed to outcomes in regard to the broken feedback loop and the incentive 
biases such as paying aid officials fixed salaries as opposed to rewarding them for 
performance (for instance for number of children immunised). 
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3.6.2 Input-based model 
The traditional focus of public accountability30 has been one of an input-driven model 
(Paul, 1992), where performance in public services or organisations would be 
measured on the basis of inputs (human, financial, and physical resources), often 
financial and human resources, and to some extent on process and outputs. M&E 
would be centred on control mechanisms such as reports, evaluation missions, and 
audits of inputs and processes (Zumeta, 2000). In a forum organised by CIDA on 
SWAp and accountability, the input-based model was described as a form of 
monitoring that was based on process, was hierarchical, control-oriented and 
bureaucratic, and encouraged rules (Lavergne, 2002). 
Past experience of evaluation exercises carried out by DPs, common under the 
project approach, tended to be short term, used external consultants that were not 
always well familiarised with local realities and problems, applied poor methodological 
design, lacked consistency across evaluations as well as benchmarks which impeded 
assessment of progress over time. Engelkes (1993) questions, thus, the reliability, 
validity, and relevance of the use of evaluation reports of PHC programmes funded by 
donors. Schrettenbrunner and Harpham (1993) point out that "it seems likely that 
expensive, ill-designed and inappropriate health impact evaluations will continue to be 
implemented due to political pressures [as they involve people with strong stakes in 
the projects/programmes], which ignore the conceptual and methodological problems 
associated with such evaluations". 
There are also problems with the use of audits as the agent may hide information from 
the principal. Related to this is the issue of using international auditors as opposed to 
local ones. In this case, the problems arise from the unfamiliarity of international 
auditors with local practices which can be very intricate. The auditors have difficulties 
assimilating those or have very limited time to assimilate these and hence need to rely 
on local staff to guide them through the practices. 
Given the incentive environment in which these evaluations take place [chains of 
principal-agent relationships (where DPs also act as agents) and international 
30 "Public accountability refers to the spectrum of approaches, mechanisms and practices used by the 
stakeholders concerned with public services to ensure a desired level and type of performance. Its 
effectiveness will depend on whether influence of the concerned stakeholders is reflected in the 
monitoring and incentive systems of service providers" (Paul, 1992). 
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bureaucracy], it. is not surprising that the scope for such evaluations and audits to. 
observe and verify action (including inputs), outputs and most of all effort is very 
limited. Thus they fail to reveal performance information to the ultimate principals (tax 
payers in donor countries) as well as to punish agents for engaging in opportunistic 
behaviours - and to highlight that evaluators or auditors could be subject to cooption 
or bribery even if external. 
Under the input-driven accountability model, DPs focus on budgetary expenditures 
(Adam and Gunning, 2002; Martens et al. 2002). Here the agent shifts effort to 
activities where outputs are easily monitored, i. e. inputs (budget controls as opposed 
to long term sustainability or quality of a project or capacity development initiative) 
(Martens et al. 2002). M&E focus on the amounts of resources planned to be spent 
vis-ä-vis amount of funds actually disbursed (delivery rates), which also counts as a 
form of evaluating managerial performance of staff in aid agencies. Emphasis on 
achieving high levels of delivery rates can lead to strong pressures over the year, with 
the situation worsening in the third quarter of the year, to a point of risking expenditure 
in less important and relevant elements of the project that are less difficult to achieve. 
For instance, as opposed to building up a community project, which requires a 
bottom-up approach, resources could be spent on publications, which are based on a 
more top-down approach and will use resources more quickly. 
3.6.3 Outcome-based model 
A school tracking study in Uganda (Ablo and Reinikka, 1998) helped to highlight the 
limitations of the input model for monitoring in IDA (Adam and Gunning, 2002) and 
instigated alternative approaches by focusing more on the effects of the inputs 
allocated into the system vis-ä-vis the beneficiary population. Going beyond the 
simple comparison of budget allocations to actual disbursement, the study followed 
the disbursed resources at the central level and checked whether funds reached the 
intended destination, which in this case were primary schools (Booth and Lucas, 
2002). The study demonstrated that on average only 13% of the funds disbursed at 
central level reached the schools. The bulk of the resources were either used by local 
government officials for purposes outside the education sector or for private gain. 
As part of the aid effectiveness package of reforms, more focus has been placed on 
outcomes/results. In order to account for those results, monitoring and evaluation 
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systems are being adapted to focus more clearly on outcome and equity measures. 
In this model, emphasis is placed on monitoring outcome indicators such as variation 
in morbidity and mortality. In regard to equity, one can use benefit incidence analysis 
for example to examine the extent to which the poor and disadvantaged are de facto 
S 
being able to access and utilise health services. This shift is likely to compound the 
principals' monitoring and verification tasks given the multidimensional nature of 
outcome measures. 
The model is described as one that promotes greater pro-activity, more flexibility in 
assessing and managing risks and places greater emphasis on partnership 
(Lavergne, 2002). This description suggests that the outcome based model of M&E is 
to some extent based on the concept of'trust. As stated earlier, according to Allen 
(2000) trust and cooperation can contribute to more effective relational contracts by 
substituting the impossibility of writing complete contracts and monitoring fully the 
agent's performance in view of information problems. The outcome based model is 
also closely associated with the new aid modes of GBS and SWAp. As opposed to the 
project approach where trust is believed not to be a major problem as projects rely 
more on micro-management, in a SWAp trust is perceived as being more important. 
The idea is that risk is shared between partners and that trust between people from 
various organisations is built over time (Peters and Chao, 1998). Beyond trust and 
given weaknesses of existing monitoring and information systems, in practice partners 
seem to progress along the continuum of SWAp by establishing intermediary 
instruments as mentioned earlier, such as earmarked contributions or basketing, 
demanding additional accounting and auditing requirements in line with their 
countries' regulations and procedures, and imposing conditionalities. With regard to 
this, Foster et al. (2000) point out that before donors gain confidence in existing 
systems, they "are still keeping close to the detail of sector programme development 
and implementation, expecting close liaison and consultation with government officials 
throughout the process". Hence, elements of the input-based model of monitoring 
continue to be used. 
The health sector, as opposed to other sectors in IDA, has already had experience in 
the past of focusing on outcome measures via vertical programmes supported by 
international agencies such as UNICEF and WHO (Adam and Gunning, 2002) and 
more recently with GAVI (Starling et al., 2001). Under the SWAp, the focus of 
evaluation moves from the performance of single projects towards the performance of 
the entire health system, chiefly in regard to health outcomes (Cassels and Janovsky, 
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1998). For instance, the use of maternal mortality is suggested as an indicator of 
access to health care and functioning of health systems, as SWAp focuses on health 
systems development and not on single diseases or conditions (Goodburn and 
Campbell, 2001). 
More generally, this model has several- advantages. The use of outcome measures 
allows for the provision of evidence of status, for the use of benchmarks for assessing 
progress over time and for the clarification of policy and provision of a political 
framework (Maxwell, 2003) - e. g. targets like the MDGs have provided political 
impetus to poverty alleviation efforts. It is also helpful to broaden the perspective of 
the actors involved in designing and implementing activities, by focusing on more long 
term goals and ultimate objectives, such as improving rates of educational attainment 
or reducing the proportion of people living in poverty in a given country over a 
specified period of time. 
However, when analysed from a principal-agency perspective, this model has a 
number of disadvantages. It involves very high costs of measurement, verification and 
other complexities such as lack of capacity which may facilitate the scope for the, 
occurrence of moral hazard and adverse selection (Martens et al., 2002; Adam and 
Gunning, 2002). If even in developed countries the use of performance measurement 
imposes considerable challenges (Mannion and Goddard, 2002), in low income 
countries these challenges are much greater. General problems with-this model 
include risks of: over-simplification and misinterpretation of development efforts and 
how development outcomes occur (to take a reductionist approach to a complex/ 
multifaceted problem) (Lavergne, 2002; Maxwell, 2003). These issues reflect the 
kinds of difficulties faced by a principal when trying to disentangle the various 
dimensions of the agents' performance in the monitoring process. 
The complexities related to observability and verifiability when dealing with the 
outcome model raises a number of questions around what to measure, how to 
measure, and capacity to measure. 
With respect to what to measure, the first question refers to what kinds of indicators 
should be chosen. There is of course the risk of over-emphasizing results that are 
easy to quantify at the expense of less tangible but equally important outcomes 
(Lavergne, 2002; Maxwell, 2003). As seen in a tracking study of GAVI activities at 
country level, incentives based on quantity may lead to data being faked (Starling et 
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al., 2001) or effort being diverted from quality, particularly when the latter is poorly 
measured (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and measurement or monitoring systems 
are weak. 
It is difficult to identify the key indicators that help to understand the crucial links in the 
causal chain. The danger is to develop a mechanical (technical and rigid) reporting of 
indicators as opposed to strategic use of data (Lavergne, 2002; Booth and Lucas, 
2002). Lavergne (2002) sees this problem as particularly relevant to the log frame 
approach as a tool of ROM, underpinned by a linear causality postulate from inputs- 
process-to-outputs-to-outcomes. The how (the process of implementation) tends not 
to be captured in ROM frameworks. One needs to recognise the presence of 
feedback loops; synergies, vicious and virtual circles, and others that cannot be 
linearly described (Lavergne, 2002) as randomness and uncertainty. The inclusion of 
intermediate targets may help to clarify the gaps. Yet Lavergne (2002) argues further 
for the need for more analysis of how the links occur. Adam and Gunning (2002) also 
point out that more research may help clarify the problem of technical uncertainties 
between inputs and outputs (though this may not help in relation to uncertainty due to 
difficulties of observing the agent's efforts). 
The choice of indicators of performance is an intricate exercise, as those selected can 
be either too broad and vague to the point of being meaningless or too limited and 
excluding important elements that should have been captured. Adam and Gunning 
(2002) argue that outcomes were vaguely defined in Uganda (though not all) and 
there were often incomplete links between short term and long term targets or 
outcomes. In addition, the choice of indicators can be rather contentious. For 
instance, the MDGs are strong on material aspects of deprivation such as income, but 
weak on non-material aspects like political rights and freedom, and refer to poverty 
reduction as opposed to equality (Maxwell, 2003). Indicators are a sign of the (health) 
policies of a country, which in turn reflect the values and judgements a society or 
political system attaches to the achievements they envisage. It would be naive to 
imagine that a value-free policy is feasible (Williams, 2001). 
In terms of how to measure health outcomes, a variety of issues around methods, 
data quality, and verifiability are of concern. There are considerable challenges 
regarding the production of simple, accurate and relevant data. Methods and data are 
not always reliable; one needs to be attentive to the design of systems and 
instruments applied in the production of routine data and surveys for example. In fact, 
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surveys are seen as technically superior, but they may contain shortcomings as well, 
regarding for example the use of reliable and robust methods and the kind of 
assumptions made (Booth and Lucas, 2002). As pointed out by critics of the WHR 
2000 (Williams, 2001; Almeida 2001), one needs transparent choice and handling of 
data, including data of policy relevance. 
There is a risk of relying on existing poor systems and using unreliable data, without 
making efforts to improve the current system or considering what the information 
actually indicates in relation to outcomes (Adam and Gunning, 2002). This has been 
suggested by Booth and Lucas (2002) in the case of PRSP indicators, who also 
suggest making better use of alternative methods to compensate for shortcomings of 
existing systems of routine information. Further there is scope for manipulation of data 
in order to achieve higher targets and thus rewards, since data collection and 
processing systems may not be reliable, even if audit systems were put into place, as 
was discussed in the study of GAVI in Tanzania and Mozambique (Starling et al., 
2001). 
Another issue of concern refers to indicators lacking audited benchmarks (baseline) 
(Adam and Gunning, 2002). This raises the question of what are the bases for the 
setting of targets. These might be reliable estimates of the current situation and 
potential impact based on experience and studies, or consensus reached between 
parties, or guess work. 
In addition, there is a lack of verification protocols or systems of independent 
verification31 (Adam and Gunning, 2002). Performance-based contracts need to have 
measurable, verifiable and non-manipulable indicators. However, as discussed 
previously, limited scope for verifiability of outcomes by a third party (court of law, 
auditors) may foster the opportunity for moral hazard (incentives for misreporting). 
Notwithstanding, costs of measurement and verification are very high, particularly in 
decentralised countries. Verifiability and manipulability of data are even more serious 
concerns if funds are attached directly to achievement of outcomes (once more, see 
the example of, GAVI), while if the main purpose is monitoring, the problem is less 
critical, as there are no attached incentives for manipulating of data. A possible 
strategy to minimise this problem is to introduce sample audits and surveys. The 
31 If this is possible, as, depending on the nature of service or good or indicator, it may not be possible for 
a third party to verify it. 
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former are being used in the education sector in Uganda to verify district level school 
returns (Adam and Gunning, 2002). 
Regarding capacity to measure, a contradiction of the outcome-oriented model is that 
it requires a strong capacity for implementation and low income countries simply lack 
it. Because of the problem of fragmentation (different donors and various projects), 
when aid is delivered by the project approach (even though the project approach 
tends to be associated with input measures), it requires the scarce resources to be 
spread even more thinly (Lavergne, 2002). In pooled arrangements, monitoring 
mechanisms rely on existing weak structures and procedures (as scarcity of human 
resources and lack of computerised systems for example may increase the scope for 
opportunism), raising concerns regarding for example fiduciary risks among DPs 
(Lavergne, 2002). The author adds that DPs fear that the problem of weak monitoring 
systems is made worse in the contexts of poor rule of law, corruption, and domestic 
rivalries. 
Hence there is need to improve capacity for enhancing information systems for routine 
data collection, reporting and analysis (and application of analysis into policy and 
implementation) as well as for carrying out surveys and audits. As Lavergne (2002) 
points out, the use of performance indicators for rewarding the contract raises issues 
of uncertainty and measurability related to capacity, and when considering measures 
for enhancement of the system, it is important not to overlook the incentive 
environment. Furthermore, it is worth noting that outcome monitoring requires more 
capacity of governments but also of donors. In addition to strengthening routine 
systems, Booth and Lucas (2002) suggest complementary methods: service delivery 
and financial or input (drugs for example) tracking surveys, problem-oriented 
commissioned studies and participatory impact monitoring. 
A compounding factor to the challenges of measuring outcomes raised above relates 
to the difficulties of assigning responsibility for the achievement of outcomes - 
outcome attributability (Maxwell, 2003; Lavergne, 2002). These difficulties are 
intensified by, or related to, uncertainty, risk, and randomness. Attributability of 
outcomes is considered important in IDA, as agencies are under pressure to account 
to their governments or constituencies (their principals) for the results of aid resources 
invested. 
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However, as in SWAp or GBS, a DP can report to its principal(s) on the total results 
achieved, thus capitalising on the contribution made by other DPs. Just a small aid 
contribution can buy a donor voice into the recipient government's policies and 
piggyback on the credits of the results of all donors and the RG. As pointed out by Hill 
(2002), in SWAp risks are shared but individual donors are not directly accountable for 
failures while RGs may be. The issue of attributability may actually be used as an 
excuse for another problem which could be the lack of trust of DPs in RGs and their 
systems, highlighting the tension in easing control versus relying on existing systems 
and supporting their improvements. 
Further to the issue of uncertainty, monitoring of health outcomes is particularly 
difficult as these outcomes are the result of long term efforts and investments as well 
as of endogenous and exogenous determinants. 
There are considerable difficulties in measuring ultimate outcomes as they materialise 
after long time lags. In this regard, Radelet and Herding (2003) point out that 
development is essentially a "risky long-term process in which even the best-designed 
interventions may not succeed. While demanding results, the US must encourage 
innovation, which will require accepting failures from good-faith efforts. " Hence, there 
is need to establish partnerships and investments over the long term, which has not 
been the nature of the relationships between DPs and RGs32. A plausible reason is 
that political systems in most donor countries have government mandates in cycles of 
usually 4 to 5 years, and DPs need to account to their constituencies on the basis of 
such short periods (Oliveira-Cruz et al., 2003). Furthermore, posting of aid officials to 
RGs is often short to medium term (often cycles of no more than 5 years) (Walt et al., 
1999b) and these officials have career incentives to perform well vis-ä-vis their 
institutions. In addition, the length of relationships can be subject to factors internal to 
the recipient countries as well, such as political instability or distrust (problems of 
corruption etc. ). Such problems are likely not to translate into the agent advancing the 
utility of the principal. 
A simple interpretation could be that the focus of accountability under the project 
approach had been more input-based and control-oriented while in pooled 
arrangements it has been more based on a target or outcome orientation. However 
32 While the experience in the project approach has been of a more short to medium term (though not 
all), the perspective of SWAp and GBS is to establish longer term relationships. 
72 
this distinction is not so clear cut. There are cases where targets can be related to 
inputs - and also they can work as conditionalities (see Adam and Gunning, 2002). 
As discussed earlier, there are considerable challenges when focusing on ultimate 
outcomes for monitoring and even more so for compensation purposes of the aid 
contract. Some authors call for a more balanced approach to the choice of. monitoring 
indicators 
For instance, the "difficulty of attributing health target strategies to changes and partly 
to often small and slow changes, which make health outcomes a difficult field for 
reliable measurement ... intermediate and process outcomes, i. e. improved and/or 
equitable access to services or a reduction in risk factor profiles, have their own 
relevance. They often change faster and are easier to detect' (Busse and Wismar, 
2002). Booth and Lucas (2002) see that the monitoring approach of PRSPs should 
actually be more holistic and balanced, where indicators of inputs, intermediate 
outputs, outcomes and implementation processes as well as final poverty 
outcomes/impacts are taken into account as opposed to a focused view on final 
outcomes only. While PRSPs are leading to an increase in final poverty-outcome 
measurements, there is: 
Less evidence of renewed interest in measuring the intermediate processes and 
achievements that will be necessary to produce the desired final outcomes. This 
is a serious deficiency, as rapid feedback on this level of change is what matters 
most for accountability and learning. PRSPs are to be reviewed annually, 
requiring attention to variables that move relatively quickly and provide evidence 
of real achievements. Donors striving to support PRSPs with general budget 
funding also need a sound basis for disbursing tranches year by year. (Booth 
and Lucas, 2002) 
This is. in contrast to Adam and Gunning (2002) who see the focus of performance 
indicators to be in outcome measures and the use of input or process indicators as a 
drift back into'business as usual'. As is happening in Uganda, in spite of o general 
discourse of moving into performance indicators based on, outcomes, in actual 
practice, intermediate targets are 'still' being used. 
Lavergne (2002) sees as beneficial the use of a mixed set of indicators ranging from 
all cycles of aid delivery (inputs, processes, outputs) to effectiveness (outcomes), 
according to the countries priorities. Other dimensions of performance (beyond 
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results/outcomes) of a health system that could be used in monitoring include, for 
example, fair financing, responsiveness, stewardship and cost-effectiveness. 
The above relates to the issue that where there is uncertainty, one can improve on 
output-based contracts by rewarding any element of effort one is able to measure. 
Health care produces outputs, but health is not primarily produced by health services. 
As noted by Halfon and Hochstein (2002), "health is a consequence of multiple 
determinants operating in nested genetic, biological, behavioral, social, economic 
contexts that change as a person develops". Health outcomes not being a perfect 
function of health services (efforts of doctors, other providers, managers, policy 
makers) compounds, the challenges of basing payments on outcomes (Liu, 1999) or 
more generally of carrying out monitoring strategies in this field. 
Thus, health outcomes are part of a complex chain of influences, and it is very difficult 
to observe the efforts of all the different actors and institutions involved in order to 
measure the agent's advancement of the principal's utility. 
3.7 Compensation scheme 
A fundamental problem in the way DPs are using performance indicators for allocating 
aid resources refers to the failure to establish a clear compensation scheme that 
rewards good performance and penalises bad performance (without completely 
stopping the programme). Adam and Gunning (2002) see this as a new form of 
conditionality - ex post; Schmidt, (1995) discusses it not specifically in relation to 
performance indicators but to aid disbursement in general; Killick (1997) refers to the 
failure of a penalty-reward system in conditionality contracts of structural adjustment 
programmes supported by the World Bank. 
Adam and Gunning (2002) argue that this is what has been attempted in Uganda: 
although the restructuring of aid modalities with the introduction of the PRSP and 
GBS/SWAp and consequent use of performance indicators33 has led to important 
changes in the DPs-RGs relations, such as improvement of donor coordination, it has 
not as yet established an explicit compensation scheme. The GFATM, however, 
seems to have been able to establish a vague penalty mechanism (not an explicit 
33The authors use performance indicators as an alternative form to input measures. 
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one), as evidenced by the financial audit requirement which states that countries will 
have to "accept serious consequences" (GFATM, 2002). 'Serious consequences' 
appears to have been translated in practice by suspension and even cancellation of 
grants by the GFATM, as was the case in Uganda due to poor performance of the RG 
in relation to the agreed contract (IRIN news, 2006a; The New Vision, 2007b). 
In Pakistan, disbursements of external aid were withheld until government 
expenditures were made, as a result of controversy over reaching government 
expenditure targets and the adequacy of some of the yearly plans (Peters and Chao, 
1998). This raises the question of whether this penalty had been agreed in advance, 
so that it constituted an explicit penalty, or whether it was an implicit penalty taken 
along the way- more likely the latter. Peters and Chao (1998) also mention that in the 
SWAp, disputes related to expenditure programmes have been dealt with through 
negotiation processes among partners, which have become a common feature of the 
planning and review cycles. This begs the question of whether negotiation processes 
are being used as substitutes for penalties. 
An example of a rare explicit mechanism of compensation in the aid contract is the 
one used by the EU. They have devised an innovative system of graduated 
performance disbursement34 (Adam and Gunning, 2002). This seems to be working 
on a pilot basis as only a small proportion of the aid budget is allocated by the use of 
this formula. Yet, the authors argue that the use of the formula is rather promising as it 
allows disbursement to be in line with the degree of progress achieved towards the 
agreed performance, and it avoids problems of DPs having to withhold funds 
completely when some targets have been achieved (and thus agents need to be 
rewarded for this) and others not. 
This seems indeed to be a rather clear and fair mechanism given that most donors 
are not credible when they base the compensation contract explicitly on performance 
indicators or targets (as happened in the April 2001 joint review of the education 
34 Adam and Gunning (2002) describe the formula as follows: "for each of the agreed outcome indicators 
a score is calculated: one point if the agreed objective is attained, 0.5 if this is not the case but there is 
evidence of a "considerable positive development" and otherwise the score would be zero. Performance 
is then measured as the (unweighted) average of the individual indicator scores. Disbursement is 
proportional to this average score, with the maximum disbursement reached when 80% of the maximum 
performance is realized: each 1% (of the maximum score) increase in performance triggers the release of 
1.25% of the tranche (up to the maximum of 100%). For example, in the case of four indicators this would 
imply that if the score was 0.5 for each indicator then 62.5% of the tranche would be disbursed (1.25 
times 50%, the actual average score as a percentage of the maximum). If the objectives for three of the 
four indicators were attained while the score was 0.5 for the fourth one then the full amount would be 
disbursed. " 
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sector in Uganda), thereafter paying anyway in spite of poor progress (Adam and 
Gunning, 2002). Alternatively, they may withhold funds but this will cause serious 
problems of service disruption, hindering efforts of capacity development and 
encouraging distrust among partners. On the other hand, the score system seems not 
to be free of problems. For instance, when a 0.5 score is given for an indicator on the 
basis of 'considerable positive development', a clearer definition of what is meant 
under considerable development is needed for each indicator, at the expense of 
encountering similar problems of vaguely defined performance measures. 
The lack of an explicit compensation scheme in the aid contract may also be in the 
interest of DPs who rely on countries such as Uganda ('good performers') as show 
cases. DPs after all are under pressure from their principals to disburse their allocated 
budgets. The current trend of a change in the aid contract (from inputs based to 
outcome based), being more rhetoric than fact, serves both sides (DPs and RGs) 
given scope for opportunism of RGs and DPs alike when acting as agents. 
Mechanisms by which performance and penalty/reward are linked under SWAp/GBS 
are quite subtle. This may be so even if implicit penalties/rewards come later rather 
than as immediate responses to failures or successes. For instance, this may the 
case when DPs suspend budget support contributions because of government's poor 
performance in an area outside the agreed contract (e. g. increased military 
expenditures) and not due to failure in achieving agreed targets (e. g. in the health 
sector). Clearly, implicit compensation mechanisms, used in the context of SWAp and 
other aid modes, need to be explored further. 
3.8 Other options for dealing with agency problems 
As discussed previously, repetition in agency relationships may improve some 
incentive problems (Stiglitz, 1989) as by "allowing for more than one period allows 
one player's action to generate a future response by the other player. There is at least 
the possibility of a more efficient outcome. " In such kind of situations, it may be 
possible to compare the output over time (MacDonald, 1984). 
However, difficulties in achieving these efficiency gains in IDA may apply in a context 
where changes in actors and policies within governments of both DPs and RGs occur, 
and occur rather often. These changes may take place due to political changes via a 
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democratic or non-democratic process, or due to economic constraints for example 
that can lead to reductions in aid flows. This has implications in relation to potential 
changes in the underlying objective functions of the partners, i. e. individuals and or 
organisations. 
Yet, particularly in SWAp and GBS as opposed to the project approach, there is scope 
for monitoring outputs over time. It is assumed that relationships under these aid 
modalities will tend to be of longer duration. However, for recipient countries there are 
no forms of guarantee that DPs will continue a contract. Even if the recipient country 
complies with all conditionalities and performs accordingly, there is the risk that 
because of resource shortages or changes in political priorities, a DP may suspend 
their contributions. Nonetheless, as discussed previously, improvements in health 
status require long term (i. e. decades) and sustained levels of investment, and such 
commitments have not so far been a common approach. To the issue of commitment, 
Stiglitz (1989) questioned: "can ... the worker commit himself not to leave, or can the 
employer commit himself not to terminate the relationship? " 
When using the project approach, DPs have actually been the subject of criticism for 
their interest in quick results, which again is related to political structures and length of 
mandates in donor countries. In addition, representatives of DPs rarely spend more 
than five years in one country, and the turnover of high-ranking staff in MoHs is 
infamous (Walt et al., 1999b citing Lucas et al., 1998). In spite of such uncertainties, 
there are cases of long term commitment from DPs, as shown by the project of almost 
30 years established in partnership between the government of Vietnam and SIDA35. 
On the other hand, commitment to long term relationships 'no matter what' can lead to 
inefficiencies and poor results. 
Reputation in IDAH can play a role as an option to deal with agency problems, being 
particularly applicable to considerations regarding observability and verifiability. 
In order for DPs to believe in RGs, they need to be able to observe "or to participate in 
the development of convincing plans and expenditure programmes, built on solid 
information... [these] are consistently implemented in an open and transparent 
environment, and [... ] the chosen policies are followed over time by stable 
government staff which provide continuity to the process" (Walt et al., 1999b). In the 
context of SWAp, the authors further note that "MoHs in low-income countries may 
35 The partnership is known as the Vietnam-Sweden Health Cooperation (VSHC) (Morten Jerve, 2001). 
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need significant assistance to allow them to formulate realistic plans, set priorities, 
devise sensible indicators, and then to monitor the whole process". Foster et al. 
(2000) point out that given weaknesses in monitoring systems, review processes lack 
credibility. As discussed in the previous section on monitoring, weak systems and 
underlying incentives reflect the considerable difficulties in observing RGs behaviour. 
Also as raised earlier in this thesis, besides observability, other elements that can 
influence the continuation of an existing relationship include trust but also geopolitical 
interests. 
Verifiability may be more important when an agent's reputation needs to be verified by 
a third party via the agent's existing or previous contractual relationships. However, 
the scope for a third party to be able to verify the behaviour of a RG or a DP is limited, 
as highlighted previously. 
It is worth noting the role of reputation of other partners besides RGs. For instance, 
Azfar (2002) points out in regard to contracted private or not for profit organisations 
involved in IDA that these organisations "do have incentives to control costs but not to 
minimize them. Potential loss of reputation from shoddy work is therefore relatively 
more important to saving on costs, hence quality is less likely to fall below threshold. " 
To the reputation of DPs, they are perceived be bureaucratic, unreliable, and 
defaulting on pledged funds (Walt et al., 1999b). This raises the discussion of trust of 
RGs in relation to DPs. In regard to trust of DPs vis-ä-vis RGs, The Economist (2002) 
has stated that "developing trust and partnership with kleptocrats is hard", in the 
context of resources of DFID going into budget support and the apprehension of poor 
accountability in recipient countries. 
Walt et al. (1 999b) suggest that asymmetrical power relations between RGs and DPs 
may be defeated through "frank dialogue and the patient nurturing of mutual trust". 
This begs the question once more as to the scope of using trust to counter 
opportunism. 
Another option to be considered when performance in a principal-agency relationship 
is insufficient is termination. Termination may occur due to factors exogenous to the 
recipient country, such as reductions in aid budgets, but also because of poor 
governance and other problems in the aid contract, such as not credible or inefficient 
penalty/reward systems. 
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Termination in IDAH is, however, a rather difficult option. In spite of the problems in 
the relationship, there are other factors to consider: first, the argument of moral 
obligation to continue activities in the field; second, the. pressure of the agents (direct 
beneficiaries of aid) for continuation of their contracts (suppliers, consultants etc. ); 
third, if agency problems are endemic then terminating one relationship and finding 
another agent will not eliminate agency problems; and finally, the broader purpose of 
the aid contract - to serve as a political tool. In addition, in many countries, the choice 
of agents is not large. In settings where governance is very weak DPs may establish 
partnerships with the non-governmental sector, but in more general terms, as 
principals, DPs tend to have but one agent, i. e. the government [which can use its 
monopsonistic position to extract rent from the principal (Whynes, 1993)]. In such 
circumstances, DPs may have to exit, to move demand to another provider. If the 
current trend in IDA of channelling aid via a country's budget persists, obviously the 
sole agent will be the country's government. Options left to DPs may include the 
imposition of conditionalities (for instance reduction in defence budgets), the 
temporary suspension of aid or the exit to other countries. 
Further in relation to exit, DPs may find it "easier to walk away from a proposal or 
clamp down on how funds are used than to deal with any potentially embarrassing 
risks. Governments, however, cannot walk away' (Peters and Chao, 1998). The 
relative freedom of DPs to come and go, the lack of a penalty/reward system to 
sanction donor defaults, and the unilateral withdrawal of aid in reaction to local 
conflicts, highlight weaknesses in the nature of the relationship between DPs and RGs 
(Hill, 2002), at the global level. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has proposed that 
donor countries monitor each other's performance, and similarly, the New Partnership 
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) suggests having African country governments in 
the peer review process of donors (Maxwell, 2003). However, a clear penalty/reward 
system is lacking, which in this case refers to the other facet of the aid contract, when 
RGs act as principals. 
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3.9 Concluding remarks 
In sum, the kinds of conflicts of interests between the various actors involved in IDA 
outlined previously, the multiple layers of delegations between actors and 
organisations, the broken feedback loop between the populations in `donor' and 
recipient countries, the consequent weak accountability link across these institutions, 
and the difficulties related to monitoring (observing) the actions and or outputs yielded 
by agents, give rise to an array of incentive problems and highlight the need of 
devising sophisticated incentive structures (or at least being alert to the perverse 
incentives that may arise and design coping mechanisms). The design of effective 
incentive structures is of such complexity that it is even referred to by Martens et al. 
(2002) as an art that should address agency problems by motivating agents to reveal 
relevant information to principals and minimize biases in their behaviour. As examined 
earlier, the example of the Arthur Anderson and Enron scandals is of relevance here 
as both shareholders and managers (principals and agents) had strong incentives to 
present a favourable portrait of their companies. In IDA, similar problems may occur 
with DPs and RGs. Both groups when acting as agents need to present the best 
possible results to their principals. It is worth mentioning again, that DPs also act as 
agents and are accountable to their tax-payers or may be under the pressure of the 
other agents in the chain of principal-agents (the direct beneficiaries of aid). 
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Chapter 4: Research design and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The research design and methods presented in this chapter were developed with a 
view to achieving the study's aims and objectives, which were: 
Aims: 
- To better understand the relationship between RGs and DPs, by assessing more 
specifically: 
o How the relationship changed with the new modes of development assistance 
for health (SWAp and GBS) in Uganda; 
o The nature of the incentive structures embedded in the new aid mechanisms 
and how they were structured by the monitoring and compensation schemes; 
o The motives (objective functions) of the organisations and individuals and how 
those shed light onto the behaviours of the parties in the aid environment in 
Uganda; 
o The appropriateness of thinking embedded in economics, particularly the 
agency theory framework, when applied to understand the aid contract. 
Specific objectives: 
- To describe the existing monitoring mechanisms and how they differed in terms of 
focus (inputs, process, outputs, outcomes) 
- To examine the effectiveness of the mechanisms, as understood by the actors, for 
monitoring performance 
- To seek to understand the implications of monitoring mechanisms for behaviour 
under the aid contract 
- To explore the nature of the compensation scheme (penalty-reward system) 
adopted under the new aid modalities 
- To assess how credible the penalties and rewards were from the agents' point of 
view and how the credibility affected their actions (incentives to under-perform) 
- To assess how the parties understood the nature of the contracts (projects, 
SWAp, GBS) in terms of objectives or expectations. 
Martens et al. (2002) suggest that the application of the agency model to understand 
the intra-organisational behaviour (as related to motives, incentives, efforts) of 
81 
individuals involved in IDA requires detailed work and thus needs to focus on few 
organisations. This refers to the micro level in Zinnes and Bolaky's framework 
described in chapter 3. In addition to seeking to understand the behaviour of 
individuals within organisations in this study, I have also opted to analyse the 
relationship between a small number of organisations involved in aid delivery in 
Uganda (the meso level) - as opposed to analysing the whole range of relationships 
within and between the various actors and organisations involved in the broad area of 
IDAH (the macro level). The selected organisations included: the national recipient 
government (MoH and MoFPED), bilateral agencies and some multilateral agencies 
using a project approach, SWAp and GBS. The national recipient government was 
selected because it is the main contact point for the aid delivery process (particularly 
in the context of GBS and SWAp) and can be interpreted as the agent in the 
relationship with DPs, following a standard agency theory model. More specifically, 
the MoFPED was chosen because it is in charge of the country's finances and 
planning processes (including aid flows), and the MoH because it is a recipient of aid 
and in charge of policy formulation, management and service delivery. The bilateral 
agencies were selected because they provide significant volumes of aid to Uganda 
(see information provided in chapter 1) and thus can be seen as principals vis-ä-vis 
the RG. Because of the agency framework the multilateral agencies were not initially 
chosen as, having more principals, these agencies would add a greater level of 
complexity to the study. As this was a first exploration of the applicability of agency 
theory to the field of IDAH, this additional complexity was thought to be better 
explored in later studies. Yet, some multilaterals have been included in the study 
because they had large projects and/or a high level of influence in Uganda at the time 
of fieldwork. I have highlighted in bold the relationship between the selected 
organisations in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between selected organisations for study in this thesis 
Population in 
'donor' countries 
Recipient 
Govern / Government 
ment of 
'Donor' 
NGOs 
(central or Population in 
'donor' i local) 'recipient' countries 
country 
ý (local or , - 
central) 
Bilateral 
agency 
40 
Multilateral 
agencies Recipient Service Delivery NGOs 
Units (governmental, 
private or donor 
sponsored) 
For profit 
Foundations or organisation 
charities (funded by 
private for profit 
companies) 
Principal-Agent (financial) relationship 
Principal-Agent (regulatory) relationship -----------10. 
No Principal-Agent relationship 
Source: adapted from Figure 3.1. 
4.2 Research design and epistemology 
Ideally a study applying the agency model to IDAH should endeavour to analyse all 
three levels of the aid relationships, macro, meso and micro. This would preferably 
encompass multiple sites (recipient countries) where comparisons and contrasts could 
be drawn; a longitudinal approach to data collection; and the use of qualitative 
followed by quantitative methods. However, given resource constraints faced by a 
PhD research, I opted to make use of qualitative methods to understand the effects of 
the restructuring of the 'contractual' relationship between RGs and DPs as new 
modes of aid were adopted in a specific country setting (Uganda). An in-depth 
qualitative approach was required to investigate this area of research given the small 
number of organisations (sample size) that could be examined thoroughly. According 
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to Coast (1999) the power of the qualitative approach lies in its "ability to aid 
understanding, provide explanations and explore issues, particularly those of a 
complex nature". This is in line with the justification provided by Yin (2003) for the 
adoption of the case-study approach. Coast (1999) also observes that the main 
weakness of qualitative research is its inability to generate data that can be 
generalised statistically. Nevertheless, it is important that first an in-depth 
understanding and body of knowledge for a specific field of research is reached. Such 
body of knowledge can then generate hypotheses for quantitative analysis that may 
be generalisable. In addition, while themes revealed in a qualitative study are unique 
to the context investigated, the understanding of the interplay for instance of how 
motives and behaviours operate can shed light on the performance of contracts or on 
the relationship between the parties that can be useful in providing insights to other 
settings. This refers to 'conceptual generalisibility' (Green and Thorogood, 2004). 
The importance of real-life context is captured by qualitative research in general 
(Coast, 1999) and in particular by a case-study approach (Yin, 2003). The latter has a 
particular strength in its ability to "cope with, and provide insights into, complex real 
world developments, with the 'case' providing a source of explanations for wider 
developments" (Keen and Packwood, 2000). 
Given the relevance of understanding the policy context and the complex nature of the 
relationship between DPs and the GoU, and above all given the need to analyse this 
problem in-depth, I opted to use the analytical narrative type of case-study approach, 
having as the unit of analysis the key modes of aid in operation in the country. 
The case-study approach has been increasingly used to investigate the nature of 
contracts in the health sector (Allen, 2000; Palmer, 2001). In addition, the analytical 
narrative approach has been suggested as an appropriate method to be used in 
investigations in the field of NIE applied to IDA (Azfar, 2002; Zinnes and Bolaky, 
2002). Analytic narrative can be used to interview political actors and "seek to 
understand the actor's preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, 
the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt 
and the constraints that limit their actions" (Bates et al., 1998). As Zinnes and Bolaky 
(2002) note: "since the [analytic narrative] approach is couched in behavioral terms, it 
not only allows us to evaluate the obstacles to effective aid, but it also provides 
effective guidance on how to design incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms to 
prevent, correct or attenuate opportunism that jeopardizes aid effectiveness. " 
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A crucial epistemological debate in social sciences refers to the divide between the 
positivist and relativist approaches (Patton, 1999; Silverman, 1993; Miller and 
Glassner, 1997). These approaches tend to be broadly associated with the following 
contrasting paradigms in relation to scientific investigations: 
Table 4.1: Epistemological divide 
Positivism Interpretivism / idealism I relativism 
Objectivity, one absolute truth, value free Subjectivity [in the sense that data involving human 
beings reflect various different perspectives (or'truths') 
in line with the phenomenological paradigm of the 
interpretative and social constructionist schools (Patton, 
1999)] 
Quantitative methods, deductive analysis Qualitative methods, inductive approach 
Most economic research, including the area of health economics, adopts a theory led 
deductive approach which is related to the positivist model (Coast, 1999). The use of 
agency theory as a guide to the research process of this thesis, including the data 
generation and analysis, can be seen as a reductionist approach and more closely 
associated with the positivist paradigm. As argued by Buse (1999), the rationale of 
political investigations shall be centred on the explanation of behaviours as opposed 
to the testing of a hypothesis. Agency theory and its assumptions in this research 
were not used to corroborate this particular theoretical approach. Instead, the 
approach adopted was of using it as a conceptual framework because the insights 
offered by this theoretical approach plausibly matched the areas of concern I had 
when designing this study. Hence, the initial set of themes to be explored was 
identified among this theory's core concepts. In order to deal with the concern of a 
reductionist approach to the data, an explicit attempt to recognise variables and 
themes that did not fit the theory was introduced in the data analysis. 
However, in trying to advance beyond the concern noted above for the limitations of a 
reductionist approach by adopting a theory-led analytical model, the research required 
contributions from epistemological paradigms that would take into account the 
relevance of more in-depth understandings of the policy context and the complexities 
inherent in the relationships in the context of aid delivery at country level. 
Realism proposes an alternative paradigm bridging differences between the positivist 
and relativist approaches (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). The main characteristic of the 
realistic approach refers to "its stress on the mechanics of explanation, and its attempt 
to show that the usage of such explanatory strategies can lead to a progressive body 
of scientific knowledge" (ibid. ). Research rooted in this scientific philosophy is not 
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focused on elucidating cause and effect but rather in seeking to understand `how and 
why', as well as seeking and recognising patterns. 
Critical realism36 emphasises that reality needs to be construed through lenses of 
dynamism, differentiation, and desimplication. Or in other words, the natural world 
needs to be seen as being always in change, differences need to be valued, and 
complexity recognised (Cameron, 2004). In line with this, McPake et al. (2006) 
propose a model that seeks to understand health systems based on the realistic 
school of thought which is also informed by complexity theory. Figure 4.2 depicts the 
key characteristics of the model. The dynamic responses (e. g. clientelism, community 
groups) that operate in an environment shape the interactions between the intended 
policy changes (de jure system) and those de facto experienced as the policies are 
implemented. 
Figure 4.2: A conceptual model for health systems research 
Dynamic responses: 
Informal structures 
eg, community groups 
networks of friends 
Informal behaviours 
eg. (offering or demanding) 
under-the-counter payment 
professionalism 
Informal relationships 
eg. clientelism 
political alliance 
De-facto system: 
Services as experienced by 
people 
For example: access; quality 
De jure system: 
Organisational structures 
Intended incentives 
Management procedures 
Training courses 
Source: McPake et a/. (2006) 
The approach adopted in this research attempted to comprehend the interrelated 
motivations and conflicting objective functions of the various actors involved in aid 
delivery in Uganda rather than simply demonstrating a causal link, such as between 
SWAp and health sector results. This research is not about the impact of new aid 
modes on performance; it is more concerned about how it changed, what changes it 
brought within the Ugandan context, why some elements of the relationship could 
36 Earlier formulations of the realistic approach had been referred to as 'naive realism' and were more 
closely associated with the philosophy of natural sciences while later contributions by social scientists 
(e. g. Bhaskar and Pawson and Tilley) introduced the use of the term critical realism (Robson, 2002). 
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change and others not (unravelling motives, behaviours, incentives, processes, 
contexts). In other words, performance is not measured as a result of the introduction 
of new aid modes but further understanding is sought of how the new aid modes 
operate and the implications of their mode of operation in terms of changes in the 
incentive environment and behaviours. 
4.3 Data generation and sources 
4.3.1 Data generation 
This research involved a fieldwork period of approximately 10 months for data 
generation. This period is broken down in 3 phases. A first visit was made to Uganda 
in April 2002 when I was able to participate as an observer in a Joint Review Mission 
(JRM) of the health sector. Besides observing the national level meetings taking place 
in Kampala, I took part in one of the district visits. This phase pre-dated and informed 
the preparation of the study design (but notes from observation of these meetings 
were also used as sources for the research). 
The second and main phase of the fieldwork took place between September 2003 and 
the beginning of June 2004. During this period I was living in Kampala, Uganda. Given 
a pre-established collaborative programme between the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the Institute of Public Health (IPH) of Makerere 
University, the Health Systems Development Knowledge Programme, I was affiliated 
to that Institute. The period of fieldwork coincided with a collaborative project of the 
Health Systems Development Knowledge Programme that aimed to produce a book 
reflecting upon key health systems reforms implemented in Uganda since 2000 
(Kirunga Tashobya et al., 2006). My involvement while in Uganda included the co- 
organisation with IPH, and other partners (MoH more specifically the Health Planning 
Department, some DPs (DFID, WHO and Danida) and NGOs (UCMB), of various 
discussion meetings that served to inform the analysis and writing of the chapters for 
the book. 
The third phase included two small visits to the field coinciding with the JRMs of 
October 2004 and October 2005. The first of these two short visits was particularly 
helpful in obtaining additional data to close key gaps identified through the initial 
process of data analysis. The second visit allowed me to take stock of a fast changing 
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political and institutional environment. Given that the last visit depicted a rather 
different circumstance from the previous ones (including a number of new individuals 
in charge of the negotiations between the Government and DPs) and no formal data 
collection process took place at the time, it has only been used to inform general 
changes as described in chapter 8. 
4.3.2 Data sources 
In general terms, all data sources proved to be valuable to the research. Field notes 
and observation were used to inform the analysis. They provided elements that 
helped construct the broad narrative of the results chapters. They also were 
advantageous in clarifying the more implicit questions being pursued by the research. 
Documentary analysis was particularly helpful in providing description I narratives and 
chronology of events, mainly in the form of policy and strategy papers but also 
available local literature (including grey literature). Other sources such as minutes of 
meetings, evaluation reports, and similar provided some insights for answering some 
research questions. Interviews helped construct evidence in relation to perceptions, 
in-depth opinions, and understandings of actors. Appendix 1 provides an overview of 
the methods used in relation to the objectives and key research questions. A more 
detailed account of the data sources is provided below. 
Observation 
Observation can be either direct or indirect, and participant or non-participant. 
According to Yin (2003) direct observation can range from a field visit to more formal 
data collection activities such as the observation of meetings. He defines participant 
observation as a "special mode of observation in which you are not merely a passive 
observer. Instead, you may assume a variety of roles within a case study situation and 
may actually participate in the events being studied" (ibid. ). Past research in Uganda 
by Jeppsson (2004) used participant observation - the author was formally employed 
as a technical advisor in the health sector and thus taking part in the policy making 
and implementation processes during the period of his research. In contrast, as 
mentioned in the previous section, while I worked and lived in Uganda during the 
fieldwork, I was not directly involved in tasks within the policy making and 
implementation processes. However, the interactions I was able to have with various 
policy makers during that period allowed me to get to know 'who was who' and 
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informed the choice of key informants; to gain insights into interpersonal behaviour 
and motives as well as access to events and groups that would otherwise not have 
been possible or been very difficult. This is noted as a particular strength of the 
participant observation method (Yin, 2003). By not being directly employed in the 
health sector, it was possible to control for a potential bias of this method which refers 
to the investigator's scope to manipulate events (ibid. ). 
Direct observation of meetings was used in this research and it was helpful in: 
- Mapping out the organisations involved in the field as well as familiarising the 
investigator with the formal structures and processes within the health sector 
(Allen, 2000). 
- Gathering evidence in relation to facts and events; the nature and processes 
of interaction of the different partners; and their behaviour and views in relation 
to events. 
- Providing insights about behaviours of the parties by throwing light on or 
challenging statements made during interviews. 
- Meeting individuals more formally but also informally, which helped in getting 
to know them and being known by them. The fact that I got to know and 
observe them helped me define those who should be interviewed. The fact 
that they got to know me seemed to help them to agree to be interviewed and, 
according to one interviewee, it also enabled them to be more open and willing 
to tell me information they would not otherwise do, because they felt they 
could trust me. In addition, the regular interactions with these individuals 
allowed me to follow up issues as I tried to further understand certain problems 
or ask them for specific documents / reports. 
Obtaining documents shared among participants (often progress or annual 
reports prepared for DPs). 
A total of 30 different meetings were directly observed by me. Hand written notes of 
the meetings observed were taken by me and later typed. Notes included not only 
facts but also observations of interactions and behaviours. 
Appendix 2 includes a list of the categories of meetings observed (e. g. HPACs, 
HDPGs, etc. ) and types of participants. Although the work focused on the national 
level interactions/relationship between the Government and DPs, district and civil 
society views were partially captured through discussions as observed during 
meetings like JRMs, NHAs, PERs. 
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Obtaining access to observe SWAp/GBS related meetings was unproblematic. This 
was particularly the case towards the end of the fieldwork as I was known to people 
and they would often remind me of upcoming meetings. At the beginning I asked for 
permission to attend regular meetings like JRMs, HPAC and HDPG from individuals I 
knew from previous visits to Uganda and through the collaborative work of the Health 
Systems Development Knowledge Programme. Access was granted on an informal 
basis. 
Access to project related meetings was more difficult. These meetings seemed to be 
less open and consultative than the SWAp/GBS meetings. Their schedules were also 
less clear. I had to ask development partners and programme managers if and when I 
could attend these meetings. But there was the basic problem that few evaluations or 
negotiation meetings appeared to take place during the length of the fieldwork. 
A potential bias of the method of observation is that the actors involved in the events 
being observed may alter their behaviour in the presence of an observer (Patton, 
1999; Allen, 2000). It seemed that most meetings observed had not been influenced 
by the fact that I was present. This was particularly the case for large meetings like 
PERs, NHAs, JRMs where my presence was diluted in the very large number of 
participants (above 100 approximately). Meetings with medium size number of 
participants such as HPAC and HDPG appeared also not to have been influenced by 
my presence, as the review of previous minutes of such meetings seemed to suggest 
the discussion of similar themes. Finally the few project related meetings attended 
were also of medium size in terms of number of participants, but these are more 
difficult to assess as to whether there was a change in behaviour by the actors as no 
access to previous minutes were made available. However, even in the case of the 
SWAp related meetings, it is not entirely possible to know whether my presence 
altered the nature of the discussions and the information shared or not. 
Documentary analysis 
One of the benefits of using documents as a data source according to Yin (2003) is 
that they allow for a broad coverage in terms of time (spanning over long periods), 
and range of events and settings (national, regional, local levels). In this study, 
documents were helpful in providing a historical chronology of events reporting on 
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policy implementation at the national level. Both published and unpublished 
documents relevant to the research topic were collected. 
Documents that proved particularly useful included policy papers, health sector plans 
and reviews (e. g. MTEF; AHSPR and aide memoirs of JRMs). In addition, as 
suggested by Martens et al. (2002), documents related to resource allocations and 
related budget procedures were made use of (e. g. MTEF and Annual Budget 
Performance Reports). Another type of documentation used was the media 
(particularly newspapers) as I followed the unfolding of issues relevant to the research 
questions. 
Sources of access to documents included libraries or document centres of the MoH 
and MoFPED, offices of DP agencies, and the IPH. However, the major source for 
obtaining access to documents and reports (particularly up to date) was through 
participation in meetings. The second most useful source to obtain documents was 
through the email list of the HDPG. The third source was through the group of 
interviewees (during interviews which tended to take place in their offices). 
As documents were received or mentioned during interviews or during meetings 
observed, those received would be skimmed for content, and requests for mentioned 
documents or for related or additional documentation, would be made to the relevant 
persons. 
There were some difficulties in obtaining access to documents related to projects and 
other documentation particularly at the beginning of fieldwork. Requests made to 
people seemed to be forgotten as they were very busy with other pressing demands. 
Access improved towards the end as I had become more familiar with people or I 
could try to access the same document from different sources. 
A potential problem related to this data source is the issue of reporting bias. 
Documents may contain unknown (to the reader) biases of those who wrote or 
produced the documents (Yin, 2003). A considerable part of the documents reviewed 
were official publications by the GoU. These carried the potential bias of representing 
official views, and the risk of issues being reported not being verified by independent 
sources. To counterbalance this problem I reviewed, to the extent possible, some 
consultancy reports as well. These, however, also have potential biases of those 
funding the reports, in most cases DPs. Finally, some media documents were used as 
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an alternative view, particularly when other sources did not provide extensive 
evidence on sensitive issues (e. g. corruption). 
Finally, a minor point to report here refers to a few quotes from official documents that 
contained grammatical / language errors. Corrections are shown in brackets in the 
text. 
Interviews 
According to Yin (2003) interviews form a crucial data source for case studies given 
that the majority of case studies relate to human affairs. Interviews can also give an 
irk-depth account of understandings and are helpful in investigating reasons for human 
actions and motivations, which is not the case with quantitative methods such as 
surveys (Azfar, 2002). The general features of in-depth interviews tend to include: 
"their flexible and interactive nature, their ability to achieve depth, the generative 
nature of the data ... in the sense that new knowledge or thoughts are 
likely, at some 
stage, to be created' (Legard et al., 2003). 
For this study a total of 36 in-depth interviews37 38 were carried out by me with 
Government officials, DPs and others. The main organisational affiliations of 
respondents are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Interviewees according to their organisational affiliation39 
Categories/ Government Development partners Others 
Total 
MoH MoFPED Mainly Mainly Multilaterals 
GBS/SWAp Project (but 
Involved in 
the SWAp) 
12 3 5 6 2 3 (technical assistants funded by 
DPs posted at MoH 
2 (civil societ /NGO 
3 (consultants who have been to 
Uganda over a number of years - 
most since the start of SWAp) 
36 15 13 8 
37 A copy of the interview guide used is provided in Appendix 3. 38 In total 33 interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed (by a research assistant and verified by me). 
The three interviews not recorded were due to refusal by interviewee (two) or because of technical 
problems (one). Hand notes were taken of all interviews as a back up strategy. When quoting from 
transcripts, there were a few instances of grammar corrections when the meaning was being harmed 
(these are shown in brackets). There were also some instances when notes were used instead of 
verbatim quotation. 
39 A similar table is available in Appendix 4. Besides the information provided here it also shows the 
number of interviewees categorised by sex and level of seniority in their organisations. 40 Interviews with representatives from multilaterals were included as it emerged during the research 
process that it was necessary to discuss certain topics with them regarding their relationship with the 
Government and other DPs. 
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Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted. As defined by 
Robson (2002), a semi-structured interview "has predetermined questions, but the 
order can be based upon the interviewer's perception of what seems most 
appropriate. Question wording can be changed and explanations given; particular 
questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee can be omitted, or 
additional ones included. " This approach was taken for interviewing all groups of 
respondents. 
Out of the 36 interviewees, five were key informants42. In addition to the formal/semi- 
structured model used to interview this group of respondents, I also had several 
informal discussions (unstructured interviews) during the research process with the 
key informants. For instance, at my last visit to Uganda, two key informants were 
interviewed further. This was aimed at closing some gaps (after initial data analysis). 
The unstructured approach to interviewing is described as the situation when 
(Robson, 2002): "the interviewer has a general area of interest and concern, but lets 
the conversation develop within this area. It can be completely informal. " 
Key informant interviews provided expert knowledge about the relationship between 
the parties; they were accessed over the course of the project, and they provided the 
big picture and were more reflective than other respondents. This is in line with the 
definition given by Patton (2002) that "key informants are people who are particularly 
knowledgeable about the inquiry setting and articulate about their knowledge - people 
whose insights can prove particularly useful in helping an observer understand what is 
happening and why". The key informants who contributed to this project were part of 
the organisational affiliations presented in Table 4.2 above. 
The sample of interviewees followed a purposive approach. This sampling technique 
is described by Green and Thorogood (2004) as the situation when interviewees are 
selected deliberately with the purpose of generating the kind of data appropriate for 
the research (in line with its aims and driving questions). Purposive sampling, in 
contrast to probabilistic sampling, "involves studying information-rich cases in depth 
and detail' (Patton, 1999). 
41 This figure does not represent different DP agencies as more than one individual per agency was 
interviewed in some cases. 
42 Throughout the results and discussion chapters the abbreviation KI is used for key informants. 
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The interviewees chosen for this project were selected because they represented 
national level views and expertise, and it was on the basis of their particular position 
and long term experience that I could use their perceptions and knowledge as data. 
They all were actors in the policy process. 
While most respondents were involved in general aspects of the contractual 
relationship at national level, there were attempts to incorporate more specific views. 
For instance, views from those directly involved in monitoring as well as disease- 
specific programmes were sought as they would help in answering some of the 
research questions43. Table 4.3 below shows the groups of interviewees according to 
their specific areas of expertise (it excludes the ones considered to have general 
expertise). 
Table 4.3: Interviewees according to specific areas of expertise 
District level Disease specific programmes Monitoring and Evaluation 
Government 1 2 3 
DPs 2 
Others 1 
Among development partners, I endeavoured to interview representatives of each 
agency active in the health sector44. But there was also an explicit attempt to have a 
balance in terms of the number of officials interviewed that represented the categories 
of project and SWAp/GBS donors. 
Among Government officials45, I interviewed individuals from the ministries of health 
and finance. There was also a deliberate attempt to interview senior and junior 
officials within Government46. This proved to be a helpful approach in checking the 
statements made by senior staff in previous research in relation to a sensitive topic 
(political economy of tobacco control) (Seddon et al., 2000). It is recognised that 
43 This was thought to be helpful in investigating the extent to which final health outcome measures were 
being monitored in the Ugandan context. To this end, I used a probe approach as adopted in research 
activities of the Health System Development Knowledge Programme (2001). This approach consists of 
the use of conditions or specific diseases as a means of bridging the gap between systems analysis and 
outcomes, for example. The Health Systems Development Knowledge Programme has made use of the 
following services or conditions: maternal health services, TB, HIV/STIs, under 5 mortality, and type I 
diabetes. The main justification for choosing this approach is the ability of research to replicate important 
dimensions of health systems performance. 
as All DP agencies involved in the health sector were emailed with information about the project and an 
interview appointment was requested. 
as The director of IPH (Makerere University) wrote a letter to Government officials informing them about 
the research project and requesting appointments for interviews. This coincided with a major health 
sector meeting that most officials were attending and I took the opportunity to follow up the letter 
personally with them. 6 This approach was not followed for Development Partner representatives because often there was only 
one person in charge of health sector issues in each agency. 
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senior members of staff are more inclined to offer information in line with the 
organisation's 'official' policy (Allen, 2000). However, the experience in this research 
was that they were not always less inclined to offer open and transparent information. 
The ability and willingness to share information easily during the interviews seemed to 
be related to their own personality (their openness); point in their career (those 
towards the end, e. g. close to retirement, were more open); and the length of contact 
between the researcher and interviewer (some individuals with whom I had had more 
contact or worked with in other projects were more inclined to be more open). 
The third category of interviewee involved a group that had links in part to 
Government and DPs but were seen for the purposes of this research as standing 
independently. Inclusion of this category was thus a strategy to gain views from a third 
party and to improve data validity. The category included consultants and technical 
assistants (TAs) who had stronger associations with DPs as they tended to fund their 
assignments, although in some cases they were funded through the Partnership 
Account which was managed by the Government under the SWAp framework. Yet it 
was considered important to widen the group of interviewees, and NGO/civil society 
representatives and consultants and TAs may feel freer to speak their views, in 
comparison to representatives of DPs or the Government who may be inclined to 
adhere to the official discourse of their organisation. This is of particular relevance as 
I assume the nature of the contract to be implicit, which makes it difficult for 
individuals to observe the subtle forms of compensation and incentives. 
Combined with the purposive sampling approach, I also used the snowball technique. 
In each interview I asked the respondent for suggestions of other interviewees. As 
explained by Patton (2002) "the chain of recommended informants would typically 
diverge initially as many possible sources are recommended, then converge as a few 
names get mentioned over and over". The technique proved particularly helpful in 
identifying individuals in organisations I was not very familiar with through the regular 
meetings observed, e. g. the MoFPED as opposed to the MoH. 
A potential problem that can arise with the use of the snowball technique is that the 
researcher may have to rely on the suggestions and contact details from DPs and 
Government officials who may suggest interviewees with more favourable opinion of 
their work. However, as noted earlier, the observation of meetings helped me to 
become familiarised with the different individuals involved in the policy processes. 
This allowed me to gain insights about who was in what job and how to distinguish 
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those of relevance for interview by avoiding imbalances (e. g. only SWAp donors) and 
potential biases (though these may still have occurred). 
In general, the response rate of those contacted for interview was very good. Only 
one person in government refused to be interviewed explicitly. However, a number of 
others were approached but due to time constraints on their side, the interviews did 
not materialise. Out of the group of DPs contacted, only two were not interviewed. 
One never replied and was not contactable directly during the meetings. The agency 
of the second had channelled their funds and delegated managerial responsibility to 
another agency. 
One of the difficulties encountered was in scheduling interviews as individuals were 
very busy. Hence, most interviews were conducted towards the end of the fieldwork 
period. The main implication was lack of time to perform an interim analysis of findings 
as the process developed. However, a positive outcome was that more knowledge 
about the context had been gathered by that point which helped in probing on specific 
issues. The delay also allowed time to know who was who and thus helped in 
selecting the interviewees. 
There might have been a problem of recall bias. It seemed that more recent problems 
were considered to be more difficult and past ones less so. It could be that recent 
problems were more vivid in the mind of the respondents as these were issues they 
had to deal with at that particular moment. However, this could be a bias of 
interpretation given the lack of longitudinal data to assess the problem over time. It 
could also be a problem of institutional memory since there were changes in staff in 
the various organisations involved over time. 
A final problem that could have affected the study is the issue of selection bias. 
According to Patton (2002), there is an inherent problem with purposeful sampling 
techniques as they allow for research results to be limited by. the selectivity of those 
who were sampled to be interviewed. In this research there could have been a 
particular problem with regard to reliance on data generated by key informants who 
had their own views and who also helped me to be introduced to other people in 
Uganda. Those they introduced me to could share similar views. As observed by Yin 
"(2003), this may happen "because of the interpersonal influence - frequently subtle - 
that the informant may have over you. A reasonable way of dealing with this pitfall 
again is to rely on other sources of evidence to corroborate any insight by such 
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informants and to search for contrary evidence as carefully as possible. " In Uganda at 
the time, there was a perception of individuals in Government being split into two 
groups. The group of key informants that I had access to belonged to a large extent to 
one of these groups. Hence, in order to deal with this problem, I interviewed 
individuals from the other group so as to try to gather a different perspective. 
Field notes 
A diary of fieldwork activities has been used in recent investigations in health 
economics (Allen, 2000) and policy analysis where it assisted in the recording of 
research techniques and findings (Seddon et al., 2000). A diary or field notes can 
assist in recording overall impressions, insights, and informally collected information. I 
made use of field notes to record insights and particular pieces of information when 
these were shared during informal discussions or social events. 
4.4 Data analysis 
By and large, the analytical process adopted in this research followed the Framework 
Approach which was developed within the context of applied qualitative research with 
a view to informing policy developments (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). Analysis also 
drew on the thematic content approach (Green and Thorogood, 2004; Patton, 2002), 
based on the general guidance that it "is used to refer to any qualitative data reduction 
and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to 
identify core consistencies and meanings" (Patton, 2002). The main analytical steps 
involved: familiarisation with the data (including data cleaning and checking for 
consistency), development of a coding scheme (or indexing) based on the 
identification of a thematic framework, charting and interpretation. This analytical 
method is more closely aligned with the realist (deductive) approach than with the 
constructivist (inductive) one. As explained earlier in this chapter, agency theory 
guided the conceptual framework of this study and was used to generate the first set 
of themes to code the data. Amendments were made according to themes revealed 
by the data. Combining these two approaches allows for one to complement the other 
(Coast, 1999). For instance, amendments allowed for the incorporation of themes 
generated inductively (e. g. macroeconomic ceiling and GHIs which then were 
interpreted in the light of key assumptions from agency theory). Some other themes 
explored through the interview guide were taken out during the analysis. This took 
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place as they became less central to the guiding research questions and to the 
analysis of the overall data set as the narrative began to emerge47. 
The thematic content analysis as related to the different sources involved: 
a) Interviews 
- Interview data were coded48 but to a large extent data were already framed into 
themes of the conceptual framework since questions developed for the interview 
guide derived directly from the research objectives which were informed by the 
theoretical framework of the study (agency theory). Hence the coding system 
applied was a closed one. 
- Respondents have in most cases answered the questions, in considerable depth, 
and introduced some new themes that were analysed using an inductive 
approach. 
b) Notes from observations of meetings 
- This data set was much less structured than the interview data and was subject to 
coding using a similar coding system to that used for the interview data. 
- Amendments were also made to incorporate new themes revealed by the data. 
- Given its less structured nature, this data set allowed for a greater range of 
themes to emerge (though it contained to a certain extent more factual and less 
analytical material than the interviews) which helped to enrich the contextual 
interpretation process and compose the narrative. 
c) Documents 
- Documents were subject to a broad classification of themes related to the 
research questions / codes (printed and electronic versions); 
- They were summarised and provided general information necessary to describe 
the nature of the relationship between the parties, more specifically they provided 
data that allowed for the synthesis of the general contexts and historical 
interactions. 
- They were incorporated into the analysis as needed to support or challenge 
evidence from other data sources. 
47 E. g. trust - answers tended to be mechanical not relating in considerable depth to the other themes, 
patterns and context. 8 Examples of codes included: effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms; focus of monitoring 
mechanisms (on inputs, outputs or outcomes); good and bad performance; implicit or indirect penalties 
and rewards. 
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d) Field notes 
- Data from fieldwork notes were summarised and used to inform the analysis. 
- This data source was helpful in allowing for insights to be recorded alongside the 
data generation process and served as an initial step in the preliminary analysis of 
the data. 
During the analytical process there were intermediary phases characterised by 
periods of writing up summary narratives of the results or undertaking annotated 
outlines of the preliminary chapters. These processes helped to clarify the overall 
structure of the thesis as well as the internal structure of the chapters. They were also 
helpful in further clarifying the central themes emerging from the data. 
By adopting the analytic narrative approach there was an attempt to provide a 
coherent interpretation of the story of the new aid modes in Uganda at that time and to 
further understand the various narratives scattered across the assembled data. As put 
by Bates et al. (1998), the analytic narrative method "pays close attention to stories, 
accounts, and context... extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate 
both exposition and explanation. " The attempts to form a coherent picture of the 
whole story by knitting together the different pieces of evidence involved not only 
formally generated data (e. g. interviews, notes from observations of meetings) but 
also informally generated data (from living in the country, interacting with people 
informally, including in social events, and reading the newspapers etc. ). Ritchie and 
Spencer (1994) noted that "piecing together the overall picture is not simply a 
question of aggregating patterns, but of weighing up the salience and dynamics of 
issues, and searching for a structure rather than a multiplicity of evidence". 
Theory led and revealed themes formed the description of the narrative that was used 
to present the research findings throughout the chapters. The analytical process 
continued to take place during the writing up process as chains of events were 
assembled, contrasting perspectives examined, behavioural patterns assessed. At 
this stage all data sources were combined through the writing of the narrative. During 
this process, pieces of evidence were questioned (as to how they related to the other 
data sources), possible associations were tested and drawn, explanations developed, 
and general inferences were made (iterative process of analysing, structuring and 
writing). Similar to the experience of Buse (1999), this process of "examining points of 
complementarity and diversity of opinion, and interpreting their meaning, presented an 
integral yet challenging component of the study'. 
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The quotes selected were those that most clearly and richly expressed the general 
idea in regard to findings; or those that expressed contrasting views (deviant cases) 
from the general pattern identified. 
4.5 Data quality 
Elements of qualitative research that are commonly discussed as being of relevance 
in relation to quality and rigour include reliability and validity. The former is related to 
the 'repeatability' of the interpretation undertaken, i. e. the extent to which another 
researcher is able to reproduce the findings and conclusions (Green and Thorogood, 
2004). The latter refers to the 'truth' of the results and explanations provided (ibid. ). 
Various techniques have been suggested to contribute towards improved reliability 
and validity (Silverman, 1993 and 1998; Patton, 1999; Mays and Pope, 2000). These 
include examples that are discussed below. 
With respect to reliability, objective and comprehensive maintenance of records and 
account of generated data and the analytical process (Silverman, 1998; Mays and 
Pope, 2000) was followed. 
As suggested by Patton (1999), interviews, observation and documentary analysis 
were used as data sources. This triangulation of different methods should allow for 
one source balancing the scope for errors and bias of the other (Allen, 2000). One 
may find, however, that different data sources are not always in consonance with 
each other, as "different kinds of data may yield somewhat different results because 
different types of inquiry are sensitive to different real world nuances" (Patton, 1999). 
Hence, methodological triangulation may not contribute towards data aggregation that 
would add up to a more comprehensive representation of reality (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983, cited in Silverman, 1993). But further understanding the discrepancies 
in results across different data sets yielded through different methods can provide 
further insights into the subject being researched (Patton, 1999) and thus broaden the 
perspective of the area under investigation. 
Member or respondent validation is the process of presenting the preliminary research 
findings to the subjects under investigation and refining them in view of their feedback 
(Silverman, 1993). 1 presented preliminary findings of this research during a 
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dissemination workshop of Health Systems Development Knowledge Programme 
activities in Uganda in October 2005. However, Mays and Pope (2000) highlighted a 
problem with this approach: the interpretation provided by the researcher is broader 
than that of respondents. It should thus be used as an error reduction strategy and not 
as a test of validity. 
Deviant case analysis (Silverman, 1998; Patton, 1999) refers to the process of 
searching for and examining negative cases and events that are not in consonance 
with identified trends. In line with the approach taken in the past by others conducting 
case studies (Palmer, 2001), the analytical process of this research involved taking 
into account a range of negative events. 
Ethical procedures 
Ethical clearance from LSHTM as well as from the appropriate body in Uganda (IPH / 
Makerere University and the National Council for Science and Technology) was 
obtained before the start of data collection activities49. Consent for interviews was 
agreed verbally. An information sheet5° was prepared and given to every interviewee. 
Confidentiality of data was maintained throughout the research process and no names 
of individuals interviewed were disclosed. 
49 See Appendix 5 for copy of relevant documentation. 
50 Copy available in Appendix 6. 
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Chapter 5: Monitoring under imperfect information 
5.1 Introduction 
Principals delegate actions so they need to rely on observation or monitoring to gain 
information on the agent's performance. However, it is very difficult to gain information 
about the agent's behaviour, because of problems related to the tasks of monitoring 
and verification of performance, i. e. risk, uncertainty, and information asymmetry. The 
context of multiple layers of international bureaucracy and conflicting objective 
functions (inter and intra organisational) in the aid environment adds to the difficulties. 
As noted by Seabright (2002), "aid agencies face ... greater problems with monitoring 
the quality of work, because of the lack of direct feedback from beneficiaries in their 
structure of command and responsibility". In addition, complexities related to the 
health sector (e. g. uncertainties in relation to outcomes being the result of long term 
efforts and investments as well as of endogenous and exogenous determinants) make 
the task of monitoring even more difficult. The monitoring task is further compounded 
by the problem of weak monitoring capacity in resource-constrained environments of 
low and middle income countries. This is demonstrated by previous work in the area 
of HIV/AIDS in India (Guinness, 2005) and PHC in South Africa (Palmer, 2001). 
Hence, the challenges involved in applying the agency model to IDAH include 
difficulties in obtaining information on the behaviour of the agent (e. g. whether 
information is being hidden from the principal); problems of risks and uncertainties of 
measuring health outcomes; and more broadly, the problem of lack of information due 
to capacity problems of producing data. 
New aid modalities offer new ways of managing the relationship between RGs and 
DPs by altering the incentive and monitoring environment. As noted previously, in a 
contractual relationship the compensation scheme (penalties and rewards applied by 
the principal towards the agent) is usually linked to some kind of monitoring strategy. 
The next chapter will explore the penalties and rewards adopted under the new aid 
modalities, i. e. SWAp/GBS. 
In this chapter, I seek to understand the implications for the aid contract of the focus 
of monitoring mechanisms, i. e. if on an input-based or outcome-based model. 
Problems with these models may involve issues of information asymmetry, risk, 
uncertainties and the behaviour of the parties involved (Government and DPs). The 
102 
implications for the aid contract in terms of scope for the agent (Government) to avoid 
effort or shirk responsibilities, for example, are likely to be influenced by the capacity 
and effectiveness of the existing monitoring system. Hence I was interested in 
investigating the extent to which the monitoring processes and mechanisms allowed 
the principals (DPs) to obtain information about performance. 
The evidence for this chapter was drawn from a combination of data sources. These 
include interview data but also notes from direct observation of the operation of 
monitoring structures such as JRMs, NHA, HPAC, WGs, and District Visits. In 
addition, I used minutes and aide memoirs of meetings (e. g. from HPAC and JRMs). 
Documents and reports were another key data source for this chapter: sector plans 
(e. g. HSSP), Government reports (e. g. AHSPR), policy documents and reviews (e. g. 
MTR), and local reports and other documents (e. g. letters, research or consultancy 
reports), some made available through the HDPG email list or during meetings 
attended. Finally, I also made use of notes from informal discussions/accounts [as 
provided by DP representatives, Government officials, others (NGO representatives 
and consultants)]. 
5.2 Focus of monitoring mechanisms, related effectiveness of these 
mechanisms and implications for the aid contract 
In the Ugandan health sector, responsibility for assessing performance lies mainly 
with JRMs. With the introduction of the SWAp and given the overall context of 
increased concern for aid effectiveness, this new monitoring mechanism attempts to 
focus on outcomes / results rather than inputs to a greater extent than in project 
modes of assistance. Hence, this section investigates the focus of the M&E processes 
and structures adopted by GBS and SWAp in the health sector - whether centred on 
inputs, processes, outputs or outcomes. 
The use of performance indicators in the Ugandan health sector evolved from a 
situation where it was important to have clear processes functioning (HSSP, 
performance report for the sector, guidelines, Budget Framework Paper, support to 
districts). 
At the start of the sector plan, the focus was on processes rather than outputs 
like: actual drafting of sector plan, to hold JRMs on time, preparation of annual 
performance reports, recruitment of staff, and money reaching districts. Having 
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or not having these things at the beginning was a big measure of performance. 
(KI - 2, DP representative) 
Once these processes showed signs that they are working, the focus moved to 
outputs which started to be owned by both Government and DPs. 
When donors became comfortable with the processes as agreed between 
them and the Government and the related actions, they began to own the 
outputs whether it was high or low. (KI - 1, Government official) 
Based on consensus reached among health sector stakeholders, 18 national level 
indicators were selected to monitor the performance of the health sector strategic 
plan. These HSSP performance indicators prioritized process and output measures: 
input, 3 indicators; process, 4; output, 9 (2 are not identified). The five Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan - PEAP - indicators (out of the 18 indicators) were also mainly 
output indicators - as presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: PEAP indicators 
PEAP Indicators Category Source Progress up to 2003/04 
Utilisation of out -patient services Output HMIS doubled 
Immunisation rates for DPT3 Output HMIS doubled 
Deliveries in health units Output HMIS stagnant 
HIV prevalence rates Outcome Sentinel sites / ACP 
reports 
decreased (up until 2002103, 
data not available for 2003/04) 
Proportion of posts filled by qualified staff Output HMIS/staff inventories doubled 
Source: MoH (2004c) 
The choice of the above output indicators was justified in terms of the need to argue 
that a greater consumption of health services would be contributing to improved 
health outcomes (Yates et al. 2006). In addition, given uncertainties related to 
reaching targets/outcomes, the focus was said to be based on a range of process and 
output indicators. 
Later, during the discussions of the second HSSP, there was interest by the parties in 
assessing performance vis-ä-vis outcomes. This is explored in section 5.4. Table 5.2 
shows the use of performance indicators over time. 
Table 5.2: Evolution of use of performance indicators over time in the Ugandan health 
sector 
Beginning of HSSP: on inputs and processes 
Around time of field work: on outputs 
HSSP 2/ future: increasingly on outcomes 
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As shown in Table 5.3 below, depending on the focus of the monitoring mechanisms, 
there may be different implications for the aid contract. In order to assess the extent to 
which these have been occurring in the Ugandan context, the effectiveness of the 
existing Government system in terms of its capacity and behaviours of the parties are 
further explored in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
Table 5.3: Implications for the aid contract and focus of different monitoring 
mechanisms 
Input model Outcome model 
Focus Inputs, processes and outputs (e. g. Outcomes (e. g. changes in morbidity and 
budgetary expenditures). mortality). 
Implications for aid Agent shifts effort to activities where High costs of measurement, problems of 
contract outputs are easily monitored (budget verification, lack of capacity which may facilitate 
(Martens et al., controls as opposed to quality measures). the scope for the occurrence of opportunistic 
2002) and (Adam behaviour. 
and Gunning, 2002) 1 
5.3 The input-based model of performance and related implications 
This section explores problems related to the input-based model of monitoring 
processes and mechanisms under the new aid modalities (SWAp/GBS). In order to do 
this, the section examines the effectiveness of existing Government mechanisms and 
processes used for monitoring performance, in relation to their role in reducing 
information asymmetries, i. e. how much they can reveal of the performance and 
behaviour of the sector/agent (in this case the RG). Specific areas covered include: 
data production and analysis; reporting system; and verification processes. 
Government information and monitoring systems improved considerably after the start 
of HSSP I (alongside the process of introduction of the SWAp and other health sector 
reforms). However, there were still considerable difficulties involving data production, 
analysis and effective use for decision making in Uganda, both at national and district 
levels, which hindered the monitoring of performance and the reduction of information 
asymmetries even if various M&E structures and processes had been put in place 
and/or strengthened. 
The Government tended to recognise improvements, as for example: 
The beginning was difficult but things have improved. The challenge at times 
was that people were not aware of what they were supposed to do. Regular 
discussions and agreements have made people more committed. The system 
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is now regular, more consistent, with clear objectives, and with districts. 
(Government official) 
In contrast, while development partners acknowledged improvements, they pointed to 
persisting weaknesses: 
Most systems (in place) are to a certain extent working, or are in place but 
data or information is not being presented or used for decision making. But 
monitoring per se is taking place. (DP representative) 
5.3.1 Data production and analysis 
This sub-section reviews problems related to the Government system for data 
production and analysis. It covers the routine data collection system [Health 
Management and Information System (HMIS)], funding and management issues. 
The HMIS, which uses facility-based data, appeared to have improved over the period 
of the SWAp. 
The health information system is starting to function better but not as good as 
it could be. Apparently Tanzania has a strong district approach in their system. 
(DP representative) 
HMIS is poor but it is improving. It is not good for figures but one can use the 
trends shown. (KI - 4, other) 
Persisting limitations, however, of the HMIS included data incompleteness and 
constraints related to data entry (in most cases data entry was delayed) (notes from 
various meetings, e. g. HPAC January 2004). Another problem was that the HMIS did 
not provide disaggregated data (e. g. per gender, age and income gradients) (MoH, 
2003d). 
Nevertheless, as noted above there were improvements in relation to completeness 
and timeliness. These two indicators were tracked through the district league table. 
Overall the combined percentage values for these indicators increased from 15.6% in 
1999/2000 to 52% in 2000/01 (ibid. ). In 2004, overall completeness was 89% and 
timeliness 85% (MoH, 2004c). 
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Limitations of the HMIS noted above are likely to be related to a series of challenges 
faced in relation to M&E within the MoH. For example, from observations during the 
preparatory meetings of HSSP2, it was noted that the agenda for the WG on 
Monitoring and Supervision did not include a discussion of the HMIS. Yet this should 
be a crucial area for enhancement during the second sector plan (with a duration of 
five years) and should be at the core of the activities of a WG on monitoring. 
Further shortcomings experienced by the HMIS are also likely to be related to 
problems of the Resource Centre (RC) in fulfilling its mission of producing up-to-date 
and reliable information for decision making. The RC (part of the MoH) is responsible 
for overall data gathering and analysis for the health sector as a whole, as well as for 
providing guidance in this area to districts. 
The resource centre is still severely understaffed, under-funded, and lacks 
strategic direction. (Ssengooba et al., 2004) 
Inadequate capacity in the resource centre to analyse and disseminate 
information submitted has resulted in failure to establish a reliable information 
base for the sector. (MoH, 2003d) 
There was poor coordination of initiatives to analyse existing data by the different 
programmes hindering its effective use by policy makers. 
Uncoordinated development of information systems by line programs does not 
facilitate development of the Resource Centre. (ibid. ) 
Some programmes re-analyse data in their area because work by the 
Resource Centre is poor..... There are anomalies in the system such as 
differences between UNEPI data of DPT3 coverage of 72% and Annual 
Performance Report of 84%. In theory these are based on the same data but 
different analysis, by different teams. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
There was a lack of support to districts in analysing and making use of their own data: 
As observed during the district visits, while data collection was taking place at facility 
level, it lacked analysis. Motivation to carry out the analysis was often poor at facility 
level as HMIS forms were expected to go to the RC and there was no feedback. 
If reporting is mandatory then feedback from the centre [should] also be 
mandatory (District Government official during a JRM) 
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Below district level, monitoring and feedback were considered to be even worse. 
There was a weak definitiori of the roles of sub-districts and their links to communities. 
WE between districts and communities is almost absent. (Government 
official) 
With respect to the commitment of the RC, the poor quality of its management was 
widely recognised as a problem (noted by various KIs). According to discussions 
during the 2003 JRM, even though the RC reported directly to top management, this 
higher managerial level was said to lack time to follow up on the problems faced by 
the RC. This suggests there was a considerable degree of indifference towards 
producing and analysing reliable data in the health sector; if not, even top 
management in the Ministry was unable to find time to support the RC. Participants in 
the discussion (2003 JRM) suggested making the RC directly accountable to HPAC 
(i. e. getting donors to monitor its performance more closely). But even the regular 
quarterly reporting supposed to be produced by the RC was not being submitted to 
HPAC (MoH, 2003d). Yet this had not turned into a serious matter of concern for 
donors in their discussions with the Government - although requests have been made 
for regular reporting (see section 4.3.251). Hence it is questionable whether making 
the RC accountable to HPAC would necessarily improve its performance. In addition, 
it is an internal management issue that should not be handed over for oversight by 
DPs but resolved by the MoH. 
The RC also faced the problem of lack of resources. This involved both capital and 
recurrent funding and was particularly severe in relation to staffing levels (MoH, 
2003d). Only about 30% of the RC vacancies were filled (ibid. ). At district level there 
was also a severe lack of personnel dedicated to monitoring tasks, especially records 
assistants (ibid. ). Those in post also lacked technical expertise, for example records 
assistants were in need of supervision and on the job training (notes from 
observations of meetings). Skilled human resources in this area were considered to 
be in short supply overall in the country, although donor projects seemed not to be 
facing such severe problems of under-staffed M&E (notes from observations of 
meetings). 
A question here would be the extent to which donors were willing to provide direct 
(financial) support for strengthening the RC given its problems of poor capacity. While 
51 Sub-section: HPAC's role in enforcing reporting of performance. 
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offers had been made to strengthen the RC, they only came to fruition on a limited 
scale - as provided by WHO, DANIDA and USAID (KI - 1, Government official). 
There was a lot of interest in supporting the resource centre. But its poor 
management scared donors away. (KI - 1, Government official) 
Since donors appeared willing to provide greater financial support to the RC, as noted 
above, it seemed to be problems more closely related to the RC management and 
lack of political commitment of the Government that posed a barrier to improvements. 
On the other hand, DPs could have put more pressure on the Government to have 
such management problems resolved or at least ameliorated. 
5.3.2 Reporting system 
With the introduction of the first HSSP and the implementation of various reforms 
(including the SWAp), efforts were made by Government and DPs towards 
institutionalising and improving the quality of routine reports used to assess the 
performance of the health sector. In this sub-section, I examine these efforts and the 
effect they had on the system of data dissemination. 
Reporting of indicators 
There was some improvement in the reporting of HSSP monitoring indicators over 
time. Table 5.4 shows the number of indicators, of the 18 HSSP indicators, for which 
data were available from 2001 to 2004. 
Table 5.4: Data availability for HSSP indicators from 2001/02 to 2003/04 
Indicators AHSPR - Year 
8 2001/02 
9 2002/03 
12 2003/04* 
`Although data were not updated since 2002/03 for 2 indicators 
Sources: MoH (2002c); MoH (2003c); MoH (2004c) 
Therefore, by 2003/04 one-third of the indicators were still un-accounted for. 
Some indicators were listed as having HMIS or internal reports as data sources 
(which should be routinely collected) and yet reporting for 4 of them was not available 
(in the AHSPRs), as shown in the Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Reporting of selected HSSP indicators 
Category Indicator Baseline Data Reporting 
source 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Output Health facility level specific yes HMIS NA NA NA NA 
number of C/sections per 1,000 
deliveries within the catchment 
area of the facility 
Process Percentage of facilities without yes HMIS NA NA yes yes 
any stock-outs of chloroquine, 
Oral Rehydration Solution 
(ORS), cotrimoxazole and 
measles vaccine 
Process Percentage of disbursed PHC yes Monitoring NA NA NA NA 
Conditional Grants funds that reports 
are expended. 
Input Percentage of PHC Conditional NA Based on yes yes yes NA 
Grants funds released on time Health 
to the sector (non-salary Planning 
recurrent and capital). Department, 
MoH, 
MoFPED 
data 
Source: MoH (2005a) 
For instance, as shown in Table 5.5 (the third indicator), there was inconsistent 
reporting in relation to the PHC Conditional Grants releases and expenditure, even 
though it should not be difficult to get hold of this information from the 
MoFPED/districts. This begs the question as to whether the Government was hiding 
information from DPs because of a lack of commitment towards monitoring (and 
potentially as a means to cover any misconduct) or simple inefficiency/lack of 
capacity. PHC Conditional Grants form part of the Poverty Action Fund and as noted 
earlier should in principle be the focus of close attention by those DPs that provide 
budget support through this channel. 
In relation to more difficult to measure indicators, such as those related to quality and 
access, reporting had also been irregular. Table 5.6 summarises reporting available 
for the 4 indicators based on survey/mapping data: 
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Table 5.6: Reporting for HSSP indicators based on survey/mapping data 
Indicator Purpose Reporting Data source Baseline 
Proportion of surveyed population Quality No survey Community NA 
expressing satisfaction with the survey 
health services 
Malaria case fatality rate among Quality One estimate was carried out Population NA 
children <5years old in Regional Referral Hospitals survey 
(seems that survey was not 
conducted) 
Percentage of fever/uncomplicated Access No survey Facility based NA 
malaria cases (all ages) correctly survey 
managed at health facilities 
Percentage of population residing Access 1 mapping conducted in Mapping 57% 
within 5km of a health facility [public 2003/04 
or Private Not-For-Profit ( PNFP)] 
providing the UMHCP (Ugandan 
Minimum Health Care Package) by 
district 
Source: MoH (2005a) 
A question worth asking here is whether the Government was shifting effort to 
activities where outputs are easily monitored (budget controls as opposed to quality 
measures) but as noted above not even budget controls were being monitored 
regularly. DPs appeared not to be holding the Government accountable to those given 
that reporting for a few indicators had been missing over a long period of time -4 
years for example for the indicator of percentage of PHC Conditional Grants funds 
released on time to the sector (non-salary recurrent and capital). 
Another problem hindering the monitoring of progress of the HSSP was lack of 
reliable baseline information (MoH, " 2003d). As noted from the 2 tables above, 
benchmarks were missing for a number of indicators -4 out of the total of 18 
indicators (MoH, 2004c), particularly those reliant on survey data. An audited 
benchmark seemed only to be available for the HIV prevalence rate based on the 
sero-prevalence survey of 1988. 
There is little clarity on the sources and validity of the baseline values adopted. 
(Ssengooba et al., 2004) 
For example, with respect to the maternal health indicator used by HSSP/PEAP 
(percentage of deliveries in health facilities), it was noted that the source for the 
baseline indicator was not known as there were different data sources being used 
(Ssengooba et al., 2004 and notes from meetings e. g. PEAP revision meeting 
October 2003). The source of the figures used for following up this indicator over the 
years were also said to be unclear - institutional deliveries: 25% in 99/00; 17.5% in 
01/02; 20% in 02/03 (KI - 2, DP representative). 
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Health sector PEAP targets agreed at the start of HSSP (in 2000) were later revised 
midway through the implementation process. Some were revised upwards and some 
downwards as shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Changes to agreed health sector PEAP targets as per the AHSPR 2004 
Original target as Revised target as per Revised upwards (1) 
per HSSP Document AHSPR (dated 2004) or downwards 
Out-Patient Department (OPD) 0.6 0.7 1 
utilisation 
DPT3 / pentavalent vaccine 80% 85% 1 
coverage 
Deliveries in health facilities 70% 35% 
(Government and PNFP) 
Approved posts filled by qualified 80% 52%` 
health workers 
National average HIV sero- 1.7% 5% ? 
prevalence as captured from Ante- 
Natal Care (ANC) surveillance sites 
*This target had already been changed in the AHSPR of 2003 to 48%. 
Sources: MoH (2000b) and MoH (2004c) 
The AHSPR 2004, which described the changes in the target levels as shown above, 
provided no explanation as to why these alterations took place. In the 2003 report 
though, it was noted that given the dynamic nature of the implementation process of 
HSSP, targets were revised mainly due to the lack of resources available for carrying 
out the related activities (MoH, 2003c). 
The changes seemed to have taken place in order to reflect more closely the realities 
of implementation. It is questionable though whether the original targets should not 
have been kept to show shortcomings in performance. Poor performance might have 
been covered up by targets being changed along the way which could have been due 
to lack of effort or commitment on the side of Government as opposed to lack of 
resources which was claimed to be the motive. 
Key health sector performance reports / reviews 
Although the first Annual Health Sector Performance Reports (AHSPRs) were 
considered to be of poor quality, with programmes reporting from an implementation 
perspective (e. g. number of workshops held or meetings attended), later reports, as 
for instance the report for 2003-2004, have been commended for providing a good 
synopsis of the sector's performance with regard to key outputs at the central and 
local levels of government, in. spite of some programmes still reporting on the basis of 
inputs (Ssengooba et al., 2004). Frequency of reporting has also improved. 
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At the beginning annual reports would be delayed about 3 years. Donors have 
done a lot of work, they couldn't wait 3 years to account back and made this 
clear to government. (KI - 1, Government official) 
Before SWAp there was no annual health sector performance report. All there 
was, was the statement to parliament on progress of the sector which was 
descriptive, not helpful. From there the annual health sector performance 
reports were institutionalised and the quality has improved from the report of 
2001/02 to the one of 2002103. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
League tables were introduced with the purpose of ranking districts according to their 
performance as measured against a set of indicators based on HMIS and other 
sources of data (MoH, 2003d). The key objectives of the league table were to 
compare and contrast performance across the districts, share as a learning 
experience the successes from the well-performing ones and provide strategic 
support to those districts identified as poor performing (MoH, 2003c). 
However, the use of HMIS data can give rise to a number of questions in regard to the 
validity of the league table given problems experienced by the system (incomplete 
and inaccurate nature of data). For example, one indicator is the percentage of health 
units submitting complete HMIS returns. As observed during discussions at the 2003 
JRM, the number of units within a district reporting their HMIS forms was considered 
as complete in the league table, but the contents may not be complete in the forms 
returned. 
In theory, performance should be captured by the annual reports and league 
table. But these reports will only be as good as the data and the capacity to 
analyse and produce them is. There was lots of [missing] data which would 
effectively change the order of the districts and completely invalidate the 
process. (KI - 4, other) 
At central level (MoH), there were quarterly review retreats and quarterly work-plan 
reviews. 
Quarterly review retreats were led by the RC and focused on the review of HSSP 
indicators (e. g. OPD and malaria case load) using HMIS. It was noted that these 
retreats "sort of happen even though they are not great" (KI - 2, DP representative). 
Shortcomings in the performance of the RC as discussed in the previous sub-section 
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could be linked to the possible explanations underlying the poor quality of these 
quarterly review retreats. 
The quarterly work-plan reviews were led by the Quality Assurance Department 
(QAD) and should generate the quarterly reports on the basis of progress against the 
work-plans for central level programmes [technical programmes, i. e. the basic 
package which is part of the Uganda Minimum Health Care Package (UMHCP)] and 
departments. The quality of reporting was considered tobe poor (not results oriented, 
often just a list of activities performed, such as purchase of equipment, vehicles) and 
lacking management enforcement and feedback (internal verification), as mentioned 
by various Kls. 
[The] in charge of technical programmes reports against the work-plan 
(activity, progress, comments) but nobody checks what you are reporting. Only 
basis is a verbal / oral presentation. No progress on indicators is shown. 
Senior management gives very poor feedback to technical divisions. (KI - 3, 
other) 
The reporting by technical programmes also suffered from a lack of liaison with the 
RC for production and analysis of data (poor validity) (various Kls). Moreover, these 
reports were not being submitted to HPAC on a regular basis (MoH, 2003d) and so it 
is questionable whether they were being produced on a routine basis. The lack of a 
consolidated MoH work plan (discussed during various HPAC and JRMs) was also 
likely to have hindered, the aggregation of the reports presented by the programmes 
and departments. In addition, the production of the AHSPRs was obstructed by 
central programmes and departments that did not submit their reports in the 
standardised forms (MoH, 2003c; MoH, 2004c), although this was said to be 
improving over time (KI - 1, Government official). _ 
Budget Framework Paper priorities need to be translated into prioritised work- 
plans for different departments and divisions within the ministry which then can 
feed into the quarterly reporting of progress and can facilitate the preparation 
of the annual performance report, and quarterly retreats and reviews need to 
be of better quality. (KI - 4, other) 
These problems are likely to be partially related to lack of capacity (lack of expertise 
and number of staff) to analyse existing data. Other reasons for these problems may 
be associated with issues of poor management and declining commitment towards 
monitoring, particularly on the side of the Government. 
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Firstly, during the HSSP2 preparation retreat, it was observed that there was some 
lack of interest from technical programmes in the discussions of the WG on monitoring 
and supervision. For example, representatives of only 3 technical programmes 
attended this WG during the retreat: HIV/AIDS, UNEPI and RH. Malaria, which 
constitutes the highest disease burden in the country, was not present. In addition, the 
presentation of this WG during the retreat was the least attended in terms of number 
of participants. A quote from the WG presenter echoed the lack of progress/interest in 
this area: "we need to see this area really working better than under HSSPI". 
Secondly, the QAD which was responsible for producing these reports seemed to face 
some problems of management similar to the RC, as noted by a number of Kls. In 
addition, based on observations of various meetings of the WG on Monitoring and 
Supervision (during JRMs and the preparatory phase for the second HSSP), it was 
noted that this WG - which is also led by the QAD - seemed to lack high level political 
support. The leadership of the WG was often not present to lead the deliberations, 
hindering the scope for decision making as those deputising did not seem to have full 
delegation. In addition, there was also not significant representation of development 
partners during the WG meetings which could have acted to counter balance the 
ministry's lack of commitment. 
Further, the Health Systems WG remarked that the WG on Monitoring and 
Supervision had not been meeting regularly during the preparations for HSSP2 unlike 
the other WGs (notes of observation from SWG meeting). Even the Government, 
which was chairing the Health Systems WG meeting, confirmed this problem. 
Finally, the top management of the MoH did not seem to be very dedicated to 
enforcing that programmes and other central level departments produce these reports 
regularly and up to set standards (notes from observations of meetings). 
PHC conditional grant monitoring reports (which focus on performance at district level) 
consisted of an assessment of work-plan implementation, service delivery outputs 
achieved in each quarter against set targets (PEAP indicators), and budget 
performance and compliance with national guidelines (MoH, 2003d). According to 
various Kls, the monitoring of these grants took place regularly at the beginning of 
HSSP implementation. However, around 2003 and 2004 visits and reporting appeared 
to be less frequent. For instance, in 2004 there were no PHC Conditional Grants 
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monitoring reports available until May. In 2003 there were 2 reports out 4 due. 
Conversely, in 2002 all 4 reports were produced (information provided by Government 
official). 
However, as shown in Table 5.5, PHC Conditional Grants reporting for percentage of 
funds expended was not available in the AHSPRs from 2000/01 to 2003/04, even 
though it should have been made available in line with the information provided 
above. The reporting presented in the AHSPRs was likely to be the result of the yearly 
consolidation of reports as provided by districts. There might have been a time lag for 
submission of these between the end of the FY in June and the tight schedule for the 
production of the AHSPRs in October. If districts did not submit these reports, the 
MoH could have reported on the basis of the reports for the quarterly monitoring visits. 
This was noted as a problem during the MTR (MoH, 2003d). The area teams52 and 
the district league tables that were created later were a response in trying to deal with 
such difficulties (KI - 1, Government official). Yet the lack of reporting by districts 
persisted (albeit with some improvements), as illustrated by the district league table of 
2003/04 when data were available for a number of districts though not all (MoH, 
2004c). 
The lack of interest of top and senior management was mentioned as a significant 
problem in relation to enforcement of the visits and reporting. 
The technical people are committed... but the top and senior management are 
not seriously interested in this commitment. For example, the quarterly reports 
we are supposed to prepare like this financial year, we have only monitored 
once simply because there was no money [to carry out the visits], and this is 
PAF money. You make a request for the money to come so that we can 
submit a report and it does not come. You tell top management and they don't 
take it serious. (Government official) - 
Because these conditional grants are part of PAF, MoFPED requires the submission 
of monitoring reports before the next tranche of funding is released. But PAF, as 
noted earlier, is also part of GBS and the MoFPED is likely to be operating under a 
request from DPs in the first place. Yet even this requirement was being ignored as 
funds continued to be released in the absence of reporting (Government official). 
52 Through this strategy groups of staff from the MoH pulled from various departments (e. g. planning, 
disease specific areas, quality assurance etc. ) were responsible for providing long term support to a 
selected group of districts (about 3 to 8 districts per group) (Murindwa et al. 2006). 
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This should be a very crucial area of concern for DPs since PAF funds have been 
specifically earmarked / protected for poverty-alleviating activities. Some DPs only 
contribute to the budget by financing this specific fund. Yet accountability as seen 
here was deficient. Also of concern is the quality of the reports (when they are made 
available), as put by one DP representative: "they have to give us a report on how 
they spent our money. This doesn't have sense because they can write what they 
want". This statement highlights the concern in relation to the lack of verification or 
checks and balances in the system as the Government can write the report in such a 
way as to show the information that they want and hide the information they would 
prefer not to share on poor performance - to their benefit. 
Improving the quality of reporting should also involve enhancing the quality of the data 
used and the systems that produce and analyse the data. As one KI (KI - 4, other) 
highlighted earlier, "reports will only be as good as the data and the capacity to 
analyse the data and produce them is", even if frequency of reporting (AHSPR) and 
new reports (league tables) have been put into place. 
This begs the questions as to what extent DPs were really engaged in gaining more 
information on the performance, and why they would allow Government to continue 
with practices of poor reporting. As noted by another KI (KI - 1, Government official), 
when donors put pressure on Government to have AHSPRs produced on a regular 
basis, this happened. DPs fund the production of AHSPRs, which were presented 
yearly as one of the accounts of performance during the JRMs. Hence, pressure to 
have these reports available was perhaps likely to be linked to the agreement of 
presenting the reports at JRMs but may also be linked to visibility issues - where 
donors could show their joint work with the MoH. Other reports, such as the quarterly 
workplan reviews, might be seen as internal documents to the MoH. This could 
perhaps explain why they emphasised efforts towards improving one kind of report 
and not others. 
HPAC's role in enforcing reoortina of performance 
A committee that meets once a month will to a certain extent deal with various 
process issues. However, HPAC seemed to lack strategic focus by not paying close 
attention to reviewing and analysing the sector performance. 
The HPAC agenda is frequently overloaded with operational and information 
sharing issues, rather than more strategic matters. (MoH, 2003d) 
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As part of an overall strategic approach, HPAC was not reviewing key reports on a 
regular basis. For example, the Mid Term Evaluation of HSSP recommended that the 
MoH started to share a number of reports for discussion at HPAC in early 2003, which 
were considered crucial in fulfilling the mission of the Committee. 
MoH should provide to HPAC members all relevant reports from the Ministry of 
Health, such as the Quarterly and Annual Reports, Minutes of the Sector 
Working Group, Quarterly Analytical Reports on the HMIS, PAF monitoring 
reports, Quality Assurance and other supervision reports, reports of the 
Workings Group, etc on a more regular and timely basis. (MoH, 2003d). 
By May 2004 the situation had not yet improved and caused concern among health 
DPs. In a letter to the chairperson of HPAC53, the HDPGs listed a series of reports / 
minutes they would like to receive on a regular basis for review at HPAC (HDPG, 
2004b). Besides those listed in the recommendation of the MTR above, these 
included minutes from ICCs, and reports (half yearly) from area team visits. 
More broadly, DPs suggested that M&E issues could be part of HPAC agendas on a 
regular basis (HDPG, 2004b). This included, for example, the follow up on 
undertakings. This signalled some level of pressure from DPs upon Government 
towards improvements in information sharing. 
A MoH work plan, if existing and operational, would facilitate the process of following 
up progress by HPAC and allow greater transparency: "It is still a challenge to have 
an annual work plan, with costing, for the MoH" (DP representative). Yet Government 
seemed not particularly engaged in working towards producing yearly work plans. As 
noted in the previous section, this problem has contributed to hindering effective 
reporting (e. g. quarterly work plan reviews) and increasing information asymmetries. 
HPAC attendance of key Government staff seemed to be a problem which has 
weakened the mechanisms of reporting to HPAC. It was observed during HPAC 
meetings that some staff in charge of reporting different actions were not regularly 
attending the meetings or did not prepare the necessary reports regarding agreed 
actions. 
53 The Director General of Health Services. 
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Attendance of directors and commissioners has been inconsistent, thus 
affecting the timeliness of action from the various section[s] of MoH. (MoH, 
2003d) 
There seemed to be a lack of clear definition of roles and strategic use of existing 
structures and committees (e. g. WGs and ICCs) as to how they could feed back into 
HPAC in regard to monitoring performance. 
The relationship of many of these committees to HPAC needs to be 
streamlined and formalised, if conflicts and contradictions are to be avoided 
and duplication of work minimised. (MoH, 2003d) 
According to a KI (KI - 2, DP representative) ICCs facilitated the reporting of technical 
programmes and since many of them received project funding, this mechanism (ICCs) 
helped to integrate projects into the SWAp. However, their potential in regard to 
integration of projects seemed not to be fully realized. From the point of view of 
another KI (KI - 3, other), SWAp structures like HPAC served to monitor the big 
picture and could focus on the major budget lines. Conversely, ICCs should look into 
the details of programme areas, like smaller budget lines, but this was not taking 
place. 
/ think the ICC meetings are very important and if donors are on board and 
know what the issues are, (they) can use these meetings to monitor 
performance, but they aren't really using the ICC meetings for this. (KI - 3, 
other) 
In relation to problems of reporting by ICCs and WGs, and lack of enforcement of their 
reporting by HPAC, one could raise the question as to whether these reports were not 
available because these structures weren't functioning (i. e. having regular meetings 
as they were supposed to, for example). Or perhaps these structures and committees 
lacked a clear agenda to focus on and which they were accountable for on a regular 
basis. For instance, when WGs met to discuss the preparation of the second HSSP 
they seemed to operate more effectively (notes from observation of WGs meetings). 
Further, through observation of HPAC meetings, the need for improvements in the 
management systems 'Of the MoH for discussing and dealing with more internal 
problems was noticeable. HPAC meetings seemed to be used as a channel for MoH 
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staff to expose issues/problems54, possibly because high level officials such as the 
DG were present. Hence, instead of being a forum for the clear reporting of progress 
to DPs, HPAC appeared to be used as a space for MoH departments to interact and 
solve internal issues. 
5.3.3 Validation and verification 
According to Adam and Gunning (2002), Uganda has no verification system for health 
statistics (all data are self-reported by the MoH and there is poor external audit 
capacity). As previously mentioned, resources and commitment are not even sufficient 
for managing the HMIS and reporting is also deficient. In this sub-section, I review 
problems related to strategic planning and financial resources in the area of validation 
and verification. 
NHAs /JRMs may serve as fora for data validation, to cross-check performance 
information, and so may the district visits (which include visits to facilities) as observed 
during JRMs when district staff or others can challenge information presented if they 
think data for their district was misrepresented. However, these are not formal and 
systematic (lacks reliability) evaluations. As pointed by a KI (KI - 3, other): "JRMs are 
based more on perceptions and they don't monitor numbers at alt'. 
Another validation effort is the triangulation of data used to produce the AHSPR 
reports. Though their main source is HMIS data for districts and annual and quarterly 
reports for central level programmes, other sources include (MoH, 2003c; MoH, 
2004c): 
- Reports of actions and undertakings (JRMs); 
- Research and other studies undertaken by various stakeholder institutions 
(though it is not clear which studies are chosen to be included). 
While these validation efforts represent good practice, they are not based on the use 
of independent and rigorously designed studies or audits that would provide 
verification of performance in the health sector. 
54 Examples included discussions on introduction / implementation of community-based programmes; 
difficulties faced by NMS to deliver drugs to districts; and pay disputes of health workers (notes from 
observation of HPAC meetings). 
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From the observations of discussions during the JRMs, it seemed that survey data, 
more specifically from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), were considered 
as an important independent gauging tool for performance. However, while DHS 
results were mentioned often, there appeared to be no system for making use of 
these data in a more systematic way. This is also likely to be related to the fact that as 
a large-scale household survey, it only takes place every 5 years. The last one 
available at the time of fieldwork was for 2000 (year of data collection). 
One example of the use of an external quality audit was that of immunisation data 
carried out for GAVI. This was found on GAVI's website and the report is dated from 
2002 (LATH / GAVI, 2002). During fieldwork, no unprompted report of this audit was 
made by interviewees or during meetings observed. It is not very clear the role played 
by such exercises. It could have contributed directly to data improvements within the 
Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI) programme or even more broadly in the 
HMIS, but this would require further investigation. 
In HIV/AIDS it seemed that survey data were produced more regularly. As reported by 
an interviewee (Government official), an (active and passive) surveillance system had 
been in place since 1988 (in antenatal clinics). A population-based cohort (12,000 
patients) study was conducted in a district and had been monitoring incidence since 
1989 (Rakai Project, 2002). This project was funded by various research institutions 
(e. g. Columbia and Johns Hopkins Universities) as well as other international bodies 
(e. g. USAID). In addition, a national sero-prevalence survey was carried out in 1988 
and the second one initiated data collection in 2004. The second national survey was 
funded mainly by the Centers for Disease Control and USAID. Results of Knowledge, 
Attitude, Behavioural Practices (KABP) studies, which were run every 2 years, were 
said to be used as well. From reviewing the report of the HIV/AIDS component in the 
AHSPR, it was not clear though how these different data sets were combined and 
reported. For example, Table 3.5 (on Performance against HSSP STD/HIV/AIDS 
Indicators) in the AHSPR of 2003/04 did not identify the data source for each indicator 
reported. In addition, the results of KABP studies seemed not to be reported as 
regularly as every 2 years, given that data were not reported for indicators such as 
"knowledge of two methods of prevention of HIV transmission" and "median age at 
first sex (years)". Or if these indicators were produced through the national sero- 
prevalence survey or DHS, this was not clearly indicated in the report of 2003/04 
(MoH, 2004c). 
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A burden of disease study was supposed to have been conducted as part of the 
preparations for the second HSSP: As per notes from HPAC and HSSP 2 preparatory 
meetings, the study did not take place due to lack of time and resources. DPs 
mentioned the study as being of great importance as it would contribute to having a 
benchmark to allow for rigorous follow up of progress of the second strategic plan. 
Given the Government's limited resources, the study was to be funded by DPs. 
Initially, the study was designed by WHO and was to be funded by WHO and the 
World Bank, but they seemed to have lost interest. WHO argued that the study was 
designed in line with the WHR 2000 rankings based on burden of diseases 
methodology which was later subject to various criticisms (Williams, 2001; Almeida et 
al., 2001). 
DPs discussed with Government (notes from HPAC and HSSP 2 preparatory 
meetings) the need to identify other sources for data collection as well as the need to 
have a sentinel surveillance system in place. The example was given of the 
Tanzanian district-based site surveillance system. However, up to the end of the 
fieldwork, no further deliberations in relation to this were observed. 
Another opportunity for studies to be conducted seemed to be have been missed by 
the health sector stakeholders (Government and DPs). The Ugandan Bureau of 
Statistics (UBOS) carries out household surveys every 2 years. Further engagement 
of the sector with UBOS could result in improvements in the data available. 
It seems that with the exception of the DHS, which is donor driven/funded, organised 
at an international scale, and on a regular basis (i. e. an established system), attempts 
to conduct or improve verification systems focused on disease-specific areas where 
there is greater availability of interest and earmarked funding by donors, like GAVI 
with vaccines or USAID with HIV/AIDS. Greater availability of data in the HIV/AIDS 
sector may also be related to HIV being a 'sexier' disease for DPs who have more 
funds earmarked for this area than any other. But efforts related to broader systems of 
verification have not come to fruition, for example burden of disease and the link to 
UBOS household surveys. 
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5.4 The outcome-based model of performance and related implications 
This section analyses potential difficulties related to the trend of moving towards a 
greater use of outcomes for monitoring performance. In addition, I explore the likely 
problems arising if aid resources are more clearly linked to achieving improved 
outcomes. 
While outcome indicators were not part of the agreed list of HSSP indicators, they 
were becoming increasingly referred to as a measure of performance. Both the PAP 
(2004/05-2007/08) and the HSSP revisions (2005/06 to 2009/10) signalled a move 
towards a stronger focus on outcomes (MoFPED, 2004f; MoH, 2005b). Donors 
commended Government for greater attention to outcomes as opposed to processes 
(e. g. during a meeting regarding the launch of HSSP2). Of particular interest were 
infant and maternal mortality ratios. 
Problems raised by interviewees related to outcome measurements in the Ugandan 
context included the following: 
" They required time consuming methods like population-based surveys such as the 
DHS. 
" Verification methods such as surveys were often said to be costly55 and to depend 
on international funds. However, as shown for example by the cost of the second 
Ugandan HIV sero-behavioural survey - USD 3 million for a sample size of 10,437 
households in 2004 (email communication with DP representative co-funding the 
survey dated 25/05/2004) - this did not seem to be such a costly exercise. A 
government official argued that the reason there was a 16 year gap between the 
first and second HIV sero-prevalence surveys was because these surveys were 
so expensive. But it may be that the cost of conducting the survey is not such a 
problem; more of an issue is that it is reliant on donor funding and the related 
unpredictability and preferences of those donors. 
" Health outcomes could only be measured within medium to long time intervals 
given the time span necessary for changes to take place. For example, the DHS 
55 This is in line with the argument made by Adam and Gunning (2002) in relation to Uganda in particular 
due to the decentralised nature of the Government administrative system. 
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takes place every 5 years and HIV sero-prevalence surveys took place in Uganda 
for the first time in 1988, with the second one in 2004. However, it was a matter of 
debate in Uganda what would be the appropriate time frame for measuring health 
outcomes like infant and maternal mortality. For instance, during preparatory 
discussions of HSSP2, some Government officials noted that the new plan should 
focus on indicators that were changeable over the time frame of ,5 years. 
Maternal 
and infant mortality and HIV prevalence were not included because these are 
considered higher up and cross-cutting sectors. They were seen as PEAP but not 
HSSP indicators. Some disagreed though, as noted by one official: "five years are 
too short to measure outcome indicators and as we prepare HSSP 11 we need to 
start thinking about indicators over a 10 years time frame" (Minutes HPAC 
February 2004). 
" There were difficulties in understanding the causal link between inputs and 
outcomes, hence the inclusion of intermediary indicators / proxy measures that 
may help to clarify the gaps in understanding the causal chain as well as 
difficulties related to the measurement of outcomes. 
Data is old [UDHS], not clear whether Uganda is performing or not. Outcome 
data takes long to be produced. (KI - 1, Government official) 
" At the technical programme level, HSSP1 was said to have selected few 
intermediate / proxy indicators to monitor performance on a short term basis. 
There are good proxy measures like deliveries in health facilities and CYP for 
FP ... (that could be used given that] ... the system for vital registration in 
Uganda is very fragmented (maternal deaths). (KI - 2, DP representative) 
The HSSP 2 list of indicators did not include any outcome indicator but it included a 
greater number of indicators related to technical programmes [particularly 
Reproductive Health (RH) / Maternal health] (MoH, 2005b). 
A KI (KI - 3, other) noted that in a2 year interval, it is possible to bring down the 
Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) with the availability of post-abortion services (legal 
and cheap) and provision of FP reinforcing the value of using intermediate indicators 
to monitor progress56. Since 2002/03, CYPs were being used as a proxy indicator for 
56 In the specific case of MMR, it is a very difficult indicator to measure because of the relative 
infrequency of its events as well as the need for large sample sizes when calculating reliable estimates. 
Thus output indicators are often recommended such as the percentage of supervised deliveries by a 
skilled attendant (World Bank, 2004a). 
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contraceptive prevalence rates which were only measured through DHS every 5 to 6 
years (Erickson, 2004). CYPs were being derived from HMIS data. 
In this context, there were arguments for the use of a balanced mix of indicators to 
gauge performance. 
Need to look at input and process indicators, like training and human 
resources which is very important for RH. I think a combination of indicators is 
ideal. (KI - 3, other) 
Evidence regarding improvements of health sector performance was said to be 
centred on MMR. But some interviewees supported the idea of adopting a broader 
range of measures to be used as good health systems performance indicators (as the 
combination of the PEAP indicators). 
Development partners are under pressure to show Uganda is working. So 
there is need to persuade people to look at a broad range of indicators for 
understanding health systems performance like access, quality, coverage, and 
equity. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
5.4.1 Risk / uncertainties in using results-oriented management / performance 
based contracts 
In this sub-section I investigate problems of risks and uncertainties related to the use 
of approaches such as ROM and performance based contracts. I also explore in more 
depth risks and uncertainties involved in achieving improved results for a particular 
health outcome, maternal health. 
This is of interest given the context of a potential move towards performance based 
contracts linking aid disbursements to outcomes. Complexities explored in relation to 
maternal health include supply and demand side issues and contextual elements. 
The drive by Government, particularly the MoFPED, towards Outcome-Oriented 
Budgeting and ROM (PER 2004 meeting notes), following the international trend, 
seemed to be very much informed by the concern for improving efficiency and centred 
on the causality postulate (from inputs-process-to-outputs to outcomes). As discussed 
in the PER of 2004 (meeting notes), one of the MTEF priorities was to foster a better 
125 
tracking, feedback and coordination system for monitoring progress as resources 
were being spread too thinly to achieve results. The need for a greater focus on cost- 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness in policy making was highlighted. In line with the 
MoF guidelines, spending proposals should be linked to programme outputs 
according Outcome-Oriented Budgeting (PER 2004 meeting notes). 
However, many of the reform elements introduced in the budget process focused on 
tracking inputs as opposed to outputs/results. These included, for example, the PER; 
LTEF and MTEF; Budget Framework Papers; SWGs; tracking studies; an integrated 
financial management system; and the integration of project aid into MTEF (project 
aid corresponds to 24% of total public expenditure). In addition, some of these new 
mechanisms were still not delivering up to the expected standards. For instance, the 
PERs were said to be unable to track where the resources were going given the 
fragmented nature of the information systems (PER 2004 meeting notes). Tracking 
studies were seen as complementary to help close the gaps but they were not 
considered to be comprehensive (PER 2004 meeting notes). Conversely, a consumer 
satisfaction survey, which could provide feedback on results (on quality as perceived 
by consumers) and was recommended by the MTR (MoH, 2003d), had not been 
carried out and was not being planned for FY 2004/05 [as it neither appeared as a 
priority (un-funded) nor was budgeted in Budget Framework Paper discussed 23 April 
2004]. 
Within Government, a critique of the causality postulate was starting to take place, in 
line with the point made by the discussant of the health sector paper during the PEAP 
revision. The discussant highlighted that one needed to understand the process 
behind increased funding (inputs) and increased outputs, which involved controlling 
for other factors including those lying outside the sector and not simply assuming a 
linear relationship between inputs and outputs (PEAP revision meeting notes, 2003). 
Donors also noted this as a problem: 
The trend.... is to pay for what is delivered away from inpubprocesses to 
results. But SWAp should be about processes and outputs, as without 
processes you can't get to outputs. (KI - 5, other) 
There seemed to be growing 'anxiety' among stakeholders to know what the funds 
were producing and to have a better understanding of the national picture of activities 
and outputs. There was a great deal of discussion (e. g. during HPAC, HSSP2 
preparatory meetings, HDPG) about the need to improve the focus and the efficiency 
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of the basic package within the HSSP which should generate the sector's outputs. 
Many suggested the need of having a mechanism to track funds into the priority areas 
within the basic package and the need for more analysis. For example, it was argued 
during a HDPG (meeting notes) that there should be a possibility of assessing money 
going to priority areas by comparing programme expenditures with priorities agreed in 
JRMs and HPACs. The district league table, for example, was meant to be an attempt 
to close the information gap in this area and improve understanding of performance at 
district level. 
As' pointed out by Adam and Gunning (2002) more research may help clarify the 
problem of technical uncertainties between inputs and outputs. However, the use of 
evidence-based interventions seemed not to have been prioritised over the course of 
HSSP1. 
Here a bit of everything is done but there are no concerted efforts really... there 
is lack of a cost-effective and evidence-based policy. (KI - 3, other) 
The research and development WG during the first HSSP seemed to have focused on 
establishing the legal set up for creating a research body but very little was done in 
terms of bridging the gap between policy and research. Very limited government 
resources were allocated to research and there were only ad hoc measures to direct, 
produce or concertedly make use of existing research (Ssengooba of al., 2004). 
The lack of adoption of evidence-based decision making seemed to have been 
recognised, and during the preparatory meetings for HSSP2 (e. g. during the JRM 
2004) a number of suggestions were made in order to address this shortcoming. It 
was suggested that research should be broader than the previous focus on clinical 
issues and should include studies on the quality of care (including consumer 
satisfaction), social support mechanisms and value of contracting modes. Districts 
were told that they should conduct more operational studies and include budget 
allocations for them. Technical programmes were told to plan according to basic 
interventions (focusing on reaching outcomes, e. g. reducing maternal mortality) which 
were proven to be effective and could make a difference towards scaling up. But 
these were plans for the future; whether they will materialise is not clear. 
In this context of uncertainties and risks in producing health outputs and outcomes, I 
explored respondents' views about introducing a performance-based system where 
financial rewards would be used against progress on indicators. 
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Interviewees tended to deem it possible that problems would arise if an explicit 
incentive system for performance were put into place. When asked about the 
associated problems (weaknesses / risks / uncertainties) with linking them to 
disbursement of funds, one interviewee said: 
If the performance based approach were so easy, all the people working in 
development assistance wouldn't be struggling for so long. (DP representative) 
The range of problems raised within the health sector included: 
" Agreeing on the indicators and targets to be achieved within a given period; for 
instance, it was said that it took some time to agree and reach consensus on the 
indicators for HSSP and there are risks of over as well underestimating 
performance. 
The process of identifying how much could be achieved on a yearly basis was also 
not clear. For example, the undertaking of 80% of hospitals providing Emergency 
Obstetric Care (EmOC) [agreed during, the 2003 JRM (MoH, 2003b)] did not seem to 
be based on a thorough assessment of the existing capacity. But it seemed the target 
was defined on the basis of the best guess of participants (or recollection of 
experience) (notes of observation of JRM 2003 and subsequent HPAC meetings). An 
increase from 33% to 80% could be linked to pressure to increase the current low 
level of EmOC coverage. The decision was taken among participants of the JRM and 
in subsequent HPAC meetings that finalised the undertakings. Such definitions lacked 
further clarifications such as the denominators involved. For example, in the concept 
note for the PRSC 04 prepared by the World Bank it was not clear where the 
percentage increase of 20% comes from, i. e. what the evidence basis for a 20% 
increase was. 
Outcome 12 (reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) - in relation to expected outputs over 
the next 3 years, "Uganda is expected to ... increase proportion of static 
health 
facilities offering family planning services by 20 percent" (World Bank, 2004b). 
In such circumstances, it is more likely that the risk averse agent will pressurise for 
agreement on setting the targets at low levels that are easily achievable or on vague 
targets where achievement can be claimed irrespective of the underlying 
performance. 
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" How to judge performance on the basis of a few selected targets/indicators as the 
assessment should be made according to the overall performance of the sector 
(risk of over-simplification or misinterpretation of development efforts). 
To judge performance on a few achievements raises the questions as to 
whether it is appropriate to say the health sector has succeeded or not simply 
because either the HIV rate hasn't gone down as much as you'd hoped or for 
some reason we haven't managed to attract those staff into that area, or 
because we haven't got that strategy agreed or that constancy hasn't taken 
place or that tracking study hasn't happened. Surely you ought to be making 
a judgment on overall performance. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
The risk of choosing a few indicators might be that the agent would shift effort towards 
the targets that were being monitored and avoid effort towards those not being 
monitored and rewarded. 
For example, projects funded by UNICEF and the EU (EDF) emphasized 
number of boreholes drilled and provided rewards for them but attention to the 
process and quality was not given, so many of the boreholes collapsed after 
one year. (Government official) 
However, if assessment of performance is to be based on the overall progress of the 
sector, a much improved system of M&E would be necessary and the basis for reward 
would have to be clarified. 
" There would be scope for data manipulation. 
Example of the UNEPI project for East Africa ...... when we were at the 
district 
level, they would tell you we want 95% coverage, so they were not 
emphasizing much the process of immunisation.... but they were only 
emphasizing outcomes, expecting 95% coverage. Even to the extent that 
when the president of the country visited the district the thing he would ask 
was `what is the coverage here', 60%, who is the DMO here, replace that 
DMO. So what happened was that people started manufacturing figures 
because people want results but not the processes of these.... We started to 
get 100% coverage for some antigens in some districts where you had 
epidemics of measles. (Government official) 
0 It might create a culture of dependency on incentives. 
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The polio campaign offered incentives to health workers. Once that stopped 
and they were asked to resume routine immunisation, they wanted to receive 
incentives for that as well. (Government official) 
"A culture of nepotism would contradict performance-based system rewards on the 
basis of merit. 
There seems to be a certain amount of nepotism and favouritism and a culture 
6f financial reward not based on performance but on who you know or who 
you're paying off. (KI - 5, other) 
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0 Difficulties due to the team nature of activities performed that contribute to results. 
There is danger that it can demotivate some people who are working but 
overall performance is not improving and you can't pin down who is performing 
well or not. (Government official) 
9 Periodicity of disbursements was usually yearly, consequently output indicators 
(as opposed to outcomes) would be more suitable. 
Other difficulties were related to disentangling performance contributions as well as 
factoring in risks and uncertainties that lie outside the control of the sector: 
9 Because performance of health indicators would be determined in multiple. 
There are risks because if you tag release of funds to outcome measures then 
it may be that the health sector does its part but the other sectors don't and 
outcome measures either decline or stagnate. (Government official) 
" There were also contextual / governance elements that contributed to 
performance. 
In Northern Uganda, given problems of insecurity, support based on 
performance needs to take those issues into account. Things don't always go 
as planned and these can be for good acceptable reasons. (DP 
representative) 
Political uncertainties that might have influenced the potential for realisation of 
improved health status included the preparations for the elections and shifts in funding 
priorities, e. g. increased defence budget (discussed in more depth in the next chapter 
in relation to penalty failures) and unpredictability of aid. 
Unpredictability of aid flows by DPs might be affected by the political scenario both in 
the recipient country (e. g. if DPs respond to governance problems by cutting aid) and 
in the donor country or internationally (e. g. need to contribute to war on Iraq). The 
Government noted for example the difficulties of relying on donor finances when 
planning to scale up activities and with funds being attached to performance. 
Uganda was among the countries that pushed for an international response to 
Anti-Retrovirals in Africa but now look at the problems we are facing. Aid flows 
and aid mechanisms are unpredictable, how to link performance to flows then? 
Make countries go even crazier? (Government official) 
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Performance-based contracts and challenges in improving maternal health 
outcomes57 
Given the current debates within the aid community to move towards performance 
based contracts (e. g. outcome-based-aid, paying for results), this section uses 
maternal health as an illustration of an outcome area and related challenges involved 
in improving health outcomes and monitoring these. When seeking to improve and 
monitor maternal health outcomes, a number of factors emerged in the Ugandan 
context regarding the behaviour of the Government. These included commitment / 
leadership and performance of the Reproductive Health Division in the Mold (e. g. its 
monitoring behaviour vis-ä-vis districts). 
Political commitment towards RH was considered to be low, in particular with regard 
to family planning (MoFPED, 2003b; MoH, 2005a). Related to lack of political and 
financial commitment was the lack of clear leadership and a common vision for RH. 
Government lacks commitment. lt needs to choose a strategic direction and 
clearly prioritise. There is need for leadership. (Others) 
Richey (2003) contrasted the lack of leadership in RH with the high level commitment 
and guidance provided to HIV/AIDS in the country. This may be related to conflicting 
views (lack of a common vision) within Government on RH, particularly family 
planning. The president was openly against family planning. He often used an 
economic argument when advocating for large family sizes as a large population 
would increase the size of the Ugandan market (various Kls). 
Within the health sector, support towards family planning activities was patchy. A 
number of officials favoured family planning targeted at child spacing (based on notes 
from observations of various health sector meetings). This strategy seemed to have 
been used as a different policy and not as part of a comprehensive approach agreed 
within Government. There seemed not to be a consensus on a common policy to deal 
with the issue of rapid population growth and actors in the country could have perhaps 
built on the existing strategy of child spacing as a starting point. This fragmented view 
is reflected at district level. 
57 Maternal health indicators in Uganda offer a bleak picture: e. g. the maternal mortality ratio in 2000 was 
505 per 100,000 live births (MoH, 2004c) and only 14% of health facilities (in 55 districts) provided 
Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC) as per a needs assessment survey carried out by the MoH between 
2003 and 2004 (MoH, 2004e). 
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Those clearly in favour of a comprehensive approach towards family planning were 
DPs and the MoFPED. The latter arguments were often backed up by the figures of a 
6.9 fertility rate (third largest in the world) and 3.4% p. a. population growth (MoFPED, 
2003b) and the excessive burden these figures represent for service delivery. 
The MoFPED created a task force to specifically examine the causes of child and 
maternal mortality in Uganda and propose recommendations for improvements 
(MoFPED, 2003b). According to the report, mortality reduction was approached as a 
peripheral problem and should feature more strongly as part of the national 
development policies clearly prioritised in the PEAP. This would involve a strong 
element of intersectoral collaboration across various line ministries. Donors have also 
recognised the need for a multisectoral response and how best to mobilise other 
sectors to contribute to tackling this problem. For instance, the PRSC mission (World 
Bank, 2004b) noted that the PEAP review should reflect the need for a greater focus 
on population and reduction of the fertility rate as well as the need for the health 
sector to work more closely with other ministries. 
The MoFPED's view appeared to be that while maternal mortality was related to 
cross-cutting determinants; it was within the health sector that more could be done 
(MoFPED, 2003b). However, the report of the task force and later responses from the 
MoFPED avoided clearly assigning responsibility for the coordination of the multi- 
sectoral response towards maternal health outcomes (HPAC notes meeting 
December 2003). 
There was a suggestion that the office of the Permanent Secretary of the MoH was to 
take this up (notes from observations of HPAC meetings). However, the office did not 
appear to be willing and sufficiently competent. It was intimated that the office is often 
too overwhelmed in dealing with the demands of the minister and has not been 
effective in its role of liaising with other sector ministries (informal discussions with 
Kis). The Reproductive Health Division within the Ministry would be another unit which 
could potentially be assigned the role of coordinating the necessary multisectoral 
response, but it did not seem to have the required power/status (was often 
undermined within the MoH) nor, according to my observations, a clear interest (it did 
not seem to perceive any particular incentives apart from accepting additional work 
load). 
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The weak capacity and performance problems of the Reproductive Health Division 
within the MoH, as well as the incentive environment offered by DPs, seemed to be 
other contributing factors towards the lack of progress in maternal health indicators. 
There was an Acting Head of the Reproductive Health Division for a considerable time 
(from early 2003 until early 2005), thus hindering the effective management of the 
division. Out of a total of eight posts assigned to the division, there were four vacant 
posts (senior nursing officer, senior nutritionist, senior medical officer and principal 
medical officer). The division also had two technical assistants provided by UNFPA 
(focusing on EmOC) and DFID. However, it was said that one of them was not 
actively engaged in the work at the Ministry. (Above based on interview with a KI - 3, 
other) 
Based on observation of various meetings and informal accounts, it was noted that 
mainly the head of the division (while still acting) and the one TA provided by DFID 
were taking responsibility for the division's assignments. For instance, the DFID TA 
prepared district performance ranking tables using key RH indicators (e. g. CYPs and 
assisted deliveries) to be disseminated during HPAC and ICC meetings. During HSSP 
2 preparatory meetings of the working groups, technical officers of the Reproductive 
Health Division were mostly absent, with the exception again of the DFID TA. Officers 
in the division were said not to be carrying out supervision / monitoring visits to 
districts (although the budget line assigned for this seemed to have been spent). 
Reproductive Health has not been organising any monitoring visits to districts 
yet the resources in the budget for this disappear anyhow. (KI - 3, other) 
When asked about why officers in the division weren't attending these meetings or 
conducting district supervision, it was reported they preferred to attend project-funded 
workshops in districts (because of the payment of per diems), or do consultancy work. 
The overall management seemed unable or unwilling to change the situation by 
attracting the staffs efforts towards the MoH's priorities for RH. It was informally 
reported (by Kls) that members of the management themselves were often seeking 
project per diems and consultancy work. There were, in addition, rumours that the 
wealth of some individuals did not match their MoH salary. 
RH was made a priority area in 2001/02,2002/03 and 2003/04 (MoH, 2003c; MoH, 
2003d). In so doing, the area was supposed to receive more Government funds. 
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However, additional funds did not appear to have been allocated to the division or the 
area in view of the scarcity of funds for RH often reported (Ssengooba et al., 2003; 
Erickson, 2004; MoH, 2003d). And a number of system bottlenecks persisted, such as 
contraceptive stock outs while there was approximately 38% unmet need for family 
planning (KI - 3, other). 
In relation to the above issues, a KI (KI - 3, other) said: 
RH has been made a priority area for the past 3 years, it is talked about in 
different meetings, but there has not been enough staff recruited, or resources 
channelled, targets set and monitored. Projects take away MoH capacity by 
offering them incentives like per'diems for training workshops, or 
consultancies. MoH and donors are not tackling this problem of capacity being 
taken away from MoH to deal with the priorities of the RH's division within the 
Ministry. 
While there may be advantages in using a vertical project approach when delivering 
RH activities, it was also recognised that they may bring a plethora of adverse effects 
(Goodburn and Campbell, 2001). 
In Uganda, as observed in various meetings, some development partners also pointed 
out the limited achievements in RH and noted the problems (among others) created 
by vertical programmes, particularly those funded by UNFPA and USAID (e. g. 
meeting notes from JRM 2004). Reliance on project funding by the RH division 
seemed to have led to unpredictable flows of funding, focus on the interests of donors 
and fragmented implementation of activities (some districts get chosen while others 
not). 
According to an estimate provided by a Government official, the Reproductive Health 
Division received about US$750,000 per year from the MoH budget allocated for 
contraceptives and staff salaries. While project funding, mainly from UN agencies, 
amounted to approximately US$6-7 million per year, a KI (KI - 3, other) reported that 
donors tended to approach the RH division directly and contribute different amounts of 
funds. However, these were not submitted to the SWG where project funding should 
be prioritised, harmonised and assessed against value for money and equity 
considerations. 
Project money is not leading. to improvements of RH indicators. (KI - 3, other) 
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For example, UNFPA was said to have been funding the same 24 districts for the past 
30 years. However, improvements on RH indicators in these UNFPA districts were 
reported to be non-existent (KI - 3, other). When confronted about this, UNFPA and 
other donors were said to disregard results of where they have invested and evidence 
of where (which districts) to invest. The Government (RH division, Health Planning 
Department, top management, MoFPED) was said not to be holding UNFPA and 
other donors to account in this respect. 
SWAp/GBS donors seemed to prioritise RH, in particular EmOC, more in discourse 
than in practice. There was limited orientation to results as targets or RH indicators 
were not followed up on a systematic basis during JRMs, HPAC and ICCs. 
EmOC was identified as a problem at JRM, but there is no follow up to that 
over the year, say at the ICC with donors - including to look at the workplan, 
costs and budget. It is a dream. Within EmOC there is poor prioritising and 
everybody does a little bit, but overall there is poor coherence and lack of 
concrete results. Donors are not being serious when making RH a priority. (KI 
- 3, other) 
The role of a functioning health system in preventing maternal deaths is well 
recognised (Goodburn and Campbell, 2001). While this was also identified as a 
crucial element by various stakeholders in Uganda, the sector's overall lack of 
funding, as noted in relation to the lack of commitment, was often cited as a reason 
why results in improving maternal health have been so poor (various interviewees; 
Ssengooba et al., 2003; MoFPED, 2003b; MoH, 2003d). 
Particularly reliant on a functioning health system is the strategy of emergency 
obstetric care. The basic elements of this strategy should be available as an integral 
part of health services delivered at district level (Goodburn and Campbell, 2001). 
However, in Uganda, as noted earlier, only 14% of health facilities could provide 
emergency obstetric care (MoH, 2004e). The situation proved to be even worse at 
Health Centres level 4, where only 10% of operating theatres were said to be 
functioning (meeting notes e. g. JRM 2004; Erickson, 2004). A KI (KI - 3, other) noted: 
EmOC lacks a health systems approach (human resources, blood, transport, 
infrastructure). The approach so far has focused on technical fixes with a 
project approach. 
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All basic areas of health service delivery relevant for maternal health seemed to face 
considerable constraints, as detailed in the Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8: Constraints to health service delivery in relation to maternal health 
Management Analysis of different data including district league table (using management and outputs 
indicators) for RH pointed to issues of poor management at district level leading to poor 
outputs. " (KI - 2, DP representative) 
Infrastructure There was lack of adequate Infrastructure (MoFPED, 2003b), particularly at HC III and IV 
levels, (MoH, 2003d) which were not well equipped and funded (Ssengooba et al., 2003). 
Drugs and There were frequent stock-outs of essential RH drugs and commodities (MoFPED, 2003b) 
supplies such as for example: contraceptives, HC delivery kits, blood, IV fluids, gloves, drugs to 
manage post partum haemorrhage, eclampsia or sepsis (MoH, 2003d). 
Human resources The quantity and quality of staff were said to be problematic. There was lack of qualified staff 
(Yates et al., 2006), in particular of midwives, and the overall distribution of staff was skewed 
towards urban centres and hospitals (Ssengooba et al., 2003). 
Women perceived the quality of care provided by midwives in health facilities as poor, 
therefore, hindering demand. According to Erickson (2004) some studies in Uganda 
described midwives as being "lazy and non-responsive, unsympathetic, uncaring and 
unsupportive, demeaning and rude to patients and focused on efficiency, hygiene and 
orderliness, and insensitive to important cultural traditions". 
Referral system The referral system was ineffective (Yates et al., 2006) and the poor transport Infrastructure 
was said to be a compounding factor - e. g. ambulances were nearly absent (Ssengooba et 
al., 2003). The quality of the road network and railway (MoFPED, 2003b) and the 
unavailability or expense of public transport (MoH, 2003d) were also noted as problems. 
Various potential factors seemed to play a role in influencing demand for RH care in 
the Ugandan context: 
" There was an entrenched value in Ugandan society for large family sizes. Men in 
particular are said to value large families as they are associated with virility and 
strength besides functioning as carers for when you reach old age (Erickson, 
2004). In addition, women's status is also considered higher if they have large 
numbers of children. 
" Pregnancy and delivery were not perceived to be medical conditions but natural 
events (Yates et al., 2006; Erickson, 2004). In line with this was the notion that 
deliveries take place at home and not in health facilities. 
. Women's status and lack of control over resources was another factor affecting 
the decision to seek care during pregnancy and deliveries (MoFPED, 2003b; MoH, 
2003d; Ssengooba et al.,. 2003). 
" Costs incurred by households to reach a facility were also influencing factors. 
These include time, transport (particularly if referral is necessary58), formal and 
informal fees for services (Ssengooba et al., 2003; Yates et al., 2006). 
58 In cases of complications this was more likely to be the case given that emergency obstetric care was 
available on a limited basis, particularly so at health centres (requiring referral to district hospitals). 
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In terms of contextual elements, improvements in maternal health outcomes seemed 
to have been compounded by insecurity and poverty. Uganda went through years of 
dictatorship and political instability and more recently has been fighting an insurgence 
movement in the Northern parts of the country, which together have resulted in the 
neglect of funding towards social services (MoFPED, 2003b). 
Another obstacle, according to Pyle et al. (2000, cited in MoFPED, 2003b) is food 
scarcity in rural areas and declining per capita production of food. Related to food 
scarcity is general poverty in the community which is a further element argued to have 
compounded maternal health outcomes in the country. As put by Ssengooba et al. 
(2003), "many households rely on large numbers of children as a source of labour, 
and women are expected to work when pregnant or near delivery'. 
Inequalities in health care utilisation are also of concern, particularly in the context of 
the high percentage of the population still living under the poverty line (38%) (World 
Bank, 2004a). Women from wealthier households are said to be consistently more 
likely to utilise family planning and maternal health services, e. g. ANC, delivery in 
health facilities etc. (ibid. ). 
5.5 Summary of findings 
In this chapter, I was interested in assessing the effectiveness of the Government 
mechanisms and processes of monitoring as related to their role in reducing 
information asymmetries. I found that there were a number of improvements in 
monitoring and reporting since the start of HSSP in 2000 (e. g. improved quality and 
regularity of AHSPRs and introduction of league tables to rank district performance). 
However, considerable problems highlighted that monitoring capacity and ability to 
assess performance was still weak. This hindered the extent to which the monitoring 
mechanisms and processes could reveal of the performance and behaviour of the 
agent (the Government). Problems included: 
0 Lack of coordination of monitoring activities and weak communication in this area 
between districts and the centre. 
" Incomplete reporting of output measures and other indicators of access and 
quality of care (e. g. internal MoH reports as the quarterly reviews and the PAF 
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monitoring reports were often not available or if available were of poor quality, and 
presented problems of validity). 
" Systems in place were short of quantifiable measures of performance (objectivity) 
(e. g. lack of reliable baseline information for a number of indicators; some targets 
were changed along the implementation process). 
" There was a general problem of lack of strategic planning and financial resources 
concerning the validation and verification systems. Validation mechanisms like 
JRMs and triangulation of data for the AHSPRs lacked a formal, rigorous and 
independent approach. Verification efforts seemed to rely on unpredictable donor 
funding. This source of funding also concentrated on areas of interest to DPs 
which tended to be linked to large scale and/or well established international 
surveys such as the DHS and disease-specific ones (e. g. on vaccinations by GAVI 
and HIV/AIDS by USAID). 
9 There were considerable problems of weak capacity (e. g. lack of human 
resources, equipment, and training for district personnel) of the RC which led the 
information system for the sector to be unreliable. 
The underlying reason for the identified weaknesses in the monitoring system seemed 
to be related to the lack of effort (high level commitment) towards improvements from 
the agent and its principals - a) Government [e. g. senior / top level officials not being 
particularly engaged in efforts towards improvements of the performance of the RC (in 
spite of the need to have a well functioning RC in order to produce better quality 
data)]; b) DPs [e. g. not putting sufficient pressure on the Government as when they 
accepted that budget funds continued to be disbursed in spite of PAF monitoring 
reports (accountabilities) not being available]. 
Even though new aid modes (SWAp/GBS) are associated with a greater focus on 
outcomes, in Uganda I found that during the implementation of HSSP1, the 
Government monitoring system focused on inputs, processes and outputs (input- 
based model) to a greater extent than on outcomes. 
According to interviewees, issues that would compound the problem of imperfect 
information, if the monitoring system were to focus on outcomes were that this would: 
require time consuming methods; depend on donor funding; require long time 
intervals between measurements; lack clear causal link between inputs and 
outcomes, and hence need to use proxy / intermediate measures. 
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With respect to other information problems - risks and uncertainties - concerning the 
use of ROM or performance-based contracts, respondent's views were that these 
were due to: 
a) Within the sector: difficulties in agreeing on indicators and targets (risk-averse 
agent); risk of over-simplification or mis-interpretation of efforts; risk of efforts being 
shifted towards monitored targets and indicators; scope for manipulation of data; 
b) Outside the sector: health having multiple determinants; governance/political 
problems and behaviour of DPs (unpredictability of aid flows). ' 
In this context, the causality postulate (from inputs-process-to-outputs to outcomes) 
was challenged by views that there was a need to better understand the processes of 
implementation. However, little effort has been put into the research and adoption of 
evidence-based interventions by the agent (Government) and principals (DPs). 
A number of problems were identified when analysing the specific outcome area of 
maternal health/RH. This was used as an illustration of the kinds of challenges the aid 
community is likely to face throughout the monitoring process if discussions around 
the adoption of performance based contract (e. g. paying for results, focusing on an 
outcome based model of monitoring) materialises. These problems, summarised 
below, highlighted the kinds of complexities involved in monitoring the effort of the 
agent in contributing towards improved health outcomes. Maternal health (MMR) was 
chosen as an outcome area that has been argued to be a suitable indicator of access 
to health care and of the functioning of health systems (Goodburn and Campbell, 
2001). 
- Problems related to monitoring the behaviour of the agent (Government) 
included; Lack of leadership and common view towards RH and population 
growth; Lack of political and financial commitments; Weak overall Government 
coordination towards a multisectoral response and intersectoral collaboration 
(e. g. not clearly prioritised in the PEAP); and weak capacity and performance 
of the RH division (partially linked to shortages of staff and staff diverted to 
donor project-funded workshops and consultancies). There were also issues 
concerning conflicting objective functions between the agent and the 
principals, these involved unpredictability of aid flows and focus on activities 
and districts of interest to DPs (also bypassing Government control 
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mechanisms like SWG). Other monitoring problems involved risks and 
uncertainties related to the various determinants of maternal health outcomes: 
Health systems constraints (problems in relation to referral system, staff 
shortages, skewed distribution of staff within the country, poor quality of care 
provided by midwives, frequent stock-outs of essential RH drugs etc. ); 
Demand side barriers (women's status in society and related lack of control 
over resources, household costs to reach a health facility etc which hindered 
their ability to access health care); and insecurity and poverty added to 
uncertainties and information asymmetries. 
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Chapter 6: Rewards, penalties and constraining factors within the aid 
environment 
6.1 Introduction 
New aid modalities of SWAp and GBS have contributed to change the nature of the 
relationship between DPs and the Government. Ensuing changes and results from the 
adoption of SWAp and GBS include the introduction of new monitoring structures, 
greater use of performance indicators as well as improved donor coordination and 
coherence of policy. 
However, these new aid modalities have not led to an explicit compensation scheme 
being established (Adam and Gunning, 2002). In this chapter, the compensation 
scheme is understood as the system of penalties and rewards operated by the 
principals (DPs). Penalties and rewards function as mechanisms of control of the 
agent (Government) on the basis of what has been monitored and how well (or not). 
Hence, good performance of the agent should be rewarded and poor performance 
penalised. 
In this chapter, I first review the formal system of performance appraisal which forms 
the basis for the compensation scheme as agreed between the parties, and assess 
the extent to which penalties or rewards are applied by DPs towards the recipient 
Government. Secondly, given difficulties in developing an effective explicit 
compensation scheme in the complex aid environment, I examine ways in which the 
formal system of penalties and rewards as operated by DPs vis-ä-vis the recipient 
Government seemed to be distorted. Examples of failure to reward and penalise and 
related constraints are analysed. Thirdly, in view of the lack of penalties being applied, 
I review the possible reasons that DPs and the Government may have for distorting 
the system. It is hypothesised that the lack of progress towards an explicit 
compensation scheme may be in the interest of DPs who rely on countries such as 
Uganda (success story or good-performer) as show cases (incentive to present 
successes-to their principals - tax payers in the donor countries). 
The evidence for this chapter was assembled from the main data sources used for 
this research. Similar to the sources used in the previous chapter, here I have 
combined interview data with notes from direct observation of meetings such as the 
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JRMs, PERs, HPAC and HDPG. Aide memoirs of these meetings were also used. 
Other documents used as data sources included: AHSPRs, Annual Budget 
Performance Reports, consultancy reports and some media reports. Notes from 
informal discussions with representatives of donor agencies, Government and other 
stakeholders were also taken into account when gathering evidence for this chapter. 
6.2 Review of the formal system of performance appraisal 
In this section the formal system of performance assessment, which forms the basis 
for penalties and rewards, is presented and its effectiveness analysed. 
6.2.1 The JRMs Performance Appraisal System under the SWAp/GBS 
For donors providing GBS or support to the sector, JRMs represented the main 
instrument of performance assessment related to the health sector (based on review 
of various Aide Memoirs of JRMs). The outcome of the Joint Review process (a 
declaration of satisfactory progress) triggered the release of funds for some 
development agencies, particularly those providing sector-support. Donors supporting 
the general budget released funds on the basis of the outcome of the JRMs of other 
sectors as well, . such as education and water and sanitation. 
The JRMs system of performance assessment seemed to be a comprehensive one, 
based on the review of (from various Aide Memoirs of JRMs): 
9 National level indicators as presented in the AHSPRs, particularly the agreed 
PEAP indicators (health); 
0 Undertakings (priorities), one or two priority programmes, and a tracking study for 
the following year; 
" Joint District visits to selected districts, which included visits to different types of 
facilities, with a view to assess progress on areas such as human resources, 
financial flows, information and management systems, and agreed technical 
priority areas. 
However, the assessment of performance by DP representatives was said to be 
based on: a review of overall progress on issues such as those that had or had not 
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been solved during HPAC through the year and a 'general feel' (KI - 2, DP 
representative); and discussions on general progress held during the JRMs. 
We have our internal discussions once a year where we see how far our 
support is coming and feed back home what has happened but things we say 
would be the things we get out of the JRM. (DP representative) 
We have as a sector tried to take an overall view of things, reasonable 
progress considered against undertakings, evidence of improvement in terms 
of the PEAP indicators and our general assessment of what's happening ..... 
which is horrendously subjective but we sit round as a donor group and we 
have long discussions about this. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
While discussions held among DPs regarding perceptions of progress lacked 
objectivity, they had the upside of being carried out by the group of health DPs. This 
allows insights from different persons / organisations to contribute to a more in-depth 
evaluation as different sources of information are pulled together. The joint nature of 
this approach to assessing performance seeks a common view or a consensus-based 
decision as opposed to a subjective decision based for instance on the views of one 
advisor or one agency, when it is done outside the JRM/SWAp framework. 
The subjective nature of the system of assessment was also noted by the fact that 
DPs accepted as satisfactory, incomplete performance progress against agreed 
PEAP indicators and undertakings. It was not necessary for 100% of all undertakings 
or all targets for improvements of the PEAP or HSSP indicators to be achieved in 
order for funds to be released. By declaring progress as satisfactory at sector level, 
there were no conditional impediments for funds to be released. 
Actually we don't go by the undertakings agreed and technically / am not sure 
we've ever got all the undertakings completely achieved. Last time, we got 
closest, with most of them achieved. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
Over the time covered by this research, no reports were found of explicit penalties 
being applied to the Government due to poor performance as reviewed during the 
JRMs. Funds were withdrawn or suspended in the past and threats of cutting aid were 
made, as discussed in section 5.3, but these were not linked to an objective and 
explicit system agreed with the Government as related to poor performance at the 
sector level. 
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Next, I review in more detail the Joint Review system of performance assessment 
(focusing on national level indicators; undertakings and district visits) and explore its 
lack of explicitness or consistency in regard to rules for definition of poor performance 
and responses in the JRMs. 
National level indicators, including the health sector PEAP indicators 
As noted in Chapter 5, reporting of progress in relation to the agreed performance 
indicators between the parties as presented in the AHSPRs was incomplete; health 
sector PEAP targets agreed in 2000 were later revised (upwards and downwards) 
during the implementation process; and progress against the five health-related PEAP 
targets was variable. While figures have indicated considerable improvements 
towards OPD and DPT3, for instance, deliveries in health facilities remained stagnant. 
Yet, penalties for lack of progress in relation to achieving these targets had not been 
imposed. 
Undertakings 
As shown in Table 6.1, not all undertakings were achieved during the period of review. 
The best output is a 100% achievement for the 9th JRM, although lack of reporting 
hindered a more thorough analysis of the precise level of achievement of these 
undertakings. In other JRMs, full achievement of agreed undertakings (not counting 
those partially achieved) was as low as 1/6, as in the case of the 8 `h JRM. 
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Table 6.1: Number of undertakings achieved or not vis-ä-vis total number of 
undertakings per JRM 
Reporting from Total number of Number of undertakings Number of undertakings not 
JRM undertakings achieved achieved or achieved partially 
10 - Oct. 2004 9 5 (however some 4 partially achieved (see examples in 
undertakings were very the second table 6.2) 
vaguely worded thus 
facilitating report on progress 
- see table 6.2) 
9"'- Nov. 2003 Aide memoir states that "all four of the undertakings from October 2002 JR had been 
achieved'. A detailed table with the list of undertakings, means of verification, and progress 
made against them was not provided in the aide memoir. 
8 -Aril 2003 6 1 5 artiall achieved 
7- Oct. 2002 9 3 1 partially, 4 not clear If partially or not 
(1 undertaking had achieved 
no report of 
progress) 
6t-April 2002 10 1 4 partially and another 4 partially but 
(1 undertaking had only very incipiently 
no clear report of 
progress) 
5u'- Oct. 2001 Given that I didn't have access to the aide memoir of the 4 JRM it was not clear but it 
appeared that undertakings were not agreed for review during the 5th JRM. This JRM reported 
that "there was general consensus that the performance of the MoH and districts should be 
ideally assessed on the MoH and district total workplans rather than solely on the achievement 
of undertakings. " Difficulties in achieving previously agreed undertakings might have led to a 
decision of focusing on workplans. 
4 -April 2001 Data not available 
3` - Oct 2000 12 1 7 partially achieved and 4 not achieved 
Source: MoH (2004a); MoH (2003b); MoH (2003a); MoH (2002b); MoH (2002a); MoH (2001d). 
There were varying degrees of partial achievement of undertakings (see Table 6.2). In 
some cases a draft report was available instead of a final report which should have 
been presented and agreed. In other cases, only initial steps had been reported 
towards establishing, for example, a coordination mechanism. It was not clear though 
what was meant by initial steps, for instance, on undertaking "to develop a mechanism 
for coordination of on-going research in the health sector to support evidence-based 
policy formulation, planning and implementation of the HSSP" (MoH, 2002b). 
59 There could have been a mistake in the writing up of the aide memoir as the review of progress should 
cover the agreed undertakings during the 8TH JRM of April 2003. 
60 A very succinct reporting on progress towards the undertakings for this JRM hindered a more in-depth 
understanding of the level of performance achieved. 61 Limited detail of reporting also hindered a more comprehensive analysis of performance achieved 
(though not as succinct as reporting at 7th JRM). 
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Table 6.2: Examples of partially achieved undertakings 
Undertakin Means of verification Progress 
Basic Package 
Reproductive Health 
" Initiate EmOC in the 19 districts Reports on percentage of Constituted Regional Technical 
where needs assessment was hospitals in the 17 districts Support Teams to go the 10 
done (only 5% of HC IV met the able to provide basic EmOC hospitals where basic EmOC was 
criteria for basic emergency found lacking, 
obstetric care) to achieve at Draft roll out EmOC plan for the 
least 80% of all hospitals able to   Report of needs assessment rest of the country prepared 
provide basic EmOC, for the remaining 37 districts Needs Assessment for the 
  Complete the needs remaining 37 districts and data 
assessment of EmOC in the analysis completed. Report writing 
remaining 37 districts in process but to be ready for Oct. 
04 JRM 
Community Mobilisation Final field implementation Field and facilitation manuals and 
  Finalise and initiate guidelines for community brochure developed and pre- 
implementation of guidelines for dialogue: community dialogue tested 
community dialogue, implementation strategy, field Technical assistance recruited for 
mobilisation and participation in manual for implementation, strategy development. Draft 
health promotion and health facilitation manual and strategy in place 
services delivery brochure. Documentation report and video 
" Documentation of for two districts (Mubende and 
implementation of community Bugiri) available 
dialogue in 8 districts Report on community dialogue 
(reports, video, reports) read 
Source: MoH (2004a). 
Over time, it was noted that undertakings became less ambitious and more feasible 
within the period of review. This perhaps indicates why a number of undertakings 
were not being achieved or only initial progress towards them was made in the early 
years of the JRMs. 
It was ludicrously large amounts of things that were going to be done and 
everyone was wildly over optimistic of what could be achieved .... very 
unrealistic, they were aspirational .... and we had to spend a lot of the first 
years getting to grips with ...... 
in terms of what we wanted to, trying to be 
more realistic. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
An example of an ambitious undertaking to be achieved within a6 month time frame 
was: 
MoH to take action within Government to ensure the health training schools 
fulfil the needs of the HSSP. Progress to be reported on: management 
modalities; criteria for student enrolment (number and qualifications); quality of 
training (tutors and practicals); conversion to the new training courses, etc. 62 
In addition, regarding the lack of objective 'measures of progress, as seen in the 
examples provided in Table 6.3, the agreed means of verification still had scope for 
further quantification of clear outputs. 
62 The achievement of this particular undertaking was compounded by the fact that health training 
schools falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, thus requiring collaboration and efforts 
from a Ministry other than the one held accountable for the undertaking. 
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Table 6.363: Undertakings and related lack of objective measure of progress 
Undertaking Means of 
verification 
Progress Comments 
Basic Package Action plan for " Action plan for scaling A number of hospitals are 
HIV/AIDS scaling up up finalized and being not yet accredited due to 
Scale up capacity for ART ART to all used for inadequate capacity. 
management and uptake to all hospitals implementation, Training of health workers is 
hospitals and achieve Accreditation 58 health facilities in 20 going on at regional level. 
accreditation to at least 50%. system or districts accredited to This will facilitate the 
criteria provide ARVs, accreditation process. 
" 26 health facilities 
(including all the 11 
Regional Referral 
Hospitals) providing free 
ARVs (target 2,700 
adults) 
Basic Package Reports on Constituted Regional Secured funding for 
Reproductive Health percentage of Technical Support Regional Technical 
" Initiate EmOC in the 19 hospitals in Teams to go the 10 Support Teams from 
districts where needs the 17 districts hospitals where basic UNICEF 
assessment was done able to EmOC was found EmOC is area of 
(only 5% of HC IV met the provide basic lacking, priority under UN 
criteria for basic EmOC Draft roll out EmOC plan response on reduction 
emergency obstetric care) for the rest of the of MMR and UNFPA 
to achieve at least 80% of countryprepared has pledged to provide 
all hospitals able to Report of Needs Assessment for EmOC equipment 
provide basic EmOC, needs the remaining 37  ' Secured funding from 
  Complete the needs assessment districts and data Programme 9 for 
assessment of EmOC in for the analysis completed. procuring 1,000 MVA 
the remaining 37 districts remaining 37 Report writing in kits and emergency 
districts process but to be ready RH drugs. 
for Oct. 04 JRM 
Agreed undertakings for HIV/AIDS and RH during the 9`" JRM (MoH, 2003b) and reported progress 
during the 1 0th JRM (MoH, 2004a). 
The lack of more quantifiable measures of progress may be in part because a number 
of activities were process related (and had focused on the production of reports or 
reviews of an area). The other problem is that the progress towards these 
undertakings was reported by the Government, but there was no system of verification 
to control for actual performance of the actions taken and the quality of the activities, 
as discussed earlier. 
It seemed that besides the presentation during the JRMs on progress against 
undertakings, no other form of more substantive accountability was provided to DPs. 
Who is challenging the fact that they were really taking place, that a quick and 
dirty presentation was made during the JRM to say what they did about this. 
(KI - 3, other) 
For some undertakings a report was provided, as for example for the tracking studies, 
but this was not the case for all undertakings on a systematic basis. And even when 
reports were provided, there may have been scope for putting less effort in to 
63 Further examples of undertakings that lacked quantifiable means of verification are provided in 
Appendix 7. 
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producing them or for manipulating the reports' contents. Such routes could prove 
difficult, however, since a report has to provide more details than a presentation; there 
should be a team (not just one individual) involved in the production of the report or it 
may be a company that is responsible for producing the report (as for the tracking 
studies). This way there is somewhat less scope for hiding or manipulating 
information. 
Yet, as put by a KI (KI - 5, other), there were problems with the way DPs used the 
reporting system: 
They might get hung up on the process... they feel that if they've got a report 
in the hand, no matter how bad the report is, that's good enough. 
Further, undertakings were often vaguely formulated (as per examples in Table 6.4) 
and this could be interpreted as a way to make them easy to reach. 
There is a tendency to make undertakings too easily achievable. (KI - 4, other) 
Table 6.464: Examples of vaguely worded undertakings and progress reported. 
Undertakin Means of verification Progress 
Human Resources for Training to increase outputs of HTIs being scaled 
Health Document detailing plan up through: 
Initiate the scaling up of to scale up HRH improving infrastructure, increasing number of 
training and production tutors and financial backup for disadvantaged 
improvement of the Monitoring reports on students. 
quality and outputs of outputs of various Quality of HRH produced from HTIs being 
health workers for the training schools. improved through: tutor development, provision of 
HSSP training & health learning materials, support for 
practical field work, support to inspectorate 
activities of MoH and MoES, reviews of the various 
curricula, and support to in-service training, 
Basic Package Action plan for scaling Action plan for scaling up finalized and being used 
HIVIAIDS up ART to all hospitals for implementation, 
Scale up capacity for Accreditation system or 58 health facilities in 20 districts accredited to 
ART management and criteria provide ARVs, 
uptake to all hospitals 26 health facilities (including all the 11 Regional 
and achieve Referral Hospitals) providing free ARVs (target 
accreditation to at least 2,700 adults) 
50%. 
Source: MoH (2004a). 
Undertakings were dependent on the agreement of both Government and DPs. 
However, as pointed out by a key informant (KI - 2, DP representative), the degree of 
agreement on the undertakings was not always in the partners favour. In a discussion 
during a HPAC meeting (January 2004), a DP representative requested that the 
undertaking on RH agreed during the 9`h JRM (MoH, 2003b) needed to be more 
ambitious, as it was rather easy to reach. The reply then by the chairperson of the 
Committee was that there was a need to respect the implementers plan. 
64 Additional examples of vaguely formulated undertakings are shown in Appendix 8. 
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In spite of the reluctance of Government to agree on less easy to reach undertakings, 
DPs have at times attempted to put pressure on the Government. For instance, during 
the HPAC meeting of December 2003, some DPs pointed out the imprecision of some 
of the undertakings agreed in the 9th JRM (MoH, 2003b) like the HIV/AIDS one - 
"Scale up capacity for ART management and uptake to all hospitals and achieve 
accreditation to at least 50%"- and asked for means of verifications to tighten them 
up. The request was then accepted. 
However, the negotiations held during the above meeting were not unproblematic. A 
DP representative noted that specification of what was meant by capacity building for 
Anti-Retrovirals was needed, as was an alternative wording for'make progress 
towards accreditation of hospitals' in regard to scale up of uptake of Anti-Retrovirals. 
Another DP representative suggested introducing an indicator measuring, for 
example, the number of caesarean sections for the RH undertaking of roll out of 
emergency obstetric care (EmOC). They also suggested that 80% of the units should 
be able to provide basic EmOC. A Government official, however, proposed to leave 
out the parameter related to EmOC (preferring to leave it a more vague formulation). 
DPs then questioned why the undertaking for AIDS was treated more optimistically 
and for RH more pessimistically. They also suggested having output-focused means 
of verification, which were partially achieved during the negotiation (see Table 6.3 
showing the means of verification for these undertakings). 
The above discussion illustrates how-the Government seemed to be trying to avoid 
effort, and how DPs attempted to make the means of verification more output oriented 
and hold the Government accountable. 
Yet, in spite of the various problems presented above in relation to undertakings, 
progress towards achieving the agreed undertakings was declared65 satisfactory for 
all four JRMs between the 7`h and 1 01h (see Table 6.5) and funds disbursed 
accordingly. 
65 According to data presented in Table 6.5, it seems that undertakings start to be consistently reviewed 
as of the 71h JRM (MoH, 2002b). 
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Table 6.5: Statements made at JRMs on achievement of undertakings 
JRM Statement on achievement of undertakings 
3` Oct "... although the GoU had made remarkable progress, a number of undertakings from the April 2000 
2000 review remain outstanding. " 
4 April Data not available 
2001 
5 Oct. "The fifth JRM confirmed considerable progress with the implementation of the HSSP.... " (See table 
2001 6.1 but it appears no undertakings were agreed during the 41h JRM and thus not reviewed during the 
5`h one). 
6 April "The JRM confirmed that progress in the health sector over the last six months has been 
2002 satisfactory. " (No particular note is made of undertakings in the'overall outcome of the meeting 
report). 
7 Oct "Progress against actions and undertakings agreed in the JRM was satisfactory". 
2002 
8 April 'The JRM confirmed that the progress against undertakings agreed at the JRM in October 2002 
2003 was satisfactory". 
9 Nov "Confirmed that progress continued to be satisfactory and that all the undertakings had been met". 
2003 
10 Oct "The JRM confirmed that there was satisfactory progress towards achievement of the undertakings". 
2004 
Source: MoH (2000a); MoH (2001a); MoH (2001b); MoH (2002a); MoH (2002b); MoH (2003a); MoH (2003b); MoH 
(2004a). 
JRM District visits 
The quality of data obtained on the performance of districts during the visits varied 
across districts. This was related to the overall organisation prior to and after the 
visits. Some districts were not well prepared for the visits and the MoH could also 
have made some improvements in relation to overall organisation (notes from 
observations of district visits). Preparation for the visits as organised by the MoH was 
thorough: districts were selected; groups were formed to visit the clusters of districts; 
transport / logistics for teams leaving Kampala was timely arranged; and there were 
clear Terms of References (ToRs) for the visits (notes from observations of district 
visits). It was not clear at what point the communication between the MoH and the 
districts (within the district) regarding the preparations of the visits seem to subside. 
In addition, there was some variation in the composition and quality of the teams 
organised at central level going to the districts (leadership of team, data collected and 
presented), although clear ToRs were usually provided by the MoH prior to departure 
(notes from observations of district visits). 
Top and senior management did not seem to get very involved in the process, and a 
number of Government officials appeared to see the visits more as an obligation. 
There seemed to be no pressure from the top management of the MoH towards 
enforcing senior officials to attend the visits. 
Senior management is supposed to go but they just delegate and don't take it 
seriously. Top management for example does not take part in district visits. 
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They don't give the example. They don't show commitment. (KI - 1, 
Government official) 
Participation by top and senior management in the district visits could perhaps have 
allowed for greater possibility of sharing views and information on performance, and 
scope for influencing decisions (e. g. in the JRMs). The non-participation by top and 
senior management seemed to reveal their lack of interest in these processes. 
Perhaps this was because these processes were not sufficiently owned by 
Government and/or because they clashed with other priorities (e. g. national level 
meetings, consultancy work or discomforts of travelling). 
In 2003 (when I was part of the team visiting one of the districts), one of the Director 
of District Health Services (DDHSs) visited, claimed that he only got informed of the 
visit on the day of our arrival and so did not have time to prepare himself for it. So 
documents for review were not available, and officials that our team were supposed to 
speak to were not available for meetings, thus hindering the scope of performance 
assessment. This could have been a communication problem at the centre, but it 
could be related to inefficiency at the district or both. In contrast, the second district 
visited during that year was informed about the visit and prepared for it. On various 
occasions during the districts visits, I observed, staff (in charge or their deputies) at 
facility level were not present for the visits (affecting access to documents which 
would have been needed for review) - usually were attending some other activity 
(training). Yet, these were visits that take place once a year around the same period 
and it should be possible to prioritise the availability of staff. 
Upon return from the districts there was a lack of clarity (guidelines) for teams 
reporting back at NHAs or JRMs. Moreover, feedback mechanisms to districts on 
districts visits were poor. For instance, NHA/JRM 2003 did not build in sufficient time 
for consolidation and analysis of the district situation, presentation of results and 
proposed recommendations (notes from observation of district visits and NHA/JRMs). 
The reason why districts were not prepared and top management did not take part or 
was not committed - lacking ownership of the process - could be the perception by 
some Government officials that district visits were more important for DPs. 
Joint reviews are donor-driven. It is when joint reviews take place that a 
mission will come from abroad and people will go down to districts for 
monitoring. (Government official) 
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It seemed that district visits were a request of donors who would like to see the 
situation at district level (including visits to facilities) in order to get a 'feel' for what is 
going on. But they were not structured formally enough as an exercise of data 
collection and analysis. The monitoring of performance through district visits allowed 
for an overall impression but it could not provide a comparative basis or assessment 
of trends over time, apart perhaps from using the institutional memory of those who 
participated in the process over a long period of time (often locally employed donor 
agency officials and some TAs, and of course government officials who are in country 
over longer time spans). 
/ was surprised here in Uganda, during this JRM [district visit (2003)]66, about 
lack of focus on quantitative measures of progress. No targets or benchmarks 
to measure or assess progress against. This is in contrast to my previous 
experience of monitoring activities. (KI - 3, other) 
During a meeting of the health DPs group in 2003, one representative suggested that 
district visits be de-linked from JRMs. The representative noted that district visits 
could be integrated into regular MoH monitoring activities to avoid duplication (donor- 
specific monitoring mechanisms). Donor representatives could join area team visits. 
However, it was pointed out by others that this was an opportunity for donor agency 
representatives coming from headquarters to visit the districts. 
In spite of the scope for greater objectivity in the processes related to the district visits, 
having taken part myself in more than one visit, it was clear that they allow for an 
opportunity to learn about the overall health situation, management and political 
commitment at district level. The fact that each team tended to visit more than one 
district also provided a chance to compare and contrast performance across settings. 
For example, the visits to two districts in Western Uganda in 2003 were enlightening 
with respect to providing an overview of: a) progress on key interventions in the areas 
of RH, HIV/AIDS and malaria control; b) constraints to implementation in relation to 
planning and monitoring, human resources, infrastructure and drug supplies; c) 
sources of financial support; d) technical support received from the MoH. 
66 During district visit. 
153 
6.2.2 World Bank PRSC and EU graduated trigger point mechanism 
There were some attempts to develop and introduce a more explicit system of 
performance assessment and compensation for GBS. Some multilateral agencies 
adopted a trigger point mechanism, graduated (EU) or not (WB-PRSC), based on 
agreed indicators (outputs mainly) or actions (processes). 
World Bank PRSC 
The appraisal process for the PRSC was centred on the achievement of prior actions 
(World Bank, 2004b). Prior actions were similar to undertakings as they were also 
retrospective, i. e. stakeholders agree on actions one year before. However, they were 
credit conditions as appraisal of progress towards achieving the prior actions 
determined the final negotiations of the PRSC and its submission to the World Bank's 
board for approval (ibid. ). The appraisal process was based on the review of a series 
of documents and data (sources included for example the Public Expenditure 
Reviews67 and aide memoirs of JRMs) (ibid. ) and discussions with key stakeholders 
were held (various KIs). But the assessment was also based on the general 
perception of progress among stakeholders, particularly for the health PRSC (KI - 2, 
DP representative). 
Usually, the prior action for the health sector was the 'satisfactory implementation of 
the undertakings agreed in the health sector review', as in the PRSC3 (World Bank, 
2003). Hence, technically the appraisal would be based on the outcome of the JRMs 
in regard to the achievement of undertakings. However, in practice, as noted above 
the assessment took account of the overall perception of progress by those involved 
in the review. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the JRM process 
assessed performance not only on the basis of undertakings. In addition, less than 
100% of the undertakings needed to be achieved in order for satisfactory performance 
to be declared. 
A DP representative noted that performance in the areas of public expenditure and 
governance was key to the decisions by the World Bank on the release of further 
67 Focus on the assessment of budget performance. 
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tranches68. Thus, concerns regarding performance in the health sector were 
considered "secondary". Within the two areas of priority for the World Bank, public 
expenditure was an area of even greater concern than governance. 
However, different donors placed emphasis on different areas or issues, for example 
the bilaterals tended to put a lot of weight on governance issues (KI - 1, Government 
official). This was of relevance because many bilateral agencies adopted the PRSC 
review mechanism as part of their decision criteria for disbursement of general budget 
support funds, thus reducing transaction costs. This was the case for instance of 
69 DFID. 
In effect although it [PRSC] is a specific bank administrative instrument the 
others ride on that. So it depends on where the donor comes from, some will 
put more emphasis on corruption and some will put on other [things] and these 
will be on their bilateral document. But what they usually do is not to try and 
bring in something new; they will emphasize something in the PEAP and the 
PRSC. (KI - 1, Government official) 
While the PRSC review system represents a more explicit approach to the 
compensation scheme, it has scope for further development and still is based on 
subjective elements of performance assessment. 
The system was based on 8 to 10 agreed prior actions that if all were achieved 
triggered the disbursement of funds. However, it lacked a proportionate weighting 
system whereby the amount to be disbursed could be graduated in line with the level 
of progress made towards the prior actions.. Some donors were discussing possible 
ways to improve the current system with the World Bank. For example, a key 
informant noted that in view of risks in tying funds to specific indicators, donors could 
release funds on the basis of achievement of a fixed proportionate number of 
undertakings or prior actions out of an agreed total number, e. g. 3 out 4. 
It is a blunt instrument, 150 million dollars dependent on whether you get those 8 
things done or not. DFID and other partners have been trying to get the Bank to 
68 Prior actions tend to focus on specific areas. The ones chosen for the PRSC 4 were (World Bank, 
2004b): public expenditure (budget performance); public administration (pay reform, procurement); 
glovernance / accountability (anti-corruption measures); health, education and water sectors. 9 As an illustration of the involvement of other development agencies in the PRSC appraisal process, the 
World Bank team in charge of the review of the PRSC4 received the support of 8 development agencies. 
These were: Development Cooperation Ireland, DANIDA, DFID, EC, KIWI Netherlands, Norad, and Sida 
(World Bank, 2004b). 
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do some scaling. If you could get 5 out of 8 you get this much or if they progress 
against some of them. (KI - 4, other) 
Surely there will be disagreements as to how best to structure the compensation 
scheme and make it more objective. For instance, a DP representative mentioned that 
attempts to have a more explicit system to assess performance proved to be difficult 
as it was more of a subjective issue. 
lt is very difficult to determine how and what to penalise, for instance if 
overspending is above, 2% or 3% or 10%. (DP representative) 
In the past, although not all agreed prior actions were achieved or-serious concerns 
had been raised in relation to various issues, it appeared no releases of PRSC have 
been reduced or withdrawn due to unsatisfactory progress. 
So if you don't deliver on the trigger actions, they look at them and see why 
and then there is a whole discussion. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
An example of prior actions not achieved included those reviewed during the appraisal 
mission of PRSC 4, when out of 8 prior actions, 2 were not on track at the time of the 
mission. These were in the water and sanitation sector and on budget performance 
(see table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Non-achieved prior actions 
Prior actions agreed during pre-appraisal mission Progress towards achievement 
In the annual public expenditure review, the Government This is not on track. While overall expenditures 
has agreed with donors on the Medium Term Expenditure amounted to 91 %"of programmed levels for the first two 
Framework (MTEF) for 2003104-2005/06, and has executed quarters, overall PAF releases only amounted to 84% 
the 2003/04 budget through the first three-quarters of pro-rata budget (compared to 96% at the same stage 
consistent with budget allocations. in 2002/03), with public administration running at 123% 
Satisfactory implementation of undertakings agreed in water This is not on track. 
and sanitation sector review in September 2003 and 
confirmed by March 2004 review. 
Source: World Bank (2004b). 
An example of an issue in the area of anti-corruption that had been considered as 
being of serious concern in the past is: 
Corruption remains high and the mission is concerned that there are worrying 
indications, including legal actions questioning the legality of the 1G's7° work on 
the Leadership Code and Cabinet's proposals to curb the power of the 1G. It is 
of particular concern to the mission that the institutions dealing with corruption 
face a range of obstacles, which weaken their ability to work and undermine 
morale. They all face resource constraints (human and financial) that limit 
70 Inspector General. 
156 
effectiveness. The mission also notes that there has been little progress made 
on the commissions of inquiry and still no prosecutions. On the 
implementation of crosscutting reforms, there is equal concern over the slow 
progress. (World Bank, 2004b) 
In spite of the above problems, the agreed prior action in the area of governance or 
accountability was considered to be on track, as per Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Prior action on-track in the area of governance and accountability 
Prior actions agreed during pre-appraisal mission Progress towards achievement 
The Inspector General (IG) completes the analysis of This is on track. The critical analysis of assets of 
declared assets and information collected from key Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of State has been 
categories of leaders, initiates asset verification, investigates completed and that of Permanent Secretaries has 
all complaints from the public received by his office by commenced. The critical analysis of Presidential 
November 1 2003, and presents a time bound action plan advisors will commence shortly. Arising from the critical 
for the implementation of the leadership code. analysis, verification of assets of some Ministers is 
ongoing. All 29 complaints received by the office by I 
November, 2003 are being investigated and three have 
been completed. A draft action plan was presented to 
the mission. 
Source: World Bank (2004b) 
As noted above, the PRSC system of compensation has various shortcomings, as for 
example to release funds in spite of prior actions not being achieved and use of a 
subjective approach to performance assessment. These weaknesses in the system 
can be exploited by the Government who could prefer to avoid putting effort towards 
performance. In the case of the PRSC, these shortcomings have wider repercussions 
as other development agencies besides the World Bank use this appraisal system for 
the release of funds to the budget. But as noted by Miovic (2004), by adopting the 
PRSC as a common system of performance appraisal, donors are at least contributing 
to decrease the burden on the Government with regard to transaction costs. 
EU graduated trigger point mechanism 
The EU compensation scheme represents an advance when compared to the PRSC 
as it was graduated", thus allowing disbursements (rewards) to be in line with the 
degree of progress achieved towards the agreed indicators. 
However, the score system seemed to have some limitations as well. As for example 
with respect to the performance measure of 'considerable positive development' 
(when a 0.5 score is given for an indicator) which was only vaguely defined. This lack 
of explicitness may allow parties to reach agreement in relation to progress and 
71 For a description of the formula for the graduated trigger point mechanism see section 3.7 in chapter 3. 
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subsequent disbursement (reward) in spite of a lack of tangible performance 
improvements being achieved. 
In addition, similarly to the JRM and the PRSC, the EU system of performance 
appraisal was based to a certain extent on a subjective system which involved 
discussions and negotiations towards disbursements. For instance, in 2004, two 
targets were not fully achieved (DP representative). These were: posts filled by 
qualified health workers and OPD attendance. One of the arguments put forward in 
their negotiations with Brussels to justify issues and request the full release of the next 
tranche was that the targets had being revised as per discussions during the 
preparatory phase of HSSP2 (DP representative). In addition, processes like the JRM 
and its outcome (whether rated overall as satisfactory or not, undertakings achieved 
or not) were used to assess performance, even if partially, 72 and to inform decisions 
on the release of funds. 
lt is a rigid system but the local advisors have some leeway, it is very much up 
to them to decide and convince Brussels, it is a long process but it is possible 
to release funds even if targets have not been met, but of course it will need to 
be duly justified. (DP Representative) 
6.3 Distortions in the Penalties and Rewards System 
In this section, I analyse problems regarding the subjective nature and related 
inefficiencies of the performance appraisal system as linked to the compensation 
scheme. More specifically I explore distortions in the penalty and rewards system in 
terms of constraints and the incentive environment vis-ä-vis the aid contract. 
6.3.1 Constraints towards rewards through the Government budget 
This sub-section explores constraints related to the behaviour of both parties - 
Government and DPs - that have hindered the reward of Government performance. It 
also analyses problems related to the incentive environment in relation to projects, the 
SWAp related mechanisms of control and Government rules and regulations. 
72 Additional sources envisaged to be used as part of the assessment of performance included: reports 
and assessments by the Government, IMF, World Bank, Bank of Uganda, annual public expenditure 
review, office of the Auditor General and other independent audits and evaluations (EU, 2004). 
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Macroeconomic budget ceilings hindering DPs from rewarding the Government 
The Government was rewarded with increased budget support from DPs from about 
2000 to 2003. This increase contributed towards augmented financial allocations by 
the MoFPED to the health sector. As noted in Chapter 1, from the start of the first 
HSSP (2000/01-2004/05), the number of DPs providing budget support to the 
government increased from 5 to 8 (MoH, 2003d). In addition, the volume of budget 
support provided by DPs to the GoU increased from US$227.17 million to US$275.1 
million73 between FYs 2000/01 and 2003/04 (MoFPED, 2001; MoFPED, 2002a; 
MoFPED, 2003a; MoFPED, 2004a). Over a similar time period, from 1999/00 to 
2002/03, the budget74 for the health sector also increased 18% in real terms 
(Ssengooba et al., 2006). 
In spite of these increases, health expenditure still fell short of needs. Public funding 
for the sector only reached $9 per capita (including donor projects and budget 
support) in 2003/04 (MoH, 2004c) and the estimated cost of providing the minimum 
health care package during the first HSSP (2000/01 - 2004/05) was $28 per capita 
(ibid. ). 
Further rewards that would contribute towards closing the gap between the existing 
funding for the health sector and its estimated needs were constrained by 
macroeconomic budget ceilings. While DPs appeared willing to increase their 
contributions to the MoH (as per various informal discussions with DPs, e. g. the World 
Bank and SIDA, the MoFPED opposed this on the basis of the country's 
macroeconomic budget caps. 
The rationale for the sectoral ceilings for budgets imposed by the MoFPED related to 
efforts to ensure macroeconomic stability of the country and improved aid efficiency. 
Ensuring macroeconomic stability referred to the potential negative effects of high 
inflows of aid on the macro-economy of the country [potential for appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and decreased exports, fiscal deficits, high interest rates and 
reduced private investment impinging on productivity and growth (Adam and Bevan, 
2002; Lake, 2004; and MoFPED, 2004d)]. 
73 These figures include grants only (exclude loans). 74 Excluding donor projects. 
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A key informant (KI - 4, other) noted that this approach adopted by the MoFPED and 
the Bank of Uganda was a conservative, non-Keynesian approach of private sector 
led development and growth, based on low public expenditures. The key informant 
added that this view was supported by macroeconomists of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank but opposed by some bilaterals like DFID which was 
seen as 'softy and left wing' - and hence arguments for higher public sector 
expenditures had not been accepted. 
Another rationale for the cap on the overall amount of aid allowed into Uganda was 
the general desire of the GoU to reduce the proportion of aid (budget support or 
project aid) to domestic revenues, which was close to 47% (MoFPED, 2004g). The 
motivation for pursuing this goal was related in part to the GoU's assertion of its 
sovereignty. A further argument was that accountability might only come if the budget 
for development came from domestic revenues (from local tax payers) and not donor 
funding (Brownbridge, 2004). It was also related to the government's concerns 
regarding the (un)predictability and (un)sustainability of aid funds into the country. As 
mentioned by a key informant (KI - 4, other): "he [the president] sort of puts the 
message out, he doesn't want the budget too dominated by donor money because 
everyone realises that things can change at anytime". 
Increased aid in the form of proiects (particularly GHIs) and poor compliance of DPs 
with Government's preferred aid mode (GBS) 
There was a perception of a general lack of prioritisation in the sector with regard to 
various projects that were being accepted, as put by this key informant (KI - 3, other): 
Projects don't seem to be assessed by the MoH thoroughly against what they 
contribute or the extent to which they can contribute to the core of HSSP 
priorities. Basically any project, any money being offered is being accepted. 
For example, Uganda has been applying to almost all rounds of applications of 
the GFATM. 
This was taking place in spite of the macroeconomic ceiling constraint and 
represented thus a failure of the reward system, as the Government's preferred mode 
of aid would have been to receive support to the budget. 
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There was an exceptional case of a USAID project that was rejected75. However, it 
seemed there was a trend to accept large projects in view of the political clout of the 
countries/agencies involved as exemplified by the frequency of applications to the 
GFATM and the volume of PEPFAR funds. The examples of PEPFAR and the 
GFATM are explored here in further detail. 
It was not clear what the involvement of the MoFPED was in the process of approving 
the PEPFAR and GFATM projects in relation to the regular budgetary processes. 
PEPFAR by-passed the existing technical mechanisms of aid coordination, e. g. its 
projects were not submitted to review and scrutiny by the health sector stakeholders 
through the SWG (based on notes from observations of meetings and discussions 
with various Kls). It also did not follow the timetable for proposals and funding 
disbursements as per schedules for planning and budgeting in the country (based on 
notes from observations of meetings and discussions with various Kls). 
PEPFAR seemed to distinguish itself with respect to the way it was introduced in 
Uganda because of its political nature. It was explained that the project was 
negotiated at a high political level between the President's office and the US Embassy 
/ White House (various Kls). This political circumvention of technical structures (e. g. 
non-submission of the project for approval at the SWG) seemed to be related to a 
distortion of the formal reward system. PEPFAR funds were provided in the form of 
projects and not GBS as well as within the context of geopolitics - as reward for 
Uganda's support to the war in Iraq - instead of Uganda's performance in the health 
sector or on HIV/AIDS (various interviewees). 
The grants of the GFATM to Uganda were another example of funding in the project 
form which was accepted notwithstanding the macroeconomic ceilings and the by- 
passing of common control mechanisms for aid disbursement (e. g. SWG), thus failing 
to reward Uganda through increased funding channelled through GBS. 
Differently from other Global Health Initiatives (e. g. PEPFAR), the GFATM system is 
such that the recipient country has to apply for funding. Uganda applied for all four 
rounds of funding (within the period of fieldwork - as per discussions during observed 
meetings). The argument by those leading the application process, the MoH, was the 
75 A Government official said this was an exception as the Ugandan's health sector is severely under- 
funded and depends on donors. The project had an estimated budget of US$16 million. The reasons for 
rejecting the project were based on an analysis by the MoH as reported by a key informant, only about 
US$ 500,000 would had been allocated following HSSP priorities and it was not was clear what benefit it 
would bring to the MoH (what outputs it would contribute). 
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lack of funding in the sector (as observed during HPAC meetings). This argument was 
used in the negotiations with the MoFPED to obtain their consent in waiving the rule of 
integrating new project funding within the budget ceiling76 (which would be offset from 
the budgetary funding to be received by the MoH and thus not lead to de facto 
increased overall funding for the sector). This was also necessary in order to comply 
with the condition imposed by the GFATM of additionality (Njie et al., 2005) - that the 
funds provided by the GFATM would be additional to those existing within the 
country's budget thus avoiding aid fungibility problems. The MoFPED agreed that the 
GFATM funding (up to round four as per end of fieldwork) would beýadditional (notes 
from observed meetings and discussions with various Kls). The agreement by the 
MoFPED was considered to have been an exception in view of the high profile status 
of the GFATM (KI - 5, other). 
When an organization like the global fund comes in because of its very strong 
resource mobilization capacity, the government then changes its mind a little. 
Since there is so much money here they would simply have to accept this less 
systematic approach ..... and then we will simply hope that there will be more 
money coming to sustain the changes that are coming through the global fund. 
(KI - 5, other) 
The volume of funding made available by the GFATM, and its perceived accessibility 
as opposed to budget support funding, seemed to make certain parts of the 
Government more flexible about its rules and mechanisms. This reaction to the Global 
Fund project funding interfered with the existing integrated budgeting processes. 
People rushed off around the Global Fund but collectively the rest of us [BS 
donors] have more money that we are providing to the budget but that it is not 
seen to be accessible in the same way ... somehow the idea of the 
Global 
Fund money even if it's relatively small excited much more political, interest. 
don't know 
... it's seen as an opportunity that anybody can get something of 
out of it and somehow with budget support money that isn't [the case]. (DP 
representative) 
Possible explanations for the reward failure (project aid instead of GBS): incentive 
environment: ineffectiveness of control mechanisms and systems of rules and 
regulations in the public bureau 
76 As part of the policy of fixed macroeconomic budgetary ceilings, the MoFPED had adopted as one of 
its priorities, for the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MIEF) and Long Term Expenditure 
Framework (LTEF), to integrate donor projects into sector ceilings which once incorporated would 
displace budget funding. The motive was to avoid expensive and inefficient projects (budget funding was 
considered more flexible, efficient, and equitable) (Kassami, 2004). 
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Given the context of the general scarcity of resources within the budget to cover the 
needs of technical programmes, the budget ceilings imposed by the MoFPED seemed 
to have created an incentive for these programmes to actively continue to seek project 
funding. 
The Ministry of Finance encourages the use of SWAp, but currently the 
approach of the Ministry of Finance [with]... sectoral budget ceilings results in 
threats to the sector, not only because there is insufficient funding to the sector 
at the moment, but also because it encourages the sector to seek funds 
elsewhere, off budget. If the sector was getting sufficient or a lot more funds 
through the budget it would be easier to argue against the GF and other GHIs. 
(KI - 4, other) 
It was added for instance that the AIDS Control Programme would probably prefer to 
fund Anti-Retrovirals through public health facilities, using the Government budget, but 
sufficient funds were not available for this model of delivery (KI - 4, other). There was 
thus a conflict between what the practice of the MoFPED ended up being versus its 
rhetoric of advocating for GBS to be the preferred mode of aid by the Government. 
The resulting practice seemed to have been linked to political pressures on the 
MoFPED to accept projects like PEPFAR and the GFTAM. On the other hand, its 
policy of imposing a macroeconomic ceiling was said not to be a direct imposition or 
conditionality of the IMF and other international institutions (KI - 1, Government 
official). However, the advice provided by these institutions to the MoFPED towards 
adopting the budgetary ceilings seemed to have encountered widespread support 
among officials of that Ministry (KI - 4, other). 
All SWAp related structures should serve the overall Government purpose of 
prioritising relevant projects according to the sector's policies across the various units 
and programmes in the MoH. ICCs and the SWG should play a particular role as 
control mechanisms of technical programmes by integrating/harmonising their specific 
policies and interventions and holding them accountable within the sector (various 
Kls). 
In the case of ICCs they were intended to help technical programmes to reflect upon 
their priorities vis-ä-vis those of the ministry/sector as a whole and to refocus their 
programme of work in line with that of the Ministry as opposed to simply responding to 
the project agendas as directed by the different agencies/donor programmes (various 
163 
Kis). While this was said to have happened to some extent, there were accounts of 
technical programmes, for instance the Reproductive Health Division, using the ICC to 
actively seek project funding, while "in other fora they behave as to abide by the 
SWAp bible" (KI - 3, other). The key informant noted that project funding was sought 
after as a source of individual benefits (consultancies, equipment, vehicles, and per 
diems). 
The effectiveness of the SWG in assessing projects against value for money and 
equity concerns and possibly directing funding towards the budget mechanism was 
also seen as deficient. For'small' projects and/or projects of low (political) profile, the 
system seemed to work (KI - 5, other). But with large projects from influential 
organisations such as the GFATM and PEPFAR, as discussed above, the rules of 
review within the SWG were by-passed and these projects were negotiated directly 
with the MoFPED (or not as in the case of PEPFAR). 
Some parts of Government still argued that the rules and regulations of the public 
bureau would be sufficient to align incentives in this environment. The perception was 
that because government was a bureaucracy, the policies and rules it had effected 
should be adhered to. 
We have clearly said that our preferred mode of financing is budget support, 
and over the years, budget support has been on an increasing trend and even 
to provide more incentives for ministries, the issue of integrating projects into 
the budget is meant to be a trade off. If you have more projects then you have 
less budget support - as government we are not very much in control of 
projects so need to think twice if they are worth it.... the way government 
works, [is that] it's a bureaucracy, so there, are no power struggles in that 
sense. (Government Official) 
However, the evidence presented in this section seemed to indicate that the rules and 
regulations put in place by Government have not been able to curb donor projects and 
bring technical programmes to adhere to the budget system. 
Hence, some changes seem to have taken place regarding contractual outcomes in 
relation to the budgeting process since the introduction of GBS, in terms of both intra- 
government incentives and increased efficiency in public spending and equity of 
resource allocation. However, macroeconomic ceilings appeared to hinder further 
improvements. The shift from project funding towards GBS or sector support, at the 
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earlier stages of the HSSP, triggered changes in the incentive structure. This was 
characterised by a move away from incentives made available through project funding 
from development agencies to Government units towards incentives within 
Government units to compete for budgetary funds. As argued by Ssengooba et al. 
(2006), with the shift towards greater funding through GBS and SWAp there had been 
greater efficiency (more predictable budget flows, resources more fungible, lower 
transaction costs, stronger budget process, capture of project funds) and equity. But 
the macroeconomic ceilings and the increased funding via projects with the advent of 
the GHIs (e. g. PEPFAR) appeared to have hindered further gains in efficiency, service 
quality and in number of services for the poor through increased aid flows to the 
health sector budget. 
6.3.2 Poor performance by the Government and failure in penalising by DPs 
This section reviews instances of poor performance by the Government that tended 
not to be penalised by DPs. It covers the areas of governance (budgetary and 
accountability issues) and management problems in the health sector. 
Performance problems regarding governance issues 
In this sub-section I present some evidence in regard to poor performance in the 
areas of defence expenditure and accountability / transparency. 
Issues related to defence expenditures have led some DPs in the past to withdraw or 
delay disbursement to the Government budget. In 2001/02 support to the budget by 
Belgium was interrupted. This was due to Uganda's military intervention in the DRC 
(DP representative). The bilateral agreement at the time envisaged a total transfer of 
approximately US$ 4 million, of which US$ 1.3 million was disbursed in 2000/01 
(MoFPED, 2001). While there were conditions set out in the agreement, these did not 
include penalties for defence-related issues but focused on the performance of the 
health sector (DP representative). 
In FYs 2002/03 and 2003/04, the UK, Ireland and Netherlands withdrew support to the 
general budget following a 23% cut in the Government budget to fund increased 
defence expenditure (MoFPED, 2003a; MoFPED, 2004a). In FY 2003/04, the 
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reduction in disbursements by the above DPs was 10% of their projected contributions 
(MoFPED, 2003a; MoFPED, 2004a). 
Besides the above, Ireland also delayed budget support contributions in FY 2001/02, 
in the amount of US$ 6.5 million. This was due to the delayed release of the report on 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) probe (Lake, 2004; MoFPED 2002a). 
In addition to the abovementioned reason of increased allocations for defence, the 
budget cut by the UK Government in FY 2002/03 in the amount of £1 Omillion was due 
to the Government's failure to release a Defence Review Report (including 
implications for the budget on defence expenditure) (KI - 2, DP representative). 
There has been no discussion and we said if there isn't a discussion then 
there won't be money. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
Suspension or delays applied by DPs as penalties for poor performance were 
perceived by the Government as disruptive for activities and processes - particularly 
with regard to the lack of aid predictability (various interviewees). However, the effect 
of penalties applied by DPs was neutralised because of the lack of predictability of 
donor aid itself. This was because shortfalls caused by the cuts/delays (penalties) 
were often offset by foreign reserves (including disbursements carried over or 
contributions that came later than originally scheduled) or by the effects of 
depreciation in currencies. 
For example, in FY 2003/04, despite the cut in disbursement by the UK Government, 
budget support grants exceeded forecasts. The Ugandan Government received US$ 
329 million instead of the projected US$ 226 million (MoFPED, 2004a). The reason for 
this particular increase was that the World Bank, instead of providing a loan to the 
Government, decided to offer it as a grant (ibid. ). 
This helped to more than offset the delayed disbursements and the cut in 
funding by the United Kingdom. (ibid. ) 
The effects of currency depreciation and the foreign reserves may not have 
completely counteracted the losses caused by the penalties of DPs but they helped. 
For instance in FY 2002/03: 
The shortfalls [due to delayed and reduced disbursements by DPs] were 
partially offset by the depreciation of the US dollar" against the respective 
77 US$ is the currency used for foreign reserves. 
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donor currencies, and in particular the Euro and the GB pound. Disbursements 
carried over from FY 2001/02 also helped offset the shortfall. (MoFPED, 
2003a) 
The above problem was related to the lack of harmonisation among DPs in having a 
common/joint penalty response. Donors could have formed a 'cartel of good 
intentions' (Easterly, 2002) and used their power to cut aid to Uganda in view of the 
considerable proportion of budget support vis-ä-vis the Government budget. Instead 
DPs allowed the Government to offset penalties with delayed disbursements. 
For example, with respect to Uganda's military intervention in the DRC, none of the 
major donors, in terms of volume of aid provided, cut their aid in FY 2001/02. It was 
only Belgium that withdrew support and Ireland that delayed its contribution. As noted 
earlier these represented US$ 2.7 million and. US$ 6.5 million respectively. The UK 
grant contributions (including PAF and non PAF) in that year amounted to US$ 67.5 
million (MoFPED, 2002a). 
One of the possible reasons as to why donors were reluctant to penalise Uganda in 
view of the military intervention in the DRC related to Uganda's standing as a 'good 
performer'. 
Museveni got an easy ride about the Congo because of his status as president 
of the country which invented the PRSP which has made dramatic reductions 
in poverty, which was the first country in the world to qualify for HIPC debt 
relief etc. (KI - 4, other) 
Issues related to health expenditure are also of relevance. In 2003/04, during the 
negotiation process for the 2004/05 budget, the health sector budget was due to be 
decreased by 11% in real terms relative to the previous year's budget (MoH, 2004b). 
This was later rescinded, although there was still a reduction of 3% in relation to the 
previous year (ibid. ). The discussion following below evolves around the details of the 
phase while negotiations were ongoing and the budget seemed likely to be reduced 
by 11 %. 
The reason for the reduction in the health sector budget was the increase needed in 
the budget for defence and public administration expenditures (notes from the PER 
meeting May 2004). This occurred in spite of the protection of funds under PAF 
conditional grants (which is one way for donors to protect their contributions within the 
167 
agreed poverty alleviation strategy). The increase for public administration was related 
to expenditures allocated for preparations for the 2006 elections, in particular for the 
referendum to decide whether the president could stand for a third term. There were 
also rumours that the increases in the defence budget would allow for plans to station 
army contingents in every sub-county. 
Cuts in the health sector budget were envisaged to affect MoH running costs, project 
counterpart contributions, but also the drugs and human resources budget lines (the 
latter with more direct consequences for service delivery) (based on notes from 
observation of meetings). 
During the meetings of the 2004 Public Expenditure Review, DPs alerted Government 
to their dissatisfaction with the budget allocations. They said the budget did not reflect 
a convincing balance towards PEAP related expenditures. Allocations for defence, 
insecurity and public administration were too high and at the expense of health, 
justice, law and order for example. Worryingly, the increase in defence expenditure 
was said not to be targeted to deal with the conflict situation in the North. The 
increase in public administration expenditure was also said to be potentially linked to 
political activities under the heading of community mobilisation and greater expenses 
of the State House. During the Review a debate ensued about the appropriate level of 
defence expenditure. The Prime Minister argued that not too much could be disclosed 
about defence for obvious reasons. Donors reiterated that in the context of GBS there 
should be a strong budget management process whose forecasts prioritise resources 
towards the PEAP targets. 
Hence, although donors expressed their dissatisfaction with the reduction of the 
health sector budget, they did not apply any related penalties. 
During the interviews for this research, donor representatives and government officials 
tended not to speak openly and in detail about accountability problems, in particular 
corruption. This was an obvious issue. There were, for instance, some media reports 
quoting donor representatives themselves expressing concern with regard to 
problems in this area. 
Everyone knows there is corruption in Uganda at high and low levels. There 
are very many reports but nothing has been done on these reports. [Interview 
with French Ambassador, Jean-Bernard Thiant (The Monitor, 2004b)] 
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In addition, the corruption perception index by Transparency International suggested 
that Uganda was among the most corrupt countries. In 2005 it was ranked 11778 out 
of 158 countries in the index (Transparency International, 2005). Further, there 
appeared to be decreasing levels of accountability, which DPs were able to observe, 
as discussed below. Yet DPs were not applying penalties towards the Government 
despite these problems. 
Political commitment was reported to have decreased as the 2006 elections were 
approaching (various Kls). It was perceived that efforts moved towards ensuring that 
the then current Government would win the process. Some feared that some methods 
used may not have been very democratic. There were rumours that there had been a 
tightening of intelligence / security operations, and people at middle to senior levels 
(but not those at the very top levels) were feeling afraid of "not coming home" and 
started leaving the government (KI - 5, other). Moreover, it was said that landline 
telephones and mobiles had been tapped at the MoH and that certain budget lines of 
the MoH just could not be questioned (KI -4 and 5, others). This was happening in 
the context of the parliamentary discussion to change the constitution to allow the 
presidential mandates to be extended to 3 terms. 
DPs could have faced the challenge of confronting the Government in regard to their 
stances on governance and accountability at that point, by applying penalties or 
perhaps threatening to leave Uganda. However, the president was still very popular 
among the people living in rural areas and he was likely to be elected without having 
to resort to undemocratic measures (various Kis). 
Prior to the elections, problems were also reported in relation to political interference 
and slackening commitment to monitoring at higher levels, including in the health 
sector (senior and top management). 
At higher levels there are problems of political interference in the assessment 
of performance. (Government Official) 
A further observation on the issue of technical commitment being overridden by 
political goals referred to the appointment of one of the commissioners in the MoH 
around 2003, which was based more on his political credentials than his technical 
skills and experience for the post (various Kls). Another example was in October 2003 
78 With a score of 2.5 - whereas the least corrupt country surveyed was Iceland with a score of 9.7 and 
the most corrupt one, Chad, with a score of 1.7. 
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when there was an attempt by the Ugandan National Statistics Bureau to present the 
results of the last household survey (at the time). Before it was released to the public, 
the Government, discontented that the survey showed an increase in poverty, aborted 
the presentation. A key informant reported that "researchers were asked to go back 
and `massage' the data". 
An additional area of concern referred to the independence of the Inspector General 
of Government and the Auditor General. A Government official noted that the offices 
of the Inspector and Auditor Generals offered an appropriate legal and institutional 
framework. The Inspector General of Government was said to be a political member 
of the government, close to the president (KIs -4 and 5, others). It was noted that 
there were no clear rules or criteria, for instance, as to what gets investigated or not 
(corruption cases) (KIs -4 and 5, others). The Auditor General was also appointed by 
the president and there was no independent board to ratify such appointments 
(Robinson, 2006). In this context, the PRSC mission of 2004 raised concerns with 
respect to the lack of Government commitment to adopting appropriate audit 
legislation with a view to curb existing problems of poor accountability of public funds, 
and high fiduciary risks (World Bank, 2004b). It seemed thus that while institutions 
have been put in place to deal with issues of corruption, their effectiveness has been 
less than desirable. 
Although Uganda has institutions with the legal authority to investigate and 
prosecute corruption, impunity remains widespread. New measures that 
strengthen the Inspector General of Government are intended to counter this 
impunity, but what effect they will have remains to be seen given widespread 
complacency about corruption. (Transparency International, 2004) 
Evidence on their [institutions dedicated to tackling the problem of 
accountability] performance in curbing the level of corruption measured 
through the number of successful prosecutions and dismissals points to a 
consistent record of underachievement. (Robinson, 2006) 
There were also rumours of misconduct among top level political figures in various 
sectors. Further, it appeared that donors were colluding in this. It was said that donors 
tacitly accepted the Government keeping some corrupt politicians within cabinet (KI - 
4, other). Such agreement would have been based on the fact that the president owed 
these politicians for their political support after having helped him win the election. 
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Donors then pressured for these politicians to be posted in Ministries where they 
could `steal less' (KI - 4, other). 
Further specific areas where there were accounts of suspected cases of corruption 
included: the Early Childhood Development and Nutrition project; and Government 
procurement. 
The Early Childhood Development and Nutrition Project, a World Bank funded project, 
was said to be a source of corruption among high level officials and politicians across 
Government (in social sector ministries: health, gender, and education) (various Kls). 
The project was due to end in 2004 as agreed by the SWG. However, the MoH 
requested a six month extension of the project (HPAC meeting 04 February 2004 
minute). Later it was noted that the extension was being requested in spite of funds 
amounting to US$2 million having been diverted from the project (HPAC meeting 
minutes 14 April 2004). The extension involved counterpart funding from the 
Government which was budgeted for in the 2004/2005 FY budget, in spite of various 
cuts that were envisaged for the overall budget for the health sector at that stage. This 
counterpart funding was prioritised (not part of the cuts). The MoH argued that the 
extension was needed in order to finalise the project and that it funded important 
activities such as part of the DHS and it was a high profile project with links to the 
social committee of Parliament. In spite of the widespread rumours about this project, 
the World Bank continued to fund it. It was perceived as one of its best projects, 
mainly because it had high disbursement rates (KI - 1, Government official). Hence, it 
appeared this was another example of collusion between the Government and a DP. 
Procurement was also an area where lack of accountability was a problem in Uganda: 
Government procurement.... has been a major source of graft (Transparency 
International, 2004). 
Disruption in the procurement system seemed to have caused stock outs of essential 
supplies such as test kits for HIV/AIDS (for almost a year in 2003) and contraceptives 
(KI - 5, other). There appeared to be a tendency for poor planning and hence frequent 
need of emergency procurement (Raja and JSI / Deliver, 2003). This was a wider 
Government issue and did not affect the health sector only. It seemed that external 
companies, big businesses in the country and high level politicians were involved in 
corruption (notes from observation of HDPG meetings). 
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The problem was mentioned during the 2003 JRM, for example, when it was noted 
that there was too much political interference on technical issues and investigations 
by different institutions were needed (notes from observation of meetings). However, 
the responses were weak. The World Bank tried to deal with the problem via its 
management at higher levels (notes from observation of HDPG meetings). Other 
health DPs said they would continue to raise the issue through the SWAp-related 
structures such as the HPAC and JRMs (notes from observation of HDPG meetings). 
This was-taking place but in a somewhat informal way. The issue was mentioned in 
general discussions; however, it tended not to be addressed with Government directly 
and publicly (notes from observation of meetings). Clearly one of the problems in this 
area was the need for evidence to hold those responsible to account, which was not 
easily obtainable. 
We have not actually taken a firm stand on perceived potential corruption but 
think it's because that is not obvious. We don't really know but you know that 
it's got to be something because there are things that are going on.... But it is 
kind of insidious; you can't really put your finger on it. But we have not as a 
group stood up, and said, wait a minute we do have to clean this up. We have 
been doing it through the [commissioning of] case studies.... it's a really 
sensitive area, obviously. So I think we try to deal with it in more indirect ways. 
(DP representative) 
Performance problems regarding management in the health sector 
The health sector seemed to be experiencing performance problems at around the 
time of the fieldwork (2003/2004). This worsening of performance is exemplified below 
through analysis of problems in relation to the budget process and tracking studies 
(Programme 9 study). 
The SWAp seemed to have contributed to the enhancement of the reporting and 
accountability structures of the budget process, particularly after the start of the HSSP 
in 2000. For instance, the budget framework process was said to have been well 
managed and to have become more transparent (various interviewees). The Budget 
Framework Papers were institutionalised as part of the budget process and had their 
quality and consistency improved over time. As highlighted by a key informant (KI - 5, 
other), the preparation process of Budget Framework Papers included information 
being made available on time for discussion among partners before it needed to be 
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submitted to MoFPED. However, there were problems of transparency in the budget 
process at a later stage, mainly during the period of 2003/2004 as illustrated below. 
For example, the budget negotiations for the 2004/05 budget seemed to lack an 
overall strategic approach. There was lack of clarity / transparency in budget lines and 
this was said to be linked in part to the lack of a consolidated yearly work plan of the 
MoH (notes from observation of meetings). To this point, one DP representative noted 
that a strategic plan was needed and not just a cost of programmatic activities. 
Still within the context of the budget negotiations for the 2004/05 budget, another 
problem referred to the difficulties DPs experienced when trying to obtain information 
on the budget. DPs in the health sector were trying to use their influence by lobbying 
with the macro development partners group79 to support the arguments of the MoH 
during the negotiations with the MoFPED. However, health DPs felt they were 
hampered by not having timely details on the budget that would have allowed them to 
make a stronger case earlier in the process. They also felt they had to put pressure on 
the MoH to further pursue the negotiations and avoid the budget cuts. They 
highlighted to the MoH that they still had the opportunity to negotiate with the 
MoFPED and at cabinet as well as with Parliament prior to the finalisation of the 
Budget Framework Paper (notes from observation of HPAC meetings). 
This might be understood as interference but it was difficult to understand why the 
MoH (particularly the Health Planning Department) did not seem so engaged in the 
negotiations with the MoFPED and appeared to be reluctant to 'use' donors to put 
pressure on the MoFPED and Parliament. For instance, it was said that donor-funded 
TAs within the Department were being excluded from the budget discussions (notes 
from observation of the HDPG meetings). A DP representative during a SWG meeting 
(May 2004) questioned the Ministry's behaviour in relation to this problem: "Doesn't 
the Ministry of Health trust development partners? Do you want our help or not? " 
This case raises questions such as to what extent some individuals in the MoH 
perceived DPs as an obstacle and not as facilitators. They might not have trusted their 
partners or perhaps they were not as committed to the budget process as they might 
have been in the pursuit of other causes. An illustrative case of the potential 'quest' of 
79 The macro development partner group works closely with the MoFPED; and is directly involved in the 
budget negotiation process as well as the public expenditure reviews. 
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other objectives was the development of a proposal to introduce social health 
insurance in Uganda. 
Resources were allocated in the 2004/05 budget for the preparatory phase of 
information gathering and discussions for the development of the proposal. This 
included, for example, mobilisation activities at district level and study tours to 
Thailand and Brazil80. Donors were once again dissatisfied that the paper detailing the 
proposal for social health insurance was not circulated for discussion with them. In 
spite of the budget cuts foreseen in that year, during the negotiations the budget line 
for the development of this proposal had a substantial increase. A DP representative 
noted that a group of consultants from Harvard had recently suggested that social 
health insurance should be a long term strategy (next 10 to 15 years) and hence in 
view of the budget cuts in the 2004/05 budget, this should not be a priority (notes from 
observation of HPAC meeting, May 2004). 
Various key informants noted that there were hidden agendas (corruption) being 
pursued with the resources allocated for the development of this proposal. They also 
noted that within the Ministry (Health Planning Department) there were reprimands for 
people who were opposed the social health insurance strategy. 
A crucial part of the budget process should be the effective functioning of the SWG. 
However, this also seemed to be deficient. For example, meetings which should be 
monthly started to be become less frequent, as illustrated by a gap of three months 
between the December 2003 and the April 2004 meetings (notes of observation from 
HPAC meetings). 
Due to such gaps, DPs noted that meetings became packed with information and 
documents to be analysed within short notice, thus hindering proper discussions and 
agreements (notes from observation of meetings). This once again illustrated the lack 
of effort made by the MoH in involving donors, specially the Health Planning 
Department which was in charge of leading the budget process. 
The SWG is not just to stamp on the Budget Framework Paper as decided by 
top management. SWG is'supposed to be a process with discussions along 
the way. (DP representative during SWG meeting of May 2004) 
80 Even though Brazil abolished Social Health Insurance in 1988. 
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An additional problem with respect to the functioning of the SWG related to the delay 
by the MoFPED in producing clear ToRs for the SWG. The SWG had been meeting 
for two years with no ToRs. The lack of detail about its functioning meant that 
members of the SWG had to deal with vague and often disputable criteria (e. g. with 
regard to donations in kind, multi-sectoral projects, project management costs). 
Donors requested the MoFPED provide further details in terms of guidelines but it had 
still not done this by the end of the fieldwork (notes from observation of meetings). 
Further, it was said that since 2002 (and at least up to the end of fieldwork), RH 
projects were not subject to review by the SWG (KI - 3, other). Donors were said to 
approach the Reproductive Health Division directly and various small projects were 
accepted which were not assessed against efficiency and equity criteria. 
Thus, it appeared that the existing budget process under the SWAp framework and its 
structures like the SWG had failed as mechanisms of control. During meetings like 
HPAC donors held the Government accountable and threatened to withhold funds if 
there was not satisfactory progress on the Budget Framework Paper or if the SWG did 
not become operational. 
Meeting noted that if there were no SWG meetings, partners would declare 
there won't be any funds released to the health sector. (HPAC meeting 
minutes 14 April 2004) 
However, when it came to the decision at the time of the JRM 2004, progress was 
declared satisfactory and funds released. This represented a failure by DPs to 
penalise Government for the various abovementioned performance problems. 
As presented below, tracking studies scrutinising problems within a specific area 
seemed to have contributed to reduce information asymmetries at the beginning of the 
SWAp (in 2000). From the first tracking study of financial flows (2001/2002), it 
appeared that disbursements of funds improved after the follow up by the MoH of the 
recommendations made by the study. For instance, in 2000/2001 the average time 
delay for the flow of funds from the MoFPED to service delivery points in districts 
decreased from 75 days to less than 30 over the two year period (MoH, 2003d). The 
study showed that implementation of activities at district level was delayed by about 
two months in any quarter - leaving about only one month per quarter for 
implementation (MoH, 2001 c). The absorption of funds and the quality of services 
delivered was highlighted by the study as being directly affected by the delays. 
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The results of the second tracking study on procurement of supplies and central 
activities81- National Service Delivery Programme (in short form called Programme 9) 
- and the way the MoH responded to the findings was in clear contrast to the trend set 
by the first tracking study where information problems in the system were revealed 
and problems dealt with. 
According to Table 6.8, the study's findings showed for example that new releases of 
funding were taking place in spite of the lack of accountability for previously released 
funds (finding number 11). One of the PAF guidelines was that accountability must be 
demonstrated before new releases, and hence MoFPED was not following its own 
guidelines (KI -1, Government official). 
Further, as shown by the example of finding 6 in Table 6.8, in some programmes 
there were accountability problems in approximately 70% of transactions. There were 
also instances of reallocation of funds from one sub-budget line to another without 
prior discussion (finding 2). This was possible due to the lack of clear guidelines for 
reallocation of funds (finding 3), which could perhaps be linked to the lack of interest 
by Government in producing such criteria. 
8' Due to economies of scale, funds are centralised into this programme for purchases of programme 
supplies to districts. 
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Table 6.8: Key problems identified by the tracking study of Programme 9 
Key findings 
1. Delays experienced at MoH to disburse funds to sub-programmes (lengthy process, incomplete requisitions, 
poor accountability). 
2. Re-allocations are not done in a participatory manner with the sub-programmes - guidelines do not exist. 
3. Too broad and inadequate guidelines of eligibility of activities for programme 9 funding provided by Budget 
Framework Paper and policy priorities within MoH headquarters. 
4. Guidelines for utilisation of PAF funds were complied to more by sub-programmes outside MoH HQs than 
within. 
5. Lack of supporting documentation for some facilities/ services received by some sub-programmes. E. g.: In .... 
(Omitted for confidentially reasons) programme of the 84 transactions sampled, only 30% showed 
accountability and 46% had implementation reports on the activities undertaken. (Underlying by VOC) 
6. Fiscal accountability of funds was reviewed by MoH internal auditors. No evidence of review of the technical 
aspects of the activities done (lack of technical reports for activities carried out). E. g.: It was observed that 
funds released on direct payment for some activities on programme 9 did not have any accountability, for 
instance where seminars were held, hotels receipts are lacking to support payment for the facilities/services 
received and participants did not acknowledge receipt of per diemslatlowances. 
7. Accountability of funds received & reporting on activities carried out still weak for most of the sub-programmes 
reviewed. 
8. Periodical [financial] reports (releases vs. actual) not regularly prepared at programme & sub-programme 
levels. 
9. Some programmes (i. e. professional councils) did not keep proper books of accounts. 
10. Sub-programmes activities are not matched with funding sources during expenditure recording & accountability 
phases. 
11. There was more or less 100% compliance of releases from MoFPED & releases were received in time. 
Sources: MoH and Business Synergies (2004) and Powerpoint presentation during stakeholders meeting, May 2004. 
As pointed out during discussions at the 2003 JRM, it was surprising that the Auditor 
General approved the accounts of Programme 9 in view of the above findings. In 
addition, according to a comment by a DP representative during the stakeholders' 
meeting (where the study's findings were presented), some of the problems identified 
by this study could have been addressed earlier if PAF reports that were supposed to 
be reviewed at HPAC and SWG had been submitted on a regular basis. 
The results of the tracking study of Programme 9 should have been presented during 
the 2003 JRM. However, they were only presented in complete form to a stakeholders 
meeting six months later, in May 2004. There were several problems that led to 
delays in the production of the report by the study team as well as delays on the part 
of the MoH in responding to the findings of the study and in relation to the 
implementation of the study's recommendations. These are summarised in table 6.9. 
82 Programme 9 guidelines were supposed to have been developed one year before the tracking study, 
however by the time of the presentation of tracking study, this still had not happened (key informants). 
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Table 6.9: Problems related to the delays experienced by Programme 9 Tracking 
Study 
Problems experienced 
by research team 
Problems related to the delays in the response by the MoH - 
during conduction of Immediate response to recommendations Response in relation to 
study of the study implementation of study's 
recommendations 
The delay was in part There were also delays in the preparation of The undertaking for Programme 9 
due to problems faced a follow up response to the tracking study agreed during the JRM 
by the consultants recommendations of the study by the MoH. 2003 was to hold a stakeholders 
undertaking the study This was agreed to be presented to DPs workshop to finalise the study's report 
such as difficulties in during the July 2004 HPAC meeting (Minutes and to implement its recommendations 
getting information (like of HPAC dated 2nd June, 2004). At the end of (MoH, 2003b). Progress as reported 
work-plans and records) August 2004, DPs in a letter to the Director during the 2004 JRM was that the draft 
from some sub- General Health Services expressed concern report was discussed among 
programmes, poor about the lack of progress in regard to the stakeholders and a final report 
stores records and plan for implementing the recommendations produced on the basis of the 
accounts record keeping related to the tracking study (Letter by the discussions held. However, the 
by the sub-programmes, HDPG dated 26 August, 2004). A matrix implementation of the study's 
and delay in the detailing the process and actions for the recommendation had to be deferred to 
contractual extension of implementation of the study's another undertaking agreed in the 2004 
the study (Powerpoint recommendation was finally presented to JRM. A programme of work for the 
presentation during HPAC in September, 2004 (Minutes of implementation was to be presented by 
stakeholders meeting, HPAC dated 91' of September, 2004). the end of January 2005 (MoH, 2004a). 
May 2004). 
The delays presented above might have been related to more systemic problems in 
the budgeting and accounting procedures83 which are more amenable to change. But 
there was also the possibility that the Government was not directing sufficient effort 
into monitoring, or was unwilling to provide information that might reveal this. In this 
regard, there were accounts that top management of the MoH was not prepared to 
respond to the identified problems and seek solutions because of suspicions of 
corruption (various Kis noted this). 
For example, the difficulties experienced by the study team in accessing data from the 
MoH seemed to be related to the unwillingness by top management to facilitate 
access (KI - 5, other). Further, during the 2003 JRM, the Government apologised for 
the non-presentation of the tracking study due to 'technical problems'. A key informant 
(KI - 4, other) at the time mentioned that the person in charge was "actually avoiding 
the presentation of some harsh findings about the lack of transparency in the 
allocation of funds of Programme 9, with, for example, PAF money going into 
workshops in Muyonyo and other similar resorts with long lists of participants that 
aren't all needed. " 
83 Which were probably related to administrative problems (lack of or poor record keeping) and capacity 
issues (problems due to lack of staff). 
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In addition, a question that arises here relates to the possible explanations behind the 
contrasting experiences between the tracking study on financial flows and the one on 
Programme 9. Perhaps there was greater support within Government during the time 
of the first study for more in-depth investigations into problems, for revealing and 
sharing information, for seeking solutions to problems experienced at district level. 
This could be related to the individuals in charge and the overall spirit of reform and 
focus on improving performance (context of introduction / early implementation of 
SWAp and HSSP). 
There was a strong reforming political leadership with vision for the sector; top 
management was also committed, and they were supported by strong 
reforming technical people. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
It may also be the case that districts were dealt with more rigorously by the centre 
than the centre dealt with its own performance. 
And it certainly seems to me with the tracking studies that the central level 
PAF funding was not being monitored to anything as the same degree as the 
district funding. And [yet that's] where the potential for diversion of funds is 
essentially higher. (KI - 4, other) 
At the time the latter study was conducted, there was a different group of officials in 
charge who were perhaps less concerned about performance improvements and 
efficiency gains. 
Last year, due to changes in personalities within the ministry.... the proponents 
of the partnership have not, been visible to the same extent and some of the 
new faces within the ministry have not seemed to value the partnerships to the 
same extent so you've seen fewer meetings, their engagement has been 
limited over the last year and decisions have been taken that ... should 
have 
been discussed. (KI - 1, Government official) 
There had also been changes in the overall political context which seemed to be 
geared more towards the electoral process (third term) and less towards the 
implementation of reforms at sectoral level. 
... [with] the run up to the elections it will constrain the ability of individuals 
within the ministry to determine a lot of those technical decisions as political 
affairs are starting to come into the scene at the expense of the technical. (KI - 
5, other) 
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The above was likely to be related to the overall governance problems presented 
earlier in this section. For example, technical commitment was being overridden, with 
some senior officials in the MoH being appointed because of their political credentials. 
Within this context, the response by DPs was to threaten to apply sanctions by stating 
that if the study was not presented by June (2004), progress on this undertaking 
would be declared non-satisfactory and this would affect the transfer of donor funding 
(HPAC meeting minutes 14 April 2004). However, in spite of the delays observed and 
the problems revealed by the study, progress was declared satisfactory during the 
1 0th JRM. in October (MoH, 2004a) and funds were not withheld. 
6.4 Distortion of the penalties and rewards system by the parties 
This section examines reasons as to why. the penalties and rewards system was 
being distorted by the parties. 
6.4.1 Donors distorting the penalties and rewards system 
Key issues analysed in this sub-section are: the way in which Uganda was made a 
success story and further rewarded for these 'successes'; "and how DPs employed 
incentives to disburse aid resources and did not penalise the Government despite 
poor performance. 
Uganda's rewards for its 'successes' 
Evidence from key informants suggested that Uganda appeared to be rewarded not 
necessarily because of its good performance but because of incentives donors had to 
make it into a success story and/or to buy into its existing status of a success story. 
DPs played off their own country governments by trying to invest in a successful 
programme so that they could have a claim on the results, get more funding and again 
have further pressure to disburse and so on. 
We are doing enough where we can take credit for some of the results as well. 
Not that the government doesn't get credit. But as in any development 
agency, it has to be able also to say here is what we have achieved... and 
then again, if you can say that you're successful that your agency is doing 
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things that look successful, and then you can also get more funding. (DP 
representative) 
As added by this donor representative, if successful a country would get more funding 
in the future. For example, PEPFAR coming to Uganda was a reward84 for the 
HIV/AIDS work done previously and considered to be a success. In the first year, 
Uganda was due to receive the largest share of PEPFAR funds - more than South 
Africa which has a much higher prevalence rate85 (18.6% in 2003) and Nigeria which 
has a much larger population (132 million86 with a prevalence rate of 3.7% in 2003) 
(notes from observation of meetings). PEPFAR was said to be built strategically and 
intentionally upon the programme successes and existing partner relationships 
established in Uganda (various Kis). 
Geopolitical interests appeared also to play a role in the way Uganda was rewarded - 
not linked to its performance - as noted by key informants. These included: the role 
Uganda could play as an ally to the US in stabilising the region; the ease of working in 
Uganda (given the stable politico-institutional environment, e. g. non-existence of 
armed conflict in most parts of the country, established/elected Government, 
accountability structures in place such as the Parliament) in comparison with Sudan or 
DRC; and the speculation that there might be oil reserves in Northern Uganda which 
would attract US interests. But more strongly argued by various interviewees was that 
Uganda's support to the invasion of Iraq was being rewarded with PEPFAR funding 
(as mentioned in section 6.3.1). 
USAID considered Uganda to be a well-performing country in the area of HIV/AIDS 
and Malaria as noted by a donor representative. Under the Clinton administration the 
relationship between the two countries was said to be good, although the Clinton 
administration was deemed more critical of Uganda and Museveni. Under the current 
administration, USAID and Bush have not been critical of Museveni, for example on 
the third term issue. Museveni and Bush were also said to be allies in respect to the 
adoption of a Christian rightwing doctrine (Epstein, 2005). 
84 It was considered a reward in terms of more funding from the perspective of the donor agency and 
those parts of Government benefiting from it. But on the other hand, it operated as a reward failure 
towards the budget support mechanism from the perspective of other parts of Government that adhered 
to it, as argued in section 6.3.1. 
85 Source for prevalence data for South Africa and Nigeria: UNAIDS, 2006. " 
86 Data refers to 2004/2005 (UNFPA, 2007) 
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Incentives by DPs to disburse aid and not penalise the Government 
Government performance was far from desirable or matching what was agreed and 
yet funds continued to be disbursed. SWAp and GBS donors had been signalling the 
possibility of even more funds if macro-economic ceilings were lifted. 
Donors are too soft on Uganda and are not tackling the big problems (KI - 3, 
other). 
As presented in this and the previous chapter, there were various instances of poor 
performance or shirking on the agreed aid contract on the part of the Government. 
These included for example: 
" Inadequate high level political support towards the management and performance 
of the Resource Centre, Reproductive Health Division, and Health Planning 
Department (and related budget process issues); 
" Persistently low indicators for RH and maternal health; 
" Undertakings not being achieved or being vaguely formulated; 
" Failure of the control mechanisms of the SWAp (e. g. SWG); 
" Decreased levels of transparency and various rumours of corruption. 
Failure to penalise took place in the context of verifiability problems. The actions of 
the Government could be observed by DP and the Government itself, but not by a 
third party - as independent assessment of performance was deficient. Commitment 
to M&E by both parties was also low. Donors could easily observe poor performance 
as'many have access to information beyond JRMs and reports through TAs working 
within the Ministry. 
As noted previously, there were problems wherein the achievement of performance 
was facilitated by the writing of ambiguous indicators or the agreement to 
undertakings that were under-demanding, vaguely formulated and lacked quantitative 
benchmarks against which progress could be measured. 
While there were threats, for instance, because of the delay in responding to the 
report of the Programme 9 tracking study, these threats did not materialise. Threats 
were not even made in relation to non-achievement of agreed undertakings in the 
areas of RH or HIV/AIDS (from observation of meetings and review of documents like 
minutes of HPAC meetings). 
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Hence, performance was inadequately measured and poor performance was not 
punished. The Government's perception was that aid would continue to flow, thus 
there were no incentives to perform better. 
As noted by a key informant (KI - 3, other), sanctions for poor performance are not 
credible if they do not materialise. For instance, it was mentioned that RH had been 
made a priority area by DPs and the Government for the past 3 years but there had 
not been enough results or any punishment. If donors continue to fund without due 
attention to performance and penalties, poor performance and misbehaviour will 
continue. 
Lack of adherence of donors to conditionalities or not imposing penalties mean 
that government is also not serious about performance, donors then lose 
leverage and government can do what it wants. (KI - 5, other) 
These problems could be further exacerbated because aside from the general 
incentives DPs had to disburse their aid budgets in spite of poor performance by the 
Government, the situation has been compounded by the recent increases in aid 
budgets. For instance, in the UK the Labour Party's commitment to aid has resulted in 
substantially increased budgets for DFID (KI - 4, other). 
This incentive to disburse is likely to be linked to the overall higher profile of aid and 
development in the UK and among the G8 countries in recent years, going beyond the 
Labour Party commitment, as reflected for instance in the pledges agreed during the 
G8 summit in Gleneagles. Hence, DFID's considerable increase in development aid 
budget represents a strong pressure to disburse funds over the next years. Failure to 
do so could be politically embarrassing for the Government, both domestically and 
internationally. 
While the UK Government has been channelling its increased aid budget via GBS, the 
US Government, which also increased its foreign aid budget, opted for large-scale 
projects such as PEPFAR as the mechanisms for disbursing their funds. 
Donors' justifications 
DPs tended to justify their continued disbursements of aid flows by presenting a 
number of difficulties in relation to alternative answers. For instance, various 
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interviewees (DPs and Kls) mentioned that there was a 'tricky' balance in judging 
when corruption and governance problems exceeded 'acceptable' levels and when it 
was time to take action (related to the argument that it was a long term process of 
building capacity and improving existing systems). 
But the course of action that could be taken also seemed to lack clarity. For example, 
in the case of corruption, should donors whistle blow to local media or 
parliamentarians and stimulate local accountability mechanisms or should they 
suspend aid. The latter was argued (KI - 4, other) to have the downside of disrupting 
service delivery and poverty reduction targets. In the case of the former, it could also 
be speculated that they might be afraid of adverse consequences, such as job losses 
or other retaliations, if they pursued the route of exposure via local media for instance. 
In addition, there was the need for legally robust evidence for any investigation to 
move forward, which may not be easy. 
Another possibility was for donors to support Civil Society Organisations to hold the 
Government to account by funding them. However, if DPs continued to disburse aid in 
spite of poor performance by the Government, Civil Society Organisations might feel 
betrayed, as they saw donors' funding as a powerful instrument to hold Government 
to account in comparison with their ability to do so from inside the country 
mechanisms and power relations. 
A further possibility would be if the World Bank were to engage more in political and 
governance issues. Given that the World Bank was considered a `heavy weight', this 
was thought to be helpful in strengthening the position of all donors (KI - 4, other). 
However, the World Bank was seen as lacking expertise in political analysis (Kls -4 
and 5, others). On the other hand, while "by its founding charter, it is prohibited from 
entering into political aspects of the governance agenda... [it] has become 
increasingly active on anti-corruption and government accountability' (Pomerantz, 
2004). DFID was also said to be lacking technical expertise on political analysis (Kls - 
4 and 5, others). Their advisors felt, for instance, that they knew little about countries' 
history and cultures; and that they spent too short a period of time in each country 
than is required to build a sufficiently strong knowledge base. 
Some donor representatives interviewed felt powerless (at advisors level) to take 
action regarding accountability problems but also on issues like poor performance 
within the MoH. 
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We have less power than people think as donors. We can say things at HPAC 
or SWG but if I can't persuade something then it won't happen. (KI - 2, DP 
representative) 
Some donor representatives noted that once they opted for GBS, there was no 'way 
out' and they felt 'trapped'. This might be related to the issue of political power within 
the hierarchy of development agencies but also to the lack of an explicit system of 
penalties and rewards. For instance, in regard to the problems of accountability, 
particularly around the election process and rumours of diversion of funds for that 
purpose (section 6.3.2), in spite of this being raised by advisors at country level, it had 
to be perceived as a major problem by headquarters before, for example, DFID would 
take action (which came later around the time of the elections in 2006 - after the 
fieldwork). 
Another justification for the lack of penalties being applied related to the argument that 
there was a lack of funding and so poor performance was acceptable. The donor 
representative concerned felt constrained in taking action: 
There is an unwritten rule that you can't deal with poor performance because 
part of the deal is that if you are going to perform well, you are paid well and 
that's the sort of argument that you will go back to, their civil service systems 
are like ours were, somebody does not perform well then he moves them or 
promote, doesn't make the great performance overall. (KI - 2, DP 
representative) 
A further argument was that of 'interference'. DPs seemed to fear being accused of 
meddling in domestic affairs - by making use of the SWAp processes in substitution of 
other Government mechanisms that if functional and effective would not require DPs 
to 'step in'. 
To what extent is it right for us to be interfering? The DG has made that clear, 
to what extent is us playing an appropriate role in 'showing accountability and 
good performance, to what extent is the SWAP taking over from other 
processes that ought to be happening within Government.... if the DG hasn't 
got the time or doesn't feel able to tell the Commissioner Planning, get a- 
decent budget framework paper produced, then he probably won't mind if we 
do that. But is that right? (KI - 2, DP representative) 
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Another justification related to the power of those people within Government that 
donors interacted with, at their hierarchical level. Donors argued that problems lay 
somewhere above those they were in contact with; for example, top level officials 
within the MoH not being able to deal with the issue of corruption at higher levels, or 
project funding being negotiated directly with the President's office as was the case of 
PEPFAR. 
A final justification that donors seemed to have for not holding the Government to 
account related to their hesitation or fear of breaking trust levels and exposing or 
challenging individuals they have been working with. This appeared to be the case 
with relationships that developed over a long term, based on personalities that got 
along well, which allowed for the development of openness and trust - as in the 
relationship established between certain top level officials and some aid 
representatives who were able to openly discuss internal MoH management 
problems. However, while one was trusted at the individual level, as a donor he or she 
was also trusted not to say anything or not to take it to an institutional level (KI - 2, DP 
representative). 
The above point could have been related to individual rewards within aid agencies. 
Aid representatives might have been rewarded on the basis of evaluation of clients / 
Government counterparts in recipient countries (Azfar, 2002). They were expected to 
have a good relationship with government counterparts, and be seen as influential 
within government, so strengthening the leverage of the aid agency. 
6.4.2 Government benefiting from a distorted system of penalties and rewards 
It seemed the case that some individuals or groups within Government were 
misbehaving by seeking individual benefits from project funding or through the budget 
(given transparency problems, for example). As one Government official put it: "Why 
work for the MoH if 1 can do my own things like consultancies? " 
They also did not seem very interested in health systems development issues and 
monitoring and hence in holding DPs accountable as necessary regarding their 
performance in relation to the partnership principles and HSSP. 
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This government is not very critical of donors, it is important for them to just 
have the money; they don't really care whether a donor does not perform well. 
(DP representative) 
In this context, DPs seemed to have considerable autonomy in relation to their actions 
given the lack of commitment shown by the Government towards its own priorities. 
lt is a very easy going place, the Government is not critical of donors, there 
isn't a strong agenda, or strong priorities, so donors feel they can come here 
and do what they like. (KI - 3, other) 
On the other hand, it could also be that parts of Government (with less political 
support at the technical level) were not able to hold donors and others within 
Government to account given the lack of effective control mechanisms and failure of 
the compensation scheme. This would include, for instance, the difficulties faced with 
GHIs, such as PEPFAR. 
6.5 Summary of findings 
The main mechanism of control to assess and compensate for performance 
established through the SWAp/GBS was the JRM. This process of performance 
assessment was considered to lack objective measures as it was based on a 
subjective system of discussions and agreements among DPs (principals) on general 
improvement as opposed to an explicit or condition-based system. Examples of 
weaknesses related to the JRM performance appraisal system included: 
0 Incomplete progress reporting of national level indicators; 
0 Undertakings lacking quantifiable measures of progress, being vaguely formulated 
and lacking verifiability; 
" Organisation of district visits facing problems of variable quality across the 
different districts, affecting the extent to which information could be collected and 
analysed; district visits lacking commitment or engagement from the Government 
(both district and MoH levels) as it seemed to be perceived as a donor-driven 
mechanism of accountability. 
Attempts to use a more explicit system of compensation, as adopted by the World 
Bank PRSC system and the EU, also faced problems of subjectivity regarding the 
187 
assessment of performance. They relied on the outcome of JRMs (even if partially as 
was the case for the EU). The World Bank accepted performance as satisfactory in 
spite of poor reporting and non-achievement of agreed prior actions. As other 
development agencies used the PRSC system to trigger the release of funds, the 
above limitations were exacerbated. The EU compensation scheme represented an 
advance when compared to the PRSC because it was graduated. However, it also 
faced some limitations such as problems of performance measures being only 
vaguely defined; and being based to a certain extent on a subjective system which 
involved discussions and negotiations towards disbursements. 
The above deficiencies hindered the scope for DPs as principals to assess the true 
level of performance of the agent, and hence to compensate accordingly. 
In spite of the different formal models (JRM, PRSC, EU) in place in Uganda, the 
subjective nature of the appraisal system and the inefficiencies experienced (which 
are also related to the complexities in the aid environment) allowed for the distortion of 
the compensation scheme as penalties and rewards failed to be applied by DPs to the 
Government. And funds continued to be disbursed despite the lack of progress made 
in achieving all agreed targets and undertakings as well as other performance 
problems which donors were able to observe. 
Examples of poor performance in the area of governance by the Government which 
donors were able to observe but tended not to penalise included: 
" Decreasing levels of accountability about which donors expressed dissatisfaction. 
" Increased defence expenditure (and reduced funding for the health sector in the 
2004/05 budget) and accountability problems (e. g. lack of independence of the 
Inspector General, who was a political member of the Government, and lack of 
clear rules as to which cases of corruption were investigated and which not). 
However, there were some instances of poor performance in the area of governance 
that led DPs to apply penalties to the Government. These included, for instance, the 
area of defence when Belgium withdrew support because of Uganda's military 
intervention in the DRC in 2001/02. Yet, the effect of these penalties was neutralised 
because of the unpredictability of donor aid generally. 
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Examples of poor performance by the Government in the management of the health 
sector involved an increasing lack of transparency, in terms of: other agendas being 
brought to the fore as some individuals put their own interests first; slackening in 
political leadership on reform and deficient high level political support for the 
management of the Health Planning Department; problems in relation to the budget 
process and tracking studies (Programme 9). 
While donors threatened to apply penalties in view of these problems within the health 
sector, these threats did not materialise. 
There were also examples of constraints concerning the aid environment that have 
hindered rewards from operating effectively. These were mainly: 
a) The imposition of macroeconomic budget ceilings by the MoF that constrained DPs 
from increasing aid (and thus hindered the augmentation of the health sector budget); 
and 
b) The delivery of aid through projects in spite of macroeconomic ceilings. This 
reflected a reward failure as DPs brought in aid in the form of projects when the 
Government's preferred mode is GBS/SWAp. 
Underlying issues related to the above reward failures seemed to include: incentives 
provided to technical programmes to seek projects and incentives for DP agencies 
when acting as agents of their donor governments to disburse project funding; 
weaknesses of control mechanisms such as the SWG; and ineffectiveness of the 
public bureau rules and regulations. These resulted in a budget support reward failure 
with the health sector budget below what it should be to cover the minimum health 
care package ($28). 
Both parties seemed to benefit from a distorted system of penalties and rewards: 
" DPs seemed to be under pressure to disburse aid and had incentives to present 
success stories (or to buy into areas where Uganda had a success story status, 
such as HIV/AIDS) to their tax payers/own country Government, in order to 
continue receiving funding which needed to be disbursed. 
Difficulties presented by DPs as justifications for not penalising Government in 
spite of poor performance included: complexity in judging when problems of 
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accountability surpass `acceptable' levels and what type of action to take 
(including consequences such as disruption of service delivery due to aid being 
withdrawn); poor performance being tolerable in view of the overall lack of funding 
within Government to improve performance; fear of being accused of interfering in 
internal Government affairs; lack of power at their hierarchical level (technical not 
political); and breaking the trust of those they interacted with within Government. 
" The Ugandan Government seemed to lack incentives to perform better (as threats 
to penalise were not credible since they did not tend to materialise). In addition, 
some parts of the Government seemed more interested in engaging further in 
opportunistic behaviours and were not particularly committed to aid being 
delivered through the budget. 
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Chapter 7: Motives 
7.1 Introduction 
In a standard agency relationship, the principal uses incentives to guide or to motivate 
the agent's actions towards agreed desired outcomes. In such a relationship, both 
parties have independent objective functions and each one acts so as to maximise 
their expected utility. In order for the principal to deal with the incentive compatibility 
constraint (incentives are needed not only for the agent to choose the employment but 
also to advance the principal's interests within that employment), it is important to 
identify and understand objective functions. 
The understanding of objective functions helps to predict people's behaviour within 
and across organisations. In turn these additional insights can throw some light onto 
the design of appropriate incentive schemes or refining of existing ones so as to avoid 
perverse incentives. Ultimately this should equip DPs as principals to achieve certain 
desired policy outcomes, for instance the MDGs or strengthened health systems. 
Economic theory assumes that in the face of constraints, individuals maximise their 
utility functions which contain a number of arguments e. g. salary, safety, power, 
recognition etc. (McPake et al., 2002). The measurement of these arguments could 
throw light onto one's objective function, but with the exception of salaries, these 
arguments are difficult to assess. Erus and Weisbrod (2002), when researching 
objective functions in non-profit and for-profit organisations, opted to study the 
expressions of objective functions in employee compensation structures. A similar 
strategy of identifying a proxy for the expression of objective functions of DPs and 
RGs is needed which captures the subtle differences. 
In this chapter, I study the objective functions of individuals within organisations (DPs 
and Government). But also the aggregated effect of those motives that make up the 
goals of the organisations they belong to and how that affects the relationship 
between principals (DPs) and the agent (Government). In applying Zinnes and 
Bolaky's framework (2002), 1 focus here on the micro and meso levels. To this end, 
have interviewed staff in both Government and DP agencies to find out about their 
motivations as well as their career objectives as a proxy to analyse their objective 
functions. There was also an attempt to better understand individuals' utility functions 
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by not solely relying on interview data but by also observing the behaviours of 
individuals and their actions within their organisational environment (to the extent 
possible in open access meetings and through access to documents reflecting the 
organisation's behaviour). 
There are shortcomings with this approach. While it is important to understand one's 
utility function in full, respondents may not have fully disclosed their true motives. In 
addition, all elements of individual objective functions may not be observable to 
outsiders (McPake et al., 2002). To minimise some of these problems I asked 
interviewees about their perceptions of the goals of the other parties (e. g. Government 
officials were asked about what they thought the goals of Development Partners 
were). Moreover, some of the interviews used in this chapter were with key informants 
who reported on their perceptions, as third parties, of the motivations of 
Government/DPs. Although some key informants were part of either one or the other 
organisational group, some other key informants were not staff of any of these (e. g. 
external consultants). 
A caveat here is that the group of people interviewed tended to be individuals more 
closely linked to the SWAp and GBS as opposed to projects. This is because there 
was greater access to them through the meetings such as JRMs and HPAC, in 
contrast to project management and evaluation meetings. This may have biased the 
account of individuals' motives and organisational goals presented in this chapter. 
Table 7.1 shows the number of interviewees (for this chapter) according to their 
categories within this research. 
Table 7.1: Interviewee categories for this chapter 
Government Development Partner"' Key Informants 
Non disease Disease GBS/SWAp Project/SWAp Other 
specific specific 
Number of programme programme 
respondents 7 2 5 5 5 
In order to better understand individual and organisational objective functions I 
compared and contrasted stated and revealed motives and related conflicting 
objective functions. While individual objective functions were assessed primarily by 
87 Distinction between GBS/SWAp and project supporting donors reflects main channel of aid used by 
the agencies, but there was some overlap as to the channels of aid used by various donors. In addition, 
in spite of channelling the bulk of their funding through projects, a donor could still be involved in the 
SWAp process. 
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considering their stated motives, the examination of organisational objective functions 
relied on investigating motives as these were revealed through the behaviours of 
principals (DPs) and the agent (Government) whose actions I was able to observe. To 
a large extent, illustrations of actions presented here were used in the previous results 
chapters. 
7.2 Stated motives 
This section focuses on the motives of Government and of DPs, as stated by the 
parties (based mainly on interview data). It covers individual (including career 
development goals) and organisational motives. 
7.2.1 Individual motives of Government officials 
A major factor that was claimed to motivate Government officials was the willingness 
to contribute to health systems development. Individuals said they were motivated 'to 
make a difference'. More specifically they emphasised they would like to work towards 
health sector reforms, the SWAp, improving quality of care and supporting districts. 
The latter was reflected, for example, in this quote: 
i mean you go to a health unit and you find people [queuing] the whole day, 
staff not bothered, infection control is poor. Yet they have the equipments. But 
if you sit down and say colleagues, the resources we have here, the drugs we 
have can provide better services than this and you assist them; the next time 
you come you find a big improvement, you feel great. (Government official) 
Disease-specific areas (e. g. HIV/AIDS or malaria) were not alluded to among the 
motives of individual Government officials. An exception was a reference to women's 
health as a particular motivation for one interviewee. However, this could have been 
biased by the group of interviewees who were to a large extent not linked to disease- 
specific programmes in the MoH. 
Visibility of successful reforms or programme outputs and related recognition for 
Uganda due to such achievements were also mentioned as part of people's motives. 
This was related to individuals' roles in such successes being appreciated/valued. 
Being associated with these successful programmes was seen as potentially 
rewarding for staff, for example, when pursuing an international career (e. g. a job at 
WHO) or being invited to overseas conferences, or receiving consultancy 
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assignments. In addition, Uganda's visibility allowed staff to share their 
experiences/expertise with other countries as, for example, when serving on the board 
of international organisations. 
Some individuals (both at technical level and at top and senior management levels) 
claimed to be motivated by the greater control over resources allowed by projects. 
These resources were related to elements that enabled the implementation of 
activities and facilitated their work, such as vehicles, fuel, computers, telephones, and 
support staff. They were seen as motivating factors in view of poor conditions and low 
pay in Government. Some key informants noted that individuals from technical 
programmes were more likely to be driven by project resources and the associated 
status they might offer. 
Motivation is being given to me in office like being given facilities, now I have a 
phone, a direct phone, I have somebody who can help me, / have a secretarial 
staff, I have the support staff, fuel and a vehicle to move and do our work. 
(Government official) 
There was also a perception among some donors that certain individuals in 
Government, both at the political and technical levels, were more closely driven by 
financial benefits in the form of corruption. The implication was that these individuals 
might extract gains through the aid contract (a particular concern expressed by DPs in 
relation to funds being channelled through the Government budget). For instance: 
Some top people are not right, they are the `old boys network' and take wrong 
political decisions and are self-interested, corruption you know, and some 
technical people are `bad guys' as well. (DP representative) 
These concerns reflect newspaper reports of corruption both at higher and lower 
levels of Government. Suspected cases include: an instance of bribery in the amount 
of Shs 170 million involving the State Minister for Gender and Culture (The Monitor, 
2004a); and the disappearance of Shs 2.8 billion from the coffers of Mayuge district 
(The New Vision, 2004). 
A range of career development goals were reported. For instance, some people were 
happy to continue doing their jobs at the national level. As expressed by one 
Government official: "My goal is to stay at the Ministry of Health and help my people". 
In line with the commitment to make a difference and contribute towards their society 
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and Government, some said that in spite of opportunities to work abroad, they 
preferred to continue working for the Ministry. 
i have been approached several times, but I had that commitment for my 
country because at that time when we were in the middle of fighting this 
epidemic, it did not matter to us really the good jobs and good money, what we 
wanted was really to fight this epidemic and see how we can rescue our 
country out of it. Otherwise most of my colleagues in other countries who were 
programme managers are now working with UNAIDS. (Government official]) 
Others noted they would like to gain experience elsewhere and this included working 
with an international organisation. Although not mentioned explicitly, informal 
discussions hinted that reasons for being interested in working with an international 
organisation were associated with prestige/status, better salaries and resources within 
the working environment. No one demonstrated interest in working at the 
implementation level (districts or health facilities). 
Many individuals said they were pursuing opportunities for further training (including at 
academic level, e. g. PhD) and/or the possibility of combining some involvement in 
research. 
1... publish and contribute to a deeper understanding of our daily health 
situation -/ have so far had several publications. (Government official) 
Some expressed a combination of the above goals, as illustrated by the quote below: 
I would like to see my professional career develop, do some further training, 
be promoted, gain more experience, and land myself in an international 
position. 
(Government official) 
7.2.2 Individual motives of development partners 
Similar to the motives of Government officials, individuals working for development 
partner agencies expressed their willingness to `make a difference', to work towards 
improvements in the sector. They felt motivated to help the Government to achieve its 
plans. They were generally interested in development issues, in Africa but also in 
Uganda as. a country. More specifically they conveyed their commitment to poverty 
reduction, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. These motivations were more strongly 
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emphasised by those working in the larger bilateral development agencies in the 
country, i. e. USAID and DFID. For instance, 
DFID has a strong reputation as the most motivated and committed 
government department in Britain. People work for it because they want to, not 
because that's the government department they've been assigned to... I care 
about what happens in this country, with the people in this country, and having 
an opportunity to do something about some of the problems is a motivating 
factor to me. (DP Representative) 
Other motivating factors for DP representatives included the independent nature of 
their work as it allowed them to take initiatives and have some control over aid 
delivered. Further elements were the possibility of having management control, power 
and seeing their particular role recognised. These motives seem comparable to those 
of Government individuals who described some of their motivations as related to. the 
rewards they could extract from being associated with successful programmes; but 
also implicit is the link to the control of resources as allowed by projects in contrast to 
sector and general budget support. 
Some individuals noted it was motivating to be part of the decision-making process of 
government. They appreciated the scope they had to influence and change policy. For 
instance, one individual mentioned that she was responsible for including a specific 
monitoring indicator (CYPs) in the area of reproductive health as part of the list of 
indicators of HSSP. 
Donor coordination and improvements in their relationship with the Government 
played a role in motivating a number of individuals. They felt it was very motivating to 
be working in an environment where donor coordination was so advanced as 
compared to some other countries. The way some donor representatives expressed 
their motivation towards aid coordination differed slightly from individuals within 
Government. Government individuals felt motivated by the SWAp process as a whole 
and its goal of contributing to overall improvements in health systems performance 
(e. g. improved efficiency, reduced transaction costs). DP representatives, on the other 
hand, seemed to be more motivated by the actual process of donor coordination and 
its less bureaucratic nature compared to previous ways of engagement between 
donors and with the Government. 
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In terms of career development goals, the majority of respondents intended to 
continue working in the area of development aid. They would like to gain further 
experience in different countries which would allow them the opportunity of learning 
different cultures and languages. Further studies were also among the career plans of 
some individuals - as was the case for individuals within Government. 
A few mentioned their objective of moving their area of work from more technical 
issues towards general health systems. In addition, some other individuals who 
expressed intentions to stay in their organisations aimed at progressing within the 
hierarchy and becoming directors for example. Some others noted interest in working 
in a different development agency. This was particularly the case of individuals 
working for bilateral agencies who would like to move to a multilateral one. 
7.2.3 Organisational goals of Government 
As reported by interviewees, major Government organisational goals were said to 
include poverty alleviation, development of the sector - in terms of improved 
performance and quality of service delivery - and reduction of morbidity and mortality. 
These goals were also expressed in key Government plans such as the PEAP and 
HSSP. Donors' perception of Government goals were in line with the above. They 
emphasised the objectives of the MoH as being centred on overall improvement of 
health outcomes (including rehabilitating the infrastructure) and not just a focus on 
'quick fixes'. One DP representative mentioned that "they (the Government) have 
some good technical people and some good political leadership working towards this". 
In order to reach these goals, some respondents noted that there was a need for 
resources which were often linked to the overall funding gap of government and the 
need to pursue donor aid as a means to close this gap. One Government official for 
instance said: "The Government's goal is to improve the health status of the 
population through HSSP and NHP and related targets and seek support from donors 
to achieve so. " 
Another goal of the Government as an organisation was claimed to be the SWAp, 
which was perceived as a means to attain improvements in health system 
performance. In line with the SWAp principles, Government objectives included the 
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pursuit of control and ownership so that it could articulate its own policies, bearing in 
mind the need to negotiate and reach consensus with other stakeholders. 
In line with the SWAp and aid coordination reforms, the Government also had the aim 
of improving its relationship with donors. Improvements were said by various 
interviewees to be attempted through making aid delivery more efficient (reducing 
transaction costs, enhancing harmonisation of donor practices) and effective 
(increasing transparency, developing further donor coordination and alignment 
towards Uganda's priorities, i. e. to follow the HSSP and channel aid through the 
budget). For example, a government representative mentioned that the Government 
expected to "coordinate development partners in order to achieve its objective of 
reducing maternal mortality and increasing contraceptive prevalence in view of 
different donors supporting Government in different ways, like USAID which does not 
cover certain areas so need to assure other donors do". 
A further Government goal reported by some interviewees was in the area of human 
resources. The key objectives were to increase the numbers of health workers and 
their motivation. This was seen as an area where there was lack of alignment with the 
goals of development partners. The Government felt it had to devote greater efforts to 
this area in order to fill the gap left by donors who it perceived to concentrate their 
investments on infrastructure and equipment. 
7.2.4 Organisational goals of Development Partners88 
Responses by DP representatives varied from those referring to the broad goals of 
poverty reduction, economic development and the provision of humanitarian aid, to 
more specific ones such as the long-term development of health systems and 
improvement of health outcomes. These motives reflected those of Government as 
formulated in its plans, e. g. PEAP and HSSP. However, the goal of contributing 
towards the long-term development of health systems could be seen as being in 
contrast to the response of various individual representatives from donor agencies 
when saying they were motivated to obtain experience in different countries and learn 
different cultures, making their stay in each country relatively short. Yet, as an 
individual, one can attempt to contribute towards long-term impact despite being in the 
country for a short period. Perhaps of greater relevance is the extent to which they 
88 At country level (does not include the goals of headquarters). 
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have a stake as individuals in Uganda's development and want to see credits for their 
achievements during their stay in the country. 
Some donors, such as USAID, outlined their goals in relation to more precise areas of 
interest such as HIV/AIDS (including the achievement of targets in this area as 
2/7/1089), RH, TB, malaria, population and child survival, and to a lesser extent some 
work in cross-cutting issues. 
Donors like DFID and Italian Cooperation expressed their motives in terms of overall 
and long-term health systems development and partnerships strengthening, i. e. 
discontinuing of vertical projects (seen as associated with short-term gains), adoption 
of aid harmonisation practices, SWAp, GBS, greater government ownership and 
leadership, and the achievement of the MDGs. 
While it was said that aid had become more humanitarian over the years after a 
number of agencies untied their aid, which focused in the past on opening up markets 
for their economies, perception of commercial interests seemed to persist, as 
reflected through the responses of some interviewees. These were often linked to 
political / geopolitical goals. 
For instance, the pursuit of economic and political interests when providing aid is 
explicitly recognised by the US, which considers it a conduit to the improvement of its 
foreign relations. 
U. S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering 
America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets 
while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world. (USAID, 2006) 
The driving motive behind the PEPFAR grant to Uganda was often referred to by 
various interviewees as being linked to the country's support for the invasion of Iraq 
by the US Government. 
Further, some respondents noted that aid was driven by the commercial interests of 
those countries that have, for example, a big pharmaceutical sector and those that 
employ aid as a mechanism to promote employment for their own country experts. For 
89 Two million people on treatment, seven million infections averted and ten million people cared for, 
including orphans and vulnerable children. 
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example, a key informant (KI - 3, other) said, "it is about how much they themselves 
can get out of if'. 
As observed during field work, various donors had been supporting the capacity of the 
MoH through the provision of short- and long-term technical assistants. For instance, 
DFID, Danida, Sida and, on a smaller scale, Italian Cooperation funded international 
advisors who were based within the MoH. While on the one hand there is the 
argument that donors 'use' aid to the benefit of their country experts, on the other 
hand there is still a lack of skilled human resource capacity in various departments in 
the MoH as senior technical personnel in the Ministry appeared to be considerably 
over-stretched. 
Other political motives reported by a few interviewees included strategic alliances 
between organisations. For example, in view of its limited resources, WHO attempted 
to make use of opportunities such as to allocate some funds into an activity or project 
of another organisation so as to become associated with it. This was said to have 
taken place in the case of the World Bank MAP project and HIV/AIDS activities. 
Further examples of donors pursuing the advancement of domestic interests ranged 
from externalities to influence over past colonies. In relation to the former, a 
Government respondent noted, "they provide aid to control diseases like TB and 
HIV/AIDS in developing country so that it does not reach their doors". This could thus 
be associated with DPs interest in funding (infectious) disease-specific programmes. 
With respect to the latter, DFID and Italian Cooperation were said to be motivated to 
provide aid to Uganda due to historical ties: in the case of DFID, because Uganda had 
been a UK protectorate in the past; and for Italian Cooperation, its aid was linked to 
the commitment of supporting their missionaries (established in Uganda for a long 
period). The perception of some Government officials was that donors felt they would 
like to keep having control over their past colonies, "they can't just let it go". 
International commitments and a sense of obligation to provide aid, as donors are 
under peer pressure to do so, appeared to be seen by some interviewees as 
additional motives. For instance, the target of contributing 0.7% of a donor country's 
GDP towards development aid was mentioned by some DP representatives. 
A distinction made amongst donor motivations was between 'big and powerful' donor 
countries and smaller donors. As put by a key informant (KI - 1, Government official): 
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"Because they (Scandinavian countries) have smaller countries you find that they 
don't have big political ambitions against the [recipient] nation, you find that their aid 
tends to try and really fit in the country needs much more than some of the other big 
countries which have an ego problem". However, when assessing the responses of 
individuals from the so-called 'big, powerful' donor countries, the emerging pattern 
was of strong commitment towards goals such as improving health system 
performance and reducing poverty. In addition there is also a distinction to be made 
within the group of 'big, powerful' donor countries. For instance, while USAID goals 
were more focused on disease-specific programmes, DFID's motives concentrated on 
health systems improvements and aid harmonisation. 
7.3 Revealed motives 
In trying to further understand the motives of those involved in the aid contract in 
Uganda, the behaviours of the parties were contrasted with the claims made in the 
sections above. 
7.3.1 Government motivated towards health system goals? 
Various examples are presented below where the behaviour of Government seemed 
to contrast with the claimed motive of pursuing the further development of the health 
sector. 
There was limited Government commitment towards governance (accountability and 
transparency), as presented in chapter 6. Illustrations of this included Uganda's 
ranking in the Transparency International index as one of the most corrupt countries in 
the world; the decreasing levels of political commitment prior to the 2006 election; the 
lack of independence of the Inspector General of Government; rumours of corruption 
problems with procurement in general and with certain projects like the Early 
Childhood Project; and the health sector budget cut due to increases needed for 
defence and public administration (election process) expenditures. 
There were problems of poor management, lack of transparency in relation to the 
health sector budget and decreasing commitment within the sector (particularly at the 
MoH). More specifically, also as presented in chapter 6, there were: problems of 
accountability with the tracking study of Programme 9; problems / weaknesses with 
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the budget process and the SWG; and the vague formulation of undertakings plus the 
failure to achieve them in full on a regular basis. 
Further illustrations outlined in chapter 5 concerned the limited commitment towards 
improving the existing system of performance monitoring: e. g. the performance 
problems of the RC, the QAD, and the Supervision and Monitoring WG. 
An additional example involved Government staff not attending key health planning 
and review meetings including SWAp-related ones, or attending for reasons other 
than those intended. Illustrations of this were provided in chapters 5 and 6: 
representatives of very few technical programmes attending the meetings of the WG 
on monitoring and supervision during the preparations for HSSP2; and top and senior 
management in the MoH not participating in JRM district visits. Further, regarding the 
reason as to why some technical programme staff decided to take part at NHAs and 
JRMs, this was said to be because: 
People come to have free lunches and when it does not clash with any 
consultancy work they are doing (KI - 3, other). 
7.3.2 DPs motivated towards aid effectiveness (aid harmonisation and 
alignment with a view to contributing to health systems development)? 
Similar to the above section where contradictions between claimed motives and the 
actual behaviour of Government were presented, here a number of examples are 
provided in relation to the behaviour of DPs vis-ä-vis their claimed motives in relation 
to aid effectiveness (in terms of aid harmonisation and alignment with a view to 
contributing to health systems development). 
Lack of donor expenditure information and unpredictability of aid flows 
Government officials continued to struggle when attempting to obtain expenditure 
information on the contributions of donors within the country. A related problem was 
the unpredictability of aid flows (both the amount to be released and delays in planned 
releases) by DPs. These issues hindered more effective coordination, planning and 
budgeting by the Government. Ultimately this could have an influence on the overall 
goal of reducing, poverty in the country which was one of the claimed motives of DPs. 
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Problems of transparency with project funding of donors vis-ä-vis Government was 
seen as having improved (KI - 2, Development Partner) but a number of donors still 
persisted in not declaring their budgets or doing so in an incomplete way. For 
instance, the MoH, when carrying out a National Health Accounts survey, described 
the process of obtaining expenditure data from donors as one of the most challenging 
aspects of the survey (MoH, 2004d). Similarly, when the MoH attempted to carry out a 
survey on donor expenditure to the health sector, it received information from only 
50% of DPs active in the sector (MoH, 2004c)90. Various attempts were made by 
Government-officials during the HPAC meetings preceding the AHSPR to get DPs to 
provide the requested information, but Government information on donor expenditure 
was still patchy and unreliable (notes from observation of HPAC meetings and KI -1, 
Government official). 
As for likely reasons as to why DPs seemed to defy requests by the Government to 
share their expenditure information, a key informant (KI - 1, Government official) said: 
/ think it is a mixture of two things, one is that it's tedious to look up to this kind 
of information, but I mean they also make us do a few tedious things so it's not 
a big deal. But possibly it's a matter of hiding information. This second one is 
just a guess. I think in some cases their expenditure figures are not so good as 
they would want or they've made us believe. The fact is that donor projects 
often times or in most cases actually spend much more on things which are 
not the main focus of HSSP. 
Regarding the problem of unpredictability of aid flows, while bilateral and multilateral 
agreements provide the overall amount DPs intend to provide as aid to the 
Government, uncertainties in the yearly schedules of donor contributions disrupt the 
planning and disbursement of budgetary funds by the Government (particularly in the 
case of general budget support). 
At the beginning of the year they will tell you we are giving you $100 million but 
in the year's course, part of it comes, part of it doesn't come at all, part of it 
comes late, which makes it difficult to plan and execute programs as agreed. 
(Government Official) 
90 However, the information reported in the AHSPR for Ireland Aid was not accurate. This raised a 
discussion during the 2004 JRM (notes from observation of meeting) about how donors like Ireland Aid 
felt it was discouraging to go through the long process of providing detailed information to Government 
which later was misrepresented in the report. 
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There was variation among DPs as some were said to prepare agreements with more 
detailed information and to continue providing updated information on yearly forecasts 
of disbursements more than others (KI - 1, Government official). Delays in 
disbursements to Government might have occurred due to administrative problems 
internal to the development agency (MoFPED, 2003a). Reductions in aid contribution 
have also been linked to other priorities for the donor country. 
Uganda is not one of [our] priority countries... when for example the war in Iraq 
happened; we had to follow the American politics and had to take the money 
from somewhere. So there were budget cuts in our own ex-colonies and other 
countries which are not so important. (DP representative) 
Political and commercial motives 
Examples of political and commercial motives, as presented in section 6.4.1 (chapter 
6), include: Uganda's receiving of PEPFAR funding for its support to the invasion of 
Iraq; the increased UK aid budget and related incentives to disburse it associated with 
political pressures in both international and domestic environments around greater 
commitment to aid and development. The latter was potentially related to the choice of 
GBS as a preferred aid modality as aid would be absorbed more easily given scope 
for less transaction costs for donors (e. g. no need of a project management unit) and 
not just for recipient governments. 
A further example referred to the US Government pursuing commercial interests and 
SWAp/GBS donors allowing Government budget funds to be potentially used in a less 
efficient and transparent way. The April 2004 HPAC meeting discussed the TORs for 
a consultancy on how to improve Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), 
which should include disease surveillance, continuing education, and tele-medicine. A 
number of companies or institutions had expressed interest in supporting the 
development of the new system. These were: Rocky Mountain Technology Group (an 
American company), Gates Foundation, and Johns Hopkins (notes from HPAC 
meeting, April 2004). Some DPs suggested the MoH might want to consider two 
institutions that would provide advice and support free of charge: ePollNet (part of the 
UN system), and the International Institute for Communication and Development 
which was funded by various DPs' (e. g. DFID, DANIDA, CIDA etc. ) (notes from HPAC 
meeting, April 2004). But it was noted that the office of the Permanent Secretary had 
already requested the US embassy for support from the Rocky Mountain Technology 
Group (notes from HPAC meeting, April 2004). This was said during the meeting to 
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have taken place after high level pressure in the form of various letters from U. S. 
Congressmen were sent to the office of the Permanent Secretary91. 
The above seemed to highlight SWAp/GBS donors' weak pressure on the US 
Government as it pursued commercial interests and on the Ugandan Government for 
accepting a deal that was not in the country's best interests. This begs the question as 
to why SWAp/GBS donors allowed such a deal, accepting that pooled resources were 
used this way. This may be because SWAP/GBS donors prioritised their own 
geopolitical interests and felt they could not put diplomatic pressure on the US 
government for fear of being confrontational about an issue that could be seen as 
petty in view of larger interests with the US Government. Another question would be 
whether the GoU or some individuals in the Government accepted the deal because 
they would potentially benefit directly from the deal. 
Lack of alignment of donor projects towards the country's priorities and policies 
Lack of alignment of donor project expenditures with the national priorities in Uganda 
was another area where DPs behaviour differed from their claims of contributing 
towards poverty reduction and long term development of health systems. 
For example, data assembled by the MoH on selected projects show that donor 
projects spend 68% of their resources on budget items that are not directly in line with 
the priorities of the Strategic Health Plan (MoH, 2003c). Figure 7.1 below gives a 
breakdown of project expenditure on key inputs for the financing of the HSSP using a 
sample of donor projects funded by 5 different development partners. Expenditures 
falling under the categories of infrastructure, drugs and supplies, and human 
resources were considered by the Government the main expenditures required to 
fund HSSP. Expenditures falling under the category of other inputs (amounting to the 
68% of expenditures mentioned above) comprised mainly project overheads and 
technical assistance which were not part of the costing groups of HSSP undertaken 
by the Government (KIs -1 and 4, Government official and other). In regard to the 
allocation of funds to technical assistance, it seemed that a number of DPs saw it as 
necessary while the Government disagreed and saw other elements as more 
91 It is though not very clear whether the contract was awarded to Rocky Mountain Technology Group as 
no access to such a document was made possible. In searching through the World Wide Web it was 
found that a US Congressman had links with the Rocky Mountain Technology Group (would like to invite 
its CEO to explain to other fellow Congressmen how it can contribute to ways of developing public-private 
partnerships to support the development of ICT in low income countries) (Rehberg, 2006). The Rocky 
Mountain Technology Group produced software that was to be used by more than 300 Ugandan 
hospitals and clinics (ibid. ). 
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important for funding. On the other hand it appeared that the Government was more 
willing to accept technical assistance when it was not handling the budget allocated 
for it. This was said to be the case with a USAID health systems project proposal. The 
proposal was rejected by the Government on the grounds that the proportion of funds 
allocated to technical assistance was too high. However, as noted by a DP 
representative, the Government later made a number of requests for technical 
assistance support which it was difficult for USAID to respond to in view of the lack of 
earmarked funds for this. 
Figure 7.1: Donor project expenditure break down 
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Source: Adapted from Figure 3.5 (MoH, 2003c). 
Another example is PEPFAR. This project also had activities that were not in line with 
HSSP, e. g. provision of Anti-Retrovirals which was not part of the basic package as 
established by the strategic plan (various KIs and notes from observation of 
meetings). During the 2004 JRM it was mentioned that the targets set by the US 
Government were not chosen in consultation with local Government partners. These 
included: 60,000 people on treatment; 165,000 infections averted; 300,000 HIV 
infected and orphans receiving care (notes from presentation to update on PEPFAR 
for HDPGroup May 2004). In addition, in contrast to the proviso in the MöU between 
Uganda and Health Development Partners that "as provided in the Constitution of 
Uganda, ensure that other marginalized groups of society such as the poor, the 
displaced and the disabled are specifically addressed" (GoU, 2000), PEPFAR 
presentations (notes from observation of meetings) did not seem to outline a clear 
strategy on how it would reach these particular groups. It did not explicitly mention a 
focus on the poor, only on orphans. A common critique made in various meetings of 
health sector stakeholders (notes from observation of these meetings) was that the 
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agencies implementing PEPFAR projects were reaching their targets by focusing on 
'easy to reach' population groups such as health workers, teachers, police officers in 
large urban areas as opposed to the poor and vulnerable in rural parts of the country. 
Yet, donors like DFID, which often emphasise in their policy documents and strategies 
the need to prioritise the poor and vulnerable (DFID, 1997; 2000; 2006), did not tend 
to add any points to such discussions. It also tended to be the case, that Ugandan 
participants were the ones raising the problem. 
Some of the key problems highlighted in relation to the GFATM and other GHIs in 
Uganda, as per discussions of the health systems WG92 during the 2004 JRM (notes 
from observation of this meeting) for example, included how they were outside the 
SWAp framework through: 
a) The creation of parallel systems of management as opposed to having the funds 
integrated into the SWAp (earmarked within the health sector budget), thus the 
GFATM in Uganda opted for a separate project management unit. They also 
created their own monitoring tools instead of using the JRMs. In addition, they 
used a parallel system for procurement, although the GFATM guidelines had 
provision for the use of a common working arrangement. 
b) Conditionalities of additionality. The GFATM funds were considered as additional 
to the existing resources in the sector, but this was against the MoFPED policy of 
macroeconomic budget ceilings and project funding falling within the established 
ceilings. 
Large-scale donor projects and/or GHIs were also subject to criticisms because of 
their detrimental effects on the health system, particularly with respect to human 
resources (which constituted one of the key goals for improvement by the 
Government). Often mentioned (by various Kis and government officials) were 
problems related to the higher salaries they offer for staff joining their projects. There 
was also the availability of equipment and vehicles as well as per diems which acted 
as perks to attract staff within Government. The pressure exercised on Government 
units/staff by DPs was reported to be higher towards the end of the year as donors 
needed to disburse their allocated budgets. 
Donors override partnership principles, they go behind doors and approach 
units and divisions for project aid, lure government units with perks as 
computers, TA, vehicles, specially at the end of financial year, when they are 
under pressure to disburse their yearly budgets. (Government official) 
92 Members included Director General, Director of Health Services Planning, SIDA, DANIDA, and DFID. 
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GHIs seemed to have affected not only Government units directly but also other 
organisations within the sector. The PNFP sector (which receives financial subsidy 
and seconded health workers from the Government) appeared to be undermined as 
its best qualified human resources were leaving to join recipients of PEPFAR funds 
like TASO and Mildmay (notes of HPAC and JRM meetings). For instance, TASO 
received 300 applications for clinical positions advertised. Salaries paid by TASO 
were reported to be 3 times that paid by the PNFP (notes of donor coordination 
meeting at TASO). The view of TASO and UPHOLD (another recipient of PEPFAR 
funds) was that: 
We are not poaching staff, applicants are not from Government units. But on 
the other hand, it's a free world. (Taso Representative) 
7.4 Inter- and intra-organisational conflicting objective functions 
In this section, I analyse conflicting objective functions between the parties. These are 
additional to the differences in motives claimed versus those revealed which were 
presented in the first part of the chapter. The discrepancies in objective functions were 
not only taking place between organisations but also within Government and DP 
agencies. While there should be a certain level of alignment between the objective 
functions of individuals with the goals of the organisation they belong to, different 
people within organisations are also likely to be more strongly motivated by different 
things creating intra-organisational conflicting objective functions. This will ultimately 
affect the way the parties interact and influence the outcome of desired policy goals. 
The section also covers difficulties in relation to dealing with such conflicting objective 
functions. 
In addition to the problems of conflicting objective functions between Government and 
donors, the lack of alignment of donors with the sector plans generated 
disagreements within Government. A key informant (KI - 2, DP representative) 
pointed out that in a conflict between -a DP and the Government, the latter is not a 
single entity. It is formed by various parts and individuals, with different interests and 
holding differing powers. For instance, in the case of PEPFAR: 
If the president has said yes, then [a senior health sector official] saying hang 
on, not like that, isn't going to get us anywhere, he can't even be confident that 
his ministers are saying the same thing as him. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
208 
Illustrative of the problems of differing motives within Government and between 
Government and different DPs was the case of applications to the GFATM round four. 
The Government was criticised by some donors (those providing GBS and sector 
support) for applying to the GFATM, yet when donors were consulted by the 
Government on whether the MoH should apply at the time of round four (notes from 
HPAC meeting, January 2004), there was general agreement. This also begged the 
question as to the extent of commitment from Government officials (within the MoH) 
involved in the application processes towards their own Government policies and 
principles, given the rule by the MoFPED that new project funding would be offset 
from GBS thus not leading to de facto increased overall funding for the sector. 
It was at times argued (by some Kis -3 and 5, others) that the technical programmes 
were the ones seeking or accepting project funding (including from the GFATM), but 
the lack of adherence towards the use of the budget system was also claimed to be 
no longer uniform among top management and commissioners. One key informant (KI 
- 1, Government official) said: some of the new people seem not to value the 
partnership to the same extent, like the likely successor (to a senior health sector 
official). The support basis for the SWAp principles and structures was said to be very 
narrow - essentially two senior officials at the top level and some technical staff were 
reported to remain committed (KI - 5, other). But even those officials' commitment 
was not consistent as shown by the decision of the MoH to apply to all rounds of 
funding of the GFATM. 
Another potential explanation was that instead of a commitment problem on the side 
of senior health sector officials, they might have been under political pressure 
exercised at a higher level which would be in line with the goals being pursued by the 
technical programmes. Within the structure of the MoH in Uganda there were two 
directorates, and the technical programmes fell under the Directorate of Clinical and 
Community Services. The other Directorate - of Planning and Development - was in 
charge of coordinating cross-cutting inputs and balancing out all the requirements. 
The Directorate of Clinical and Community Services was said to follow a more vertical, 
disease-specific approach, often preferring the project mode (KI - 5, other). 
Consequently, there had been some level of tension between the two directorates. 
While at various points the top leadership within the MoH was said to have managed 
to balance the conflicts, this started to weaken in the face of political interference from 
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above. Furthermore, it was suggested that the political interference was linked to 
pressure exercised by the Global Fund outside Uganda (KI - 5, other). 
Another example reinforces the above problem of internal political pressures put on 
the top leadership of the MoH. In the SWG the alignment of technical level demands 
with the internal political level and the external agency led to non-priority projects 
being approved. This was said to be case with the ORET Dutch project which was a 
proposal to buy single-sourced imaging equipment (KI -1, Government official). The 
technical level was interested in the project and made internal demands through top 
management, while concomitantly the donor agency (in this case the Dutch 
Government) applied pressure at the political level outside the MoH which then 
demanded the internal structures of the Ministry to approve the project. 
A further conflict of objective functions within Government and between Government 
and DPs referred to the health sector budget cuts (due to increases in the budgets of 
defence and public administration). This was a priority for some parts of Government 
but the MoH did not agree with it. However, as discussed in chapter 6, the MoH at the 
time did not appear to be very engaged in trying to restore the sector budget. Yet, the 
MoFPED appeared to be put under considerable pressure from numerous sides (as 
various interests were at play93). These included also the political forces pushing for 
the increases in expenditures for defence and public administration. 
They [MoFPED] are in a very difficult position subject to political masters. 
There are many vested interests and those interests have power. (KI - 1, 
Government official) 
Concerning the goals of the MoFPED, while some goals of the Ministry were in line 
with those of the Government as a whole, such as poverty reduction and economic 
development, some were specific to their mandate and particular motivations. For 
instance, the macroeconomic stability of the country and control of resources was 
perceived by a number of interviewees as being among the prime objectives of the 
MoFPED. The resulting conflicting objective functions within Government as well as 
between Government and DPs seemed to hinder further rewards in the form of 
increased volumes of aid for the health sector, as noted in chapter 5. 
93 For example, the various sectors lobbying for increases of their share of the budget; DPs supporting 
sectoral allocations - particularly the poverty alleviating budget lines; and the MoFPED itself also driven 
by the goal of keeping the budget within the limits of revenues. 
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Overall the various stakeholders agreed that improved sectoral outputs and 
macroeconomic stability should be Government goals. However, as noted by a key 
informant (KI - 5, other), "the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health have 
ultimately the same interests but they put emphasis on different things". 
Health sector stakeholders argued with the MoFPED that producing more outputs 
would require greater investment in the sector, thus an augmentation of its budget. 
The Ministry of Finance wants the Ministry of Health to improve its indicators, 
to go to scale, but does not increase the health sector's resource envelope to 
match the scaling up, their goal is the macroeconomic stability. (Government 
official/ MoH) 
Difficulties in dealing with conflicting obiective functions 
There was a lack of authority and stewardship within Government (in particular at the 
higher echelons) towards technical programmes in delivering the UMHCP and 
adhering to the SWAp framework (notes from observations of meetings and Kls -3 
and 5, others). This was likely related to the problems noted above of external 
pressure exerted by development agencies at the political level and towards 
Government technical programmes (attracted by the power of project perks) 
combined with the perceived low level of commitment by top management (including 
commissioners)94. Hence some Government officials noted the need for wider 
internalization and ownership towards SWAp by DPs and other Government officials 
as a shared goal. These points are illustrated in this quote: 
If top management was seriously committed, projects would be refused, like 
with the previous group in power who had a vision for the sector. Like, for 
example, this project of MAP (World Bank). Our minister had refused it, he 
said if we agree to have all the planning through the SWAP process why are 
you now bringing the project again, but because it had been discussed before 
he came, he said ok let's leave it to go ahead but in future no more projects 
and we had succeeded. But when management changed, we had some 
loopholes... some development partners were interested in projects so when 
they have that small loophole in the ministry they take advantage of it. So the 
only way forward is to have a serious top management who can say no. 
(Government official) 
94 This cadre was seen to be detached from the routine management of the technical programmes, 
lacking knowledge of their activities and not showing ownership towards them (Kls). 
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Internalization and ownership towards the SWAp within Government seemed to have 
been one of the goals achieved by the previous leadership in the MoH. The previous 
minister (at the time of fieldwork) was said to have been able to motivate staff in the 
health sector towards Government goals as embodied in his vision, authority and 
charisma as a political leader. 
He was really engaged with the sector and he would get everybody [to] line up 
in one direction. (Government official) 
I have seen people listening to [the previous minister and some other senior 
health sector official's] ideas about health sector reforms until 9 o'clock at 
night. (KI - 2, DP representative) 
However, besides the problem of relying on key individuals (as opposed to strong 
institutions) who can play a major role in aligning motives within Government, 
changes in the motivations of donors have also played a role in regard to difficulties in 
aligning the goals of Government with those of development partners. The SWAp 
appeared to be a major objective of a larger number of development agencies during 
its introduction and first years of implementation in Uganda (between 2000 and 
2002/03). 
The range of individuals motivated by the SWAp made the realisation of the 
SWAp benefits easier... which was strengthened by the continuity of committed 
individuals in key donor agencies and posts... (KI - 4, other) 
This cohesion subsided towards 2003 onwards with the introduction of the large GHIs 
(e. g. PEPFAR and GFATM) which were more strongly driven by disease-specific 
goals. 
In 2001 the overall balance was towards integration and coordination and 2 
years further down the road and the arrival of alternatives in the form of the 
Global Fund and other projects has actually deepened the conflict and thrown 
that balance off... individuals have advantages and benefits to gain from 
that... people had learned something [to work in an integrated, coordinated 
mode] but .... now global funds deepen that [the conflicts] because they 
bring 
in so many possibilities. (KI - 5, other) 
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7.5 Summary of findings 
The findings in this chapter demonstrate that objective functions of individuals and 
organisations contained a range of arguments. 
At the individual level, Government officials stated that they were to a large extent 
driven by the willingness to: Contribute to health systems development (health sector 
reforms, SWAp, improving quality of care, and supporting districts); Be involved in 
successful reforms and or projects/outputs as these would be linked to greater 
visibility for Uganda - this was also associated with their contribution towards these 
successes being valued/recognised (possibility of career advancement: e. g. 
international jobs); and have greater control over project resources which enabled the 
implementation of activities and facilitated their work. 
As for development partner representatives, they claimed that their key motivations 
were to: Contribute towards development and poverty reduction; Contribute to 
improvements in the sector in line with Government plans; Be involved in specific 
areas such as HIV/AIDS and reproductive health; Take initiatives and have control 
over aid, and have their role recognised; Have influence over policy and 
changes/reforms; and Be involved in donor coordination and improvements in the 
relationship. 
Besides the motives of individuals, I also investigated individual's career objectives as 
proxies of their objective functions. I found that as part of the career objectives of 
individual Government officials, they wanted to continue to work for the Government 
at national level and contribute towards the country's development. Others preferred 
to seek a career within an international organisation. Some others intended to 
combine both objectives, continue to work for the Government but in the future to 
work internationally. 
The career objectives of individual DP representatives concentrated on continuing to 
work in development aid; to gain further experience in different countries (learn 
different cultures and languages); to move from working in technical areas to health 
systems; and to progress in their careers (be promoted to post like directors etc. ). 
The organisational goals of the agent (Government), included: poverty alleviation, 
development of sector (in terms of improved performance and quality of service 
delivery), reduction of morbidity and mortality; Aid as a means to close the 
Government's funding gap to achieve the above goals; the improvement of health 
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systems performance using SWAp to make aid more efficient (e. g. reducing 
transaction costs) and more effective (increasing transparency and developing further 
donor coordination and alignment towards the country's priorities, i. e. Government 
having greater control and ownership); and improvements in the area of human 
resources. 
To a certain extent principals (DP organisations) had similar goals to those of the 
agent, as poverty alleviation, economic development and humanitarian aid; long-term 
development of'health systems and improvement of health outcomes. However, the 
goals of all DPs were not always aligned to each other. While some were more 
interested in health systems and aid harmonisation, others had a stronger interest in 
disease-specific goals. The goals of some DPs also differed from those of the agent 
(the Government). These geopolitical / commercial goals (e. g. support for Iraq war 
through PEPFAR as a reward for Uganda's support; means to provide employment for 
their own country experts; externalities: control of infectious diseases; influence over 
past colonies; international commitments). 
When comparing motives as claimed by interviewees with those revealed through the 
observation of the behaviours of principals and the agent at the organisational level, I 
found that there was a less clear commitment / drive towards (a) health systems 
development by the agent, and (b) aid effectiveness (as translated by sector 
development and aid harmonisation) by principals, than asserted by the parties in the 
interviews. 
More specifically, instances of Government behaviour denoting divergence from their 
claims include: Limited level of commitment towards accountability and transparency 
(outside the health sector) (e. g. lack of independence of the Inspector General of 
Government and budget increases for defence expenditures); and problems of 
transparency, poor management and decreasing commitment within the sector (MoH) 
(e. g. problems in relation to the budget process and tracking study of Programme 9). 
As for DPs, examples of actions that contrasted with their stated goals were: Lack of 
donor expenditure information and unpredictability of aid flows; Pursuit of political and 
commercial goals (not being contested by donors that provide GBS/sector support 
and did not contest the use of Government budget funds being used to advance , 
commercial interests of other donors); Lack of alignment of donor projects towards the 
country's priorities and policies. 
214 
Agency theory presumes motives to be single dimensional allowing incentives to be 
t 
centred on financial rewards for example. However as the findings in this chapter 
showed, in the aid environment motives are multidimensional and at times conflicting 
within organizations which makes agency relationships not well defined. 
More specific examples of inter- and intra-organisational conflicting goals included: 
Between the MoH and MoFPED on increases of the health sector budget hindered by 
the macroeconomic ceilings (including conflicts with donors as well); and within the 
health sector in relation to GHIs [e. g. PEPFAR funds being negotiated at higher levels 
of Government, application to various rounds of the GFATM suggesting lack of 
commitment by Government officials involved in the process, and/or political pressure 
(by donors and by interested technical programmes) being exercised at a higher 
level]. 
The analysis in this chapter also showed that there were considerable difficulties in 
dealing with conflicting objective functions, these involved problems related to: 
- The lack of authority and stewardship at a high Government level towards 
technical programmes in ensuring adherence to Government priority goals and the 
SWAp framework, and counterbalancing the problems of political pressure and 
low levels of commitment towards the sectors' goals; 
- Reliance on key individuals within Government with leadership, vision and 
charisma as opposed to a strong institutional environment to align motives; 
- Changes in the motivations of donors: 
oA less coherent group of individuals and agencies were pursuing the 
SWAp and GBS agenda with the introduction of the large GHIs towards 
2003 onwards (with a stronger drive towards disease-specific goals). 
This multiplicity of objectives, often conflicting ones, created substantial problems for 
the understanding and prediction of the incentive structure operating within the 
different organisations in the aid environment. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this study was to better understand the (contractual) relationship 
between the recipient government - of Uganda - and development partners. More 
specifically the study sought to shed light on how the relationship between the parties 
was affected by the introduction of new modes of development assistance (SWAp and 
GBS). It did so by assessing these new aid modalities in relation to the motives of 
individuals and organisations involved in the aid contract; the incentive environment; 
monitoring structures; and the compensation scheme. 
In addition, the study aimed to assess the applicability of agency theory when applied 
to understand the aid environment. It was considered that by probing the nature of 
agency relationships in the Ugandan context, this would offer a means to better 
understand how new aid modalities changed underlying processes and shed light into 
behaviours observed. This chapter will provide some further analysis and discussion 
of the research findings and will throw some light on the extent to which the above 
aims have been achieved. 
The following section of this chapter discusses the main findings in the light of 
applicable agency theory concepts. Next is a reflection in relation to: agency theory as 
a conceptual framework in elucidating the behaviours observed in the Ugandan , 
context; and the study's design and methodological approach. 
8.2 Agency theory as a conceptual lens for this research 
Agency theory was helpful in elucidating various dimensions of this research. These 
were the incentive structure and observed behaviours, 'in terms of: 
- The monitoring environment (problems of information asymmetries and information 
problems such as moral hazard/hidden*action and effort); 
- The compensation scheme (the problem of a distorted penalties and rewards 
system); and 
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- The motives of the parties and related conflicting objective functions embedded in 
the aid contract, both individually and from an organisational point of view. 
8.2.1 Monitoring: information asymmetry, moral hazard, risk and uncertainty 
Information asymmetries and moral hazard 
The weaknesses of the M&E structures and processes reviewed (e. g. lack of human 
resources and lack of support to districts in relation to data analysis) as well as the 
shortcomings of the JRM process (the ways performance could be covered up in the 
reporting of undertakings, poor district visits system, and the lack of effective 
validation and verification systems) contributed to information asymmetries in the aid 
contract. 
The context in Uganda was such that principals (DPs) were able to observe to a 
certain extent actions, outcomes and effort of the agent, although effort of the agent 
was often a more difficult dimension to monitor. As put by Arrow (1985), effort of an 
agent is the most typical hidden action. An example was the lack of effort by the 
Government in relation to improving the monitoring structures/units within the MoH, as 
presented for instance in relation to the problems of the RC and the QAD. 
Government's lack of commitment seemed to be associated with the poor 
performance of these units. The lack of regular reporting by these different 
structures/units of the MoH (e. g. of the PHC Conditional Grants and quarterly reports) 
to the SWAp mechanisms (e. g. HPAC) highlighted the variation in the extent to which 
the necessary information on performance was being provided and the true 
information was being revealed by the agent (Government). 
Donors, the principals in this case, did not put pressure on Government to reveal 
information - although they asked for reports (through HPAC), they did not penalise 
Government for not presenting these. Hence, the agent lacked incentives to perform 
according to expectations. 
Why there was failure to monitor 
The above begs the, question as to why the Government was not improving M&E 
structures so that better information on performance could be revealed and 
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information asymmetries could be reduced. In addition it is also questionable as to 
why DPs as principals were not putting pressure on the Government so that poor 
performance of M&E could be exposed, particularly as M&E appeared to be getting 
worse (as exemplified by the problems towards 2003/2004). 
Government and DPs behaviours might have been related to: 
- The possibility that Government, by maintaining inefficiencies / weaknesses in the 
way M&E structures/units operated (e. g. RC and QAD department, Monitoring and 
Supervision WG), was deliberately attempting to cover up misconduct; or to use 
Williamson's terminology, the agent might have pursued its own interests and 
behaved with guile (Williamson, 1985). This is evidenced by the problems detected 
through the tracking study of Programme 9 that had not been exposed by the existing 
M&E system. When these problems were uncovered through the tracking study, the 
Government tried to hide the results from health sector stakeholders. 
- The fact that GHIs contributed to fragmentation of efforts to strengthen M&E 
mechanisms and seemed to have increased transaction costs for the Government as 
staff had to spend more time applying and managing the new funding sources. This is 
in line with the argument put forward by Lavergne (2002) that the fragmented nature 
of the delivery of aid through the project approach requires the use of already scarce 
resources. 
- Perverse incentives provided by some donor projects which some Government 
individuals took advantage of by shirking their duties. For example, some officers in 
the RH division did not carry out supervision / monitoring visits to districts - they 
preferred to attend project-funded workshops in districts or do consultancy work. This 
is not unusual - in The Gambia, training workshops funded by donor projects were 
used as an opportunity for staff to 'top up' their salaries, with negative effects on the 
staffing of health facilities (Conn et al., 1996). 
- The lack of a clear stake/ interest by any donor or group of donors in improving 
M&E. For instance, the earlier quote which indicated that donors felt scared by the 
poor management in the RC and, thus backed off from their offer to provide financial 
support to the Centre suggests that DPs were not strongly committed towards efforts 
to produce better data. Such behaviour seemed to have contributed to hindering more 
substantial progress in the area alongside Government's lack of engagement as well. 
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This is in contrast to improvements seen in drug management. The introduction of the 
push and pull system and the institutional support for the National Medical Stores 
(NMS) clearly benefited from the technical and financial support of one particular 
donor (DANIDA) which had a long-term commitment to the area (Nazerali et al., 
2006). 
- The lack of pressure from DPs on the Government to reduce information 
asymmetries, which indicates that by strengthening M&E, more performance 
problems would be revealed. This would lead to pressures to penalise the agent and 
could eventually affect the level of funds that donors would disburse, which would not 
be desirable if they are under pressure to spend. For example, GBS/SWAp donors 
who supported the creation of PAF, with the specific characteristic of protecting 
poverty alleviation activities, accepted erratic reporting of expenditures from the PHC 
Conditional Grants which is part of PAF. 
Risks and uncertainties 
Monitoring problems are exacerbated by risks and uncertainties that permeate the aid 
contract. Such factors compound the task of how best to determine penalties and 
rewards. These monitoring problems become more complex in an environment of 
information asymmetries. Information problems (information asymmetries, risks and 
uncertainties) may allow the agent to cover up performance problems (McPake et al., 
2002), particularly in areas where the effort of the agent is difficult to determine. 
According to MacDonald (1984), this is the case because the agent has no immediate 
reason to reveal relevant information about the expected contract's output to the 
principal, in line with the advancement of the agent's utility function. Producing health 
outcomes involves supply and demand side issues as well as contextual (including 
intersectoral) determinants. Illustrative of the above are some of the findings 
presented in relation to reproductive health / maternal health. 
Demand and supply issues may create information asymmetry, as may be the case 
when the supply side (i. e. action of the agent) is not working - related to health 
systems constraints. The agent then can hold the demand side or contextual factors 
(where more risks and uncertainties lie) responsible for the poor performance. An 
illustration could be that if staff are rude and influence the choice of mothers to deliver 
in a health facility, the agent could blame the demand side for such problems, e. g. 
cultural issues that hinder the uptake of maternity services. 
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The difficulty of how best to design a compensation scheme for the aid contract when 
the output produced by the agent (here taken as the MoH) is influenced by the agent's 
action, but not totally determined by it (Arrow, 1985), is illustrated by the intersectoral 
nature of interventions in the area of maternal health. The performance of other 
sectors under other line ministries, and also again demand side issues, played a role 
in the extent to which maternal health outcomes could be achieved. 
Further risks and uncertainties that might have impacted on the performance of 
maternal health outcomes include the contextual factors of poverty, insecurity, but 
also the political environment (which was going through various changes underlined 
earlier). In addition, the lack of technical understanding compounded the problem of 
uncertainty and would require that more research and investigations (Adam and 
Gunning, 2002) (e. g. tracking studies and improved systems of verifiability) are 
undertaken to better inform policy. This could throw some light, for example, on the 
issue of lack of demand for maternal services and potentially reduce uncertainties. 
In line with the need to improve verifiability, another possibility for dealing with 
uncertainty in the aid contract would be to use independent audits or measurement of 
performance (Adam and Gunning, 2002). This strategy would also help to reduce the 
agent's scope for data manipulation (Gunning, 2005; Barder and Birdsall, 2006). 
However, as shown by Starling et al. (2001), data can still be manipulated in spite of 
an audit system put in place by GAVI, as was the case in Tanzania and Mozambique. 
Also, donors would most likely give precedence to their political and commercial 
motives before responding effectively to the results of independent audits or 
evaluation (Martens et al., 2002). Moreover, the experience of aid conditionality has 
demonstrated the lack of donors credibility when it comes to penalties as they 
continued to disburse funds in spite of evidence that RGs had not met agreed targets 
or conditions (Lawson and Booth, 2004; Azfar, 2002). 
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8.2.2 Compensation scheme: failure to penalise and reward in the context of 
poor monitoring and reasons for the distorted penalty reward system 
Failure by DPs as principals to penalise and reward according to the explicit 
agreements of the aid contract 
The problem of information asymmetries discussed earlier hindered the ability of DPs 
as principals to assess performance effectively and potentially reward for 
improvements or penalise for lack of effort or underachievement of agreed targets. 
Performance assessment lacked quantitative or more objective measures of progress 
(as opposed to statements of 'progress satisfactory') which provided the agent with 
opportunities to avoid effort (e. g. undertakings being made easy to reach / vaguely 
worded95). The ineffectiveness of the performance assessment system, as shown in 
chapter 6, was further emphasised by the fact that non-achievement of undertakings 
did not translate into a declaration of unsatisfactory performance. A similar finding was 
identified in Uganda by Adam and Gunning (2002) during the education sector joint 
review in April 2001. They noted that because of their need to keep on disbursing 
funds, donors declared performance as satisfactory despite the failure by the 
Government to meet crucial undertakings. 
Failure by the principals to penalise the Government for poor performance (e. g. 
concealment of information on the tracking study of Programme 9; production of poor 
quality reports or erratic reporting; non-achievement of targets) took place in a context 
where, in spite of information asymmetries, principals were able to observe a range of 
instances of poor performance (action of the agent and lack of effort). The Ugandan 
context is particularly interesting because there was a lot of information sharing 
through the JRMs for example (as they allowed stakeholders to express their voice 
freely, e. g. at the district visits). 
An implication of the lack of penalties being applied by the principals was that the 
agent lacked incentives to perform better. This is related to the problem of credibility, 
which donors undermined by not penalising poor performance (Adam and Gunning, 
2002). Thus improvements in the area of RH/maternal health, for instance, continued 
to face a series of constraints. The behaviour of DPs (particularly the SWAp/GBS 
95 Adam and Gunning (2002) also noted the problem of very vague terms being used for outcomes to be 
achieved as part of the aid contract in Uganda. 
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donors) in relation to RH suggests that donors were more centred on the discourse of 
prioritising RH than in translating this into practice. An example was the negotiation 
between Government and DPs on undertakings for the areas of HIV/AIDS and RH. 
DPs accepted less ambitious targets for RH when the area was in need of major 
improvements (given Uganda's poor ranking in regard to MMR even compared to 
other low income countries). In addition to allowing the Government to get away with 
an 'easy deal' for RH, DPs did not follow up RH indicators on a systematic basis 
during JRMs, HPAC and ICCs even though the area was agreed to be a priority. 
Though penalties for poor performance of the MoH were not applied (during the time 
of the field work), there was evidence of penalties being applied due to poor 
performance in the area of governance, such as Belgium's withdrawal of support due 
to Uganda's military intervention in the DRC. This penalty was of an implicit nature as 
the bilateral agreement between the parties was for support within the sector and did 
not specify penalties related to governance matters. 
Penalties for performance problems in the area of governance have generally been a 
more common response by donors, but penalties related to poor performance in the 
health sector are rarer, as shown to be the case in Uganda. More recently this has 
changed somewhat, at least in the case of more explicit aid contracts. Existing 
evidence includes: the termination by the GFATM of a grant to Burma (Bass, 2005); 
the withholding of a tranche of budget support funds allocated by the EU (using its 
graduated system) to Benin (Adam et al., 2004); and the withholding of a part of the 
performance payment by the Multi-Donor Budget Support Programme to Ghana (ODI, 
2007). Nevertheless, as stated earlier, evidence from studies on policy conditionality 
indicate that in view of pressure on donors to disburse, such policy has not been 
credible, with aid funds being released despite poor adherence by RGs to the agreed 
conditions (Azfar, 2002; Lawson and Booth, 2004). 
The implicit nature of the aid contract in Uganda underscored the low importance of 
the health sector compared with areas of greater concern for donors. This was 
evidenced by the account of a DP representative (reported in chapter 6) that 
performance in the areas of public expenditure and governance were decisive in the 
further disbursement of funds by the World Bank (PRSC). Similarly, this problem 
occurred with other GBS donors - bilateral agencies, like DFID for example; except 
that they tended to put more emphasis on governance issues rather than public 
222 
expenditure which had greater priority for the World Bank. This indicates that GBS as 
an aid mode may be less beneficial for the health sector. 
Similar to the implicit nature of penalties applied to the aid contract, implicit rewards 
took place for other reasons (e. g. willingness of DPs to be associated with Uganda's 
reputation as a success story and allegedly for Uganda's support to the US in the war 
against Iraq) than good performance in the health sector. Implicit rewards resulting in 
continuous aid disbursement in spite of performance problems has occurred in other 
settings as well. The drive by donors to sustain the aid 'success story' in Mozambique 
is reported to have led them to "turn a blind eye to banking scandals involving 
members of the ruling elite" (Hanlon, 2004 cited in de Renzio, 2006). 
Explicit rewards to the aid contract in Uganda failed to a large extent as they would 
have translated into funds being channelled through the Government's preferred 
mode of assistance - GBS. This took place in the context of intra- and inter-conflicting 
objective functions between the Government (individuals / technical programmes / 
MoH x MoFPED) and DPs (GBS / SWAp x Project donors). For example, the internal 
Government conflict between the MoH and MoFPED in regard to the macroeconomic 
budgetary ceilings imposed on the MoH impeded further rewards from DPs to the 
health sector. 
Distorted penalty reward system and related reasons 
The penalties and rewards system was distorted because the system of performance 
appraisal was subjective, weak and inefficient. This enabled both parties to shirk their 
responsibilities, with DPs using Uganda's success story status to further disburse aid 
funds in spite of evidence of poor performance, and Government behaving 
opportunistically, avoiding effort and taking advantage of information asymmetries and 
the donor's distorted system of penalties and rewards. 
Further issues associated with the distortion of the penalties and rewards system 
included: 
- Government and development agencies being large bureaucracies which weakened 
their power over control mechanisms. As argued by Easterly (2002): "bureaucracy 
works best where there is high feedback from beneficiaries, high incentives for the 
bureaucracy to respond to such feedback, easily observable outcomes, high 
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profitability that bureaucratic effort will translate into favourable outcomes, and 
competitive pressure from other bureaucracies and agencies. " In Uganda, these large 
bureaucracies allowed control mechanisms to fail because of ineffective systems of 
rules and regulations; and the lack of performance enforcement via internal 
management systems (lack of authority and hierarchy adherence). The failure of 
SWAp control mechanisms (e. g. HPAC and the SWG) suggests that the simple 
existence of such structures as a process of the aid contract was not sufficient to 
improve contractual outcomes; for example, by failing to prevent the applications to 
the GFATM, or if not completely preventing them, at least, having those funds 
integrated into the SWAp or GBS (i. e. not having the GFATM funds administered as 
separate/stand alone projects). 
- Perverse incentives / pressures to disburse aid funds when donors were advancing 
their utility, such as when they exerted political pressure at higher levels of 
Government to get their projects accepted while also `luring' the technical side (with 
project perks to attract them) to wield internal pressure through the Government 
systems to get the project approved. This was done through the by-passing of the 
internal hierarchical channels (e. g. directives by Directorate of Planning and 
Development) and the SWAp structures. This took place in the context of conflicting 
objective functions between Government and DPs as well as conflicting objective 
functions within Government (as some individuals responded to the pressure of DPs 
while others did not and disagreed with the objectives of DPs). This was evidenced by 
the key informant who reported donors to be approaching the RH division directly and 
contributing different amounts of funds. However, these were not submitted to the 
SWG where project funding should have been assessed with regards to efficiency and 
equity criteria. 
- Repetition in the aid contract, which can be characterised by the long-term 
relationships between Government officials and DPs and can play a role in relation to 
the failure to penalise by DPs. It is predicted that a contractual relationship over more 
than one period would potentially lead to more efficient outcomes due to comparison 
of outputs over time (MacDonald, 1984) - "assuming that the agent has progressive 
information on the occurrence of the outcome [actually information on the state of 
nature] so that he can continuously adapt his action (here his effort) in the time 
interval where the relationship takes place" (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1985 cited in 
Guesnerie, 1990). But it seemed that while long-term relationships between individual 
DPs and Government officials led to greater information on performance of the sector, 
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this information appeared not to be used towards penalising the Government. Instead, 
a certain level of connivance seemed to have been established, where the individual 
trust that had developed between the individuals served as a hindrance towards 
exposing poor performance and consequently the application of penalties. This may 
also be related to the personalities of individuals who might place more value on their 
relationships with counterparts than on ambitious career goals within their 
organisations. This might reflect a conflict of interest in individuals in donor agencies - 
concerned both with the welfare of the recipient country and that of their own 
employer. 
There is scope to interpret the above as collusion and this is a reason given by donor 
agencies to rotate staff after a period of time in each country. This might, however, be 
in conflict with another practice by development agencies (presented in chapter 6 as a 
possibility) where aid officials are rewarded for establishing good relationships with 
their Government counterparts (Azfar, 2002). The subjective nature of the 
performance assessment system and other weaknesses and inefficiencies in the 
penalties and rewards system discussed previously indicate that collusion would be 
facilitated. While no direct evidence for this was found in relation to individual donor 
representatives and Government officials, there were indications of corruption with the 
Early Childhood and Nutrition project from the World Bank. These were not subject to 
in-depth investigation; instead, the project had the status of being one of the best for 
that donor in Uganda. 
- The Government's ability to draw benefits from a scenario of various donors that do 
not always cooperate and do not adopt a common penalty / reward system. For 
instance, when one or just a few donors in isolation withdrew funding (as a penalty for 
defence expenditure), the Government was able to balance out the shortfall in the 
budget through use of funding from other donors (that ended up being disbursed later 
than originally scheduled). The need for greater donor harmonisation outlined above 
comes across the problem of multiple principals and joint delegation which: differs 
rather obviously from simple delegation in that the actions taken by the various 
principals to motivate the agent may impose externalities on each other (Seabright, 
2002). In this case, externalities were characterised by the opportunity Government 
had to use funds from other donors (those that did not apply penalties and disburse 
their funds later than originally scheduled). In this context, incentives for donors to 
harmonise their aid programmes are weak. Constraints to coordination include: the 
goal of pursuing their aid programmes as a means to advance their commercial and 
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political objectives; issues/responses where donors are not in agreement; 
administrative time and other expenses involved in coordination (Cassen et al., 1984, 
cited in Seabright, 2002). These constraints seemed to have prevailed in Uganda 
even though both agent and principals could be better off - avoid transaction costs 
and yield efficiency gains - if principals opted to accept more common mechanisms, 
at least from the perspective of donors at country offices (apparently not the case for 
headquarters where political goals have higher priority). 
8.2.3 Motives: Conflicting objective functions and implications for the aid 
contract 
Visibility being associated with short term gains and successes (e. g. HIV/AIDS 
instead of long term development of the recipient country's health system 
Individuals in DP agencies felt motivated to move to different countries, to learn 
different cultures. Aligned with the policy of staff rotation in donor agencies (frequent 
changes of staff from one recipient country to another) (Walt et al., 1999b), this is 
likely to have resulted in lesser commitment by those individuals towards the long 
term development of Uganda and a tendency towards a greater focus on short term 
gains and success stories. This lack of responsibility towards future goals in Uganda 
associated with individual career goals of promotions within their organisational 
environment is also related to their interest in having their particular role recognised - 
hence a focus on programmes of visibility and success stories. In addition, the pursuit 
of short term and visible achievements may be part of the objectives of donor country 
Governments since they may be under. pressure to demonstrate results to their 
constituencies. Hence they may prioritise "visible and uncontroversial forms of 
assistance with short-run payoffs, like distributing food, rather than those with long-run 
returns, like institutional reform" (Azfar, 2002). 
While a number of individuals in Government felt motivated to work for their country 
and wanted to make a contribution to improve the system over the long run, some 
others, similarly to individual DP representatives, described some of their motivations 
as related to the rewards they could extract from being associated with successful 
programmes (e. g. to obtain an international job). 
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The above may provide a plausible explanation as to why both Government and DPs 
were more ambitious about HIV/AIDS targets than RH / maternal health ones - the 
latter being an area more closely dependent on health systems improvements 
(Graham, 2002) which require longer term developments. For instance, when 
comparing RH and HIV/AIDS, the latter received large sums of resources through 
PEPFAR which could not be matched with the projects of a lesser magnitude in RH. 
As noted earlier, donor funding for HIV/AIDS was likely to be related to DPs' 
motivation to be associated with Uganda's success story in that area (repeating the 
quote from a DP representative: We are doing enough where we can take credit for 
some of the results as well. ) 
Motivated by short term goals and having control - related to preferences towards 
projects over SWAP/GBS 
Related to the above point on visibility and short term gains is the problem of 
individuals tending to focus on shorter term approaches within the aid contract. This 
might have led parties to shift to projects like GHIs, demonstrating a lesser 
commitment towards SWAp as a mode of aid delivery. That vertical projects tend to 
be more closely related to short term time horizons has been argued previously 
(Oliveira Cruz et al., 2003); this was reported to be associated with the cycle of 
Government mandates in donor countries where results from their 'investments' are 
expected on a time frame of about 4 to 5 years. 
In addition, the preference for projects was probably linked to the reported motives of 
some DP individuals of having control over aid delivered and of taking initiatives. 
Similarly some Government individuals also felt motivated to have greater control over 
resources in the form of projects which could be translated into elements that would 
facilitate their work (e. g. vehicles, support staff, computers etc. ). 
For instance, in the area of maternal health/RH, DPs like UN agencies were delivering 
aid through projects that lacked continuity and failed to contribute in an integrated way 
to strengthening the health system. This may offer some clues as to why outcomes in 
the area were not improving in Uganda. Lack of continuity and fragmentation has also 
been a problem in other settings that have used vertical projects to deliver maternal 
health services (Goodburn and Campbell, 2001). The project approach in Uganda 
clashed with the Government's attempts to improve maternal health through 
strengthening the health system as an organisational goal (focusing on EmOC), 
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because it faced problems of intra-organisational conflicting objective functions. 
(Some individuals in the area of RH were attracted to project funding and not 
committed to the Government goal of improving the system, a goal which would 
involve greater engagement of RH with other parts of the system - aiming at 
achieving more trained nurses, greater availability of contraceptive drugs in health 
facilities, hygiene standards in maternity wards improved etc. ). 
Changes of staff, of obiectives functions and move from SWAP towards GHIs 
A number of staff both in Government and in DP agencies changed since the 
introduction of the SWAp in 2000, and with this came some changes in individuals' 
motivation. It is argued that this may have led to a shift in the overall balance from 
SWAp to projects, particularly GHIs in the country. 
The available evidence indicated that a group at top management level (including the 
political level of the Ministry) and some technical level staff were perceived to be 
highly motivated towards the SWAp as a preferred mode of aid delivery/coordination 
and platform for health sector development. The motivation of these individuals and 
their alignment with the goals of Government may have been one of the driving forces 
that allowed the introduction of the SWAp and related reforms in the health sector. 
Concomitantly there were a number of individuals in some donor agencies whose 
goals were in line with those of Government and supported the SWAp reforms. 
However, later (towards 2002/03) some new DP representatives were more aligned 
towards large projects that did not conform to the country's key plans (PEAP and 
HSSP) and policies (Government budget/SWAp). Such lack of alignment of donor 
projects is a source of common critique of the project mode (Cassels and Janovsky, 
1998; Peters and Chao, 1998; Walt et al., 1999b). DPs not directly channelling the 
bulk of their aid contributions through projects, i. e. the GBS/SWAp donors, accepted 
the introduction of projects and in some cases supported (financially) GHIs 
internationally. 
Donor agencies international obiectives versus country office goals 
In spite of the reiterated commitment by DPs internationally of reaching the MDGs 
[e. g. that the MDGs are an objective being pursued by the US Government with the 
endorsement of its highest political leadership, i. e. President Bush (Natsios, 2006)], 
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these goals were part of the stated objectives of some development agencies but not 
the majority of them (as reported in chapter 7). This highlighted the lack of alignment 
between the organisational goals of donor agencies at headquarters/international 
level vis-ä-vis the goals of their field offices. 
The MDGs also appeared not to be directly aligned with national priorities as they 
were not included among the main goals of Government - although improvements in 
health outcomes in general were part of the national goals as reported by Government 
respondents. Various Government interviewees placed more emphasis on further 
strengthening / development of the health system as a key national goal for the health 
sector instead of focusing on the MDGs. 
Hence as principals, if DPs want to achieve the MDG targets, as they claim 
internationally to be their intention, and need countries such as Uganda to contribute 
towards this by incorporating this as a policy outcome of the aid contract, both the 
country offices of donor agencies and the Government should be motivated towards 
reaching the MDG targets for Uganda. 
8.3 Reflections regarding the study's conceptual framework, design and 
methodological approach 
The first part of this section considers the applicability of using agency theory as an 
analytical framework to better understand the relationship of the GoU and DPs. 
Secondly it reflects upon the cross-sectional nature of the study design and the use of 
observation and interview methods for this investigation. 
8.3.1 Applicability of agency theory as an overall analytical framework for the 
investigation 
While agency theory was helpful in elucidating various dimensions of the problem 
studied, it was limited in its capacity to capture and elucidate some other facets. 
These elements involved governance problems and a context of complexity in terms 
of the aid environment (the extent of contract incompleteness and implicitness of the 
aid contract) which are discussed below. 
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Prevailing domestic governance problems 
Data collection for this study (in 2003/2004) happened at a phase that could be 
characterised as the tipping point from a more positive to a more negative scenario of 
political commitment towards accountability and performance of public institutions. 
This is clearer if analysed now in light of key events that took place in the area of 
governance. A brief review of such events since the end of field work is provided. It 
covers changes in the political scenario in relation to the third term and the election 
process, as well as corruption problems. 
The Ugandan constitution foresaw. only two consecutive mandates for the president. 
However, Museveni proposed a change in the constitution to accommodate for a third 
term. In mid 2005, Parliament approved the amendment to the constitution which led 
DPs to warn the Government about their concerns over Museveni not being willing to 
leave power (The Economist, 2005b). Because of the slow progress towards the 
establishment of multi-party politics in Uganda and the approval of the third term 
Britain withheld aid in the amount of £5 million (ibid. ). The relatively small cut (about 
10%) vis-ä-vis the overall aid budget provided by the UK Government to Uganda 
seemed to represent a warning sign rather than a penalty which could have had 
greater impact on the Government's budget. 
Museveni won the presidential election in early 2006. However, the main opposition 
candidate, Kizza Besigye, disputed the election results on the grounds of manipulation 
of the results and hindrances that impeded voters from casting their ballots - though 
EU observers did not confirm such problems (BBC News, 2006). The period leading 
up to the elections, however, was marked by considerable problems. Most 
importantly, Besigye, who was in exile, was arrested soon after arriving in the country 
prior to running in the elections. The issue won the international media front pages. 
The arrest and the governance scenario under which it took place (lack of 
independence of the judiciary, lack of freedom of association, delays in the process 
for the political transition) led to aid being cut by £15 million by the UK Government in 
late 2005 and withdrawal of £5 million until the elections took place (DFID, 2005). This 
cut was out of a total of £50 million planned support to Uganda (ibid. ). Other donors 
that withdrew budget support funds on the grounds of the above concerns included: 
Netherlands in the amount of £5 million; Norway and Ireland £2 million (The monitor, 
2005) and Sweden £4.6 million (BBC News, 2005). 
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Already prior to the above events, there had been concerns in relation to governance 
problems (e. g. the lack of independence of the Inspector General of Government and 
lack of enforcement of requirement for politicians to declare their assets96). However, 
to my knowledge, only one donor decided to cut aid to the Government. This was the 
case of NORAD, which reduced its contribution to the GoU from NOK 75 million to 
NOK 50 million97 for the FY 2005/06 (Gjos, 2005) 
After the elections such governance problems seemed to have persisted, as 
illustrated by the siege of the High Court by armed security forces sent by the 
Government in early 2007. In spite of this having taken place for the second time98, 
bilateral donors did not express any public or clear discontentment (Daily Monitor, 
2007a) or apply any penalties to the Government. 
In regard to corruption problems, the GFATM suspended its grants to Uganda due to 
gross or serious mismanagement undertaken by the Project Management Unit (Daily 
Monitor, 2007b). This action dated from August 2005 and the suspended grants 
amounted to US$200 million (IRIN News, 2006a). 
The GFATM reinstated the funds later in November 2005 after assurances by the 
Government that investigation was under way (IRIN News, 2006b). This was done 
through the appointment by the President, Museveni, of a Commission of Inquiry in 
September 2005 (The Monitor, 2006). 
Because Government was deemed not to have taken sufficient action to deal with the 
problem during the investigation phase, the GFATM in early 2007 cancelled some of 
the grants - in the amount of US$16 million for Malaria and Tuberculosis (The New 
Vision, 2007b). However the cancelled amount represented less than 10% of the total 
amount initially suspended (US$200 million). This could be interpreted as being yet 
another warning sign by a donor that did not impact strongly on Government finances. 
Albeit late, there was a response by the Government as a result of the investigations 
led by the Commission of Inquiry. Three former ministers from the MoH were 
implicated in fraud of the GFATM funds and the President dropped them from Cabinet 
96 Based on informal discussions with various individuals in the health sector during visit to Uganda in 
November 2005). 
97 Equivalent to approximately £6.7 million and £4.5 million respectively. 98 First siege by a military unit to the High Court took place during the arrest of Besigye (BBC News, 
2007). 
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(after the 2006 elections) as demanded by DPs (The New Vision, 2007a). In addition, 
the Project Management Unit was closed down, some of the resources were 
refunded, and further investigations were taken up by the Criminal Investigation 
Department (The New Vision, 2007b). 
Additional examples of problems in the area of corruption included: 
" In May 2007, the World Bank reduced its support to Uganda via the PRSC from 
US$150 million to US$125 million due to problems related to the allocation of 
funds and financial management (higher expenditure on administration than 
originally allocated thus reducing funds from other budget lines and corruption 
problems) (IRIN, 2007). Once again, the amount reduced is not likely to have a 
great effect on the Government budget, thus more a warning than a strong penalty 
by the World Bank. This could be related to the desire to continue to have a 
success story: "The World Bank was confident that Uganda would regain its 
development momentum and `claim its rightful place as a high-impact, results- 
oriented, pro-poor development model" (ibid. ) 
" Also in May 2007, three former ministers of health were charged and detained due 
to alleged misappropriation of funds from GAVI (IRIN, 2007). Misappropriation 
took place as of 2004 when the funds were transferred to the MoH (The New 
Vision, 2007c). The charges and arrest resulted from investigations carried out by 
the Inspector General of Government (ibid. ). 
Political economy and deteriorating health sector performance 
The above developments seemed to emphasise the clientelistic nature of the political 
game that took place in Uganda. Senior individuals in Government were more geared 
towards the maintenance of power than to aid effectiveness or good governance, 
particularly after the period of declining popularity of the president. Personal rule99 and 
related use of patron-clients relations as means to maintain power are not phenomena 
unique to Uganda, but rather pervasive in African countries (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1998). In Ghana one of the flaws of GBS was its vulnerability towards a political 
patronage system, considered to be endemic (ODI, 2007). 
99 Defined as: "a dynamic world of political will and activity that is shaped less by institutions or 
impersonal social forces than by personal authorities and power" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998). 
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In order to stay in power (third term) as his political clout diminished, Museveni started 
to buy political support by appointing senior level officials (who supported him) to the 
MoH and allowing them to take personal advantage of public funds. As noted in 
chapter 6, this took place with the knowledge and implicit acceptance of DPs (KI - 4, 
other). The above national level changes seemed to have trickled down the system (to 
the sector level) as other less senior officers in the Ministry of Health also appeared to 
have been posted as a means of buying their political support (from the opposition). 
These politically motivated appointments to top level posts represented decreased 
commitment from Government towards performance improvements. This led to 
increasing levels of demotivation among some technical staff who were more 
interested in public health goals. Some of those technical staff left the Government, 
thus further contributing to the deterioration of the performance at sector level. 
According to Chabal (1992) political morality is defined as "the constitution and the 
judiciary... examining these constitutions and assessing the degree to which the 
judiciary is structurally independent from the executive are a necessary part of the 
assessment of the context of political morality in African countries today" Hence an 
initial analysis of political morality involves the evaluation of the extent to which a 
country's political leadership is abiding by the constitution and the judiciary. In 
Uganda, Museveni changed the constitution and sanctioned a siege of the justice 
court by a military unit in order to arrest his opponent in the 2006 elections. These 
actions seemed to be intended for his own benefit and have thus infringed the rule of 
law and signalled a low level of political morality in the country. 
Corruption 
Similar to clientelistic practices, corruption is also a common problem in Africa. The 
key difference between the two is that corruption is illegal (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1998). As stated by Hope (2000) in Africa, the "exercise of state power has led to the 
supremacy of the state over civil society and, in turn, to the ascendancy of the 
patrimonial state with its characteristic stranglehold on the economic and political 
levers of power, through which corruption thrives for it is through this stranglehold that 
all decision making occurs and patronage is dispensed.. . in some African countries no 
distinction is made between public and private interests and government officials 
simply appropriate state assets. " 
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In Uganda, in contrast to the penalties applied by DPs during the time of the field work 
(as presented in chapter 6), which concentrated on issues of governance, the 
suspension of funds by the GFATM was related to the performance of the health 
sector. Although it was more closely linked to problems of corruption in the 
management of funds, this was likely to have pervaded Government systems. This in 
turn affected the delivery of the agreed activities within the aid contract. 
Given that these problems permeating Government systems were not confined to the 
GFATM management structure and involved the MoH higher echelons [e. g. 
interference by high level officials in the recruitment process changing the choice 
initially proposed by the recruitment company (Daily Monitor, 2007b)], more donors 
could have responded with penalties as well or requested more in-depth 
investigations and/or reviews into Government management and financial practices. 
This applies particularly to GBS/SWAp donors that continued to disburse aid funds 
through the Government budget although the fiduciary assurances seemed to have 
slipped, as evidenced by the problems encountered in the GFTAM. 
The above poses an interesting discussion over the use of projects and GBS/SWAp, 
and which mode could be more effective in terms of constraining corrupt practices. 
o Under the project approach it may be easier to engage in corrupt practices if one 
is in'charge of a project. There may be greater scope for embezzlement of funds 
when one is in charge as opposed to through the SWAp/GBS where there are 
more controls in the system. 
o On the other hand, it could be that there are less penalties or no penalties applied 
through SWAp/GBS for corruption because there are less investigations or audits. 
A conclusion that could be drawn is that when Government misbehaves then use of 
projects would be more effective, as per the examples of the GFATM and GAVI. 
SWAp may rely to a greater extent on trust between the parties than projects do 
(Peters and Chao, 1998); this was considered to have been an important element in 
the effectiveness of the GBS experience in Mozambique (Binker and Sulemane, 
2006). However, when trust diminishes, it may be more appropriate for DPs to go 
back to projects. This was the option adopted around the time of decreasing 
transparency and the tensions preceding the elections (arrest of Besigye) - the 
resources from the aid cut to the budget by the UK were diverted to support UN 
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administered projects operating in the Northern part of Uganda (Kis -1 and 5, 
Government official and other). 
Accountability mechanisms 
The evidence indicates that the media had some role to play (how strong is not clear) 
in putting pressure on donors to penalise the Government in the case of governance 
issues - as happened during the election phase with the problems involving the 
opposition candidate (Besigye). Technical advisors from aid agencies in Uganda had 
expressed concerns in regard to governance problems (various Kls) and some 
smaller donors had penalised the Government in view of these issues. However, 
DFID, a donor providing a large volume of aid, only cut its aid budget after the 
situation had deteriorated considerably and the issue had gained space in the 
international media. This underlines the lack of power of advisors within aid agencies 
(as noted in chapter 6) and the influence the media played in holding the UK 
Government to account. 
This pressure exerted by the media could be argued to have led to more penalties 
being applied by DPs in comparison to those during the time of field work. This would 
suggest that DPs behaved more effectively as principals after the study period. 
However, the reaction of donors tended to be of withdrawing aid but in rather small 
percentages vis-ä-vis the overall amount of their contribution (similar to what was 
found during the period of field work). In addition, some problems (in the area of 
governance) prior and subsequent to the elections did not lead to penalties being 
applied, although there was dissatisfaction within the donor community. 
The broken feedback loop (Martens et al., 2002) appeared to have been re-connected 
to a certain extent. The media acted as substitute for the accountability link in the aid 
contract as it served as a tool to provide information, on performance to the ultimate 
principals holding the donor government (as an agent) to account. This was not as 
strong as was needed, however, since aid cuts were 'symbolic'. 
Dynamic nature of the domestic governance environment as related to the new aid 
modalities 
Over the implementation period of the SWAp, but particularly up until 2003/04, parties 
seemed to feel they had more knowledge of the processes and complexities of the 
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system. However, as discussed earlier, the system can become less transparent: a) 
as new officials can withhold information and behave opportunistically in spite of 
processes and mechanisms in place to control performance. (the SWG); and b) as the 
aid contract was embedded in a very dynamic setting of change at the governance 
level involving the changes of individuals (appointed due to their political alignment) 
and their motives (which influenced the goals and performance of the organisations 
they were attached to, e. g. the MoH). 
Evidence presented earlier suggests that the early phase of the SWAp and GBS in 
Uganda benefited from the favourable governance environment (including strong 
leadership, vision, strategic planning, technical support). Lake and Musumali (1999) 
suggested that in Zambia the SWAp profited from a similar scenario which included 
strong political support, clear and shared vision, and strong personalities with 
leadership skills. The positive governance'environment in Uganda appeared to have 
allowed these new modes of aid to operate more effectively, in terms of increased 
learning and innovation, and increased efficiency in the way aid was delivered. 
There was also evidence of some learning and innovation taking place as a result of 
the contract. For example, since the start of the SWAp there appeared to have been a 
better understanding of the way the system operated and which constraints there 
were. This could be seen through more in-depth knowledge allowed by the early 
tracking studies and the AHSPRs that had to be available for each JRMs (before there 
used to be only a statement to parliament on progress of the sector which was 
considered descriptive and not focused on assessing the performance of the sector as 
a whole). The SWAp structures and processes seemed to underscore some of the 
ways to approach the key constraints in the system. For instance, the first tracking 
study resulted in improved financial flows to districts and HPAC served as a forum for 
policy dialogue and negotiations on a regular basis. 
Similar to the experience of Mozambique where the SWAp is reported to have led to 
improved sector policy and strategic focus at national level (Martinez, 2006), in 
Uganda there was greater policy coherence and better plans within the health sector. 
This allowed stakeholders to share a clearer vision of the sector's needs since the 
introduction of the SWAp. For example, objectives of the sector were clearer with the 
introduction of the NHP in 1999 and HSSP in 2000. Undertakings also contributed 
towards greater clarity of the sector's goals as jointly agreed key actions did not exist 
before the SWAp. In spite of their vague nature and the fact that some were not 
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delivered at all, having these undertakings helped to focus stakeholders towards 
some common activities (as opposed to the phase when there was a greater 
predominance of projects and the fragmented effect that those projects had 
particularly at district level). 
Perhaps more worrying was the lack of clarity on how to achieve the policies and 
plans given the various constraints faced throughout the implementation process, 
although some progress could still be observed in this respect. Illustrative of this were 
improvements in the supply of drugs (Nazerali et al., 2006) and continuous attempts 
to coordinate key inputs (e. g. construction of facilities and staffing of facilities) through 
the JRMs and the integrated planning and disbursement of Government funding. The 
joint nature of the SWAp discussions and agreements signalled an innovative way to 
work in partnership with a range of actors not only Government and DPs (e. g. other 
line ministries and PNFP sector). 
There were changes in the budgeting process. that appeared to have resulted in some 
strengthening of it and some efficiency gains. New processes (e. g. Budget Framework 
Papers, PERs and SWGs) were introduced into the budgeting process. They were 
reported to have contributed to the alignment of interests of the different groups within 
Government (various KIs). This, combined with the increased level of funding 
available through the budget (MoH, 2003c; Ssengooba et al., 2006), decreased the 
need for programmes to seek project funding, thus contributing towards some 
improvement in intra-government incentives. Further, as noted in chapter 1, 
Ssengooba et al. (2006) argue that allocative efficiency improved as shown by the 
shift in the proportion of funds allocated to primary care (from 25% in 1999/90 to 43% 
in 2002/03) versus the allocation to secondary and tertiary hospital care which were 
mostly located in urban areas and have a high cost structure (from 44% in 1999/00 to 
25% in 2002/03). However, there were the macroeconomic ceilings hindering further 
efficiency gains and quality of services and more services for the poor. In addition, 
GHIs acted as to meddle in the existing integrated budgeting processes. Additional 
problems included: 
- Predictability of aid funds to the budget that was still considered a major problem 
by Government (as presented in chapter 7). On the other hand, Government was 
somewhat able to offset shortfalls due to aid cuts (applied as penalties) because 
of funds that came later than originally planned. 
237 
- While resources were more fungible with the shift towards GBS, this had its down 
side as for example when funds for defence and administration increased at the 
expense of health. 
Evidence from a cross-country evaluation exercise showed that GBS contributed to 
strengthening of budget processes as sector ministries became more involved in 
budgeting at national level (IDD and Associates, 2006 cited in de Renzio, 2006). In 
contrast, improved efficiency of public spending did not occur in Tanzania after the 
introduction of GBS - which was argued to be linked to hindrances at service delivery 
level not having been tackled (Lawson et al., 2006). 
Whether transaction costs had been reduced with the introduction of the SWAp/GBS 
related structures and process in Uganda is difficult to assess. It seemed to be the 
case. However, data for this were perhaps not sufficient to make a conclusive 
statement. What is suggested by this study is that there was still scope to reduce 
these costs by streamlining and improving the effectiveness of the SWAp structures 
and processes. For instance, transaction costs could be reduced by making HPAC 
meetings more strategic (e. g. by improving the quality of the reporting system). 
Furthermore, using the evidence of WGs which were not operating at optimum level, a 
potential explanation would be that there were too many SWAp-related structures and 
processes in place, requiring too much time of existing staff. A reduction in transaction 
costs would not only benefit Government but also DPs which often had a limited 
number of staff in charge of health sector issues posted at country level. 
The Ugandan inconclusive results in this area mirror those in other settings. Tanzania 
and Mozambique also show a mixed picture where some transaction costs increased, 
some decreased and others remained the same (Lawson et al., 2006; Martinez, 
2006). Although also inconclusive, there is some evidence from a cross-country study 
that GBS led to reduced transaction costs in Ghana (ODI, 2007). In contrast, a five- 
country study commissioned by USAID found that transaction costs increased except 
when the managerial responsibilities related to GBS were delegated to a multilateral 
agency (Development Information Services, 2006). 
Changes in the international scenario 
Evidence presented earlier suggests that the pressure to disburse increased volumes 
of aid and geopolitical / commercial goals were to a considerable extent driving the 
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behaviour of donors in the Ugandan context. Others have also underlined the 
influence of political and strategic motives (e. g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and 
commercial interests (e. g. Hjertholm and White, 2000) in aid allocations. However the 
pursuit of such goals is clearly at odds with the reported interest in improving aid 
effectiveness in the international scenario. 
The pressure to disburse increased volumes of aid might have led donors to seek new 
aid modalities to disburse large volumes of aid, as was arguably the case with GBS 
(de Renzio, 2006). As shown in Figure 8.1, net bilateral Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) provided by the UK increased 2.5 fold between 2001 and 2005. 
Figure 8.1: UK net bilateral ODA (2001-2005) 
(in £ thousands) 
4 483 613 
2913340 
2 336 509 2 364 709 
-1_820267 
ij 
{ 
hood Imm 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Source: DFID (2007). 
The above time-frame matches the period when various DPs were supporting and 
leading the way towards SWAp and GBS (late 90s saw the introduction of SWAPs in 
various countries, including Uganda in 2000). By 2002/03 DFID had disbursed £559 
million to a number of countries in Africa and channelled these funds as budget 
support (DFID, 2004). This modality was established as one of its official policies for 
aid disbursements in 2004 (ibid. ). 
As noted in chapter 6, the incentive to disburse aid may also be associated with the 
greater visibility of aid as an issue of public mobilisation and political interest. This is 
signalled by the recent wave of attention towards Africa, particularly in the UK but also 
in the G8 countries, as for example: the increased commitments to aid during the 
2005 meeting of the G8 Gleneagles; the Live Aid concert in the same year; the 
creation of the Commission for Africa (2004); the UK Government's general 
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commitment to Africa notably through Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (The Economist, 
2005b). 
Related to volume of aid increasing is the further emphasis on the need for improved 
effectiveness of aid in terms of domestic political accountability. A higher profile of 
development aid in UK politics [involvement of top political leaders as Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, and the appointment of Hilary Benn, held as 'a next-but-one-party- 
leader' (The Economist, 2005b) in place of Clare Short) might have been needed to 
secure the support of tax payers and NGOs active in the sector and therefore the 
need to show results / successes. Failure to disburse the increased allocations to 
development aid could have characterised a political embarrassment for the 
Government internationally but also vis-ä-vis its domestic constituency. 
In spite of the mounting rhetoric of aid effectiveness alongside the increased volume 
and visibility of aid, bilateral agencies continued to pursue geopolitical and commercial 
goals. As shown in this thesis this included: indications that PEPFAR funding 
allocations to Uganda were related to the country's support to the American 
intervention in Iraq; and political pressure on the Ugandan Government to accept an 
American company (Rocky Mountain Technology Group) as a provider of Information 
Technology or a Dutch company (ORET) to provide imaging equipment. An example 
from another country context of donors' political interference in the development aid 
budget allocation for commercial purposes was the case of the 'air traffic control 
system deal' in Tanzania (also an aid-dependent low income country). Tony Blair was 
said to have personally supported the sale of an outdated air traffic control system 
made in the UK and financed through a British bank (Guardian, 2002). 
Hence, a question here is whether channelling greater volumes of aid through 
multilateral agencies instead of bilateral ones would not be an option to curb the 
problems outlined above. 
In relation to the pressure to disburse aid, it is not clear that multilateral agencies 
would be advantageous. As shown in chapter 6, both the World Bank and the EU 
relied on relatively subjective systems of performance appraisal that allowed for funds 
to be disbursed in spite of performance problems. 
The use of multilaterals as an alternative towards depoliticising aid allocations 
(Martens et al., 2002) may be less the case for the World Bank due to the political 
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nature of the appointment of its president by the US Government and the fact that the 
US provides the largest share of funding to the World Bank (Nielson and Tierney, 
2003) - which may cascade down the system. But perhaps the EU and the GFATM 
could be considered as options. Facts in their favour shown in this thesis include the 
EU's introduction of a more explicit system of performance appraisal and the 
GFATM's cancellation of some grants to Uganda. The latter, however, as noted 
earlier, involved only a small percentage of the total grant. 
Aid disbursements through multilateral agencies also carry a number of biases. These 
involve joint delegation which "may .... result in confusion over objectives, or in 
agencies pursuing their own interests. For instance, sharing of tasks may generate 
distortionary incentives and divided loyalties to different principals. Another example is 
that of a multilateral agency that reports on the `needs' of beneficiary countries and 
may have an incentive to exaggerate these needs in order to boost the importance of 
the agency. Similarly, it may bias reporting on the beneficial impact of aid 
programmes to justify its activities" (Martens et al., 2002). 
A final point refers to the confusion or the unclear use of the language about what is 
meant by aid effectiveness. Terms used in the context of this debate have included: 
performance-based aid, paying for results, ROM, greater use of outcomes measures 
of performance, and focus on international targets. Often it is not clear what recipient 
governments are expected to deliver on, e. g. whether greater outputs or improved 
outcomes. A big leap is involved here as outcomes are far more complex than 
outputs. While outcomes may refer to a reduction in maternal mortality rates for 
example, results could mean both decreased maternal mortality rates and DPT3 
coverage rates. Time and again it seems the international aid effectiveness debate 
bring concepts from other areas like education to the health sector (Barder and 
Birdsall (2006) and overlooks the complexities in achieving improved health outcomes 
but also outputs. It is perhaps less complex to increase enrolment rates than it is to 
increase uptake of maternal health services. 
Complexities in the aid contract not explained by agency theory 
There was a multiplicity of principals and agents which competed among each other 
and had multiple (and often conflicting) objectives. The multiplicity of objectives of the 
parties seemed to vary along a continuum between the extreme poles of geopolitical 
goals at one end and poverty reduction at the other for DPs. And for Government it 
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seemed to range between political agendas and rent-seeking to health systems' 
strengthening. 
This context of multiple objectives also meant that they were often not clear. For 
instance, the key objectives of DPs were ambivalent: while the MDGs were part of the 
aid effectiveness objectives, they did not seem to be a strong goal in Uganda for DPs. 
Other goals appeared more important such as the political/commercial ones (e. g. 
Rocky Mountain deal). 
It was thus difficult to understand and predict what incentives would work better, since 
there were multiple incentives operating within this context of multiple objectives 
within each organisation. This is in line with the finding of another study regarding the 
multiple and often conflicting nature of objectives within the Ugandan SWAp (Paul, 
2007). 
Hence, the aid contract seemed to be rooted in a scenario of complexity involving 
geo-political and commercial interests and domestic governance issues. This was not 
unique to Uganda - de Renzio (2006) points to the neglect of political economy 
elements by the donor community when implementing GBS. 
While agency theory was a very useful analytical framework, it was limited as it did not 
allow for a comprehensive mapping and further understanding of the governance 
environment that emerged as relevant throughout this investigation. 
8.3.2 Reflections regarding the study design and methodological approach 
Study design 
The cross-sectional nature of this study's design might account for a limitation in its 
ability to allow full understanding of the factors (particularly contextual ones) 
influencing the relationship of the RG and donors. As noted earlier, more penalties 
appeared to have been applied by DPs after the end of the field work - even if the 
amount of aid cut was relatively small in comparison to the overall aid budgets. The 
higher number of instances of aid being withdrawn could be related to the longer time 
span after the end of the field work (from mid to end 2004 until early 2007 while the 
field work was between 2003-04, but the investigation also included to a certain extent 
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a retrospective account (or'historical perspective') of some events as reported by 
interviewees and gathered through documentary analysis dated back to approximately 
2000100). In addition, it could be argued that the period subsequent to the field work 
was a time with specific characteristics such as the ones surrounding the elections. 
Given the political interests involved, it could be that this specific phase might have 
stirred up governance problems to the forefront of individuals' and Government's 
agendas affecting the interaction with donors. 
The limited access to data in relation to the post-field-work period hindered a more in- 
depth analysis of the situation in Uganda after 2004. Patton (1999) refers to the 
limitation of a cross-sectional research design as the temporal sampling problem 
which results from "the time periods during which observations took place". Thus the 
dynamic nature of the policy environment studied points to the benefits of a more 
longitudinal approach if resources and the scope of the research project allows (which 
was not the case for this thesis). 
On the other hand, the study benefited from the in-depth approach of a case study 
design and from the in-country data collection process (including the fact that I lived in 
Kampala for the largest part of that process). As argued by Martens et al. (2002), the 
study of intra-organisational behaviour of individuals in IDA using an agency 
framework requires detailed analysis. 
Reflexivity 
Having lived and worked in Uganda while conducting the field work added evidence to 
the research that can be seen as informal in regard to how it was generated. Yet 
these pieces of evidence were based on the fact that living and working in the country 
allowed me the opportunity to interact formally and informally with a range of 
stakeholders [ultimately individuals with their own different views and perceptions - 
and also limits, selectivity and biases (Patton, 1999)]; to gather further insights from 
their perspectives; to observe and experience how processes operated in various 
domains (political, administrative, social, and cultural). These have all contributed to 
shape my own view and perception of the research questions and the related 
evidence as these emerged throughout the research process. A similar approach has 
been used by others in the past where interaction with various people responsible for 
100 This historical perspective was adopted as a means to minimise the limitations of the cross-cutting 
nature of the research and aimed at throwing light onto how and why the new aid mechanisms were 
introduced and evolved during the period that was reviewed. 
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health policy implementation and service delivery was part of the data generation 
process (e. g. Jeppsson, 2004). 
A specific example of a piece of evidence generated to some extent through informal 
methods which affected my judgements refers to the problem of corruption. The 
sensitive nature of the topic, linked to confidentiality concerns, added to the informality 
of the circumstances under which people were willing to discuss the topic. A few 
individuals had no problems in talking about the theme during interviews, but others 
who mentioned the theme when interviewed asked to for it to be 'off the record' and 
there were some that only referred to the topic in informal conversations (outside 
interview setting). In this context, other sources contributed to build evidence in 
relation to this theme, including my own observations of institutional processes, 
readings of local media reports, and information exchanged for instance in social 
gatherings. 
Gold's typology of observational methods (1958 cited in Green and Thorogood, 2004) 
differentiates among four different roles along a continuum as shown in Figure 8.2. 
Figure 8.2: Typology of observational methods 
4111I 10 10 
Complete observer Observer as participant Participant as observer Complete participant 
Source: adapted from Gold's model (Green and Thorogood, 2004) 
Based on this typology I was an "observer as participant" and "participant as 
observer". As noted in chapter 4, while living in Kampala, I was involved in the 
production of a book on health systems reforms. The formal meetings and the 
informal contact with the authors of the book allowed me indirect observations which 
were additional to the formal ones undertaken (e. g. of JRMs, district visits). During 
those formal meetings of the health sector as the JRMs, I was a direct observer but 
mainly a non-participant. During district visits there were some elements of 
participation, as I asked questions and helped in drafting the report. However, even 
during these formal meetings, there was a fair amount of informal interactions during 
breaks where one would discuss issues presented and could have a say on various 
topics. 
My position then changed when meeting with the authors while we prepared the book. 
I then became an indirect observer of their behaviour and accessed their particular 
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insights on the health system in Uganda. At the same time I was a participant in the 
meetings, as one of the authors, and shared my views. 
Other more informal observations took place when I was in the MoH. I was present 
there because I sometimes used their office space (due to power shortages in the 
IPH), also while waiting to meet individuals for interviews, and I made friends there 
and used to come to meet them up in their offices before going out. These less 
structured observations allowed me to have a greater `feel' for the people's work ethic. 
I was able to have a better sense of their engagement, their attitude towards 
performance. The informal interactions led to access to more information, helped in 
shaping my views on the behaviours, which I could compare and contrast to the 
different perspectives i was getting from the interviews and formal direct but non- 
participatory observations of meetings. According to Green and Thorogood (2004), 
"long-term participation in the field enables the researcher to capitalize on both 
distance and familiarity to analyse social behaviour". My field work experience made 
me feel as an outsider but one that was granted an insider view without direct 
participation in the policy making process at the time (apart perhaps from inputs / 
suggestions during the book meetings and other informal discussions, and it is not 
clear whether people took them on or not). 
Some of the individuals I had more contact with through the book work and other 
interactions in Uganda became key informants for this research. They represented 
national level/broad views and at times specific expertise. On the basis of these and 
their particular position and experience in the sector, I interviewed and consulted them 
about their knowledge and perceptions. Patton (1999) notes that: "the danger in 
cultivating and using key informants is that the researcher comes to rely on them too 
much and loses sight of the fact that their perspectives are necessarily limited, 
selective, and biased. Data from informants represent perceptions, not truth. " I sought 
other sources of evidence to avoid the problem of relying excessively on key 
informants and their interpersonal influence, as suggested by Yin (2003). 
approached key informants as being conduits of views and spaces that I could then 
reflect upon by comparing and contrasting them, including vis-ä-vis behaviours 
observed. 
The discussion of truth in interviews and observations where what people say does 
not necessarily correspond to what they think and do (if observed or asked) is 
reflected in the epistemological divide. The positivist approach stresses, on the one 
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hand, the ideals of validity and reliability in line with the search for a single truth; and 
the relativist perspective, on the other hand, emphasises that data from and about 
human beings inexorably embody differing views as opposed to one absolute truth 
(Patton, 1999). 
This relates to the response and deference effects (from a positivist point of view). In 
contrast to this positivist approach, the role of subjectivity is to be openly discussed: 
how context and interactions impacted on the research and the data produced (Green 
and Thorogood, 2004). As put by Miller and Glassner (1997), "research cannot 
provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for, but it may 
provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social 
worlds". 
In building on from this idea, the realist perspective would point out that when trying to 
achieve the truth, outcomes of interest are better interpreted by seeking explanations 
from "appropriate ideas and opportunities (`mechanisms)" and from "groups in the 
appropriate social and cultural conditions (`contexts)" (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Hence during this investigation, I attempted to further understand the relationship 
between RGs and DPs by reconciling their accounts; comparing and contrasting those 
accounts to the behaviours observed; and by considering the overall and complex 
context within which those relationships were embedded and how the context 
changed over time. This way I sought explanations of how the interactions between 
DPs and RGs happened and why those actors behaved as they did, as opposed to 
finding a causal explanation as a single truth. 
A final point refers to the issue of confidentiality. Given the small number of key 
informants and their expertise in specific areas, when citing them I avoided indicating 
to which organisational group they belonged (e. g. DPs or Government or if 
TA/consultant). 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions, policy implications and future research 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has sought to better understand the relationship between RGs and DPs. 
Notably, it aimed at assessing how the relationship changed with the introduction of 
new modes of development assistance (SWAp and GBS) for health in Uganda. This 
aim was achieved by: exploring the nature of the incentive structure embedded in the 
aid mechanisms available in Uganda and shedding light on the effectiveness of the 
monitoring system and the operation of the penalties and rewards system; unveiling 
the motives of RGs and DPs which helped to understand their behaviours; and 
analysing the appropriateness of agency theory when applied to understand the aid 
contract in the health sector. 
The specific objectives of this thesis were achieved by: 
- Describing the existing monitoring mechanisms and by identifying that in the case of 
Uganda it focused on inputs, process, outputs rather than on outcomes; 
- Examining the effectiveness of the mechanism for monitoring performance and 
showing the weaknesses of structures and processes in place as well as the 
shortcomings of the JRM process; 
- Highlighting the implications of the monitoring mechanisms for behaviour under the 
aid contract and revealing problems of information asymmetries and information 
problems as moral hazard/hidden action and effort; 
- Exploring the nature of the compensation scheme (penalty-reward system) adopted 
under the new aid modalities and identifying it to be a subjective one; 
- Assessing how credible the penalties and rewards were from the agents' point of 
view and how the credibility affected their actions by unveiling the problem of a 
distorted penalties and rewards system which benefited both DPs and the RG; 
- Assessing how the parties understood the nature of the contracts (projects, SWAp, 
GBS) in terms of objectives or expectations by showing the motives of the parties and 
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related conflicting objective functions embedded in the aid contract both individually 
and from an organisational point of view. 
Having demonstrated the achievement of the thesis' aims and objectives, the next 
section of this chapter presents the main conclusions of this investigation. The 
following section discusses implications for policy and practice of essential issues 
identified in the thesis. Section four presents the contributions made by this 
investigation towards knowledge. The final section suggests further areas of research. 
9.2 Conclusions of the thesis 
From the perspective of principal agency theory 
Data collection and analysis improved since the start of HSSP (with the start of SWAp 
and other reforms) but considerable problems still persisted or in some cases 
worsened. These problems were likely to be related to the lack of commitment/effort 
towards improvements from both sides - Government and DPs. Thus, the existing 
system of monitoring appeared to be constrained in its ability to reveal information on 
actual performance (i. e. did not reduce information asymmetries) and the weaknesses 
in the system allowed the agent opportunities to avoid effort or shirk responsibilities. 
The fact that the new aid modalities (SWAp/GBS) relied on such a weak Government 
system of data production and reporting, as well as suffering from a lack of verification 
systems, constitutes a disadvantage of these aid modalities which constrains 
improvements in the aid contract and consequently aid effectiveness. 
The mechanisms and processes of monitoring focused on inputs-processes-outputs 
to a greater extent than on outcomes. The weaknesses of the input-output model 
analysed in this thesis highlight the type of difficulties the international aid community 
is likely to face in moving towards an outcome-based system of monitoring. Such a 
system would need to be stronger in providing information to the principal and 
controlling the scope for the agent to further engage in opportunistic behaviours. 
DPs at country level acted as agents of their own country Governments and were 
under pressure to disburse aid funds. Accordingly, while DPs were able to observe 
poor performance, they failed in their roles of principals at country level to hold the 
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recipient government (agent) to account by penalising them. In addition, DPs distorted 
the penalties and rewards system by 'rewarding' Uganda with funds like PEPFAR in 
order to be associated with its success, again responding to the pressure to disburse 
aid. In this context, the Government, which fell short of demonstrating 
commitment/effort towards improving its performance and enhancing the monitoring 
system, also lacked incentives from DPs. 
Reforms within the aid effectiveness agenda may seek to provide incentives to 
reconcile the objective functions of principals and agents and the goals of the 
beneficiary population. A key problem though seemed to be how to provide incentives 
that would be sufficient in minimising conflicts between the parties and lead to 
behaviours in this environment that result in a maximisation of aid effectiveness (e. g. 
improved health outcomes). Underlying this problem was the great complexity which 
involved contract incompleteness and elements of implicitness in the contractual 
relationship, more specifically: 
- Numerous layers of principal-agent relationships and DPs simultaneously acting as 
principals and agents; 
- Multiplicity of and conflicting objectives and the difficulties to understand and predict 
incentives; 
- Bureaucracy and other problems related to the public sector being a monopoly (lack 
of competition of agents); 
- Weak institutional environment; 
- Information asymmetries; and 
- Moral hazard. 
The principal agent framework was helpful in understanding various dimensions 
embedded in this research. However, it presented some limitations and was less 
useful in providing explanations for the politically charged and dynamic setting of a 
low income country like Uganda. Hence, principal agency as a single conceptual 
framework is not ideal for understanding the complexities in such contexts. 
Outside the principal agent theory 
Geopolitical (or strategic) and domestic governance agendas played a role in 
explaining the way the sector and new aid modalities operated. Available evidence 
indicated that geopolitics and commercial interests were among the various goals of 
Development Partners. While it would be expected that DPs would be more focused 
249 
on aid effectiveness, the geopolitical goals and the focus on volume of aid (that 
needed to be disbursed) took priority. 
Finally in relation to the study's design, while its cross-cutting nature allowed for an in- 
depth understanding of a range of dimensions that affected the aid contract, such 
design made the study prone to the specificities of the time scale it covered. A more 
longitudinal design would have captured other dimensions that unfolded later in the 
research and helped to further understand some domestic governance constraints 
(e. g. the term third issue) to the aid relationship. 
9.3 Implications for policy and practice 
Evidence from studying the input-based model in Uganda suggests that there is need 
for considerable improvements of the M&E processes and structures before an 
outcome-based system is introduced, as the latter may prove to be even more 
problematic. However, even if further improvements take place, if results are to be 
attached to aid disbursements based on the opinion of interviewees, these may have 
to continue to be based on output data (e. g. OPD or CYP) given the time lag needed 
to measure outcomes and the periodicity of aid disbursements. 
The development of a more explicit and rigorous system of performance appraisal on 
which to base the compensation scheme should be carefully considered. Alternatives 
in relation to the existing implicit/subjective nature of the performance assessment 
and control mechanisms are needed. For instance, the performance assessment 
system could make greater use of more clearly quantifiable undertakings. In addition, 
the systems of validation and verification would benefit from considerable 
improvements. These could perhaps minimise the scope for the agent to shirk and for 
DPs to distort the penalties and rewards system. However, there were attempts to use 
a more explicit system like the one adopted by the EU or the PRSC WB, and they 
were still subjective and allowed distortion in view of pressure exercised by the 
Government or donors. In spite of the possible advantages of a more explicit 
compensation scheme, the problems of the existing incentive structure and overall 
governance issues, both domestically (to the RG) and internationally, indicate that it 
may help in some settings depending on the prevailing scenario but it may not in 
others. 
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In this context an option worth contemplation is multilateralism as a means to 
counterbalance the problems of geopolitical and commercial motives in delivering aid. 
The EU system, while relatively subjective, still represented an attempt to improve the 
existing system of performance appraisal through the introduction of the trigger point 
mechanisms to disburse funds. The GFATM and GAVI were two of the few institutions 
that penalised the Government due to corruption. These behaviours could be linked to 
the fact that these multilateral aid organisations are less influenced by geopolitical and 
commercial interests, as in the case of the bilateral agencies. 
Generally, there is need to foster a more favourable domestic governance 
environment that is rooted in strong ownership and leadership by local politicians, with 
clear commitment towards improving health sector performance, and not in pursuit of 
individual goals (maintenance of power or corrupt practices). The challenges towards 
these goals are many and by no means new to the development community. Yet 
further efforts should continue to be devoted towards strengthening national and local 
accountability systems. This should involve: the empowering of the system of 
representation (e. g. Parliament) to hold Government to account; stronger involvement 
of Civil Society Organisations in the policy process and monitoring of Government 
service delivery; and a free press that can also play a role in holding the Government 
accountable to the country's priorities vis-ä-vis the beneficiary population. These 
interventions could improve the governance environment which could lead to a more 
conducive environment towards reforms and aid being used more effectively in the 
health sector - and eventually contribute towards public health goals. Still donors' 
pressure to disburse may undermine the scope of action of local accountability if civil 
society lacks power and parliaments are subject to patronage practices. Any concrete 
and lasting improvements in this area are probably more likely to bear fruit if they 
result from indigenous forces and are based on a genuine pursuit of greater 
sovereignty of low income countries. 
Equally important is the need to substantially strengthen accountability mechanisms of 
donor countries. (including both bilateral and multilateral). Evidence presented in 
chapter 8 indicated that the media had some influence in holding donor governments 
to account. However, there is still need of much stronger mechanisms of 
accountability of donor behaviour. Particularly important would be to get the ultimate 
principals (tax payers) more involved. One possible idea would be to enable their 
participation in some type of policy review board of aid effectiveness at donor country 
level. A greater engagement of the ultimate principals in the policy process of aid 
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formulation and delivery could contribute towards a deeper understanding of what it is 
expected in terms of performance of donor agencies. This could perhaps highlight that 
the focus of performance should go beyond increasing the amount of aid disbursed to 
focus instead on how well these funds are contributing to concrete changes in health 
outcomes in low income countries, for example. 
In a future scenario of the world moving more closely towards global governance 
structures, as opposed to the existing international governance system of today as 
exemplified by the United Nations101, the aid system could benefit from an overarching 
regulatory body. Such a body would enforce sanctions in case of donors' 
misbehaviour, such as the use of aid as a political or commercial instrument. In the 
absence of such a regulatory body, current proposals such as the peer review system 
established by the DAC/OECD could perhaps at least serve to put some pressure on 
donors. Yet the problem of who would have the power to apply sanctions effectively 
still remains. 
Meanwhile, a more concrete option may be to have greater flexibility in how aid is to 
be delivered in the context of fast-changing governance contexts. This study showed 
that aid seemed to be more effective during the early phase of the SWAp (2000-2002) 
under a favourable governance environment, but less effective later (2003-2004) 
when other agendas came to the fore as the governance context deteriorated. Hence, 
where there is a good governance environment and trust, GBS and/or SWAp (which is 
subject to the problem of collective action) seem to operate better. Where bad 
governance prevails, projects may offer donors more control over resources and their 
administration. Thus, GBS/SWAp donors like DFID need to take a more flexible 
approach towards the way they channel aid. GBS may suit donors that have seen a 
substantial increase in their allocations as they allow for the disbursement of large 
volumes of aid to a single entity, thus potentially reducing transaction costs for the 
donor agency. However, clear strategies need to be put into place for phases when 
disinvesting from SWAp/GBS towards projects as a more effective way of delivering 
aid. 
Regarding the confused use of the term aid effectiveness and the range of ideas 
around it, such as paying for results, more clarification is needed, including more 
careful adaptation towards the specific elements of each sector (e. g. health). Further, 
101 It is difficult though to glimpse such a world since today's one has been dominated by a few super- 
powers, often acting unilaterally. 
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debates such as those centred on the pros and cons of different aid modalities could 
be taken forward by looking at effectiveness more in terms of the governance 
environment within which these aid modalities are embedded, and how positively or 
negatively it is influencing the delivery and overall performance of aid. 
9.4 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis has contributed to advance knowledge in a number of ways. It was the first 
study to provide an analysis of IDAH using agency theory as a conceptual framework. 
In addition it provided a detailed empirical country-level assessment of the relationship 
between donors and the Ugandan Government through the lens of the introduction of 
new aid modalities (GBS and SWAp) which co-existed with projects and GHIs - which 
came to be implemented later. 
More specifically, new knowledge was gained in relation to how these aid modalities 
were implemented. This included: insights from the perspective of individuals involved 
in the delivery of aid concerning the risks and uncertainties as to the use of outcomes 
as a measure of performance of the aid contract; the way penalties and rewards were 
distorted pointing to related constraints and the underlying incentive structure that led 
both parties to benefit from the distorted system; and the understanding of objective 
functions by comparing and contrasting stated motives of individuals and 
organisations with the observed behaviours of both RG and DPs. 
Further contributions to knowledge covered the additional dimensions / themes that 
emerged through the investigation beyond the conceptual framework. These were: 
that there is confusion as to who is the principal and who is the agent and while DPs 
acted as both, the RG did not; the relevance of understanding the domestic 
governance scenario, the international changing aid environment, and the complex 
and dynamic nature of aid relationships. 
The above elements have contributed to provide a more nuanced picture of the 
challenges involved in improving aid effectiveness. The complexities related to this 
environment are often times neglected in the pursuit by the international aid 
community of simple and quick solutions, as with the recent trend of paying for results. 
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Finally, in regard to its methodological contribution, this study is one of the few in the 
health policy literature to adopt a realist perspective as well as a case study approach 
combined with the analytic narrative in an explicit form. 
9.5 Further research 
In view of the limitations of agency theory in providing explanations for this study, 
future research in this area ought to develop analytical frameworks that incorporate 
other theoretical contributions beyond the agency framework applied in this thesis. 
Alternative frameworks would perhaps have helped me to capture and explain more 
fully the shifts in the political and governance environments. Examples of other 
contributions include: political economy, new institutionalism and complexity theory. 
The dynamic environment within which the aid contract is embedded both 
internationally and domestically means many changes took place after the start of this 
study. Hence, it would be useful to expand the analysis to shed more light on the 
governance of the aid contract with a focus on donor countries. This would be 
particularly interesting given the context of greater attention towards Africa especially 
in the UK. The analysis would focus on: 
- Whether penalties applied are viewed as successes or failures of aid agencies 
in the eyes of tax payers. 
-A further understanding of the motives of aid officials at headquarters / 
international level, by looking at their career objectives and trajectories. 
- An investigation of the role of the media which, as found in this study, 
appeared to have played some role (not clear how strong) in putting pressure 
on donors to cut aid in view of governance problems. 
Moreover, it is suggested that further analysis takes place in Uganda focusing on the 
objective functions of the parties regarding individual motives and the role they play in 
relation to the behaviour of their organisations in view of staff changes (both within 
Government and DP organisations). A better understanding of the motivations of, 
actors could perhaps help in devising mechanisms to curb some of the perverse 
incentives in the system. 
In relation to both the domestic and international environments for aid, a critical need 
is to develop the evidence base on mechanisms and processes that play a role in 
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strengthening accountability mechanisms, and thus contribute towards creating a link 
between the ultimate tax payers and the beneficiaries of aid. 
A comparative analysis with a different country context would help to elucidate the 
extent to which the results found in Uganda match, or not, other low income country 
environments / different governance circumstances. More specifically, it would 
contribute towards: a further understanding as to whether a different recipient 
government dynamic may change the behaviour of donors (regarding their roles as 
principals) - e. g. perhaps a recipient country with a government more committed 
towards health systems goals would put pressure on donors to be more effective 
principals. Examples of where perhaps the government might be less amenable to let 
donors do what they want (which however does not necessarily mean they are more 
committed to public health goals) include Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Last, another area that deserves more investigation concerns the scope for 
multilateral agencies to perform more in line with aid effectiveness goals in the health 
sector. Agencies that would be particularly worth studying would be the EU and the 
GFATM which were using more explicit mechanisms and seemed to be applying 
penalties accordingly at least in some instances, in contrast to others which did not. 
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Appendix 1: Methods and techniques according to research objectives 
and questions 
285 
Specific objectives I Key research questions Methods / techniques / sources 
- to describe the existing monitoring mechanisms - review of project documents, memoranda of understanding, project 
and how they differ In terms of focus (inputs, evaluation reports, annual progress reports, JRMs aid-memoirs, 
process, outputs, outcomes) consultants' reports 
- to examine the effectiveness of the mechanisms, 
as understood by the actors, for monitoring - informal and semi-structured Interviews with staff IDPs, MoF and 
performance. MoH, participant observation and review of diary/field notes 
- to examine If since the introduction of the new aid - informal and semi-structured Interviews with staff from IDPs, MoH 
modes, there have been attempts to improve and MoF. Review of documents that describe the introduction or 
existing mechanisms of accountability, in terms of reforms of performance assessment tools. If possible, review tools (for 
control of resources (in the form of tracking studies example results of surveys) 
for example) and monitoring of outcomes 
- to investigate the implications of the different 
monitoring mechanisms and related focus to the aid 
contract: 
- the role played by other performance Indicators - Informal and semi-structured interviews with staff IDPs, MoF and 
such as input, process and intermediate health MoH; review of evaluation and audit documents; analysis of resource 
outcomes allocations and budgetary expenditures; and participant observation 
- to what extent final health outcomes are being - informal and semi-structured interviews with staff IDPs, MoF and 
used in the Ugandan context and related MoH; participant observation 
problems 
- probe analysis involving Informal and semi-structured Interviews with 
staff IDPs, MoF and MoH; participant observation; and review of the 
health sector strategic plan (and other documents setting out 
- to Investigate the role of trust, in the different aid performance indicators) 
modalities and monitoring mechanisms and how 
trust has contributed to change the nature of the - informal and semi-structured Interviews with staff from IDPs, MoH 
relationship between the partners and MoF as well as participant observation and review of field notes 
- to assess implicit mechanisms by which - review documents such as IDPs' strategy papers and annual reports 
performance and penalties and rewards could be and analyse resource allocations and budgetary expenditures to 
linked under SWAp or GBS: examine possible changes in volume of aid or changes of aid modes 
- to consider the more indirect dimensions of - Informal Interviews, participant observation, review of diary / field 
penalties and rewards used in the different aid notes, review of information published in the media; and internal 
modalities reports 
- to explore how credible the penalties and 
rewards are from the agents' point of view and - informal and semi-structured interviews, participant observation, 
how the credibility affects their actions review of field notes, review and internal reports 
(incentives to under-perform) 
- to investigate the extent to which the implicit - informal and semi-structured interviews, participant observation, 
compensation scheme is used to attempt to review of diary / field notes, review of information published in the 
manage conflicting objective functions media, and internal reports 
- to assess how the parties understand the nature of - informal and semi-structured interviews with staff from MoH, MoF, 
the contracts (projects, SWAp, GBS) in terms of and IDPs as well as review of documents related to agreements of 
objectives or expectations collaboration between the parties 
- to observe conflicting objective functions'02 by identifying tools, rewards, penalties and 
sanctions that principals use to guide an agent's 
behaviour: 
- inter-organisational (between IDPs and - review of policy documents, strategy papers, and interviews with 
the RG) senior staff 
- infra-organisational (in the RG between - interviews with junior staff from MoF and MoH to look at the tools 
the ministries of health and finance) used by higher ranking officials to get what they pursue, as well as 
review of internal documents (financial reports) 
102 Questions in the interview guide related to this theme were based on questions used previously by 
Jolly Kamwanga. 
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Appendix 2: Categories of individuals participating in the various types 
of meetings observed'03 
103 This list provides an overview of the categories of participants in the meetings I observed; it does not 
reflect an accurate account of all participants. 
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Meetings Gov DP Others (civil 
(frequency they 
'4 
society, 
occurred ) consultants, 
researchers etc. 
PER Led by MoFPED with representatives DFID, DANIDA, SIDA, DCI, Various NGOs, 
(Yearly) of the various line ministries, members USAID, NORAD, Netherlands, civil society 
of parliament etc. Italian Cooperation, Jica, GTZ, groups, 
WHO, UNICEF, sometimes researchers 
UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNDP, 
World Bank; European Union; 
ADB 
PEAP review Led by MoFPED with representatives DFID, DANIDA, SIDA, DCI, Various NGOs, 
(Every 3 years) of the various line ministries, members USAID, NORAD, Netherlands, civil society 
of parliament, etc. Italian Cooperation, Jica, GTZ, groups, 
WHO, UNICEF, sometimes researchers 
UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNDP, 
World Bank; European Union; 
ADB 
NHA Led by MoH (various units from the UN agencies (WHO, UNICEF, Various NGOs, 
(Yearly) Ministry would be represented by one UNFPA, UNAIDS); civil society 
or more officials) multilaterals (World Bank and groups, 
Health Services Commission, National European Union); bilaterals researchers 
Drug Authority, National Referral (DFID, USAID, DANIDA, 
Hospitals, National Medical Stores, SIDA, DCI, Italian 
Uganda National Health Research Cooperation, Jica, NORAD) 
Organisation, Uganda AIDS 
Commission, DDHSs, CAOs and 
some District Chairpersons, Members 
of Parliament, other ministries 
(MoFPED, MoPS, MoLG, MoES, 
MoW LE 
JRM Led by MoH (most units from the UN agencies (WHO, UNICEF, Various NGOs, 
(Yearly) Ministry would be represented by one UNFPA, UNAIDS); civil society 
or more officials) multilaterals (World Bank, groups, 
Health Services Commission, National ADB, European Union); Professional 
Drug Authority, National Referral bilaterals (DFID, USAID, Councils, 
Hospitals, National Medical Stores, DANIDA, SIDA, DCI, Italian researchers 
Uganda National Health Research Cooperation, Jica, GTZ, 
Organisation, Uganda AIDS NORAD) 
Commission, DDHSs, some CAOs 
and District Chairpersons, Members of 
Parliament, other ministries (MoFPED, 
MoPS, MoLG, MoES, MoWLE 
HPAC Led by MoH and included the following - Attendance tended to be: UN TAs based at 
(Monthly) departments (Directorate Planning and agencies (WHO, UNICEF, MoH, UCMB, 
Development, Directora Clinical and sometimes UNFPA, UNAIDS); UPMB, UMMB as 
Community Services, Resource multilaterals (World Bank and observers; 
Centre, Department of Clinical European Union); bilaterals occasionally 
Services, Department of Community (DFID, USAID, DANIDA, some consultants 
Health, Policy Analysis Unit, etc. ), and SIDA, DCI, Italian 
other ministries MoFPED, MoLG Cooperation, Jica 
SWG Led by MoH and included the following DFID, USAID, DANIDA, JICA, UPMB, UCMB 
(Should be departments (PS, Directorate Planning DCI, WHO, Italian 
monthly) and Development, Directorate Clinical Cooperation, World Bank, 
and Comuunity Services, Department European Union 
of Community Health, Health Services 
Commission, Mulago and Butabika 
hospitals) and MoFPED 
HDPG - Open to both GBS/SWAp UCMB as 
(Monthly) and Project donors observers 
- Attendance tended to be: UN 
agencies (WHO, UNICEF, 
sometimes UNFPA, UNAIDS, 
UNDP); multilaterals (World 
Bank and European -Union); 
bilaterals (DFID, USAID, 
DANIDA, SIDA, DCI, Italian 
Cooperation, Jica 
104 Does not necessarily correspond to the frequency I was able to observe them during the period of 
fieldwork). 
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Meetings Gov DP Others (civil 
(frequency they 
'5 
society, 
occurred ) consultants, 
researchers etc. 
HSSP II Led by MoH (Directorate Planning and DFID, USAID, DANIDA, JICA, Consultants, TAs 
Preparatory Development, Directorate Clinical and DCI, WHO, Italian based at MoH, 
meeting Community Services, ACP, RHD, Cooperation, World Bank, NGOs, civil 
(Every five years MCP, UNEPI, Quality Assurance European Union society groups 
but there were a Department, Resource Centre, etc. ) 
series of meetings members of WGs, representatives 
from DDHHs and MoFPED 
Annual DDHS Led by MoH (Directorate Planning and Similar to those attending Consultants 
meeting Development, Directorate Clinical and HPAC 
Community Services, etc). 
DDHSs 
Stakeholders' Led by MoH (Directorate Planning and Similar to those attending NGOs 
meeting on draft Development, Directorate Clinical and HPAC 
AHSPR FY 200/03 Community Services, representatives 
from WGs and DDHSs 
Meeting for the Led by MoH (mainly staff from DIFD, USAID, DANIDA, DCI, Consultants 
Presentation of Directorate Planning and Italian Cooperation 
Tracking Study on Development) 
Programme 9 
Project monitoring: DFID, USAID, DANIDA, TASO 
Taso (funded by European Union 
various bilateral 
and multilateral 
donors) 
Project monitoring Led by MoH included (mental health ADB 
meeting: PHC and department, quality assurance 
Mental health department, health planning 
(funded by ADB) department) 
Project consultation UAC, MoH (e. g. AIDS Control Led by the US Embassy; Various NGOs, 
meeting: PEPFAR Programme) other ministries included various other donors research 
(funded by US representatives and government Institutions 
Government) officials 
105 Does not necessarily correspond to the frequency I was able to observe them during the period of 
fieldwork). 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide106 
106 Please note that most questions were the same to the different group of interviewees. However, 
some questions were specific as to gather information pertinent to the different categories of interviewees 
(i. e. if Government, DPs or a key informant). 
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Government: MoH and MoF 
Nature of the relationship 
- How do you describe the type of relationship you have with DPs? 
Penalty-reward system 
- What do you think constitutes poor performance and how do you think would a DP respond in 
the event of poor performance on the part of the government? (Would there be a series of 
responses to performance failing below a certain ceiling)? 
- How would the government respond to poor performance or behaviour on the part of DPs? 
- Call you tell about the main events or main crisis (disagreements) along the relationship 
between the government and DPs (or if you do not remember just the most recent crisis)? 
- How was the crisis dealt with? Was aid suspended or funds delayed? 
- Has there been in the past examples of threats of reprimand or sanctions due to poor 
performance? Have these threats materialised? If not, has this led to a lesser concern for 
performance? 
- Have there been cases of projects or aid not being extended? 
- Has any DP pulled out of Uganda temporarily or definitely and why? 
- What are the gains for the Government if performance is considered satisfactory or even 
above the satisfactory level? 
- Under what circumstances can the government expect more aid funds? and less? 
Types of principal-agent relationships 
- Who tends to initiate the relationship under the project /SWAp/GBS modes? 
- What do you think is Uganda's comparative advantage in attracting aid vis-ä-vis other 
countries? 
- What strategies do you think the government uses to attract aid? (For example, advocacy on 
scarcity of aid funds in order to attract more aid) 
- Do you think the government determines the volume of aid? And the type of support? 
- Did you have the experience of a project that you wanted and a DP did not or vice-versa? 
- Have you already refused aid from an DP and why? 
- In your opinion where the power lies in this relationship? 
Objective functions 
- What are the goals set by your organisation in respect to the relationship with DPs or what 
kinds of or what kind of motivations underlies the relationship? 
- Can you tell me what do you think are the priorities of the MoH, MoF, DPs and consultants 
from the point of view of organisations and of individuals? 
- How would the MoFPED respond to in the event of poor performance by the MoH? 
To senior Staff 
- How do you motivate your staff to get them to achieve a certain organisational goal? 
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- How is poor performance dealt with? And good performance? Or what are the potential gains 
or losses to staff in case of good or bad performance? 
To junior staff 
- What are the key motivating elements in your job? 
- What are your career objectives (work-related goals)? (Career perspective within your 
institution and or outside (e. g. private sector, NGO, international organisation)? 
- Do you have examples of others in your organisation that have achieved these objectives? If 
yes, what mechanisms did they use? 
- Are these mechanisms available to you? Have you ever used them and what was the 
outcome? 
- Can these career objectives be attained by means of other strategies? 
- Which work circumstance would you like to avoid? (Job loss, demotion, on promotions)? 
- Do you know of someone in your organisation who has experienced such problems? What 
did they do to that caused it? 
Monitoring/accountability 
- Could you please describe the reporting and monitoring mechanisms work in practice 
(including frequency) for the different aid modes in place (surveys, missions, audits etc. )? 
- How effective do you think are the existing monitoring mechanisms / or do you think that they 
are really able to monitor performance? 
- To what extent do you think the right things are being monitored? 
- Do you think the monitoring mechanisms used by the different aid modes vary (one being 
more or less effective than the other) and why? 
- In the way the monitoring and evaluation systems are designed, what do you think are the 
weaknesses in the systems? 
- Are resource flows linked to the monitoring systems? If yes, have there been delays in 
releases of funds because of non-satisfactory performance? 
- Where does the focus of monitoring lie, on inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes? 
- Does the focus differ in the different aid modes? 
- Are performance indicators important in the monitoring process? And what are the 
associated problems (weaknesses) with using these kinds of indicators? 
- Are final outcomes (e. g. maternal mortality or HIV/AIDS incidence) being used for monitoring 
of performance? If yes, under which aid modes? And what are the related problems? 
- Do you see any difficulties with performance related payments in view of risks and 
uncertainties of producing outcomes or outputs and achieving targets? For instance, is it a 
problem to not know how much payment exactly will be due in a year's time? 
- Which targets are being used? And which ones are considered important by your 
organisation? 
- How important do you think are these targets from your point of view? 
- Do you see any problems with the MDGs and PRSPs targets (for HIV/AIDS and maternal 
health)? (Are in line (or not) with national priorities)? 
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- Or do you think that they are driving your work (and neglecting other diseases/targets that 
are not included in the MDGs for example)? 
- Do you feel that the Government is committed to monitoring and evaluation? Does it fund 
research (surveys), audits etc.? 
- Have there been attempts to improve existing mechanisms of accountability, in terms of 
control of resources (e. g. tracking studies) and monitoring of outcomes? 
- Do you think these attempts are bearing fruit? If yes, in what terms? If not, what are the 
constraints or difficulties? 
The role of trust 
- How do you define the term 'trust'? Would you differentiate it in terms of different kinds? 
(Such as trust contract trust, competence trust, goodwill-trust, trust in relation to 
reputation/experience, custom/convention)? 
- Do you think there is a role for trust in the relationship between the government and DPs? 
- Do you think some mechanisms support or undermine the development of trust between DPs 
and the government? If yes, which mechanism supports the development of trust? Which one 
undermines the development of trust? Why? What is it based on? Is it related to the monitoring 
system used? 
- In case of a mode that inspires more trust between the partners, has this contributed to 
change the relationship? If yes, in what ways? 
- In this figure which model do you think characterise the relationship of between the 
government and DPs? Does it vary according to the different aid modes? 
Control- Conditionality Dependency Trust-based 
based -based 
Final question 
- Who else do you suggest I should interview? (Other staff in the MoH/MoFPED, programme 
managers, consultants, NGO representatives etc. ) 
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Development Partners 
Existing modes (and volume) of IDAH 
- What modes of IDA do you operate in Uganda for the health sector and why were these 
chosen? 
- What is the history (chronology) / key events in time in relation to modes of assistance in 
Uganda? 
- What is the amount of resources you provide to the health sector in Uganda and what has 
been the trend (increasing or decreasing) in the past five years? And why do you think this is 
happening? 
Duration of 'contracts' (proiects, SWAps, GBS) 
- How long has your agency been operating in Uganda? 
- Has there been any period of discontinuation of the health sector programme? If yes, why? 
- What is the duration of the SWAp and GBS (if applicable) agreement? 
- What is the average duration of your projects? And are they often renewed or substituted by 
similar ones? 
Reasons for opting for one mode or the other (or along side the other) 
- Why has your agency decided to use the project (for example) mode of assistance and not 
the SWAp or GBS? / or why has your agency decided to use the project mode of assistance 
along side the SWAp or GBS? 
Nature of the contracts (projects, SWAp, GBS) 
- How do you describe the type of relationship you have with the Government (under the 
different aid modes)? 
Penalty-reward system 
- What do you think constitutes poor performance and how would you / your organisation 
respond in the event of poor performance on the part of the government? (Would there be a 
series of responses to performance failing below a certain ceiling)? 
- How do you think the government would respond to poor performance or behaviour on the 
part of DPs? 
- Call you tell about the main events or main crisis (disagreements) along the relationship with 
the government (or if you do not remember just the most recent crisis)? 
- How was the crisis dealt with? Was aid suspended or funds delayed? 
- Has there been in the past examples of threats of reprimand or sanctions due to poor 
performance? Have these threats materialised? If not, has this led to a lesser concern for 
performance? 
- Have there been cases of projects or aid not being extended? 
- Has you agency pulled out of Uganda temporarily or definitely and why? 
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- What are the gains for the Government if performance is considered satisfactory or even 
above the satisfactory level? 
- Under what circumstances can the government expect more aid funds? and less? 
Types of principal-agent relationships 
- Who tends to initiate the relationship under the project /SWAp/GBS modes? 
- Do you think your agency determines the volume of aid? And the type of support? 
- What do you think is Uganda's comparative advantage in attracting aid vis-ä-vis other 
countries? 
- What strategies do you think the government uses to attract aid? (For example, advocacy on 
scarcity of aid funds in order to attract more aid) 
- In your opinion where the power lies in this relationship? 
Obiective functions 
- What are the goals set by your organisation in respect to the relationship with DPs or what 
kinds of or what kind of motivations underlies the relationship? 
- Can you tell me what do you think are the priorities of DPs, MoH, MoF, and consultants from 
the point of view of organisations and of individuals? 
To senior Staff 
- How do you motivate your staff to get them to achieve a certain organisational goal? 
- How is poor performance dealt with? And good performance? Or what are the potential gains 
or losses to staff in case of good or bad performance? 
To junior staff 
- What are the key motivating elements in your job? 
- What are your career objectives (work-related goals)? (Career perspective within your 
institution and or outside (e. g. private sector, NGO, international organisation)? 
- Do you have examples of others in your organisation that have achieved these objectives? If 
yes, what mechanisms did they use? 
- Are these mechanisms available to you? Have you ever used them and what was the 
outcome? 
- Can these career objectives be attained by means of other strategies? 
- Which work circumstance would you like to avoid? (Job loss, demotion, on promotions)? 
- Do you know of someone in your organisation who has experienced such problems? What 
did they do to that caused it? 
Monitoring/accountability 
- Could you please describe the reporting and monitoring mechanisms work in practice 
(including frequency) for the different aid modes in place (surveys, missions, audits etc. )? 
- Are resource flows linked to the monitoring systems? If yes, have there been delays in 
releases of funds because of non-satisfactory performance? 
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- Where does the focus of monitoring lie, on inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes? And 
does the focus differ in the different aid modes? 
- How do you think the monitoring system in Uganda compare to other countries? 
- How effective do you think are the existing monitoring mechanisms / or do you think that they 
are really able to monitor performance? 
- To what extent do you think the right things are being monitored? 
- Do you think the monitoring mechanisms used by the different aid modes vary (one being 
more or less effective than the other) and why? 
- In the way the monitoring and evaluation systems are designed, what do you think are the 
weaknesses in the systems? 
- Are performance indicators important in the monitoring process? And what are the 
associated problems (weaknesses) with using these kinds of indicators? 
- Are final outcomes (e. g. maternal mortality or HIV/AIDS incidence) being used for monitoring 
of performance? If yes, under which aid modes? And what are the related problems? 
- Do you see any difficulties with performance related payments in view of risks and 
uncertainties of producing outcomes or outputs and achieving targets? For instance, is it a 
problem to not know haw much payment exactly will be due in a year's time? 
- Which targets are being used? And which ones are considered important by your 
organisation? 
- How important do you think are these targets from your point of view? 
- Do you see any problems with the MDGs and PRSPs targets (for HIV/AIDS and maternal 
health)? (Are in line (or not) with national priorities)? 
- What do you think is the level of commitment of the government to monitoring and 
evaluation? Do they fund research (e. g. surveys), audits, etc.? 
- Have there been attempts to improve existing mechanisms of accountability, in terms of 
control of resources (e. g. tracking studies) and monitoring of outcomes? 
- Do you think these attempts are bearing fruit? If yes, in what terms? If not, what are the 
difficulties or constraints? 
The role of trust 
- How do you define the term 'trust'? Would you differentiate it in terms of different kinds? 
(Such as trust contract trust, competence trust, goodwill-trust, trust in relation to 
reputation/experience, custom/convention)? 
- Do you think there is a role for trust in the relationship between the government and DPs? 
- Do you think some mechanisms support or undermine the development of trust between DPs 
and the government? If yes, which mechanism supports the development of trust? Which one 
undermines the development of trust? Why? What is it based on? Is it related to the monitoring 
system used? 
- In case of a mode that inspires more trust between the partners, has this contributed to 
change the relationship? If yes, in what ways? 
- Do you think some DPs trust the government more than others? 
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- In this figure which model do you think characterise the relationship between the government 
and DPs? Does it vary according to the different aid modes? 
Control- Conditionality Dependency Trust-based 
based - based 
Final question 
- Who else do you suggest I should interview? (Other staff in your agency, consultants, 
NGO 
representatives, etc. ) 
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Key informants 
Existing modes (and volume) of IDAH 
- What are the existing modes of IDA for the health sector and why were these chosen? 
- What is the history (chronology) / key events in time in relation to modes of assistance in 
Uganda? 
- What has been the trend in the last five years (increasing or decreasing) of resources of IDA 
provided to the health sector and why do you think this is happening? 
Leverage of different DPs 
- Who do you think are the most influential DP. s? 
- Why / what makes them more influential (volume of aid, competence of technical staff, and 
efficiency in the management of the aid programme)? 
Reasons for opting for one mode or the other (or along side the other) 
- Why are DPs deciding to use one mode of assistance or the other (or along side the other)? 
[For example SWAp or GBS (and projects along side)] 
Nature of the contracts (projects, SWAP, GBS) 
- How do you describe the type of relationship between the Government and DPs (under the 
different aid modes)? 
Penalty-reward system 
- What do you think constitutes poor performance and how would a DP respond in the event of 
poor performance on the part of the government? (Would there be a series of responses to 
performance failing below a certain ceiling)? 
- How would the government respond to poor performance or behaviour on the part of DPs? 
- Call you tell about the main events or main crisis (disagreements) along the relationship 
between the government and DPs (or if you do not remember just the most recent crisis)? 
- How was the crisis dealt with? Was aid suspended or funds delayed? 
- Has there been in the past examples of threats of reprimand or sanctions due to poor 
performance? Have these threats materialised? If not, has this led to a lesser concern for 
performance? 
- Have there been cases of projects or aid not being extended? 
- Has any DP agency pulled out of Uganda temporarily or definitely and why? 
- What are the gains for the Government if performance is considered satisfactory or even 
above the satisfactory level? 
- Under what circumstances can the government expect more aid funds? and less? 
Types of principal-agent relationships 
- Who tends to initiate the relationship under the project ISWApIGBS modes? 
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- Who do you think determines the volume of aid, the Government or DPs? And the type of 
support? 
- Do you know of a case when a DP wanted to implement a project or programme and the 
government did not want or vice-versa? 
- What do you think is Uganda's comparative advantage in attracting aid vis-ä-vis other 
countries? 
- What strategies do you think the government uses to attract aid? (For example, advocacy on 
scarcity of aid funds in order to attract more aid) 
- Has there been a case of Uganda refusing aid from a DP and why? 
- In your opinion where the power lies in this relationship? 
Objective functions 
- What kinds of motivations (what are their goals) underlies the relationship between DPs and 
the Government? 
- Can you tell me what do you think are the priorities of DPs, MoH, MoF, and consultants from 
the point of view of organisations and of individuals? 
- How would the MoFPED respond to in the event of poor performance by the MoH? 
Monitoring/accountability 
- How do you think the reporting and monitoring mechanisms work in practice (including 
frequency) for the different aid modes in place (surveys, missions, audits etc. )? 
- Are resource flows linked to the monitoring systems? If yes, have there been delays in 
releases of funds because of non-satisfactory performance? 
- Where does the focus of monitoring lie, on inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes? And 
does the focus differ in the different aid modes? 
- (How do you think the monitoring system in Uganda compare to other countries)? 
- For whom do you think are the existing monitoring mechanisms effective? And who's view of 
performance do the monitoring mechanisms reflect? 
- To what extent do you think the right things are being monitored? 
- Do you think the monitoring mechanisms used by the different aid modes vary (one being 
more or less effective than the other) and why? 
- In the way the monitoring and evaluation systems are designed, what do you think are the 
weaknesses in the systems? 
- Are performance indicators important in the monitoring process? And what are the 
associated problems (weaknesses) with using these kinds of indicators? 
- Are final outcomes (e. g. maternal mortality or HIV/AIDS incidence) being used for monitoring 
of performance? If yes, under which aid modes? And what are the related problems? 
- Do you see any difficulties with performance related payments in view of risks and 
uncertainties of producing outcomes or outputs and achieving targets? For instance, is it a 
problem to not know how much payment exactly will be due in a year's time? 
- Which targets are being used? And which, ones are important from your point of view? 
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- How important do you think are these targets for the different organisations (MoH, MoFPED, 
DPs)? 
- Do you see any problems with the MDGs and PRSPs targets (for HIV/AIDS and maternal 
health)? (Are in line (or not) with national priorities)? 
- Or do you think that they are driving the work of the MoH (and neglecting other 
diseases/targets that are not included in the MDGs for example)? 
- Do you think these organisations (MoH, MoFPED, DPs) are truly committed to monitoring 
and evaluation? Who funds research (e. g. surveys - like the DHS), audits, etc.? 
- Have there been attempts to improve existing mechanisms of accountability, in terms of 
control of resources (e. g. tracking studies) and monitoring of outcomes? 
- Do you think these attempts are bearing fruit? If yes, in what terms? If not, what are the 
difficulties or constraints? 
The role of trust 
- How do you define the term 'trust'? Would you differentiate it in terms of different kinds? 
(Such as trust contract trust, competence trust, goodwill-trust, trust in relation to 
reputation/experience, custom/convention)? 
- Do you think there is a role for trust in the relationship between the government and DPs? 
- Do you think some mechanisms support or undermine the development of trust between DPs 
and the government? If yes, which mechanism supports the development of trust? Which one 
undermines the development of trust? Why? What is it based on? Is it related to the monitoring 
system used? 
- In case of a mode that inspires more trust between the partners, has this contributed to 
change the relationship? If yes, in what ways? 
- Do you think some DPs trust the government more than others? 
- In this figure which model do you think characterise the relationship between the government 
and DPs? Does it vary according to the different aid modes? 
Control- Conditionality Dependency Trust-based 
based -based 
Final question 
- Who else do you suggest I should interview? (Staff in the MoH/MoFPED/DP agency, 
programme managers, consultants, NGO representative, etc. ) 
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Appendix 4: Interviewees according to their organisational affiliation, sex 
and level of seniority 
301 
N 
N 
C 
N 
M 
_ 
LL 
U) Ü 
. ' U) co 
N 
NO 
LL >0 ÜZ N 
N 
(ii r 
Cl) 
C 
r, r L LL () 
LO U) 
U) '-- 
y 
N 
fp 
r 
U 
Lo - 
C 
N 
O 
7C N 
N ý.. 
E 
O N 2> N LL - M V 
O CL C. _ U) r 
d -ý 
U) 
w 
>U)) "7 M 
CN LL U 
lÖ Co 
) 
U) CV 
N 
N 
U) 
Q fM 
W 
LL LL 
N 0 
E 
E an N 
0 o (D 
U) M 
N 
IL N ö 
r U) 
U) 
d 
y 
Oý 
0) 
N 
0 
- w 2 
u 
161 
U) 
D 
E 
O 
2 
L' 
O 
C 
u) 
_O 
I) 
a) 
ca E 
a) 
y0 
a 
LL 
I- CD L 
rn 
co 
rn 
E 
a) 
U 
n 
O 
c) U 
N 
U) 
U 
N 
ß 
0 
2ý 
co to N 
N Q) 
G) U) 
U f0 
C a) 
cE 
=' c 
r 
a) 
U) 
Ü 
2 
C2. 
C G) 
2y 
m3 
NÜ 
IC 
NO 
wN 
C 
a) 
Cý. 
a) 
ýQm 
110, o `ö 
E 
ya) C 
OO 
m=C 
ýOt 
(D L) 
C nE 
O U) 
CC) EN 
3 
m >, C) 
Cl) Ui 
CD 
ä>- 
ErM EE 
EE o Q' 
C0 
o 
0) t "n aý- 
aDäöd 
oEEnca0) 
cE-° 
>>0)ä 
20 
.0 CL 0o oac 2aýmý 
aa)ö 
"E °)v -, 
v 42 Z)>ýW- 
a)CaýaýN 
F- F- 
ýöö° 
Appendix 5: Ethical and research approval 
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gational QGountit 
, 
For &cienct anb wecPnoiogp 
(Established by Act of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda) 
i(our Ref ................................ 
zur Ref ................. S.. 1499.. Date: ............ 20-Noi -ß3 
Ms. Valeria Oliveira Cruz 
C/o Institute of Public Health 
Makerere University 
P. O Box 7072 
KAMPALA 
Dear Ms. Oliveira Cruz, 
RE: RESEARCH PROJECT, "USING AGENCY THEORY TO LOOK AT 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS: A UGANDAN CASE 
STUDY " 
This is to inform you that the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) 
approved the above research proposal on November 19,2003. The approval will expire on 
August 19,2004. If it is necessary to continue with the research beyond the expiry date, a 
request for continuation should be made in writing to the Executive Secretary, UNCST. 
Any problems of a serious nature related to the execution of your research project should be 
brought to the attention of the UNCST, and any changes to the research protocol should not be 
implemented without UNCST's approval except when necessary to eliminate apparent 
immediate hazards to the research participants(s). 
This letter also serves as proof of UNCST approval and as a reminder for you to submit to 
UNCST timely progress reports and a final report on completion of the research project. 
Yours sincerely, 
Julius u 
for: Executive Secretary 
UGANDA NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
LOCATION/CORRESPONDENCE 
PLOT 10, KArr1'AL4ROAD 
UGANDA 11O USE, 11Th/ FLOOR 
P. O. BOX6894 
KAMPALA, UGANDA. 
COMMUNICATION 
TEL: (256)41-2504" 
PAX: (256)11.234579 
E-MAIL: uncst@starcnm. co. ug 
WEBSITE: http /Iwww. uncst. paug 
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MAKERERE UNIVERSITY 
P. O. Box 7072 Kampala Uganda Tel: 256-41-532207/543872/543437 
E-mail: fwabwirc a iph. ac. ug ., e. ý... ý... Fax: 256-41-531807 
Wcbsitc: http: f/wwlv. iph. ac. ur 
INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
October 31,2003 
Dr Nyi ira 
Executive Secretary 
Uganda National Council of Science and Technology 
Kampala 
Dear Dr Nyiira 
RE: PROPOSAL ENTITLED "USING AGENCY THEORY TO LOOK AT 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATION 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS: A UGANDAN CASE STUDY" 
The above proposal by Ms Valeria Oliveira Cruz was reviewed during the 8"' meeting of the 
Higher Degrees, Research and Ethics Committee meeting held on September 30`x', 2003 in the 
MU 1PH Board Room. The committee suggested some changes, which have been incorporated 
to our satisfaction. I wish therefore to recommend the proposal to you for approval. 
I am attaching the revised proposal, the minutes of the 8`h Higher Degrees, Research and Ethics 
Committee meeting and communication from Dr George Pariyo who reviewed the proposal on 
our behalf verifying that the recommendations have been incorporated. 
Sincerely, 
Assoc. Prof. Fred Wabwire-Mangen 
Chairman, Higher Degrees, Research and Ethics Committee 
Cc: Ms Valeria Oliveira Cruz 
MN RM ýIt1W 
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From: Tom Meade 
To: Valeria Oliveira-Cruz 
CC: Barbara McPake, Ethics@Ishtm. ac. uk 
Date: Wednesday - February 11,2004 2: 17 PM 
Subject: Re: Ethics Committee 1037: Using agency theory ... 
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N 
Read Later Properties 
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Dear Valeria, 
Thanks very much. That's fine and I have now approved the study. Good luck with it. 
Tom Meade 
Tom Meade 
Tel: 020 7927 2182 
Fax: 020 7580 6897 
»> Valeria Oliveira-Cruz 2/11/2004 14: 08: 18 »> 
Dear Tom Meade 
Thanks for your comments. 
Clarifications from my part are as follows: 
-I agree there is potential bias from relying on contacts from IDPs and RGs to suggest 
interviewees, In trying to avoid this, since I arrived I have tried to map out the actors from 
both sides and decided to interview at least one official from each bilateral agency 
(multilateral agencies excluded since it would be too a large of a project and not manageable 
within the time frame available). If possible I will interview a second person in each agency 
as well. The choice of one person per agency may be because they only have one person for 
health. When they have two then there is usually a senior and a junior one. As for officials at 
the *Government I am trying to interview at least one official from the priority programmes 
[(HIV/AIDS and maternal health) as redefined in my project following recommendations from 
the upgrading] and will interview a range of officials from the planning department in the 
ministry. Further other officials such as the director general will be approached for an 
interview. So the idea now is to rely much less on simple indication or suggestion of 
interviewees and try. to work on the interviews through the structures of the different 
agencies. 
- The initial information we had about the small number of donors involved in GBS (one or 
two agencies) has now, with field-work information, being updated. Luckily the number is 
now 9 different development partners participating in this aid modality. So the problem of 
maintaining confidentiality because of small numbers of donors in GBS has now considerably 
decreased. Given this changed circumstance, I will opt for the option to describe the results 
for the group as a whole, according to the suggested options in bullet 3 of your email. 
Best recurds... 1/aleria ........................................... 
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June 2003 
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE & TROPICAL MEDICINE , 3LtKeppel Street, London WC1 E 7HT 
Application Number 
........... (To be added by the Secretary) A" QN FORM A 
ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPLICATION TO CONDUCT A STUDY INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
This form should be completed, signed by the Principal Investigator and Head of Department, and 
returned to Nicole Levin (Room 40), LSHTM, Keppel Street, London WC1 E 7HT. 
Name of Principal Investigator: Valeria de Oliveira Cruz ............................................................... 
Appointment held: Research Fellow ................... Date:.................................................................. 
Other Personnel involved: Dr. Barbara McPake, PhD supervisor ........................................... 
Title of project: 
Using Agency Theory to Analyse Relationships 
in Development Partnerships 
I approve this project scientifically. 
(Signature of Head of Department) 
Date .................. ........................ 
Received by Ethics Committee 
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1. Give an outline of the proposed project. Sufficient detail of the protocol must be 
given to allow the Committee to make an informed decision without reference to other 
documents. 
(Additional material should only be attached if considered absolutely necessary). 
Previous studies of relationships between recipient governments (RGs) and 
international development partners (IDPs) in the health sector have tended to apply 
political economy frameworks to understand the key interchanges between these two 
sets of actors. Recently, agency theory has been used to further this analysis, but its 
use has not been applied to the health sector specifically. This study aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of the types of principal agent relationships 
between RGs and IDPs and how these are affected by different aid modalities 
in the health sector in Uganda. Lack of accountability and transparency in practices 
and mechanisms of both sides have been persistent complaints in RG-IDP 
relationships. Hence, we analyse the circumstances under which IDPs act as 
principals and RGs as agents,, and, in contrast to previous studies, when RGs act as 
principals and IDPs as agents. New ways of structuring aid modalities offer 
approaches to managing the relationships differently by altering the incentive and 
monitoring environment. In the Ugandan health sector, responsibility for meeting 
development targets is reviewed at a Joint Review Mission attended by all relevant 
state actors and IDPs. This new monitoring mechanism focuses on outcomes rather 
than inputs to a greater extent than project modes of assistance, and can, therefore, 
change the nature of the relationship between RGs and IDPs. We use qualitative 
methods (interviews, observation of meetings and documentary analysis) to 
understand the effects of this restructuring, specifically analysing alternative aid 
modalities in terms of incentive compatibility, rewards and penalties. 
2. State the intended value of the project. (If this project or a similar one has been 
done before what is the value of repeating it? ). 
The literature review for this project has highlighted an array of incentive problems 
arising from: a range of conflicts of interests between the various actors involved in 
the IDA, the multiple layers of delegation between actors and organisations, the 
broken feedback loop between the populations in 'donor' and recipient countries, the 
consequent weak accountability link across these institutions, and the difficulties 
related to monitoring (observing) the actions and or outputs yielded by agents. 
As of yet, these problems haven't been thoroughly assessed. There is a lack of 
empirical evidence relating the micro-institutional relationships in international aid 
organisations (Martens et al., 2002) 
and the discernment of the multiple stages of the aid delivery process and the many 
involved actors (principals and agents) with various (and often conflicting) objectives 
and constraints (Zinnes and Bolaky, 2002). 
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The application of agency theory to the area of IDAH is of particular relevance as 
health outcomes are determined within a complex scenario of uncertainties and have 
multiple determinants. These complexities increase the difficulties in monitoring and 
measurement, which instigate the use of principal-agency theory to understand the 
explicit and implicit incentive structure of the aid contract. 
3. Specify the number (with scientific justification for sample size), age, sex, source 
and method of recruiting subjects for the study. Attach a copy of any advertisement to 
be used. 
This study involves 'human subjects' only to the extent of interviewing health systems 
officials, and it will use published and unpublished literature as well as official 
documents based on data collected by others. 
4. State the likely duration of the project, and where it will be undertaken. 
Project will be undertaken in Kampala, capital city of Uganda. The envisaged duration 
is of 7 months. 
5. Specify the procedures (including interviews) involving human subjects. 
In-depth semi-structured interviews will be carried out with representatives of 
development partner agencies based in Uganda and representatives of the ministries 
of finance and health. Within the ministry of finance, there is a special unit in charge of 
the health sector. Staff from this unit will be asked to be interviewed. In the ministry' of 
health, the researcher will seek to interview staff from the following areas: policy, 
planning, evaluation, as well as from disease specific programmes (such as 
HIV/AIOS, TB, malaria and maternal health). 
In addition, consultants working for IDPs will be approached for interviews. This is 
intended as a strategy to gain views from a third party and as to improve data validity. 
However, it is recognised that it may be difficult to gain access to interview persons of 
interest in general, and particularly consultants. This is because the researcher will, in 
most cases, have to rely on the suggestions and contact details from IDPs and RGs 
who may suggest the ones with more favourable opinion of their work. To try to 
overcome this problem, the researcher will try to approach consultants who are 
participating in meetings in which the researcher is taking part as an observer. The 
researcher believes that it is important to widen the group of interviewees, and 
consultants may feel freer to speak their views, in comparison to representatives of 
IDPs or RGs who may be inclined to adhere. to the official discourse of their 
organisation. This is particularly important as we are assuming the nature of the 
contract to be implicit, which makes if difficult for others to observe the subtle forms of 
compensation and incentives. 
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As suggested by Seddon et al. (2000) the researcher will use key informants to start 
the interview series. Key informants will be selected via personal contacts established 
by the researcher during a visit in April 2002 to Kampala when she participated of in 
Joint Review Meeting (see explanation of this kind of meeting under the next method). 
A snowball approach will be used in order to identify further interviewees. In addition, 
the researcher will seek to interview at each organisation a senior and junior staff 
member. This proved to be a helpful approach in checking the statements made by 
senior staff in previous research in relation to a sensitive topic (political economy of 
tobacco control) (Seddon et al., 2000). It is recognised that senior staff is more 
inclined to offer information in line with the organisation's 'official' policy (Alien, 2000). 
However, in hierarchical organisations junior staff may not be willing or allowed to be 
interviewed without the permission of their line managers (Alien, 2000), therefore it 
may be relevant that line managers are also interviewed, or at least familiarised with 
the research being conducted. 
With respect to the method of observation, in spite of the expected difficulties to 
observe some of the meetings between IDPs and the RG, the researcher will seek to 
gain access to them. If this is not possible, the researcher will have to rely on second 
hand account (documents and interviews) of these meetings. 
6. a) State the potential hazards, and their likelihood, that research subjects may be 
exposed to (these may include physical, biological and/or psychological dangers). 
What precautions are being taken to control and modify these hazards (include 
information on hazardous substances that will be used or produced, and the steps 
being taken to reduce risks). 
No hazards foreseen in interviewing officials, observing meetings, and reviewing 
documents. 
b) I confirm that any necessary risk assessment will have been completed for all staff 
working on this project before fieldwork commences. 
................................................................... 
Please initial to confirm agreement 
Guidelines are available on the intranet at: http: //intra. Ishtm. ac. uk/safetv/osra. htm 
and the form at http: //intra. Ishtm. ac. uk/safetv/osral. doc Reference can also be. made 
to the School's Safety Manual or to a Departmental Safety Supervisor. 
7. State the procedures or activities which may cause discomfort or distress and the 
degree of discomfort or distress likely to be entailed by the subjects. 
We do not think that this project may cause any discomfort or distress to the subjects. 
8. Specify the degree of confidentiality to be maintained with respect to the data 
collected and the method of achieving this. When small numbers are involved, 
indicate how possible identification of individuals will be avoided. 
The researcher will maintain confidentiality of data and will not disclose names of 
individuals interviewed or their organisations. However, it is anticipated that it will be difficult 
to maintain. 
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confidentiality in cases of aid modes where only one IDP is providing such modality. 
In order to minimise this problem, the researcher will inform interviewees of the 
difficulty of maintaining confidentiality and offer to show relevant excerpts of the thesis 
before making it public. If the interviewee does not agree with this option, the 
researcher will ask for the interview to be 'off the records' as it may provide useful 
insights. 
9. State the personal experience of the applicant and of senior collaborators in the 
study in the field concerned, and their contribution to the study. 
The supervisor is a senior lecturer in health economics and has extensive experience 
in the field, having led various research projects since 1984. 
While the PhD student has no research field work experience yet, she has been 
involved in deskbased research activities in the last 3 years as well as teaching in two 
courses. She also has a good record of publications in international journals. Before 
joining an academic institution, the PhD student had worked in projects involving the 
National Government of Brazil and different international development partners. 
During this time she had active roles in meetings between the parties and carried out 
monitoring activities on behalf of the Brazilian Ministry of Health to local organisations. 
10. State the manner in which consent will be obtained and supply copies of the 
information sheet and consent form. Written consent is normally required wherever 
possible. Where not possible, a detailed explanation of the reasons should be given 
and a record of those agreeing kept. See Guidelines on information/consent forms: 
httr): //intra. Ishtm. ac. uk/committees/ethics/ 
Interviewees will be verbally informed that the purpose of the study is to better 
understand the principal-agent relationships between recipient governments and 
international development partners and how these are affected by different modes of 
'contract' or development assistance for health in Uganda. 
We believe that verbal consent is sufficient in the case of this project since it is 
seeking to understand the nature of the relationship between the organisations. 
Hence, interviewees will not be asked about personal affairs. The interviewees will be 
asked about their understanding of the relationship based on their official capacity. 
It is important in this research that we obtain honest information from the interviewees, 
and we believe that asking for a signed written consent form could bias the results. 
Interviewees could be put off if asked to sign and feel less willing to tell the interviewer 
information that is needed. 
11. State what medical supervision is available and its location in relation to the 
subjects. 
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No Medical supervision will be needed, as subjects will not be taking part in any 
clinical procedures. 
12. Is the study initiated/sponsored by a pharmaceutical or other industrial company? 
YES/NO 
If YES, name the company 
13. (a) Does the project involve pre-marketing use of a drug/appliance or a new use 
for a marketed product? 
YES / NO 
(b) If YES, does the company agree to abide by the guidelines on compensation of 
the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) (Clinical Trials - 
compensation for medicine-induced injury) in respect of patients? 
YES / NO 
If YES, a written statement from the company to this effect should be attached. 
(c) In a study on healthy volunteers does the company agree to abide by the current 
guidelines of the ABPI for healthy volunteers? 
YES / NO 
If YES a copy of the proposed volunteer contract should be attached. 
(d) What is the regulatory status of the drug under the Medicines Act 1968: Product 
Licence / Clinical Trial Certificate (CTC) / Clinical Trial Exemption (CTX) / Doctor or 
Dentist Exemption (DDX)? If CTC, CTX or DDX a copy of the certificate should be 
attached. 
14. Will payments be made to subjects? (These should usually not be for more than 
travelling 
expenses and/or loss of earnings) 
YES / NO 
If YES give details and justification 
15. Will the level of service or support available to study subjects be lower after the 
study than during the study? 
YES/NO 
If yes, give details and describe the steps being taken to minimize the loss in welfare 
experienced by subjects at the termination of the study. 
16. Describe the measures to be taken to communicate the results of the study to 
study subjects, their representatives, local government, national government and 
other relevant bodies who could use the results of the study to improve the lives of the 
study subjects. 
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Study results will be disseminated through publications. Many of those interviewed will 
also be invited to workshops or seminars where results can be shared or met with in 
one-to-one interviews at the end of the study. 
17. Include any other relevant information. 
18. Where the research is to take place overseas, the Principal Investigator must 
seek ethical approval, through his/her overseas collaborators, in the country(s) 
concerned. Approval will not be granted by the LSHTM Ethics Committee until this 
written approval is submitted. 
Please list the countries where research is being undertaken 
Other countries ... Uganda ....... 
UK only (Please list) .... 
Please submit formal ethical approval statement given by local committee within each 
country. If ethical approval has not yet been obtained from a local committee in the 
country, indicate to whom the proposal has been submitted and when a response is 
expected. 
The project is being submitted to the Higher Degree Research and Ethics Committee 
at the Institute of Public Health of the Makerere University in Uganda. After review by 
this committee it will be subject to review by the national body, NCST. The process is 
expected to last between 5 and 9 weeks. 
Signature of applicant 
Medically qualified YES / NO 
Other qualifications (please state) 
Ms. Valeria de Oliveira Cruz: International Relations BA (U of Brasilia, 1993); Health 
Policy, Planning and Financing MsC (U of London, 2000) 
Dr. Barbara McPake: Economics BA (U of York, 1983); PhD (U of Wales, 1993) 
Are you a member of a medical protection organisation? YES / NO 
Are you a member of any other protection organisation? YES / NO 
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Appendix 6: Information sheet provided to interviewees 
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Information Sheet 
- Study Title: Relationships in Development Partnerships: A Case Study of Uganda 
- Name of Investigators: Valeria Oliveira Cruz, Barbara McPake, Freddie Sengooba 
- Contact details: valeria. oliveira-cruz(cDlshtm. ac. uk Phone in Uganda: +256 7741 2787 
The objective of this study is to better understand the relationship between recipient 
governments (RGs) and international development partners (IDPs) in terms of how this 
relationship is affected by different modes of development assistance for health in 
Uganda [Key modes: Project, Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and General Budgetary 
Support (GBS)] and by assessing existing modes of assistance in relation to incentives 
and monitoring structures. 
This study uses qualitative methods - interviews, observation of meetings, 
documentary analysis - to understand the effects of this restructuring, specifically 
analysing alternative aid modalities in terms of incentive compatibility, rewards and 
penalties. The cooperation of the interview is instrumental for us in order to provide us 
with her/his knowledge, views and perceptions in this field. 
Taking part in the research is entirely voluntary and withdrawal possible at any time 
without having to give a reason. 
Participants that accept to be interviewed by the investigator will be asked questions 
and documentation about issues related to his / her current involvement at the 
Government or international development agency. 
The investigators named above, particularly Ms Valeria Oliveira Cruz, will be 
responsible for the confidentiality of the material (information and documentation) 
provided, its use and disposal at the end of the study. 
Should the interview take place outside of the interviewee or interviewer's office, for 
example in a cafe or restaurant, as a way of avoiding interruption during the interview, 
incurred expenses will be covered by our project. 
This study has been approved by the Ugandan National Council for Science and 
Technology, as well as by the Ethics committees of the Institute of Public Health of the 
University of Makerere and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
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Appendix 7: Further examples of the problems of lack of quantifiable 
targets and lack of verifiability 
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Areas Undertakings Means of Verification Comments by VOC 
On human Initiate the scaling up of Document detailing plan to scale This contains no (quantitative) 
resources training and improvement of up HRH production; monitoring targets. So the monitoring report 
the quality and outputs of reports on outputs of various can show a slight increase on 
health workers for the training schools (MoH, 2003b). output and this can be considered 
HSSP (MoH, 2003b). 'initiate scaling up'. 
Because DPs will have to rely on 
the production of reports for the 
monitoring of this activity there may 
be scope for shirking. 
On All districts to review the Report on District Conventions It is also questionable the extent to 
reproductive constraints in the provision summarising the district specific which a report on the conventions 
health and uptake of maternal and constraints and solutions adopted and a roll out plan are not open to 
child health services with for improving maternal and child disguising the true amount of effort 
emphasis on district specific health services (MoH, 2004a). put into the task. 
solutions which should be 
discussed and adopted at 
District Conventions (MoH, 
2004a). 
District plans to District roll out plans for EmOC 
operationalise the roll out of (MoH, 2004a). 
the EmOC services on the 
basis of the result of the 
national needs assessment 
exercise (MoH, 2004a). 
On Finalise and initiate - Finalise field implementation Another example with a poorly 
community implementation of guidelines for community 
mobilization guidelines for community dialogue: community dialogue quantifiable/ verifiable undertaking, 
dialogue, mobilisation and implementation strategy, field 
participation in health manual for implementation, also lacking evidence base of 
promotion and health facilitation manual and brochure; 
services delivery (MoH, and effectiveness. 
2003b). -Documentation of implementation 
of community dialogue in 8 
districts (reports, video) (MoH, One DP representative noted 
2003b) 
during the 2003 JRM that this 
undertaking was very broad, 
needed a clearer focus. 
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Appendix 8: Further examples of vaguely worded / easy to achieve 
undertakings 
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Areas Undertakings Comments 
On All districts to review the Begs the question as to what does roll out and scale up mean. 
reproductive constraints in the provision 
health and uptake of maternal and It is also questionable the extent to which a report on the conventions 
child health services with and a roll out plan (as per means of verification) - which will present 
emphasis on district specific progress on the achievement of these undertaking - are not open to 
solutions which should be disguising the true amount of effort put into the task. 
discussed and adopted at 
District Conventions (MoH, 
2004a). 
District plans to 
operationalise the roll out of 
the EmOC services on the 
basis of the result of the 
national needs assessment 
exercise (MoH, 2004a). 
On Finalise and initiate Another example with a poorly quantifiable /verifiable undertaking, 
Implementation of guidelines 
community for community dialogue, also lacking evidence base of effectiveness. 
mobilisation and participation 
mobilization in health promotion and 
health services delivery 
(MoH, 2003b). 
One DP representative noted during the 2003 JRM that this 
undertaking is very broad, need a clearer focus and to further develop 
existing guidelines. 
On human Minister to appoint a technical Comment by one of the DPs during the HPAC meeting of December 
resources committee to implement 2003 when undertakings that were drafted during the JRM were being 
recommendations of the finalised: "with one meeting it could be said that undertaking was 
Social Services Committee of achieved. " 
Parliament on revisiting the 
minimum entry requirements 
for entry into Health Training 
Schools (MoH, 2003b). 
Initiate the scaling up of Means of Verification for this undertaking says: "document detailing 
training and improvement of plan to scale up HRH production; monitoring reports on outputs of 
the quality and outputs of various training schools". This contains no (quantitative) targets. So 
health workers for the HSSP the monitoring report can show a slight increase on output and this 
(MoH, 2003b). can be considered 'initiate scaling up'. 
Again because DPs will have to rely on the production of reports for 
the monitoring of this activity there may be scope for shirking. 
For example one KI (KI - 3, other) said: 
"Who is challenging the fact that they were really taking place, that a 
quick and dirty presentation was made during the JRM to say what 
they did about this": 
Progress reported towards this undertaking was similarly vague. For 
instance report below says 'increasing number of tutors' but no figures 
are provided. 
Progress towards undertakings: 
- Training to increase outputs of HTIs being scaled up through: 
Improving infrastructure, Increasing number of tutors and 
Financial backup for disadvantaged Students. 
- Quality of HRH produced from HTIs being improved through: 
Tutor development, Provision of training & health learning 
materials, Support for practical fieldwork, Support to 
inspectorate activities of MoH and MoES, Reviews of the various 
curricula and Support to in-service training. (MoH, 2004a) 
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